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The obligation of the State to ensure children have access to healthcare is 
surprisingly contentious with Western capitalism demanding open markets free from 
interference. Such a view holds healthcare services as a commodity to be traded. A 
‘right’ to health is only a goal to many, not a tangible guarantee States can rationally 
be expected to ensure because of the enormous costs and the difficulties presented 
to a court in adjudicating this right. On this view it is impossible for a child to have a 
legal right to access healthcare.  
This thesis combats such arguments. The obligation of the State is discussed from 
a moral standpoint, finding that the child’s right to health must be a State and a 
global obligation in any just society. Pragmatic discussion addresses the problem of 
legalising the obligation and showing the right can be a tangible guarantee. This is 
done through two paradigms: firstly, by looking at current international law and its 
implementation; and secondly, by looking at countries with a right to healthcare in 
their written constitution and adjudication of such a right. This combats the legal 
right arguments as well as provides lessons that international law can learn from. 
This thesis contributes to discussion around the effective enforcement and 
implementation of human rights, especially economic, social and cultural rights. It 
does this by examining the scope of a child’s right to health, and arguing for a moral 
obligation for its provision, as well as more pragmatic discussion on how to enforce 
such rights and adjudicate them to make them worth more than words on paper. 
The final chapter brings together various proposals for tackling the global challenge 
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The awareness that health is dependent upon habits that we 
control makes us the first generation in history that to a large 
extent determines its own destiny. 
- Jimmy Carter 
 
Of all of the forms of inequality, injustice in health is the most 
shocking and the most inhumane.  
- Martin Luther King, Jr 
 
 
These two quotes help explain the purpose and initial motivation behind this thesis. 
There are very real problems with health and children’s access to healthcare, with 
millions of children dying needlessly every year. In highlighting this issue, this thesis 
is not unique; however, such an important topic can never be over-discussed. One 
area where this thesis does differ from more traditional discussions on health and 
child health is the focus on the world’s richest country, the United States of America. 
The initial motivation to embark on this thesis was to discuss how or why America’s 
children did not have universal access to healthcare if it was a human right? A 
logical corollary to this question was, what could be done to change this, and better 
implement and enforce international human rights law? The rationale for focusing on 
a country with such vast wealth will become clearer throughout the thesis and its 
inclusion in discussion around the poor state of children’s access to healthcare, is 
long overdue. For too long it has been assumed that only the very poorest countries 
would have such a poor state of healthcare so as to warrant academic attention. 
The poorest countries in the world are not ignored by any means, but the US is an 
obligatory, over-due addition. The quotes above also help to highlight the other 
issues raised throughout this thesis. President Carter was right that there is so 




much about health and healthcare that is within our control. Martin Luther King Jr 
was right to make health a matter of justice, and its inequalities therefore a shocking 
injustice. Combined, these help summarise the direction of this thesis; healthcare is 
within our control and is a matter of justice. As it stands, there is great inequality and 
injustice. Since it is within our control, we have a duty, both moral and legal, to 
change the current position.  
The overall aims and objectives of the research in this thesis are ambitious. These 
are to present a highly convincing moral argument for a child’s right to healthcare in 
international law, and subsequently, based on this substantial theory, justify 
stronger enforcement of the right and recommend some ways that this could be 
achieved. If it was to be broken down into a singular research question it would be: 
can we find a way to convince everyone of a child’s right to healthcare, and, if so, 
can we find ways of ensuring it through better enforcement? In addressing such 
issues this thesis adopts an interdisciplinary, traditional doctrinal approach, in order 
to overcome some of the perceived shortcomings of existing work that examines the 
issues from a single perspective. For example, if the focus is largely on the 
philosophical, the pragmatic is often over-looked. If the focus is too much on the law, 
there remains a gap in recognising the moral obligation for change, and if the focus 
is too heavy on the sociological, it remains a comment on current affairs without 
legal or philosophical support for any conclusions which may be drawn. By drawing 
conclusions from these combined perspectives, more convincing arguments can be 
made that demonstrate clear current patterns to highlight obvious injustice; prove 
there is a legal basis that can work; provide a firm philosophical basis which makes 
them morally convincing; and propose pragmatic, economic proposals, that, 
combined with the proposed legal changes, would transform the lives of millions. 
To arrive at these conclusions, the thesis is split into two parts. Part A is to explore 
the problem, therefore setting the issues in context and placing the rest of the thesis 




within the current pragmatic setting. The research questions are very much 
questions of exploration to establish the current picture, such as; Is there actually a 
problem or difficulty in children accessing healthcare across the world? Is a child’s 
right to healthcare an assured human right, and is this being implemented or 
enforced? And finally, are there comparable, domestic lessons to enforce such a 
right? In answering these questions in turn, chapter one of Part A commences by 
discussing appropriate ways to analyse healthcare systems, and then offers a brief 
overview of six selected countries and the healthcare systems and outcomes within 
them. This systemic analysis uses many readily available reports from reliable, 
influential and international NGOs, and as such the information is only interpreted 
and discussed rather than collected at source. As mentioned above, one of the key 
differences to normal analysis of this sort is the long overdue inclusion of the USA 
as a paragon of disappointment and an example of a poor healthcare system. 
In chapter two the thesis reflects on the legal framework using treaty analysis 
followed by a review of the academic comments as to what this means in practice 
when discussing the content and enforcement of the right. The chapter begins with 
a search for the right to health, and in particular a child’s right to health, within 
international law. It is well established that a child’s right to health exists in 
international law but what this means in practice is not as straightforward. The 
mechanisms of implementation, its content, and enforcement in the case of 
violations are all contentious issues discussed throughout the chapter. Regional 
human rights law is also discussed as regional institutions can prove more 
successful implementers of human rights than the United Nations and international 
law, so the reasons why that may be the case must be analysed. One of the main 
conclusions from this exercise: that Europe is considered the most successful 
implementer of human rights largely because of the compulsory jurisdiction and 
overarching adjudication of the European courts, takes discussion neatly to the next 




chapter, chapter three, in which; there is discussion of the adjudication of the right to 
health and of economic, social and cultural rights more generally. There is limited 
international scope for this so the focus for chapter three is on the developing 
countries discussed in chapter one, all of which have a right to health in their written 
constitutions. This is seen as an appropriate analogy to the codification of rights in 
the international documents considered in chapter two, and therefore can provide 
indicators of their justiciability by analysing the case law and in particular, the 
jurisprudential methods used by the judges. It will be shown how India and Brazil 
have encountered many problems with the adjudication of these rights, whereas 
South Africa has a sensible, appropriate approach, yet missed an important 
opportunity to include the expectation of a minimum core as part of its 
reasonableness analysis. It is argued that the courts can and must have a role in 
ensuring such rights are realised, and can do so without making decisions on 
matters which are usually the prerogative of a democratic government. A court’s 
check on government and the proportionality and reasonableness of its decisions is 
necessary to ensure the fulfilment of rights and does not dictate what is right for the 
government to do; only whether the government has acted so much beyond reason 
as to violate a right. 
Part B then moves on to addressing the problems raised in Part A. This raises more 
challenging research questions which are: can, even a minimal, yet strong theory of 
justice accommodate a child’s right to healthcare, so as to provide the most 
convincing arguments to those who would deny the moral obligation? Can the 
general thesis of moral obligation and stronger judicial enforcement be applied 
globally? And finally, how would this global application look in practice? In 
answering these questions, Part B begins by moving discussion away from the 
current state of affairs and searching for a moral obligation of the State to ensure at 
least a minimal access to healthcare. This is done via a critical literature review of 




political philosophy and theories of justice, in order to address issues on what 
should, ideally, be done, in order to support the argument for a paradigm shift in the 
way such rights as well as the role and obligation of the State and the global 
community are viewed. This ideal scenario finds its roots in John Rawls’ A Theory of 
Justice; the non-traditional social contract theory that accepts its’ grounding in ideal 
theory. The hypothetical original position is a valuable moral exercise by which to 
assess our world and find it lacking in many ways. The two principles of justice 
Rawls proposes are very minimal but our world would have to change drastically in 
order to fulfil them. Chapter four also undertakes the challenge of establishing that 
the principles of justice articulated by Rawls are bestowed upon children and not 
just those who are party to Rawls’ social contract. Further, it is argued here that the 
equality of opportunity principle that Rawls proposes would naturally extend to 
include a right to healthcare. Absence of healthcare means that the chances of 
recovering from ill-health are diminished. In a state of ill-health, opportunities are 
limited. Therefore a lack of access to healthcare violates the opportunity principle 
and thus must be assured in any just society. This prominent theory is also chosen 
because it is, compared to many others, a minimal theory of justice and so finding a 
child’s right to healthcare within such a theory provides even stronger support for its 
morality, and helps the argument for changing the philosophical mindset of those 
who do not see healthcare as a right, a matter of justice, or any moral obligation on 
the State or global community. 
In the next chapter, discussion then advances to the aims of the thesis and the 
search for the right to health as a matter of justice, and more importantly, global 
justice. Firstly, chapter five lays out Rawls’ global theory. This is done because 
whilst the thesis uses the domestic Theory of Justice, it rejects the international Law 
of Peoples. Accepting one part of Rawls’ theory but not accepting his own extension 
of his own work needs justification, which can be found be using the work of other 




prominent authors who argue that A Theory of Justice should be applied globally by 
its very nature. After this extension, the idea of applying a universal jurisprudence 
for enforcing such a right through the courts is undertaken. Here, lessons are taken 
from the case law discussed in chapter three, as excellent examples of adjudicating 
a constitutional, codified right to healthcare; lessons any judicial enforcement of the 
international human right to healthcare should look to learn from. This in turn, 
informs the development of a clear framework for an international court, or indeed 
any court, to follow, as adjudicating such a right is fraught with difficult challenges. 
Chapter six then takes the step of making more precise proposals for change. 
Firstly it draws on the previous argument to apply Rawls’ theory globally, which 
would in turn mean his difference principle; a principle stating that inequalities in 
wealth are only just so long as those at the minimum level are better off than they 
otherwise would have been. Developing some of the arguments previously raised, 
this thesis then proceeds with a practical economic discussion of how this is 
possible within the scope of the right to health. This part of the research draws on 
statistical analysis from readily available information and data from reliable, 
international organisations such as the World Bank. The richest countries in the 
world could afford to fund the fulfilment of a minimum core at minimal expense to 
themselves, and it is argued that as the World Bank and IMF are made up of States, 
the majority of which have ratified conventions including a child’s right to health, 
they have a legal obligation to provide such international assistance. This connects 
to the subsequent discussion about the status of international law more generally 
and its constitutional nature. As an example of codified law, international legal 
documents bear a resemblance to a written constitution and Europe once again 
provides an example by constitutionalising its law and ensuring the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect. Discussion of the emerging but as yet ill-defined area 
of global constitutionalism, aims to show that the topic should unite behind a 




definition of codified, ratified international law being constitutional in nature and 
therefore having supremacy and direct effect which can subsequently be enforced 
by an overarching world court. This therefore brings discussion to one of the last 
major proposals; a World Court of Human Rights. Such a court would have the 
authority to adjudicate on the right to health and would not be inappropriate in doing 
so as long as it used the framework proposed in chapter five. Treating international 
law like a written constitution and using the reasonableness structure proposed 
show it can be done.  
The two quotes that began the introduction can be shown to be right. Part A will 
show that there is a great injustice in meeting a child’s right to healthcare across the 
world, and part B will argue that the alleviation of this injustice is within our control. 
This thesis draws on a number of arguments previously used, but moulds them all 
together in order to reach a particular conclusion. Some proposals are no doubt 
extremely ambitious; but that does not make them wrong. In a similar way that the 
argument that human rights are a Western concept does not necessarily make them 
wrong. Change is a slow process but substantial change has never come from 
shying away and accepting the status quo. There is a moral and legal deficit; a 
moral and legal injustice in a child’s right to healthcare and this is even present 
within the borders of the richest country in the world. This alone justifies the 
approach taken in this thesis and the ideas proposed. A global solution is the only 
just way to remove the postcode lottery of a child living or dying from preventable 
diseases. The only morally just solution is to accept that this is our problem too. We 
must accept that and rise to the challenge. Or we falter like the League of Nations 
and squander the possibility of changing the world forever. We stand on the 
precipice.  
 




A federation of all humanity, together with a sufficient 
measure of social justice, to ensure health, education, and a 
rough equality of opportunity to most of the children born into 
the world, would mean such a release and increase of 
human energy as to open a new phase in human history. 
- H. G. Wells 
 
 





Exploration of the Problem 
 
The first part of this thesis sets out the current picture, and therefore the current 
problem, of a child’s right to healthcare. It seeks to do this through practical and 
theoretical means, using a multidisciplinary approach so as to address the issue 
from a variety of perspectives. It will be recalled from the introduction that in order to 
explore the problem and establish the need for such a thesis, three research 
questions were set out for Part A to allow better understanding of the difficulties 
faced, which in turns allows the proposal of solutions in Part B. As there were three 
research questions to explore the problem, Part A is divided in to three chapters, 
each with the aim of answering such questions. The first question was whether 
there really is a problem is children accessing healthcare around the world? In order 
to answer this chapter one will seek to set out the current status of children’s 
healthcare services in various countries throughout the world. The example 
countries have been chosen either because they have a constitutional right to health 
and adjudication, or because they have a long-standing, well funded healthcare 
system. All six countries looked at in detail add something unique to the overall 
lessons this thesis seeks, namely how best to use international law to ensure and 
enforce a child’s right to healthcare.  
After this analysis of children’s access to healthcare across the world, the thesis 
turns to address the problem from a rights perspective; more specifically from a 
rights theory analysis, followed by a practical discussion on the difficulties and 
challenges of enforcing children’s rights, especially through the courts. Given the 
pathway and arguments of this thesis in trying to successfully enforce such rights 
through international as well as domestic courts, it is important that such issues are 




discussed in order to explain and explore the problems faced. Chapter two 
concludes with a legal analysis of the current legal picture at international, regional 
and domestic level. Firstly it addresses the right to health in international law, 
including regional law, before discussing how effective such a right is. It explores 
this through explanation of the monitoring procedures and courts at regional level, 
seeking to establish the effect these have had on children’s healthcare services. 
 Finally, in order to answer the third question on comparable, domestic lessons, 
national examples will be analysed, most especially in those countries discussed in 
chapter one that have a right to health in their written constitution as this will serve 
as a better example for enforcement of codified international law discussed in Part B. 
The legal cases at domestic level in these countries will serve as excellent lessons, 
both positive and negative, for further discussion in Part B on how to enforce 
international law possibly through an international court. Part A focuses on exploring 
and explaining the issues with a child’s right to healthcare and seeks to do this from 
three perspectives; healthcare systems; problems of children’s rights in theory and 
practice; and then enforcement mechanisms of rights when they are established. 
After discussing these problems the thesis moves on in Part B to discussion of 
change in two key areas; our philosophical thinking (which underpins and informs 















Children’s Access to Health Care 
 
This first chapter sets the scene to better understand the status quo of healthcare 
systems around the world to help answer the first research question as to whether 
there is actually a problem in children’s access to healthcare. This places the 
succeeding chapters on the need for implementing and enforcing a child’s right to 
healthcare within the context of the current problems and locates the necessity of 
discussion on change. The importance and continuing problems with children’s 
healthcare have been well documented, so much so that The Lancet planned a 
decade for the child ending in 2015 to coincide with the millennium development 
goals target date.1  This chapter will look at the impact of this, if any, and any 
continuing problems will be highlighted in their various forms.  
The first section of this chapter looks at any progress made in recent years in 
advancing the rights of the child to healthcare, but is limited to a small snapshot in 
order to give an overall idea; it does not claim to be a thorough analysis of health 
care status around the world. In order for even this limited scrutiny to take place, 
health indicators will be used with some discussion of how these might be used to 
measure children’s healthcare with the general overarching aim of establishing a 
picture of the current situation. Indicators have been criticised as being vague and a 
possible distraction but they can also be a necessary tool in helping a country 
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analyse the effectiveness of its healthcare system.2 The subsequent brief analysis 
using some selected indicators will highlight very real problems, showing that 
discussion in this thesis and the conclusions proposed are not a purely academic 
exercise. Using these indicators will try and measure children’s healthcare in 
various countries throughout the world during the course of the chapter. The aim is 
to provide a snapshot of healthcare status in three developing countries that have a 
justiciable right to healthcare, as well as three developed countries, not ignoring, as 
many do in such analysis, the richest country in the world, the USA. This will show 
that in many different countries, in different regions, and with vastly different 
economies, children’s healthcare encounters problems. The three developing 
countries chosen are: South Africa, Brazil and India, and are selected because they 
are from different regions across the world and have an enforceable, constitutional 
right to healthcare which strongly resembles that found in international law so these 
examples are important when looking at international law, it’s implementation and 
enforcement and the comparisons that can be made to constitutional law. In 1.3, 
discussion moves to the three developed States to be looked at which are: the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Germany. These are chosen 
because they show different ways of fully implementing a child’s right to healthcare, 
with different policies and routes taken by the UK and Germany, as well as drawing 
attention to the only industrialised nation without universal healthcare coverage.3 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Comment No. 14 - the Right 
to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 2000. Vol. UN doc.E/C.12/2000/4., (hereafter 
General Comment 14) 43 (f); Van Bueren G, The International Law on the Rights of the 
Child (Kluwer Law International, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 297-298; Wolff J, The 
Human Right to Health (Amnesty International Global Ethics Series, First edn, W. W. Norton 
& Company, Inc 2012) 32. 
3
 Epstein K, 'Covering the Uninsured. Can America afford to insure everyone?' (2002) 12 
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1.1 Health Indicators 
 
 
Health indicators are useful for establishing a general trend in whether the 
measures of healthcare systems are working, but it is also important to note their 
weaknesses in being too generalised, 4  and if not generalised then requiring 
hundreds of performance measures to be collected.5 They have advantages and 
disadvantages in that they may reflect the impact of health policy and if it is working, 
but they can also become an end in themselves which can lead to a reduction in 
overall quality of care.6 The UN requires continued monitoring of health outcomes 
as part of ensuring State compliance with the right. 7  Yet simply stating that 
implementing the right includes indicators and benchmarks is part of their criticism 
for being vague. Deciding on the best indicators to use in order to determine the 
status of children’s healthcare in a given country is also a very difficult task with 
many different suggestions having been made.8 One of the first places to look is the 
United Nations and, more specifically, to the former UN Special Rapporteur on the 
right to health, Paul Hunt.9 In 2003, Hunt began to highlight the problem: 
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Medical Association Journal 1199, see especially online appendix at 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007); Hunt P, ‘The right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (2003) Economic and Social 
Council, Contract No.: E/CN.4/2003/58; Hunt P, ‘The right of everyone to enjoy the highest 
 




[T]here is no commonly agreed and consistent way of 
categorizing and labelling different types of health 
indicators . . . [which] represents a challenge to those who 
wish to introduce a simple, consistent and rational system 
for right to health indicators. . . . to begin with, special 
attention is devoted to the following categories of right to 
health indicators: structural indicators, process indicators 
and outcome indicators.10 
Because of the lack of common agreement a limited account is undertaken to 
present a general view. Structural indicators are often yes/no questions addressing 
“whether or not key structures and mechanisms that are necessary for, or conducive 
to, the realization of the right to health, are in place.”11 Process indicators look at 
specific programmes put in place to help indicate State effort. Examples include the 
proportion of skilled health personnel present at births, or women tested for HIV. 
Finally, outcome indicators “measure the impact of programmes, activities, and 
interventions on health status and related issues.”12 Child mortality is an example of 
an outcome indicator and is considered by the European Committee of Social 
Rights and others to be a good indicator of how a country’s overall health system is 
functioning. 13  So one of Hunt’s proposals is that the normal health indicators 
commonly used should be placed into these three categories in order to have some 
consistency across the literature.14 
                                                                                                                                                                    
attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (2003) United Nations General Assembly, 
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to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (2006) 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Contract No.: E/CN.4/2006/48. 
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 Hunt P, United Nations General Assembly, Contract No.: A/58/427 (n 9) 14-15. 
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 Hunt and MacNaughton (n 9) 316. 
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 Van Bueren G (n 2) 302-305; Council of Europe, Digest of the Case Law of the European 
Committee of Social Rights (2008) 82; Reinbold GW, 'Realising Young Children's Right to 
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Bangladesh and Kenya' (2014) 22 International Journal of Children's Rights 1, 6.  
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 Hunt P, United Nations General Assembly, Contract No.: A/58/427 (n 9) 15; see also 
World Health Organization, Consultation on Indicators for the Right to Health (2004). 




In another report in 2003, Hunt also explains that “[e]ach indicator will require 
disaggregation”15 to highlight any form of discrimination within the health system of 
a nation. This is the first step to the addition of new indicators.” Disaggregated 
indicators can reveal whether or not some disadvantaged individuals and 
communities are suffering from de facto discrimination.”16 So the two major points 
about health indicators Hunt proposes are setting the categories of existing 
indicators, and adding additional indicators to ensure that disaggregation, 
participation and accountability are considered. With a focus on child’s healthcare, 
individual participation in their healthcare is not an issue.17 Accountability will be 
discussed in detail in the third chapter where the justiciability of such rights and the 
ability of the courts to hold governments to account are considered. Therefore in this 
chapter, disaggregation is the only factor that needs to be added to those indicators 
commonly used. The World Health Organization (WHO) states: “By 2012, the same 
11 indicators on reproductive, maternal and child health, disaggregated for gender 
and other equity considerations, are being used”. 18  Of these, 7 directly affect 
children’s health, with 6 directly focused on healthcare and the remaining 4 more 
focused on reproductive and maternal health. So the 6 indicators pulled directly 
from the WHO which it would seem appropriate to use are: 
1. Under-five child mortality, with the proportion of newborn 
deaths19 
2. Antiretroviral (ARV) prophylaxis among HIV positive pregnant 
women to prevent HIV transmission and antiretroviral therapy for 
[pregnant] women who are treatment-eligible 
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3. Skilled attendant at birth 
4. Postnatal care for mothers and babies within two days of birth 
5. Three doses of combined diphtheria-tetanuspertussis (DTP3) 
immunization coverage (12–23 months) 
6. Antibiotic treatment for suspected pneumonia20 
 
The necessary treatments mentioned are part of what is known as the minimum 
core of the right to health.21 This means that States are under an obligation to 
ensure these immediately, and so in theory, as being part of the basic minimum, all 
the treatments should be near universal coverage which would also lead to a 
reduction in child mortality. Crucially, these indicators are very minimal and 
designed to help lower income countries realise a basic minimum of the right to 
health. Therefore, the indicators for higher income countries should be different, and 
build on these minimums, requiring more healthcare provision and better outcomes. 
Throughout the rest of this chapter information on these six areas in various 
countries across the world will be considered to see if this expectation is being met. 
The countries chosen offer a mixed sample of nations, with developing countries: 
South Africa, Brazil and India, through to developed countries: the UK, Germany, 
and the richest nation in the world, the United States. The developing countries are 
also specifically chosen because they will be used when looking at accountability 
and justiciability in chapter three as they have an established, constitutional right to 
health and offer examples of promising adjudication providing lessons for effective 
enforcement of international law. The developed countries provide examples of the 
different ways appropriate healthcare can be achieved. The exception is of course 
the United States, which is included because it serves as an example of what a rich 
country should not do, but is also undergoing some drastic changes with the 
entering into force of the Affordable Care Act. Equally, the failures of the US will 
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highlight failures of the international legal system and the somewhat hollow 
inclusion of a right to health. 
The data used is largely provided by the UN and the WHO, which in turn is largely 
compiled by the Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME), which 
itself is led by UNICEF and the WHO, and has the World Bank and the United 
Nations Population Division as full members.22 This is the reason this data is used 
instead of other possible independent research institutes that provide different 
data.23 An advantage of using this data is that it is readily available online and as it 
is compiled by international organisations there should not be any bias towards the 
State. A problem however can be accuracy, with some lack of data or data from one 
year changing in subsequent reports. Alkema and You have highlighted the drastic 
difference between country data by two different research groups, showing how the 
way in which data is collected has a considerable impact as well as the lack of 
reliable data.24 Two important points about the figures need to be highlighted; firstly 
the rates per 1,000 births have been calculated so as to remove population 
difference, and secondly, the difference between the data for 1990 and 2010 have 
been compared, so progress, or lack thereof, can be seen. The IGME has stressed 
the difficulty in obtaining exact and precise child mortality data, particularly in 
developing countries.25 It has been argued that countries need to collect this data in 
order to know whether they are fulfilling their obligations of progressive realisation.26 
It is however also accepted that in developing countries at least, the funds required 
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to collect this data may be better spent if allocated to providing the needed care.27 
Yet health measures are necessary in order to ensure countries are getting value 
for the vast sums of money they have to spend.28 Whilst acknowledging the various 
concerns with data and data collection, this chapter will still try to establish a 
reasonably accurate picture of the status of a child’s healthcare, with a caveat that it 
is fully recognised that it is not a thorough or complete analysis, but a snapshot to 
set later discussion in context.  
When discussing the developed States, their basic indicators are understandably 
superior as they also have the resources to, and do, spend substantially more on 
healthcare. There are various suggested alternative indicators which are more 
appropriate to analyse in detail for high income countries, such as the number of 
individuals or households that become impoverished by healthcare costs.29 This 
however does not take into account those who forego medical treatment because of 
the expense. The numbers who use health care services could be a fair indicator, 
however sometimes the service may not be necessary, and it has the same problem 
of those who forego necessary treatment through no fault of their own. The numbers 
who are covered and insured could be used, but this is a very simplistic measure 
that does not account for treatments that are actually covered.30 There are therefore 
many different possibilities and ideas for measuring the effectiveness of the 
healthcare system in a developed State, all of which have potential flaws and 
studying these systems becomes a very complex exercise.  Using what is termed 
‘coverage-box framework’ of healthcare for context setting, how many and which 
people are covered, what services are covered, and what health care costs are 
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covered will be assessed.31 The aim will be to provide a brief snapshot of healthcare 
in the developed regions, to illustrate different systems and methods of 
implementation of the right to health, and how countries with the resources have 
utilised them to provide excellent healthcare to all their citizens, or show how they 
have, in spite of their resources, failed spectacularly. The aim for most industrialised 
countries and indeed many low income ones as well, has been a move towards 
universal coverage, the importance of which for public health cannot be 
underestimated.32 The term universal coverage emerged as a Western European 
idea in the 20th Century where access to care became recognised as a right.33 Thus 
governments recognised their key role in ensuring this right and formed various 
ways to establish universal coverage. Despite this, many in the richest country in 
the world remain obstinately against the idea. It is now time to move on to the 
limited account of the status of healthcare systems to present a general view of very 
real problems.34 
 
  1.2 Three Developing Countries with a justiciable right to 
healthcare35   
 
 
The three countries chosen here have established a constitutional right to 
healthcare in different ways within their jurisdictions and the indicators will be 
considered to see if any improvement in child health has followed. The mortality 
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indicators, which are examples of outcome indicators, will be looked at using the 
2011 report on child mortality estimation36 and the three figures the IGME have 
compiled for all countries, as infant mortality is considered to be a very useful 
indicator. Process indicators37 suggested above by the WHO will also be looked at 
with specific programmes that indicate State effort to provide better healthcare. 
These include those highlighted in the indicators mentioned above, such as ARV 
prophylaxis and DTP3 immunization, plus vital vaccinations for children which will 
also be added. Data for these indicators is collected from ‘Countdown 2015: 
Maternal, Newborn and Child Health Data’, which measures health interventions to 
analyse achievement of the millennium development goals. These 8 well known 
goals offer unprecedented commitment by all countries to improve the well-being of 
the poorest, and of particular interest is development goal 4 which is to reduce child 
mortality by two-thirds between the years 1990 and 2015. 38  In 2013 this had 
reduced by 47%, 39  yet 1 in 5 children are still missing out on vital life-saving 
vaccinations worldwide.40 In 2012 6.6 million children under the age of five died from 
preventable diseases, with 81% of these being in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern 
Asia.41 It is estimated that 1.5 million of these deaths could be prevented if the 
routine immunizations were received.42 Of the 50 countries with the highest under-




 Process indicators are those that look at specific programmes put in place to help indicate 
state effort against a particular healthcare concern.  
38
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five mortality rate in 1990 it is suggested that only 13 were on their way to achieving 
their millennium development goals in 2010.43 
After this brief global picture, discussion now focuses on individual developing 
countries with a right to health as a justiciable right within their legal system. The 
aim of this focus is to inform arguments on the effectiveness of adjudicating ESC 
rights, as well as indicating potentially promising health care systems and steps 
these countries should take. Whilst countries generally increase their spending on 
healthcare in an effort to cover more and more people, this is very difficult in the 
poorer countries of the world. Equally it is clear that there is no one correct path 
towards universal coverage with many countries having different systems, yet a 
common denominator is increased government funding. 44  This is a problem in 
developing countries that have limited resources however, achieving human rights 
requires international cooperation which is a prominent theme frequently made 
throughout the thesis. The healthcare systems of three developing countries will 
now be discussed to see what effect, if any, their constitutional, justiciable right to 
healthcare has had.  
 
1.2.1 South Africa 
 
South Africa and Brazil have the right to healthcare written in their modern 
constitutions, and this is becoming increasingly common with 69% of written 
Constitutions now containing a right to health, 41% of which are stated as 
justiciable.45 For South Africa, this right is in Section 27 under Chapter 2 entitled ‘Bill 
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of Rights’ which “enshrines the rights of all people” in South Africa.46 Section 27 of 
the Constitution is entitled “Health care, food, water and social security” and begins 
with: 
1. Everyone has the right to have access to  
a)  health care services, including reproductive health care; . . .  
 
2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
 
3. No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.47 
 
This has been considered a justiciable right in practice as well,48 the significance of 
which will be established in chapter three, but it is clear that the Constitution 
envisages a government obligation to provide all its citizens with healthcare, 
including, and some argue especially, children.49 However this has not been the 
case with the current system in South Africa being divided between private 
insurance schemes and under-resourced public services.50 Despite only covering a 
small percentage of the population the private schemes have accounted for the 
greatest proportion of the total health expenditure in the country highlighting the 
large disparity between rich and poor in South Africa. It is well known as one of the 
most unequal societies in the world and this carries over to healthcare as the 
outcome indicators suggest. The public sector provides care for those who cannot 
afford health insurance and do not receive it through employment and this equates 
to around 80% of the population, despite representing less than half of the total 
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health expenditure in the country.51 The private sector serves the remainder of the 
population and has substantially more resources for significantly less people. The 
rates for healthcare indicators between 1990 and 2010 reduced very little. The 
under-five mortality rate reduced from 60-57 per 1,000 live births, the infant mortality 
rate dropped by 6, and the neonatal mortality rate stayed exactly the same 
according to the figures available.52 This is only a general picture and the data may 
be inaccurate, but from what information can be gathered, the general trend in child 
mortality in South Africa is disappointing, given the promising inclusion of the right to 
health care within its Constitution. 
However in some areas children’s healthcare does appear to have improved. The 
main positive has to be the prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV which 
has increased drastically in just a few short years, from 49% coverage in 2007 to 
over 95% in 2011.53  That clear steps have been taken to help this improvement 
may be directly attributable to the benefits of having a justiciable constitutional right 
to healthcare, and the decision in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign54 
forced the government to provide the drug Nevirapine to mothers giving birth in 
State facilities. In this case failure by the government to dispense the drug was 
found to be unreasonable as it was being provided for free to the State and its 
safety and effectiveness could not be legitimately questioned. Thus the government 
was ordered by the court to dispense the drug more widely than it had been. The 
importance of such treatment in South Africa is easily seen when it is highlighted 
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that “[i]n 2011, an estimated 70.4% of maternal deaths in South Africa were 
associated with HIV infection, as were half of all deaths of children younger than 5 
years.”55 There is therefore still much more that can be done, but it is clear steps in 
the right direction have been made. In 2010, the first South African national survey 
on overall mother to child transmission rate was carried out and found to be 3.5%. 
In 2011 this had already reduced to 2.7%.56 The cost of ARV treatment was then 
reduced in 2012 for the second time, having already been reduced by the 
government in 2010, making the cost 53% lower in just two years.57 It is to be 
expected that the rate of mother to child transmission should reduce even further as 
more women will be able to afford the treatment, although 15% of public healthcare 
facilities still did not offer this treatment in 2012.58 Therefore, there is still more to be 
done despite clear steps in the right direction.  
Other areas of concern in South Africa include the absence of any improvement in 
key immunisation programmes since 2010.59 Although the 2013 profile for South 
Africa suggests recent improvements, this comes after a drop in the percentage of 
immunized children, bringing the total back to what it was in 1990. This is 
disappointing, but there also may be legitimate reasons. It may be that the 
government cannot afford to increase the numbers of vaccinations, or that it has not 
been increased because something else was prioritised and a difficult resource 
choice has had to be made. The child mortality rates are also disappointing but the 
ARV prophylaxis shows how impressive progress can be made by having a right to 
                                                          
55
 Barron P, Pillay Y, Doherty T, Sherman G, Jackson D, Bhardwaj S, Robinson P, and 
Goga A, 'Eliminating mother-to-child HIV transmission in South Africa' (2013) 91 Bulletin of 
the World Health Organization 70, 70-74;  Stephen CR, Bamford LJ, Patrick ME, and 
Wittenburg DF, Saving children 2009. Five years of data. A sixth survey of child healthcare 
in South Africa (2011). 
56
 Barron P, and others, (n 55). 
57
UNAIDS, feature story; ‘South Africa’s savings in procurement of antiretroviral drugs to 
increase access to treatment for people living with HIV’ 
<http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2012/november/20121130z
atreatmentprices/> last viewed 21/09/2015. 
58
 Barron P, and others, (n 55). 
59
 Countdown to 2015 (n 53). 




healthcare enforceable against the State. This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter three. Equally promising is the ongoing change in South Africa with 
proposals for a national health insurance scheme as a step towards universal 
coverage.60 A green paper was released in 2011 on national health insurance with 
the idea to phase in various schemes over the next 14 years, requiring the richest to 
contribute more to the scheme even if they do not use it themselves. The limited 
data in South Africa combined with the fact that this will be progressively rolled out 
means the impact of this has not yet been seen, but it is a promising step no doubt 
encouraged by an enforceable, justiciable right to healthcare. This brief portrait 
using the limited data available to illustrate a general point that children’s healthcare 
in South Africa over the last 20 years or so has improved in some areas, failed to 
improve in others, and requires more analysis and data collection. 
 
  1.2.2 Brazil 
 
For Brazil the establishment of a Constitutional right to healthcare began in 1985 
when dictatorship ended, and then in 1986 the 8th National Health Conference 
declared health to be ‘the duty of the state and the right of the citizen’.61 In 1988 the 
new Brazilian Constitution established a right to health in two provisions: in Article 6 
which establishes many social rights including education and shelter; and then in 
Articles 196-200 which are specific to the right to health. Article 196 states: 
Health is a right of all and a duty of the State and shall be 
guaranteed by means of social and economic policies aimed 
at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards and at the 
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universal and equal access to actions and services for its 
promotion, protection and recovery.62 
This subsequently led to the introduction of the Sistema Único de Saúde (Unified 
Health System, known as the SUS) formed in 1990 as a “universal, publicly-funded, 
rights-based system”,63 and there can be little doubt that it has had a large impact 
on the health indicators of Brazil and has been considered an outstanding 
success.64  It can be seen that Brazil has made the most improvements of the 
developing States looked at here, more than halving all the outcome indicator rates 
since 1990. One contributing factor to this is a focus on a family health programme 
meaning that in some areas pregnant women attend 10 prenatal appointments.65 All 
the child mortality rates have more than halved in the 20 years from 1990 and the 
immunisation rates are at near universal levels.66 Despite the promising statistics 
from Brazil there is still some suggestion that there is much to be improved upon 
with Cornwall and Shankland stating:  
There is still much to be done to improve health equity. 
Significant inequalities have persisted despite improved 
access, with marked differentials in health indicators 
becoming evident when the data are disaggregated by 
gender, race, income and region. Middle-class consumption 
of private health insurance has grown hugely since the 
introduction of the SUS, with private spending rising faster 
than public spending.67 
                                                          
62
 1988 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, translation from the original, in 
Portuguese, Art. 196. (A saúde é direito de todos e dever do Estado, garantido mediante 
políticas sociais e econômicas que visem à redução do risco de doença e de outros agravos 
e ao acesso universal e igualitário às ações e serviços para sua promoção, proteção e 
recuperação); see also Prado MM, 'The Debatable Role of Courts in Brazil's Health Care 
System: Does Litigation Harm or Help?' (2013) 41 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 124, 
135 footnote 2. 
63
 Cornwall A, and Shankland A, (n 61); see also Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United 
Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva (2011) Geneva: Office of the 




 World Health Organization, ‘Flawed but fair: Brazil's health system reaches out to the poor’ 
(2008) 86 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 248, 248. 
65
 ibid, 249. 
66
 Countdown to 2015 (n53) 39; You D, Jones G, and Wardlaw T (n 22). 
67
 Cornwall and Shankland (n 61) 2175.  




So clearly the disaggregation of health indicators mentioned above becomes an 
issue for Brazil, but progress is being made as in 2000 a Constitutional Amendment 
guaranteed a rising share of government revenues to the SUS by setting minimum 
percentages the government is required to spend on health.68 Whilst there is still 
some work to be done, there can be no doubt that Brazil has made impressive steps 
on health in recent years and the SUS is the main reason. The same authors 
concede this, applauding the drastic fall in the child mortality rates and a National 
Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios) recording an 
increase in numbers recording that they had accessed health services. 69  As 
promising as this is, it will be seen later that this has come at substantial cost. Part 
of this cost is health expenditure increase which whilst necessary has been decided 
by the Courts. This has established a jurisprudence where only those fortunate 
enough to have access to the Courts receive the needed care. Therefore the 
increase in healthcare is concentrated on those who can afford to apply to the Court, 
which in turn has led to an increase in litigation and many similar cases being 
decided. This will be further discussed in chapter 3.1.2 where the strong criticisms 
and potential problems of adjudicating a right to health in such a way will be 
addressed. 
 
  1.2.3 India 
 
Unlike South Africa and Brazil, India does not have an explicit, justiciable right to 
health or healthcare in its Constitution. Article 39 (e) mentions the health of workers, 
Article 39 (f) ensures children are given the opportunity to develop in a healthy 
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manner, and Article 42 provides maternity relief,70 but there is no specific protection 
or provision of the right to healthcare. However the right to health is protected in 
India via an extension of the right to life in Article 21. The jurisprudence of this will 
be further discussed in chapter three, but I find the Article odd in that it moves from 
the right to life to then ensuring a child’s right to education in 21A.71 Article 21A is an 
amendment to the Constitution added after the Supreme Court read the right to 
education as part of the right to life. Interestingly the legislature has decided not to 
make a similar amendment with any other extensions the Court has made of the 
right to life. However, the impact of these extensions and particularly reading the 
right to health in to the right to life provided by the courts in India can be seen by 
analysing the state of children’s healthcare. 
India has a mixed system for healthcare in a way similar to South Africa and 
America, however, the State contribution has been very limited with public spending 
on healthcare persistently low.72 Equally the private sector is not large enough to 
cover the majority of the population and most Indians have no insurance and so out-
of-pocket expenditure is India is one of the highest in the world.73 It is suggested 
that only 10-15% of Indians have health insurance which is provided through 
employers or some government schemes for selected employment groups.74 This 
has led to a situation where the best possible health care is available to the few who 
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can afford it, whereas the poorest lack even basic essential services.75 The private 
sector is run by large corporations which seemingly have a monopoly on the market 
and are therefore in control of India’s healthcare system, especially given the 
absence of an effective public service.76 The cost of healthcare becomes impossible 
for many because of the unregulated private sector77 leading to a scenario where 
one stay in hospital can cost more than a year’s salary for many Indians.78 Because 
of this situation and the low spending by India’s government there have been many 
calls for India to move towards a universal healthcare system and drastically 
increase its spending, especially given its recent economic growth. 79  Some 
proposals and plans put forward will be discussed below, such as the National Rural 
Health Mission aiming to more than double government spending on healthcare,80 
but the timing of these fairly recent calls mean that their impact remains to be 
seen.81 
It is clear looking at the limited statistics available that there are many problems 
facing the state of children’s healthcare in India with commentators in The Lancet 
calling India’s outcome figures ‘unacceptably high’. 82  Some progress has been 
made with the infant and under-five mortality rate which has decreased drastically 
and nearly halved over the 20 years from 1990, and with slight improvements in the 
neonatal mortality rate.83 However only around 50% of births are attended by skilled 
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personnel, and the percentage of children inoculated against measles and DTP3 
remains less than 75%.84 Postnatal care is also stated as only 37%,85 which may be 
a contributing factor to the smaller improvement and reduction in neonatal mortality. 
In a similar way to South Africa there may be legitimate reasons for this which will 
be discussed in chapter three, but it remains clear there are still many problems. 
India also currently spends only 1.2% of its GDP on publicly funded healthcare86 
compared to Brazil’s 4.2% and South Africa’s 3.9%.87 Yet within the past decade 
there has been some promise in India with the government committing to increase 
its spending to 3% GDP over the next few years,88 and with the introduction of the 
National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in 2005, the Rashitriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojana (RSBY, National Health Insurance Programme) in 2008, and the Janani-
Shishu Suraksha Karyakram (JSSK) in 2010.89 The NHRM provides budget support 
and aims to provide affordable primary healthcare to the rural population90 and had 
the specific aim of halving infant mortality by 2012, which it did not quite achieve but 
a large reduction resulted nonetheless.91  The RSBY was aimed at giving poor 
families more access to healthcare and in 2010 more than 14 million people were 
automatically signed up as beneficiaries of this system.92 It relies on private insurers 
for fully subsidised, via general taxes, in-patient care to the poorest.93 One problem 
with such programmes that focus on helping the poor, which are found in many 
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countries including America, is identifying who is poor enough to qualify and 
ensuring they know they are eligible and therefore enrol.94 The JSSK is aimed at 
women and babies, increasing deliveries in public health institutions and also child 
immunization rates.95 These government programmes are very promising initiatives, 
the impact of which may not yet have been seen,96 especially with the limited data 
available and only providing a brief overview of some areas. The programmes are a 
clear response to the increasing politicalisation of healthcare in India which has 
been at least aided by the courts establishing a right to healthcare which will be 
further discussed in chapter three.  
 
  1.2.4 Concluding Remarks on healthcare in Developing 
Countries with a Justiciable Right to Health 
 
The outcome indicators have improved in all three countries with Brazil and India 
showing the most drastic improvements, particularly in under-five and infant 
mortality rates in India, and with Brazil more than halving all these rates over 20 
years. The reductions in South Africa are very small in comparison and 
disappointing over a 20 year period, but, whilst the rates are still high, as will be 
seen more when the developed countries are considered, overall clear 
improvements and progression can be seen.  These numbers also correlate with 
those on the Countdown to 2015 reports and the 2013 Accountability Profiles.97 The 
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correlation between these figures is promising because it may suggest more 
accurate data across the board where figures are available. 
One of the more striking things from the statistics available is what is missing. 
Where there is no information on postnatal care in South Africa or Brazil, this has to 
be a matter of concern given the importance of this health care indicator. As the 
WHO points out: 
Up to two-thirds of the 3.1 million newborn deaths that 
occurred in 2010 can be prevented if mothers and newborns 
receive known, effective interventions. A strategy that 
promotes universal access to antenatal care, skilled birth 
attendance and early postnatal care will contribute to 
sustained reduction in maternal and neonatal mortality.98 
The only statistic available shows that only 37% of births in India receive 
appropriate postnatal care, which, regardless of any improvement, is very low and 
must be seen as disappointing.99 The impact of postnatal care cannot be known in 
countries that do not measure it, with existing problems therefore remaining unseen 
and whether or not a country is reaching the recommendations of the WHO and 
UNICEF similarly unknown.  
Additionally, ARV prophylaxis has only been measured in South Africa, which 
should be commended on its drastic improvement. Antiretroviral (ARV) prophylaxis 
is necessary to prevent mother to child HIV transmission and the substantial 
improvement in this area in South Africa has made it the best throughout the 
                                                          
98
 WHO programmes, Maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health, postnatal care 
<http://origin.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/topics/newborn/postnatal_care/en/index.ht
ml>last viewed 21/09/2015, emphasis added. The quote continues “A little less than half of 
all mothers and newborns in developing countries do not receive skilled care during birth, 
and over 70% of all babies born outside the hospital do not receive any postnatal care.” 
99
 The Lancet reports 51% of women receiving any postnatal care in 2007-2008 in India, 
which means that either the number has decreased, or 14% of those women are receiving 
insufficient postnatal care; see Kumar Paul V, and others (n 52) 339. 




continent.100 This improvement is in no small part due to the justiciability of the right 
to healthcare in South Africa which will be further discussed in chapter three.101  
Skilled attendance at birth has also improved in all three countries, with South Africa 
and Brazil achieving above 90%, which is very promising. India has improved but 
still has a long way to go only reaching 52% in 2008. This is an important indicator 
for the quality of maternal and child healthcare and the variations are seen across 
other developing countries as well, ranging from below 50% in Kenya and Nigeria, 
to 88% in Vietnam.102 The quote from the WHO above,103 highlights the importance 
of this early healthcare and this low percentage increase may account for the limited 
improvement in neonatal mortality over the same 20 year period in which there was 
a much greater reduction of infant and under-five mortality rates in India. 
Finally the percentage of children receiving antibiotics in cases of suspected 
pneumonia is either very low or the data is absent, meaning this is clearly an area 
requiring improvement in all three countries. South Africa once again shows 
disappointing data collection, with the only data available being a clear decrease in 
the numbers of children being taken to an appropriate health provider when 
suspected of having contracted pneumonia. 104  This is clearly a concerning 
retrogression. Once again more substantial data collection is needed to better 
indicate the state of children’s healthcare in South Africa. Further retrogression is 
seen in India which actually shows a decrease in the percentage of children 
receiving antibiotics, whereas in Brazil the retrogression comes from ceasing to 
collect data.  
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So these process indicators show mixed results with perhaps South Africa 
appearing the best with the drastic improvement in ARV prophylaxis and improving 
the skilled attendant at birth rate. Brazil and India also improved in that indicator, yet 
for India the rate of 52% is still far too low. After these positives it is the lack of data 
that leads to mixed results. Failure to measure such important health indicators 
should be a concern. It is clear from this data that Brazil has made the most 
improvement with near universal immunization for those recommended by the WHO. 
South Africa most disappointingly has made no improvements and actually a slight 
decrease in DTP3 immunization, whereas India has made only small improvements 
with no data for Hib.105  
Overall it seems Brazil has made the most improvements over the last 20 years, 
improving all the outcome indicators, including the three mortality rates, by more 
than half, improving the skilled attendant at birth and immunization percentage to 
near universal levels. India has improved the outcome indicators with a similar 
drastic reduction to Brazil, however the skilled attendant at birth improvement is still 
far too low. South Africa has been disappointing in the mortality rates and 
immunization, yet has made vast improvements in ARV prophylaxis and skilled 
attendant at birth rates. All 3 countries need to improve and measure postnatal care 
and the numbers of children with suspected pneumonia receiving antibiotics, with 
measurement of ARV prophylaxis also being something to improve for Brazil and 
India, with no data being available. These are important statistics to miss if they are 
placed on the WHO’s health indicators list and so failure to measure them is not 
encouraging. However, overall positives can be seen in all three countries although 
more can and must be done with better data collection being vital to know exactly 
what help may be needed. It now follows to discuss the healthcare systems of three 
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developed regions to highlight two key areas: that high spending without an 
effective healthcare policy does not produce positive results; and that there must be 
a margin of appreciation in realising the right to healthcare as different systems can 
be equally effective. 
 




Typically when discussing a minimum core human right such as a child’s right to 
healthcare, developed regions are ignored because it might be presumed there is 
complete fulfilment by responsible, accountable, and powerful governments with 
extensive resources at their disposal. Given that in 2012 some 6.6 million children 
had no health insurance at all in the United States, 106  this omission seems 
unwarranted. These children are much less likely to have a regular source of 
medical care, receive necessary preventive medicine, or have seen a doctor in the 
last year and are more likely to have unmet health needs which in many cases will 
only exacerbate.107 In the United States this uninsured number is after considering 
those children covered by both private and public sector coverage programmes, 
such as the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and is of course before 
the implementation of the well documented Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
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Act of 2010, which came into force in 2014.108 The fact that the richest country in the 
world had 6.6 million children with no health insurance at all at any point in the year 
of 2012 is a justifiable reason for considering the state of children’s healthcare in 
developed countries as well as those in the less affluent parts of the world. The goal 
of developed countries should be universal coverage; stepping stones towards 
everyone having access to necessary healthcare. It will be shown that there are 
different ways this can be achieved and that the United States has done none of 
them to the extent required. 
 
  1.3.1 The United Kingdom 
 
It is expected that developed States will have much better health facilities and 
therefore health indicators than has been seen so far in the developing regions and 
this is indeed the case.109 For example in the UK the child mortality rates have all 
reduced slightly over the 20 years 1990, but even in 1990 they were all below 1%.110 
Neonatal mortality was just 3 per 1000 live births in 2010. 111  This promising 
healthcare continues with immunisation rates at above 90%,112 however it is difficult 
to comment on data in all the other areas measured above as this does not seem to 
be collected. Countdown to 2015, for example, has only focused on certain 
developing regions and their commitment to the Millennium Development Goals. 
The limited country profiles provided by the WHO however, do suggest the superior 
state of healthcare in the three developed countries selected which is to be 
expected in a country that spends so much on healthcare. A quick indicator using 
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total health expenditure113 should illustrate the difference.114 Using the OCED data 
to consider PPP, the UK spends US$3405 per capita on health, as opposed to 
South Africa’s US$ 942, Brazil’s US$1043 or India’s very disappointing US$141. 
The extra spending allows for a much stronger healthcare system and leads to 
clearly superior health outcomes. 
In the UK, coverage is universal. All those who are “ordinarily resident” are covered 
by the National Health Service (NHS) which is largely free at the point of delivery 
and covers: 
preventive services; inpatient and outpatient (ambulatory) 
hospital (specialist) care; physician (general practitioner) 
services; inpatient and outpatient drugs; dental care; mental 
health care; learning disabilities; and rehabilitation.115 
 
Most of the costs of the NHS are met through general taxation,116 accounting for 87% 
of total health expenditure, but private health insurance is also available, and “[i]n 
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2006, it covered 12 percent of the population and accounted for 1 percent of total 
health expenditure.”117  
 
  1.3.2 Germany 
 
Whilst Germany has a slightly different healthcare system to that of the UK, the 
results are very similar. The basic indicators are once again exceptional with the 
mortality rates being below 5 per 1000 live births and the immunisation also being 
near universal. 118  Again, given the money spent this should be expected with 
expenditure being US$4495 per capita.119 Both the UK and Germany are above the 
OECD average which leads to an expectation of a good healthcare system that 
provides plenty of coverage. In Germany, mandatory health insurance has been 
gradually introduced to cover different aspects of the population since Otto von 
Bismarck’s social legislation in 1883,120 but it was the Statutory Health Insurance 
Competition Strengthening Act 2007 that put in force universal mandatory 
insurance.121 All employed citizens that earn less than €53,500 per year are covered 
by the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) which is the mandatory public health 
insurance scheme, and their dependents, spouses and children, are covered free of 
charge.122 Those earning beyond this are required to attain private health insurance. 
Also known as the Bismarck model after their former Chancellor who espoused the 
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idea, it relies on funds from household premiums, payroll taxes as well as private 
providers.123 This scheme, combined with mandatory insurance has led to universal 
coverage for all permanent residents of Germany.124  
 
The SHI scheme covers about 85 percent of the population. 
Around 10 percent of the population is covered by private 
health insurance, with civil servants and the self-employed 
being the largest groups. The remaining persons, e.g., 
soldiers and policemen, fall under special regimes.125 
 
The healthcare services covered in Germany are as substantial and similar to the 
NHS. The financing comes from around 130 “sickness funds” which “are private, not 
– for – profit insurance companies that collect premiums from employees and 
employers.”126 Employees earning up to €48,600 a year contribute 8.2% of their 
annual wage to sickness funds, with the employer contributing a further 7.3%.127 To 
help those not covered by this scheme or who cannot afford the mandatory 
insurance, there has been an increase in the amount of tax-financed federal subsidy 
for “insurance extraneous benefits provided by the SHI (especially coverage of 
children). These expenses are considered to be of common interest and therefore 
are (partly) covered from general taxes.”128 It now seems appropriate to move on 
and consider the US, because it has been suggested that: 
The German experience is especially relevant to the United 
States. Coverage is provided through a large number of 
relatively small and independent plans. In this sense, the 
delivery of health care is similar to that found in the United 
States . . .129 
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However, unlike Germany, and as indicated above, this system of health care 
provision in the US led to 6.6 million children being uninsured and without any 
health coverage in 2012, which is before the Affordable Care Act 2010 came into 
force in 2014. 
 
1.3.3 The United States 
 
The basic indicators for the United States are substantially better than those seen in 
developing countries, yet perhaps surprisingly worse than those seen in the UK and 
Germany.130 The difference is not substantial, but given the large amount of money 
the US spends on health, the outcomes should be even better. The mortality rates 
are below 10 but not as good as Germany at below 5 per 1000.131 Immunisation is 
at similar levels to the UK and Germany at above 90%.132 One point to address first 
is that being without health insurance does not mean having no healthcare at all in 
the United States. This is largely because of various government programmes that 
are universal and is one of the main reasons why the statistics make US healthcare 
appear to be of a similar standard to that in the UK and Germany. The same or 
slightly lower very basic health outcomes are being achieved, even though the 
United States spends US$8508 per capita on health.133 The United States has the 
most expensive health care system in the world, 134  and also has the highest 
mortality rates in all three categories of the three developed countries discussed, 
despite spending roughly $3,500-$4,000 per capita more than Germany and roughly 
$5,000 per capita more than the UK. It is unclear exactly why the US spends so 
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much more on healthcare with studies showing it is not because of more health 
resources, more physicians, hospital beds or more expensive medical equipment,135 
but more likely the general high prices of care which have made it more and more 
unaffordable to many Americans.136 If this is considered alongside the 6.6 million 
children that had no health insurance in 2012, it seems fair to say that the United 
States does not see much return on outcome indicators for its exceptional 
spending.137 
The prevailing view in America is a priority for civil and political rights over economic, 
social and cultural rights such as healthcare. 138  In the US, healthcare is a 
commodity that can be purchased and it is not a right the State has an obligation to 
provide.139 Finding such an obligation even on a minimal theory of justice should 
help inform a different conclusion even with the minimalist and negative American 
political principles, and will be further argued at the end of this section. Offering an 
alternative, contrary approach is one of the aims of this thesis. The important pieces 
of legislation specifically relevant to the basic health indicator statistics are the 
Comprehensive Childhood Immunization Initiative Act and the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act 1993, brought in by President Bill Clinton.140 These Acts ensure 
federal purchase and universal distribution to all children of all recommended 
childhood vaccines, which will account for the high percentage of vaccinations 
despite the numbers of uninsured children. Prior to these initiatives the goal of 
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vaccinating all children at the appropriate ages was not being achieved,141 with an 
actual decrease in 1984 in the percentage of 1-4 year olds who had been 
immunised due to a decrease in federal funding and a rise in the price of 
vaccinations.142 Fortunately, this led to the two 1993 Acts.143 The second of these 
Acts created the Vaccines for Children Program (VFC) which provided funding for 
the State to purchase vaccines from manufacturers and administer them to 10.6 
million children a year for free. 144  “Within 3 years, VFC providers collectively 
vaccinated >75% of US children using a combination of VFC vaccine and vaccine 
purchased with private and other funds.”145  
These funds and programmes help with the basic health indicators that make the 
figures and statistics similar to the UK and Germany. However, the introduction of 
Medicaid and Medicare in 1965 by Lyndon B. Johnson was first designed to provide 
health coverage to the lowest income families and people with disabilities.146 The 
impact of the Medicaid legislation on children’s health can be seen in the drastic 
reduction of infant mortality in the US, from 29.2 per 1000 live births in 1950, to 10.8 
in 1984.147 
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Before more detail on the Medicaid expansion under the recent Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) is discussed, another Act passed by Bill Clinton must be considered: The 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program Act of 1997, now known as the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). 148  This was designed to “insure 
children in families with too much income to qualify for Medicaid and too little to 
afford private insurance.”149 This can account for a 4% decrease in the number of 
children with no health insurance since 1994.150 In 2008 it was estimated that 65% 
of uninsured children were eligible for CHIP or Medicaid.151  
Some of the latest figures available report that Medicaid covers over 62 million 
Americans, which includes Medicare cover, and 31 million children. “All told, 
Medicaid and the smaller Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) cover 1 in 
every 3 children.”152 It is suggested by Medicaid.gov, a federal government website, 
that, CHIP provides health coverage to nearly 8 million children and the Agency for 
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Healthcare Research and Quality stated that 39 million children are covered by both 
Medicaid and CHIP so these numbers correlate.153  
However, despite these government programmes showing that some healthcare is 
available to those without insurance, underinsurance, costs of care and fear of 
medical debt are still major problems.154 The problem of underinsurance means that 
individuals, including children on an inadequate family plan, may have to delay or 
forgo treatment because they cannot afford to pay for it out-of-pocket, and their 
insurance does not cover it, or the financial cap from the insurance is too low.155 
One report states people have had to raise their insurance deductible to $10,000 in 
order to afford any coverage at all. This means that they are expected to pay for 
anything up to $10,000 before the insurance plan pays anything for any medical 
treatment. People with high deductibles are much more likely to report that they 
have not been able to receive, or made a choice to forego, needed medical care 
because of cost.156  Out of pocket expenditure is one of the leading causes of 
healthcare poverty and the WHO advises that it should not reach above 20% of total 
health expenditure.157 In 2012 the US was at 11.1%, but this somewhat glosses 
over the problems of out of pocket expenditure the country has,158 which links to 
another, spiralling issue of the American insurance system; increasing 
homelessness due to medical bills. 
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The relationship between healthcare and homelessness is a 
vicious cycle that is difficult to break, under the current 
healthcare system. A typical scenario is a situation in which 
an individual becomes ill, cannot access necessary medical 
care, is unable to work – or fired – and consequently 
becomes unable to pay for housing. The individual is then 
forced onto the streets, where his health deteriorates.159 
A report by the Commonwealth Fund also focuses on this issue and the lack of 
equity with the American healthcare system because of an inability to pay. In the 
report, which compares 11 high income countries, America ranks last in the 
performance of its’ healthcare system. The report highlights those Americans who 
fall through the gaps in the American insurance system and states that those with 
below-average incomes were much less likely to seek necessary medical care. In 
the 2014 report, “one-third or more lower-income adults in the U.S. said they went 
without needed care because of costs in the past year.”160 
This highlights just some of the problems of the insurance system in the United 
States, leading to a large number of uninsured people who have to forgo necessary 
treatment,161 or make large sacrifices in order to do so, and this does not exempt 
children. “In a system where health services are sold for profit on the market and 
financed through private insurance and individual payments, access and availability 
of health care inevitably remain restricted to those who can pay.”162 These problems 
are before the implementation of the Affordable Care Act in 2014, the full impact of 
which remains to be seen. 
The Affordable Care Act 2010 163  is the main reason the German model was 
discussed above, because like Germany, the ACA also made health insurance 
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compulsory with a few exemptions.164 It also offers a large expansion of Medicaid, 
offering coverage to adults aged 19-64 whose incomes are at or below 138% of the 
federal poverty level.165 However, when the Supreme Court ruled that the ACA was 
constitutional,166 they unexpectedly added limitations of the ability of the Department 
of Health and Human Services to enforce it, thus the decision to opt for such 
expansion lies with individual states within the US.167 The debate around the ACA 
has unfortunately been partisan and focused on concern for providing universal 
coverage.168 Of the 50 states in the US, 19 have still opted not to expand Medicaid 
in 2016, 169  despite the large amounts of federal funding that will be granted. 
“[S]tates will receive 100% federal funding for 2014 through 2016, 95% federal 
financing in 2017, 94% federal financing in 2018, 93% federal financing in 2019, and 
90% federal financing for 2020 and subsequent years.”170 This expansion was part 
of the deal to make health insurance compulsory, as well as the offer that individual 
states can provide less comprehensive cover than the federal level to those who 
become newly eligible for Medicaid under the ACA.171 Fortunately, the states that 
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have opted for expansion go beyond this new minimum set by the ACA to 
comparable levels of coverage previously held.172 Without this expansion across the 
country, many will fall through the cracks between state coverage and being able to 
afford a private health plan, and children will suffer too. This why in 2012, 48 million 
Americans had no health insurance, and as mentioned 6.6 million of these were 
children.173 The Commonwealth Fund provides a brief overview of the impact of the 
failure to expand Medicaid in the individual states, with Texas, for example, losing 
$9.217 billion of funding available and leaving an estimated 1,046,430 people falling 
through the coverage gap.174 Thus the subsequent drops in uninsured rates differ 
greatly among states. New York and California for example, have expanded 
Medicaid and now have uninsured adult rates of 12% and 17%, compared to Florida 
and Texas with no expansion and uninsured rates of 21% and 30% respectively.175 
More than 3 million Californians have gained Medicaid coverage since 2013,176 and 
it is estimated that as of March 2016, 20 million previously uninsured people have 
gained coverage since the bill was passed in 2010.177 It remains difficult to comment 
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definitively on the impact of the bill at this early stage, 178  yet there are some 
projections that by 2017, 26 million previously uninsured people in the US will be 
covered.179 
 
 1.3.4 Concluding Remarks on Healthcare Systems in Developed 
Countries 
 
Without the expansion of Medicaid, it will remain the case in the United States that 
the highest earners of the lowest income families and those in low-middle income 
families will struggle to obtain health coverage of any kind. Even where previously 
uninsured are brought within the programme there may be those who have serious 
physical or mental health problems because their conditions went untreated for so 
long whilst they were uninsured.180 These people need coverage the most and the 
fact that the states have actively rejected such expansion is troubling, especially 
considering the money available to them. The US may pass the minimal test with 
the vaccination programmes brought in, and the fact that emergency care will 
always be available (although a large bill may be forthcoming subsequently if there 
is no insurance),181 but it cannot be contentious to expect better health outcomes 
from a country that spends $8,508 per capita compared to the $3,405 of the UK. As 
it is, the mortality rates in the US are higher than in the UK, many still have no 
health cover, and despite the Affordable Care Act, many may still fall through the 
gaps.182  
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This may not be all that surprising when it is considered that it was not until the 
middle of the twentieth century and the In re Gault 183  case that children were 
considered persons under the Fourteenth Amendment to the American 
Constitution.184 All of these changes however, may still not ensure that the $8,508 
per capita spent on health provides every child in the United States with the 
substantially more comprehensive healthcare of similar countries that spend 
significantly less, such as the UK and Germany.  
DiFlorio discusses the politics of America and why their political tradition has led to 
the current healthcare system, but in using this competitive tradition he makes the 
moral arguments that will be made in part B of this thesis: 
Premised on a commitment to the principle of equal 
opportunity, “minimum welfare” is presumably a notion 
embraced by even the American moral perspective. The 
American political tradition is one based upon competition. In 
this spirit, the principle of minimum welfare simply provides 
that each person should have a fair chance to play the game 
and to compete with others on the basis of his or her talents 
and abilities. But in order to have an equal opportunity to 
compete, a person must at least have an opportunity to 
develop his or her capabilities. Without the fulfillment of 
certain basic needs, such as food, education, and health 
care, people are prevented from developing their capabilities 
and are thus excluded from the game of competition. 
Therefore, justice requires that “basic” needs be provided to 
all so that there is equal opportunity to develop within the 
system. Clearly, the security of basic medical care, like 
public education and social security, must be accessible to 
each individual if the competition, inherent in our society, is 
to be fair and just.185 
As if to reiterate this idea, Brassington has mentioned how social contract thinking, 
the model which Rawls’ theory of justice ascribes to, played its part in the 
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development of American independence.186 Thus, it will be shown that there should 
be a clear establishment of the right to basic healthcare, even on a minimal theory 
of justice and through the scope of American political tradition. Yet it is clear that the 
language of a right to healthcare is still problematic and controversial in the United 
States, despite its international recognition.187 Equally it has been shown that this 
right is not being fulfilled in many countries in the world. Therefore this thesis must 
eventually look at how to fulfil the right and enforcement mechanisms.  These 
arguments can be seen as ways to ensure a country is fair and just. A country can 
only be considered just if it fulfils the basic obligations of a theory of justice. The aim 
of this thesis is to provide the most convincing arguments against healthcare being 
a capitalist commodity, using a theory I believe most people will find most 
convincing at its core. If this argument can be made, it may be the persuasive 
position needed to convince even the most ardent Republican of the United States 
that healthcare is a right, not a commodity. Before making this argument however, it 
is important to continue considering the current problem and position of a child’s 
right to healthcare in international law in order to establish the requirement of 
‘addressing the problem’ through different philosophical, legal and political thinking, 
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Children’s Right to Health Care  
 
2.1 Children’s Rights Theory 
 
 2.1.1 Do Children Have Rights? 
 
It is not simply enough to state that children have rights. The purpose of the 
previous chapter was to demonstrate the real problem and the futility of simply 
accepting that a written right to healthcare for children is enough of a guarantee or 
that discussion of the topic should be limited to the current legal circumstance. 
Words on paper are meaningless, as is the right itself unless the origin of the right is 
understood. This is why any thesis that does not engage with the philosophy of the 
right will be limited, and why Rawls theory is subsequently used in this thesis to tip 
the balance in favour of a minimal right to healthcare for children. Without such 
consideration, “[c]hildren’s rights is a slogan in search of a definition.”1 This now 
brings discussion to the rights of children; the theory and practice of those difficult 
rights which helps to locate this work within the scope of children’s rights literature.  
Recalling the single research question in the introduction, it was asked firstly if we 
could find a way to convince everyone of a child’s right to healthcare? This is 
because it is vital that we find a way to convince everyone that children have rights, 
and that healthcare is one of them. Arguing for the right’s of the child has two parts; 
philosophical, and legal. The philosophical debate is important to underpin any legal 
rights that may be found and convince people of their firm foundation as, without 
this, any legal rights may be unenforced and meaningless. This chapter explores 
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these two parts of children’s rights, beginning with the philosophical debate around 
whether children can even have rights at all and discussing the two competing 
theories of rights; interest and choice (or will) theory. 
In Rawls’ theory of justice, discussed later, the fact that children are not contractors, 
and that the rights that arise from the principles of justice may differ slightly, does 
not lead to any reason why the principles should not be bestowed on children. The 
main focus here is on protection and fulfilling interests, rather than autonomy or 
capacity for such interest fulfilment.2 In this way the principles can be bestowed on 
everyone as this comparison is very much an interest theory conception of rights, 
where a sufficient interest in something is the grounding and justification of a right.3 
It is important to discuss this theory to understand where the rights of the child may 
come from. Joseph Raz, the main proponent of interest theory, argues that the 
interest must be “a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a 
duty.”4 The right is established in between them as an intermediate conclusion, as 
Raz explains: “[T]he interests are part of the justification of the rights which are part 
of the justification of the duties. Rights are the intermediate conclusions in 
arguments from ultimate values to duties.”5 From this it can be seen how an interest 
moves to a right, and a right to a duty. Rights are legally protected interests that 
imply obligations on duty holders to observe them. 6  Rights are intermediate 
conclusions between interests and duties, and as such, a key point of interest 
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theory can be seen: that rights talk can take place antecedent of duties because 
they are the “reasons for the duties to which they give rise.”7 
Interest theory allows children to be rights-holders as they have clear sufficient 
interests leading to rights. So if we agree or believe that children have rights, we 
need an interest theory conception because the main alternative, choice, or will, 
theory8 focuses on the upholding of autonomy and as such does not allow room for 
younger children to be rights-holders,9 meaning it is not the appropriate conception 
to lean on for underpinning a child’s right to health. Interest and choice (will) theory, 
are the only two, main theories on what is known as the function of rights; what 
rights do for those who hold them and therefore, who can hold them. Children 
cannot have rights on choice theory because if they were to have the freedom to 
make bad choices, that would surely be detrimental to their welfare and be against 
society’s obligations towards them.10  The key to a right within choice theory is 
control and/or autonomy. Rights serve to protect a certain measure of 
freedom/control the right-holder enjoys by dint of their capacity as an active 
manager, a choosing agent, within a realm defined by the right.11 Choice theorists 
argue that people are the “active managers of their own lives even when to do so 
will work to their overall detriment”,12 thus the upholding of autonomy is central to 
the theory. Contrastingly it is argued that under the interest theory individuals 
become “passive beneficiaries of the services of others”.13  
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Yet it is argued here that interest and choice theory, despite such fundamental 
differences in the basis of a right, need not be incompatible. Interest theory could 
place autonomy as an interest, which can then put others under a duty not to 
interfere, but at the same time it can be argued that autonomy is the core and most 
important part because to have interests that are worthwhile, or ‘sufficient’, one 
must first be autonomous. Autonomy may therefore seem to supersede all other 
rights and interests. There does appear to be some circularity here and possibly an 
irresolvable intertwining between interests and autonomy. Do we have an interest in 
being autonomous because we are autonomous? Or does our autonomous nature 
make us realise that it was because people had a duty to protect our interests in the 
past that allowed us to become autonomous beings at all? Choice theorists believe 
a right only comes from having control over someone’s duty. But contrastingly it can 
be said that they have an interest in controlling someone’s duty, and so such rights 
may exist within interest theory, if this interest is seen as sufficient. Given this 
connection between interests and autonomy, a focus on protecting future autonomy 
is not as difficult for children’s rights as might be first thought because it can be said 
children have a sufficient interest in their future autonomy being protected, leading 
to clear rights and duties of others by ensuring things such as education and 
healthcare. 
Another important difference between the two theories is unwaivable rights. Choice 
theorists, as ‘active managers’, believe any rights we possess can be waived by us, 
and that if a ‘right’, such as not to be assaulted, cannot be successfully waived, it is 
not a right. As such there is no right not to be murdered, or not to be enslaved, but 
choice theorists do not therefore condone murder or enslavement (the difference 
between what is right, and a right). They argue the language must be different, and 
that something not being protected by a right, does not mean others do not have a 
duty against doing it. If this idea is brought out of moral philosophy and into 




pragmatic legal thought, then it may seem more palatable and sympathetic. Whilst 
there is no such thing as legal murder,14 where the right not to be murdered is 
waived by the victim, we (in the UK) have the right to medical treatment, but we also 
have the right to refuse medical treatment – that is to waive our right to medical 
care.15 Thus we can control our rights, or at least certain rights. Whilst appealing, 
this is not without problems in that in order to be able to control our rights, right-
holders must necessarily be fully autonomous persons. Hence the debate of 
whether children truly have rights. 
The bestowing of rights upon children is one of the major advantages of interest 
theory. Wenar has suggested that choice theory is ‘implausibly narrow’ because it 
does not give children rights as they do not have the necessary capacity to exercise 
their rights.16 He argues: 
Few would insist that it is conceptually impossible, for 
example, for children to have a right against severe abuse. . . 
The appeal of the interest theory emanates from the wide 
range of rights that it can endorse, and from the evident fact 
that having rights can make a life go better.17 
Hart, who originally propounded choice theory, subsequently changed his views on 
the concept of a right in respect of moral rights, reportedly suggesting rights “may 
be used to focus upon individuals’ needs rather than upon their possessing 
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choices.”18 This would suggest that Hart also agrees that children therefore have 
moral and legal rights for something which is ‘focused upon their needs.’ 
Choice theorists however would rebut that such non-right-holders are still afforded 
protection by non-correlative obligations, that is, obligations that are not derived 
from any right.19 Every right may inform a corresponding duty, yet not every duty 
therefore is informed by a right. Such non-correlative obligations are necessarily 
held by the autonomous right-holders. Sumner, for example, incorporates relational 
duties based on a benefit analysis into his view of choice theory, leaving us with a 
result he hopes will negate such problems: 
[A]lthough a theory of rights which adopts the choice model 
can make no sense of the rights of . . . infants or young 
children or the severely mentally handicapped, it can 
accomplish essentially the same objective by making them 
the beneficiaries of our protective duties.20 
Such protective duties may seem to make the theory more palatable. However there 
is more to the rights of children than negative duties and obligations by adults not to 
harm them. For example, protective duties make no room for the right to education 
or healthcare as these are positive, beneficial rights based on a child’s interests. 
The negative obligations and protective duties not to physically and/or actively harm 
children will not stretch to such a right as healthcare, certainly beyond a minimum.21 
In choice theory, despite these protective duties, no positive rights for children can 
exist, as no rights for children exist, which means our children enter a world where 
moral thought concerning them is that the superior autonomous human beings 
merely have an obligation not to harm them. It should perhaps go without saying 
that we as a society have problems accepting this idea. Children have rights. These 
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rights may not have always been recognised in law, such as the Roman Republic, 
yet as MacCormick states, “that only means that some or perhaps many legal 
systems have been morally deficient, which is scarcely a startling observation.”22 
MacCormick seems to propose a blend of the two theories of rights, or what Van 
Bueren has interestingly termed a test match between them;23 an interest theory 
conception for children, and accepting autonomy and a choice theory conception for 
adults.  
This difference in the grounding of rights for adults and children has a basis in 
Feinberg’s work on the right to an open future, where certain rights are held 
exclusively by adults by virtue of their autonomy and certain rights are held 
exclusively by children by virtue of their dependency and need of protection.24 The 
idea of a gradual shift from one to the other fits neatly with other established 
thoughts that one definition of rights for children will always be problematic because 
of the changing nature of childhood, which also fits with the common law idea of 
Gillick competency in the UK,25 and that a search for a definitive point at which 
competency and capacity are gained in order to allow full autonomy is a ‘search for 
the Holy Grail.’26 MacCormick does not explicitly state that this is his view, but in 
essence this is what it appears to be. 
The presumption that people are the best judges of what is 
good for them and of whether to have it or not is not and 
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should not be extended to children, certainly not to young 
children. Neither in law nor in what I take to be sound 
morality can children’s rights be regarded as carrying the 
option of waiver or enforcement by themselves or on their 
behalf.27 
Yet MacCormick finds it a “barely contestable assertion” to state that “every child 
has a right to be nurtured, cared for, and, if possible, loved, until such a time as he 
or she is capable of caring for himself or herself.” 28  Freeman attacks such 
dichotomous debate in rights theory, 29  but despite his arguments, and that of 
MacCormick, any third option proposed comes down, not to a new theory, but to a 
gradual movement from one to the other; a movement from interest theory to choice 
theory as autonomy is increased.  
One alternative rights theory that does not fit this pattern is proposed by Federle’s 
power theory, and the belief that we should reconceive children as powerful rights-
holders.30 This theory misunderstands its own fundamental starting point and fails to 
acknowledge that in order for children to become powerful, they must be given 
power. This bestowal automatically betrays the very notion of Federle’s idea as the 
establishment that can grant power, can also take it away. Merely stating that 
someone is powerful does not make it so, in fact often the reverse is true as 
Margaret Thatcher reportedly pointed out; “Being in power is like being a lady. If you 
have to remind people that you are, you aren’t.”31 Power is a very loose and difficult 
word to define and explain. Exactly why an entire group of people believe someone 
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is powerful and are willing to acknowledge that power is not easy to define or 
understand. For children, power is certainly the wrong term to use.  
Federle argues that interest theory acknowledges the powerlessness of children,32 
because the powerful decide and bestow rights based on others interests which 
undermines them. This may be true, but it is also an accurate representation and 
the only way to ensure rights for neonates and young children are guaranteed. A 
child can be said to have an interest in being heard and taken seriously; not so 
much a right to be powerful (as no-one has that right, especially based solely on 
their own interests). This substantial interest can justify a right. If Federle is right, 
she has again unintentionally admitted that grounding rights for children on interests 
may be the most accurate representation of children’s rights currently, and merely 
stating they are or should be powerful will not change anything. My own view is that 
the dichotomy of interests and choice is unavoidable in current rights theory 
discussion, even when accepting a cross over. Some rights become wedded to 
choice theory and the exercise of control/freedom as autonomy is gained, yet some 
remain firmly grounded on an interest theory conception, which remains more 
dominant even in adult life.  
The concept of unwaivable rights; rights of third party beneficiaries, under which a 
right can be held by one who will not benefit from the duty; and the issue of what a 
‘sufficient’ interest is that will ground and justify a right, all show that interest theory 
is not without clear problems. Yet protecting sufficient interests is vital for children to 
have rights, and perhaps equally vital for protecting them in order to allow them to 
become autonomous moral agents. Freeman would seem to agree: “Children have 
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interests to protect before they develop wills to assert”.33 Yet the sufficient interests 
required by interest theory will be decided by adults, for example, what interests are 
sufficient to bestow any legal and tangible rights onto a child will be decided by the 
legislature.  So even on this theory of rights it is accepted that adults decide the 
rights for children. This is the same for all theories, rights and laws, despite authors 
suggesting their approach is better for children (the capabilities approach for 
example which suggests it is far more accommodating to the rights of the child and 
those with severe disabilities than traditional social contract theories).34 They are all 
still theories written by adults which merely take children into consideration. The 
approach, reasoning and moral justification may differ, but all such ideas come 
down to adults dictating what rights they think children should have.  
 
 2.1.2 Exercising Children’s Rights in Practice 
 
After this discussion on the theory of children’s rights, the difficulties and challenges 
of realising, exercising and more specifically enforcing these rights needs to be 
considered against the wider literature to highlight the problem and also accept the 
limitations of what is discussed in this work. The importance of judicial enforcement 
for realisation of children’s rights is a well-established argument given children’s 
lack of involvement in the democratic process and therefore inability to enforce their 
rights from a counter-majoritarian perspective.35 This idea underlies the focus on the 
judicial process and importance of the adjudication of economic, social and cultural 
rights throughout this thesis, which will be discussed in extensive detail in chapter 
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three. However, some space should be given to the issues around whether such 
cases can be brought and the problems facing the legal standing of children.  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has accepted these challenges for 
children stating that their “special and dependent status creates real difficulties for 
them in pursuing remedies for breaches of their rights”.36 There are a variety of 
barriers to children accessing and utilising the legal system and initiating legal 
proceedings. A child may not have an appropriate adult to bring a case for them, or 
such an adult may not believe it is in a child’s interests to litigate.37 The difficulties of 
children employing the legal process itself, is evidenced by the lack of ESC rights 
cases that have been initiated by children. However, as Nolan suggests, whilst it is 
important not to disregard these difficulties and problems, there is no easy solution 
for all children. In a similar way to her discussion, this thesis focuses on the 
implementation, enforcement and appropriate adjudication of such rights and 
therefore it will also be assumed that these obstacles to initiating cases can be 
overcome through a variety of methods, for example, Nolan has commented that 
existing cases show this obstacle can be overcome, with NGOs that are willing to 
take up such cases providing the strongest course of action.38 
A promising example comes from the Philippines where the Supreme Court very 
quickly accepted the locus standi of minors when intergenerational justice was 
threatened.39  The minors were challenging the right to a balanced and healthy 
ecology as protected in the Philippine Constitution.40 The Court dealt briefly with the 
children’s standing to sue and quickly found “no difficulty in ruling that they can, for 
                                                          
36
 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 5 on General Measures of 
Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts 4, 42 and 44 para 6), UN 
Doc CRC/GC/2003/5 (2004) para 24. 
37
 Nolan A (n 35) 223 
38
 Nolan A (n 35) 224. 
39
 Oposa (minors) et al. v. Factoran (in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources) et al. GR No. 101083 (1993) 224 SCRA 792.  
40
 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Article 2, Section 16. 




themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a 
class suit.”41 Whilst the case led to little or no practical impact,42 opinions differ on 
the effect of the court accepting locus standi of the minors. Gatmaytan argues that 
the court did not create the precedent that has been suggested, partly because in 
the Philippines the rules on standing are less stringent, and partly because the brief 
comments made by the court amount to obiter dictum as they were not an important 
aspect of the decision.43 However, it is also argued that the intergenerational nature 
of their comments sets new precedent in applying constitutional rights to those yet 
to be born.44  The standing for future generations is not something to consider, 
however the ease with which the court categorically stated that children had 
standing to bring a class suit that would apply to them and all of their generation is 
something that any child’s rights’ advocate would support. Ensuring children have 
locus standi before a court is not simply a word or phrase that is meaningless. It is 
an action the courts can ensure. This idea, combined with Public-Interest Litigation 
could lead to many more child’s rights cases determining whether or not a 
government is ensuring its constitutional and international legal obligations. 
As children cannot effectuate their rights through the democratic process, the courts 
importance is amplified.45  However, available remedies must be accessible and 
widely published, and during any proceedings the wishes of the child must be 
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paramount.46 As a child generally cannot individually bring claims and actions must 
be done on their behalf, the importance of class actions by powerful NGOs cannot 
be over-stated. Whilst the courts are just one part of giving effect to a child’s right to 
healthcare, they are still a powerful tool. However it is important to consider other 
options as well. “[A]dvocates for children cannot rely solely on the courts to protect 
the rights of their clients.”47 This will be discussed in chapter six. Now discussion will 
move on to the implementation of current international law and the systems 
presently in place to analyse whether or not their rights can be delivered without 
court intervention. 
In particular, this chapter will now discuss if a child’s right to health might be found 
in international law. Having established the instruments which enshrine a child’s 
right to health the discourse will move onto what this means and how this translates 
in terms of enforcement and implementation. This discussion is important in order to 
demonstrate if the rights are tangible guarantees or some idealistic goals without 
any practical effort in place to achieve them.48 This debate also looks at regional 
human rights law and strategies, with particular focus on Europe, widely considered 
the most successful implementer of human rights.49   
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One of the reasons for the focus on international law rather than domestic law is the 
attempt to find external pressure and possible redress from the international 
community for any violations. As seen in the first chapter, the political internal 
measures to ensure a child’s right to healthcare are not working in many cases, 
even in the richest country in the world. International law should help ensure the 
universality of a child’s right to healthcare and the obligation of all States to ensure 
this right (as established in chapter one). Another reason for looking at human rights 
law as opposed to small projects by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is 
sustainability and the hope of long-term solutions.50 The ultimate aim of an NGO is 
to make itself redundant.51  
It will be shown that various human rights implementation mechanisms differ in their 
strategies and outcome, and that is why there is a greater focus on the 
comparatively successful European model.52 If the aim of the thesis is to conclude 
with a strategy for successful global implementation of a child’s right to healthcare, 
then it would seem that learning from the most successful regional implementer 
would be a worthwhile measure. First, the scope of the right to healthcare in 
international law will be considered.  
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2.2 International Law 
 2.2.1 Right to Health in International Law 
 
To begin this section, the question of where a right to healthcare can be found in 
international law will be addressed. This is a broad search for the right in 
international law because the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health 
is not meant to be a right exclusively for children.53 After this, discussion will move 
on to how effect is given to the right where it can be found, specifically treaties, the 
major sources of international legal authority.54 They also help to define the content 
of the right and impose duties to assure healthcare services.55 As early as July 1946, 
and implemented in 1948, the United Nations established the World Health 
Organization. The WHO constitution (1946) first formulated the concept of a right to 
health stating that: “The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is 
one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, 
religion, political belief, economic or social condition.” 56  The importance of 
establishing an international position on a right to health was even supported by 
then President of the United States Harry Truman who stated “it [is] necessary to 
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develop strong health services in every country, which must be coordinated through 
international action.”57 
Then, in 1948, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was 
drafted which states that; “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including . . . medical care”.58 
There is no further definition of this right offered in the declaration or international 
law until the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). 59  The UDHR was split into two separate covenants, one being the 
ICESCR, and the other being the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),60 adopted at the same time. Both these Covenants elaborate on 
the rights within the UDHR61 and collectively these three human rights instruments 
are known as the International Bill of Rights.62  
Absent elaboration in the UDHR, the ICESCR is the most important amongst these 
for the general right to health. Article 12 of the ICESCR is clear in making 
healthcare a human right in international law stating: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.  
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2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall 
include those necessary for:  
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of 
infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child . 
. .  
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all 
medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness.63 
Such wording clearly envisages the establishment of a system of universal 
coverage in healthcare, and 12.2(a) focuses on the importance of children’s 
healthcare. Assuring everyone can access medical services may not by itself 
appear to require the State to fund healthcare. However, part of the right to access 
medical services is that everyone must have the ability to access medical services, 
financially and geographically for example. If there is a right to healthcare then there 
must be a right to access that care, otherwise the right is purely formal and does not 
exist, or to put another way, the very concept of having a right entails access to the 
subject of the right.64 Brassington rightly states: 
There is no medical equivalent of DIY. . . . If you have a right 
to healthcare, and that healthcare requires private provision, 
and if you lack the means to buy private insurance, then 
your right turns out, at most, to have been purely formal. But 
a right that is purely formal is no such thing: for all the good 
that it will do them, we might as well tell people that they 
have a right to walk to Venus.65 
A duty is the natural correlative of a right. 66  The right of everyone to access 
healthcare, in practice, requires the State to ensure everyone can afford necessary 
care, or to make healthcare free for those who cannot afford it. The Committee on 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has also made this clear when 
interpreting Article 9 and 26(1) of the ICESCR which provide for a child’s right to 
social insurance, to include protection from unaffordable healthcare.67 Furthermore, 
all rights are under a non-discrimination principle, which includes economic status, 
and as such a solely market-based approach should be rejected and State 
assurance is necessary. 68  If health services do not consider financial barriers, 
access to such care is restricted and intentional, or unintentional, discrimination 
occurs.69 The content of the right to health is outlined even more specifically in 
General Comment 14, published by the CESCR in 2000.70 This General Comment 
also acknowledges the financial problems with a demand for “equality of opportunity 
for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health”,71 obligating the State to 
provide an immediate guarantee that there will be no discrimination in exercising the 
right to health.72 As seen in chapter one, this is not always the case and this chapter 
looks at the current measures to prevent such violation of the right to health in 
section 2.3. 
Furthermore the general right to health is found in the Declaration of Alma-Ata 
(1978) written by the International Conference on Primary Health Care. 73  The 
declaration espouses some specific health measures to be taken in achieving 
primary health care such as the importance of immunisation against major diseases 
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and prevention of ill health.74 This Declaration is mentioned in General Comment 14 
as its recommended measures forming part of the minimum core of the right to 
health.75 The declaration also highlighted the gross inequality between developed 
and developing countries which is unacceptable and called for a reduction of this 
gap (an argument further discussed in more detail in chapter six). 76  Such a 
reduction relies on international cooperation which is required in international law 
under Article 2(1) of ICESCR.77 
Implementation strategies for the ICESCR will be discussed more in 2.3 but further 
recommendations come from another important document on these rights, the 1987 
Limburg Principles78 which specifically states that States Parties use all appropriate 
measures, including judicial, to fulfil their Covenant obligations.79 These principles 
are non-binding and are designed solely for interpretative purposes. 80  The 
implementation of judicial measures referred to here will be further discussed in the 
next chapter as this seems an important part of the principles as paragraph 19 
reiterates: “States Parties shall provide for effective remedies including, where 
appropriate, judicial remedies.” 81  I contend that in being separate from the 
legislature, which can prove slow and unreliable, judicial remedies can play a vital 
role in achieving the full realisation of a child’s right to healthcare. Some argue 
further that courts have a duty to intervene where the executive and legislative 
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branches have comprehensively failed.82 It is suggested that judicial remedies are 
also part of the obligation to fulfil the right derived from General Comment 14,83 with 
paragraph 9 specifically mentioning effective judicial remedies.84 How these rights 
manifest in practice and the issues with their enforcement will be explored below. 
 2.2.2 Children’s Rights in International Law 
 
Adopting a specific human rights treaty for children began as early as 1924 with the 
adoption of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (Geneva Declaration) by the 
League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations in 1946.85 This was later 
replaced in 1959 by a second draft declaration,86 however it was not until 40 years 
later that a legally binding87 convention was established. This has its origins in 
Article 25 of the UDHR88 and the 1959 Declaration and is now the most important 
international document for children’s rights more generally: the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). 89  This convention was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1989, and took less than a year to come into force in September 1990, 
showing its popularity given the 10 years the ICESCR took. No human rights treaty 
in history has entered in to force more rapidly than the CRC, or had more 
ratifications.90 It is the most universally accepted, legally binding document in the 
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world.91 At present, only two UN member States have not ratified the CRC. South 
Sudan, the newest member State, becoming a member in July 2011, passed 
legislation in November 2013 approving ratification. On the 23rd January 2015 it 
became the 194th country to ratify the CRC.92 The nations to not yet ratify are 
Somalia and the United States; this despite the heavy involvement and influence of 
the US in the drafting of the Convention.93 The US also joined the unanimous vote 
by the General Assembly for the Convention.94 The influence of America in the early 
years post World War II, with the Marshall Plan and establishment of the United 
Nations is lamented as it no longer acts with such former maturity on the world 
stage.95 
The CRC is the first legally binding international instrument that recognises both civil 
and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. 96  The CRC 
clearly establishes a right to healthcare in Article 2497 which explicitly states the right 
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to access health care services as well as more specific measures such as reducing 
child mortality, preventive health care services, and international cooperation to aid 
developing countries achieve fulfilment of the right. 
This important, detailed article clearly explains what is expected of the State in 
fulfilling the right of the child to healthcare. It unequivocally envisages universal 
access to healthcare for children and the government’s responsibility to ensure it.98 
It is the most elaborate and specific article in international law for a right to 
healthcare.99 The indicators discussed in chapter one are clearly part of the aim to 
protect children’s health, with mortality reduction, preventive health care, and post-
natal care, being specifically mentioned in article 24, with the reference to primary 
healthcare being one of the most distinguishing factors. 100  A child’s right to 
healthcare is therefore clearly established in international law, but the important 
documents defining the right do not stop there. General Comments 14 of ICESCR101 
and 15 of the CRC,102 further define the right and its implementation strategies and 
will be discussed more in 2.3 when looking at what establishing the right to health in 
international law actually means. It has been shown that the right to health occurs in 
many international instruments, 103  showing its importance and inescapable 
establishment; it cannot be said that there is no right to health in international law. 
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2.3 Interpretation and Enforcement 
 2.3.1 International Human Rights Law 
 
As mentioned above, the most important instruments for a child’s right to healthcare 
within international human rights law are the UDHR, the ICESCR and the CRC. The 
next step is to establish what placing the right to health in these instruments means; 
whether it has been a futile exercise of merely putting words on paper, or has had a 
physical and pragmatic impact. In essence this requires a closer analysis of what 
the interpretation of the right is, what is expected, and how this is monitored and 
enforced to guarantee State compliance. It is important at the outset to note that the 
right to health is not a right to be healthy.104 It is a right that the State does what it 
can to prevent ill health arising, and in the event of ill health, put in place measures 
that will return someone to a healthy state. Such legal obligations do not arise from 
declarations however, hence the ICCPR and ICESCR,105 and a State must actively 
chose to ratify the covenant.106 There is no requirement to do so. Even if a State 
does, often they put forward reservations declaring which parts of the treaty they 
agree to be bound by as permitted by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. 107 For dualist States, the legislature must vote to make the 
covenant/convention/treaty binding upon the country, which in turn creates specific 
obligations upon the country to realise the rights within the covenant.108 For monist 
States, the only requirement is for the State to become a signatory to the convention 
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and then they are bound by it as soon as it becomes international law with the 
necessary number of ratifications. 109  This is the same for the CRC which is 
incorporated in various ways into domestic law, as equal to either the constitution, 
or ordinary legislation or in between them dependent on the country.110 For now, 
discussion examines some key aspects of interpretation of the right to health, the 
nature of progressive realisation and the specific content expected, 111  before 
discussing the enforcement strategies used to try and ensure State compliance. 
 
  2.3.1.1 Progressive Realisation 
 
One vitally important point to be made about what the right to health and healthcare 
in these international conventions means is the principle of progressive realisation. 
This is a principle to which all economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights are 
subject112  and so circumvents certain criticism directed at ESC rights that they 
violate the logical, ethical and rule of law principle ‘ought implies can’, which means 
there cannot be a right to something that cannot be done.113 Whilst resources are 
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the ‘bedrock’ of any health care system,114 “the idea of an ought or of duty indicates 
a possible action . . . This action must certainly be possible under physical 
conditions, if it is prescribed by the moral imperative ought”.115 Critics rightly point 
out the difficulty many States have to fulfil ESC rights, giving rise to questions as to 
whether they are more idealistic goals.116This proved a drafting challenge for many 
international treaties that include ESC rights and critics have wrongly suggested an 
infringement of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. 117  However, the principle of progressive 
realisation means that there is no infringement, so the criticism is not upheld: 
“[S]ince ought is usually taken to imply can, it would follow that we are under an 
obligation to satisfy only those claims that we reasonably can, given other 
obligations that we might have.”118 The CESCR accepts this, providing that the 
inability to fulfil the right straight away because of a lack of resources is satisfactory, 
yet this does not mean the right does not exist or is meaningless.119 Article 2 (1) of 
the ICESCR explains the concept of progressive realisation and the extent of 
maximum available resources.120 This allows for understanding of resource scarcity, 
but progressive steps must still be taken with a view to achieving full realisation. 
Interestingly, the CRC does not express progressive realisation in an all-
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encompassing way for ESC rights like the ICESCR does. Instead the CRC 
specifically provides for progressive realisation of two rights; education and health. 
Thus what the right to health means, what is attainable and expected, is relative.121 
This progressive realisation is viewed as a “flexible device, reflecting the realities of 
the world” 122  and the Committee, which oversees the implementation of the 
Covenant, also severely restricts any deliberately retrogressive measures. 123 
Progressive realisation therefore does not mean that States with limited resources 
have no obligations.124 Thus the criticism that ESC rights are idealistic and cannot 
be achieved is not accepted.  
Another criticism based on progressive realisation is the difference between civil 
and political rights which can be implemented immediately and universally because 
they are not resource dependent.125 Civil and political rights differ in some ways 
from ESC rights in that the latter set of rights tended to find their way into 
constitutions and conventions later. This has given rise to the terms first generation 
and second generation rights applied to civil and political and then ESC 
respectively.126 Nevertheless, it is contended here that the rights do not differ in the 
positive and negative ways some have argued.127 The first generation, civil and 
political, rights are those that should be recognised immediately and those which 
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evolved earlier, and include the right to life and fair trial. The second generation, 
ESC rights, evolved later and are less immediately realisable, particularly in 
developing States. 128  However, Van Bueren disagrees with this generational 
categorising as a historical inaccuracy because as early as 1924 with the first 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child ESC rights were recognised.129 It has also 
been suggested that positive, ESC, rights involve expenditure of public money 
whereas negative rights do not. Many authors have pointed out the fallacy of this 
argument.130 Tobin rightly points out that these rights are not implemented without 
cost and that this argument has been repeatedly discussed and defeated in the 
literature.131 He points out that the right to life requires the creation of a criminal 
justice system in order to protect individuals and hold perpetrators to account, which 
clearly involves large resources.132 Wolf makes the same point suggesting the real 
reason for the objections between them is ideological, not a practical lack of 
resources,133 and Möller points out that the example of South Africa shows that the 
trend has shifted, and rights no longer give rise to negative obligations 
exclusively.134 However there may be a reason for the vagueness of ESC rights, but 
this will addressed in the next section.  
The economic differences between developed and developing States means that 
some States will fail to realise even the minimum core of ESC rights, which Craven 
points out is an “apparent disjunction” 135 between proclaimed rights and the 
conditions required to meet them. This is why Tobin also highlights the phrase 
‘through international assistance and co-operation’ in ICESCR as designed to 
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assuage the economic differences.136 The phrase is a clear anticipation of help from 
developed States in realising the right to health in developing ones, but can equally 
raise the question of who is responsible for meeting the right.137 It is acknowledged 
that the poorest countries cannot succeed in the realisation of these rights on their 
own.138 Hammonds and Ooms argue that such assistance is legally binding on the 
high income countries that have ratified the conventions and that are also members 
of the World Bank and IMF.139 Craven argues that a focus on the international 
environment shifts the discussion away from problems of resource limitations to a 
much needed question of distribution and economic reform.140 This is all part of a 
necessary economic redistribution that will be discussed further in 6.1. 
These measures of progressive realisation and international assistance are not 
restricted to the ICESCR but also find a place in Article 24 (4) of the CRC which 
reads:  
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage 
international co-operation with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the right recognized in the 
present article. In this regard, particular account shall be 
taken of the needs of developing countries.141 
This could not be clearer in establishing the measure of progressive realisation and 
international assistance from developed States and so criticism levelled at ESC 
rights and the right to health because of resources, or lack thereof, is unfounded 
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and misconceived.142 There is a clear obligation on the world’s richest nations to 
provide funds to the poorest so as to aid them in ensuring ESC rights, including a 
child’s right to healthcare where it is afforded explicit mention. It might be thought 
that such financial help would cost far too much and be unsustainable, yet statistics 
suggest only an extra US$50 billion a year is needed to ensure a minimum standard 
of healthcare in the world’s poorest nations, which is 0.1% GDP of the 75 high 
income countries as defined by the World Bank. 143  The vast majority of these 
countries are also parties to the CRC, with the US as the only notable absentee, 
and thus they have ratified and accepted the assistance obligation clearly 
established in Article 24 (4). Craven argues that whilst the obligation is clearly 
implied to be of an external and international nature, it does not seem to have 
developed beyond participating in international humanitarian activity.144 There will 
be further discussion of economic redistribution in 6.1, showing the obligation and 
ability of the richest countries to help ensure this right, but for now discussion 
continues on what these rights in international law actually mean by looking at the 
expected content of a right to health. 
 
  2.3.1.2 Content of the Right 
 
Another concern with ESC rights and the right to health is that the “substantive 
meaning of the right to health in international law presents a significant 
challenge”.145 There have been concerns as to the interpretation of the scope and 
content of the right to health. For a child’s right to healthcare, the exceptionally 
detailed nature of Article 24 should be enough to establish at least a basic 
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understanding of what the right to health means. As mentioned, for the ICESCR, the 
Committee has seen fit to publish General Comment 14, and for the CRC it has 
published General Comment 15,146 which both focus particularly on adding detailed 
substance to the right to health, what it means, the expectations of the State, and 
the official interpretation of the Articles. 147  Much of the language of General 
Comment 14 is similar to the ICESCR but it places a greater emphasis on the 
requirement of accessibility in paragraph 12 (b) which is broken down to include 
health services being “accessible to all . . . in law and in fact” as well as “affordable 
to all . . . based on the principle of equity”.148 Indeed the right to health is broken 
down in to four principles which are essential elements of the right; availability, 
accessibility, acceptability, and quality.149 This breakdown by the CESCR assists the 
understanding of practical measures required to be taken in order to change what is 
otherwise an idealistic goal into a tangible guarantee that can be claimed by an 
individual.150 Availability requires, inter alia, access to trained medical professionals 
and essential drugs, as determined by the WHO.151 Tobin argues what the CESCR 
says about availability offers an expansive and demanding list of services, and 
therefore offers clarity to the goal of progressive realisation. 152  Accessibility is 
broken down itself in to four sub-categories: non-discrimination, physical reach, 
economic and information. Barriers to healthcare services should not be based on 
any of these things. Acceptability means healthcare must be culturally appropriate 
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and quality demands medically appropriate care without basic failures such as out 
of date drugs or treatments.153 It is argued that such content is not clear enough to 
properly monitor compliance because it remains far from precise what is expected 
of a State.154 This is a difficulty, as each State will be different, and the way any 
State implements the right must be culturally sensitive, yet there is a requirement to 
monitor progress so that compliance can be seen. Wolff acknowledges that it is 
unclear what the correct answer is, with interpretation remaining relatively and 
necessarily fluid.155  
All of these measures are subject to a State’s resources meaning that the UN 
Committees cannot mandate States to provide them; a weakness discussed more in 
the next section.156 The only measures that are not subject to a State’s limited 
resources are those which are considered part of the minimum core. These include 
essential primary care in conjunction with contemporary instruments such as the 
Alma-Ata Declaration, 157  access to health facilities, 158  essential drugs, 159  and a 
national health plan with monitoring of indicators to measure progress, 160  and 
immunisation against major infectious diseases.161 The idea of the minimum core 
was introduced in General Comment 3, but in General Comment 14 the CESCR 
provided much greater detail of what it considered were the core obligations of the 
right to health. Interestingly the minimum core is not expressly adopted in the CRC 
or by the CCRC in its General Comments.162 The CCRC, for example, has not held 
States accountable in their concluding observations for failure to immediately satisfy 
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the minimum core obligations of a child’s right to health.163 The reason why this is 
the case is unclear and it is submitted here that this may be an oversight rather than 
a deliberate retreat from the idea of a minimum core, especially given the WHO 
indicators and Millennium Development Goals discussed in the first chapter. Even 
so, if this is an oversight by the CCRC, it is disappointing and reduces the sincerity 
and determination the UN has to ensuring the minimum core as a basic level that 
should be and can be achieved in all States.  
Tobin argues the minimum core is an impractical idea as many States will not be 
able to achieve even this basic level of protection and provision, so in reality it too is 
subject to progressive realisation.164 He goes as far as to call the minimum core of 
General Comment 14 ‘unprincipled’, ‘impractical’, and ‘onerous’.165 It will be seen 
that whilst some countries will not be able to afford a basic minimum of health care 
services unaided, it is still possible, with the requirement of international cooperation 
to make this minimum core a reality that can then be built upon. Tobin is right that 
many States have not embraced the minimum core, indeed the U.S. have not 
accepted General Comment 14 at all arguing that it goes far beyond the initial 
purpose of ICESCR and international law generally because it focuses on 
individuals and not deliberations between States.166 It will be argued however that 
not embracing a minimum core concept is a missed opportunity that can be 
reversed. Tobin argues that defining a right to health requires adjudication which 
has not happened, especially at the international level,167 and yet he also argues 
this would render the minimum core an inappropriate addition as courts lack the 
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ability to interpret it. The idea of courts interpretation of the right including a 
minimum core will be argued for in the next chapter. 
Others have argued that the right to health is “plagued by paradox”168 because of 
the minimum core, with certain immediately enforceable elements of the right that 
go beyond resource constraints which would therefore seem to be contrary to the 
acceptance of progressive realisation. 169  The paradox is in having immediately 
enforceable elements of a right that is subject to progressive realisation. The 
problem is not so severe if it is accepted that such minimum standards possess the 
unique feature coined here of having the paradox of being fundamentally paramount. 
It may be a paradox, but an understandable and acceptable one nonetheless. The 
minimums are the most basic level expected; fundamental. And yet they are also of 
such vital importance; paramount. This is a paradox; but not a plague. Nor is it a 
severe problem. As Eletheriadis has argued: 
Core obligations include access to essential drugs, water 
and sanitation and the setting up a national public health 
strategy, which must exhibit care for all. These are the things 
whose lack causes not only suffering and pain but also 
humiliation and exploitation. This is why such matters are 
moral fundamentals. Other matters could perhaps be left to 
‘progressive realisation’ according to available resources.170 
It is argued that adding clear content to a right is also the only appropriate way to 
adjudicate it so that courts know exactly what had been guaranteed, although this 
itself gives rise to concerns that courts should not be involved in interpreting rights 
and delegating resources. So it seems clear from General Comment 14, focusing on 
Article 12 of the ICESCR that whatever healthcare services are being provided, they 
should be provided for all, and the vision for each of the 161 countries that have 
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ratified the ICESCR should be to eventually achieve universal coverage and access 
to healthcare services.  
 
  2.3.1.3 Monitoring Mechanisms 
 
The ICESCR entered into force with the required 35 ratifications171 and has been 
signed but not ratified by only 6 countries, including the United States.172 Ratification 
means that the CESCR will monitor the implementation of the convention in that 
country, with no mechanism for enforcing obligations under the treaties. 173 
Monitoring occurs by requiring the State parties to submit periodic reports,174 one in 
the first two years and then every five years after that, which the State itself writes 
on how the rights are being implemented. This is the same for the CRC. From this, 
the Committee submits concluding observations with concerns and 
recommendations to each State party.175 The Committee also considers shadow 
reports by NGOs, such as the WHO, which, in theory are provided without bias and 
deliver the Committee useful guidance on their goals and indicators.176 
The Committee reporting process has been criticised as often focusing on a few 
successes and avoiding any failures. Some have also criticised the heavy burden 
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the reporting process places on developing States with many reports being late, 
sometimes twelve years after they were due.177 Equally the recommendations by 
the Committee are not legally binding meaning implementation rests on the 
responsiveness and political will of the States and the idea that shame may provide 
needed pressure.178 Freeman, in the context of the CRC, points out that there are 
“no real teeth”179 in the provisions enforcing it, and suggests that if the Committee is 
to remain the fulcrum of enforcement, it should be permanent and given more 
powers.180 Reinbold argues that the ineffectiveness of the reporting process is one 
of the key factors the CRC could not ensure achievement of the millennium 
development goals.181 This ineffectiveness is one of the main reasons the idea of 
court enforcement of human rights is explored in this thesis. Examples of concluding 
observations from the CCRC to South Africa and Brazil can provide support to the 
academic criticism that there are no real teeth in the current monitoring system.  
As far back as 2000, the CCRC issued a concluding observation for South Africa 
which raised many concerns that were still present in the chapter one research 
carried out 15 years later.182 There were specific concerns over the lack of data 
collection in South Africa, which was seen in chapter one as still being a major 
problem in determining any progress in certain areas of healthcare. Concerns were 
also raised about the lack of primary and basic healthcare, with the CCRC 
requesting South Africa to focus on reducing the infant mortality rate. As seen in 
chapter one, the rate only dropped by 6 per 1,000 live births between 1990 and 
2010. Concerns were also raised over HIV/AIDS treatment, for which no 
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improvement was made until the TAC case two years later (see below). If South 
Africa had listened to the concluding observations then the case would not have 
needed to be brought. Finally, the CCRC raised concerns over South Africa’s lack of 
ratification of ICESCR and strongly urged it to ratify the convention. In another piece 
of clear evidence that the concluding observations are not especially heeded, it took 
South Africa a further 15 years to do so. Equally, South Africa’s next report to the 
CCRC was due in 2002, yet it was not submitted until 2014, demonstrating why 
more recent concluding observations cannot be considered; none exist. The 2014 
report has not yet been considered.183 
As for Brazil, a concluding observation in 2004 again expresses many concerns 
which are raised in this thesis and throughout recent academic literature showing a 
clear lack of improvement or adherence to the observations.184  Specifically, the 
CCRC expressed concerns over the large inequality in healthcare, expressing 
concerns over the rural poor and their inability to access appropriate healthcare in 
spite of a good universal system. It is important to note that these people will be 
those least likely to be able to access the courts, which is a large contributing factor 
to such inequality. Equally, the CCRC expressed concerns on the lack of 
information on budget allocations and lack of consideration of the most vulnerable. 
These two concerns, inequality and budget allocations, are still the main 
problematic areas for healthcare in Brazil. 
These concluding observations serve as evidence of the lack of teeth that the 
current reporting procedure has which is why many authors and this thesis search 
for different ideas as to how to monitor and implement human rights. For instance 
Buergenthal suggests that the 6 reporting Committees should be replaced by 2 that 
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focus on all the human rights treaties; one which focuses on State reports, whilst the 
other focuses on individual and inter-State complaints.185 
That ESC rights lack “appropriate enforcement mechanisms at the international 
level”186 has been admitted by Navi Pillay herself, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, yet she suggests the optional protocol to the ICESCR will address 
this. Individual communications were omitted to begin with because it was believed 
that ESC rights would be inappropriate for such a complaints procedure, in a similar 
belief against the justiciability of ESC rights, 187  countered in the next chapter. 
Individual communications from citizens of State parties to the ICESCR may also 
now be considered due to an Optional Protocol of 2013. However it took four years 
for this protocol to enter into force with the required 10 State parties and it still only 
has 21 parties, the last being San Marino in August 2015.188 Unfortunately, despite 
now entering into force, individual communications can still only be heard from 
citizens of the States that have ratified the optional protocol.  
Another mechanism used by the Committee to aid States in implementing rights and 
provide a gentle form of enforcement is the publication of General Comments which 
interpret the rights and provisions of the ICESCR so that States know what is 
expected of them. Making State obligations clear makes violations much easier to 
establish and can help people be more assured in what their rights actually mean 
such as the requirement of immunisation and a focus on primary health care.189 The 
implementation of the CRC is similar to that of the ICESCR, being overseen by a 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CCRC) which consists of a panel of 18 
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experts elected after nomination from State Parties for a term of 4 years. Again 
reports are required from State parties in the first two years after ratification and 
then every five years after that, before the CCRC prepares its concluding 
observation and recommendations for each State party.190 The CRC also has an 
optional protocol, its third, which will allow children to make direct complaints to the 
Committee. This opened for signature in February 2012, and entered into force on 
14th April 2014, 3 months after Costa Rica became the 10th country to ratify it.191 
Only 14 countries as of November 2014 have ratified the third optional protocol, 
including Germany. The CCRC can also use data from NGOs and add that to its 
comments as well as petition the UN to undertake studies on certain issues if it feels 
it is appropriate.192 However, the main advantage and difference of the CRC over 
the ICESCR and its Committees, is the CRC’s near universal ratification mentioned 
above. Despite this, the recommendations of the Committee are insufficient to 
improve a child’s right to health.193 
All of the UN Committees are non-judicial bodies with clear limits to their jurisdiction. 
They work with other bodies of the UN, particularly the Economic and Social Council 
and the General Assembly, which may result in technical assistance being provided 
to certain countries based on their reports.194 The popularity of the CRC has led to 
the CCRC requesting more meetings to discuss the reports, and also “[u]nlike other 
reporting systems . . . the [CCRC] requires that governments publish the reports 
within their jurisdiction and disseminate the observations of the Committee.”195 The 
reporting system however has been criticised as weak because there is little that 
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can be done should a State choose to ignore the concluding observations with few 
legal sanctions to compel States to realise their human rights obligations.196 Indeed 
it is widely seen as one of the weakest forms of enforcement197 and it can be argued 
that this has led to the lackadaisical attitude of many countries towards the reporting 
process.198 The Convention does not state any consequences for failure to report or 
non-compliance with the Convention, and as such it has been suggested that the 
rights are more idealistic goals and aspirations than tangible guarantees with legal 
effect.199 This is why discussion will move to a focus on domestic enforcement in the 
next chapters, so as to transform these lofty ideas into a practical reality. 200 
Additionally, the rights cannot actually be demanded in a powerful way and the 
influence of human rights on State action is not very extensive because there is no 
institution set-up to claim the rights on behalf of a particular child.201 This will be 
further discussed in the forthcoming chapters where the prospect of claiming such 
rights through the courts is discussed in chapter three and globalising this idea is 
analysed in Part B. Contrastingly, the report mechanism has equally been 
suggested to be a positive exercise that leads to open dialogue and inclusiveness 
that can be a honest appraisal of rights fulfilment and “identify technical or 
vocational assistance the State may require in fulfilling its obligations.”202 However 
reports are often late and without any sanctions, preventing them from functioning 
as enforcement measures.203 
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Thus one of the main problems of international human rights law has been 
highlighted; enforcement, or lack thereof. The formal acknowledgement of a child’s 
right to healthcare is promising but is far from a guarantee of promotion and 
implementation. As it is, the reporting system cannot offer this guarantee and the 
promise of the near universal ratification of the CRC may be meaningless. Tomás 
argues that without better enforcement for guaranteeing the CRC, it is quite possible 
that in a decade it will still only be the most ratified international document without 
the universally recognised rights being put into practice.204 Freeman suggests that 
the “model of the European Convention on Human Rights is instructive. The sight of 
children hauling their own States before an international court would be particularly 
gratifying.”205 Thus it seems that lessons can be learned from regional systems 
which are now clearly part of human rights protection and may provide better 
implementation strategies for a child’s right to healthcare. 
 
 
 2.4 Regional Variations 
 
In addition to these international documents recognising the universal right to health 
there are regional agreements, charters and conventions that have similar 
objectives.206 In Europe Article 11 of the European Social Charter207 recognises the 
right to health, although this is more shaped towards creating a healthy environment 
and eliminating the causes of ill health. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
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European Union (2000) also includes the right to health care in Article 35.208 Article 
16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights also recognises the right to 
health. In similar language to the UN documents and it declares a right of every 
individual to the “best attainable state of physical and mental health.”209 Also the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) includes a long and 
very detailed article on the right to health and health services in Article 14, firstly 
using ‘best attainable’ language, and then, in section 2 listing specific measures for 
which the full implementation should be pursued.210 In the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man mentions a 
right to medical care in Article 11. 211  The Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Protocol of San Salvador),212 places the right to health in Article 10 using similar 
words to those found in Article 12 of the ICESCR and Article 24 of the CRC. The 
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Protocol seeks to ensure everyone the right to health and includes specific health 
benefits such as “[u]niversal immunization against the principle infectious 
diseases.”213  
It seems clear that regional human rights organisations have also tried to confer a 
right to healthcare through various charters and protocols. Some instruments differ 
in clarity and specificity, and some differ in legitimacy and in their legally binding 
nature. Thus the next stage is to set out what this established right actually means 
to the children who are intended to benefit from it. As chapter one established that 
the right is not being fulfilled in many places, searching for a remedy for such 
violations in international law is the aim of the remainder of this thesis. Firstly 
discussion must focus on the current strategies in place to give effect to the rights 
indicated above. Some work; some do not; and lessons can be taken from some of 
the successful systems. 
  
 
 2.4.1 Regional human rights law 
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  2.4.1.1 Organization of American States 
 
The Organization of American States (OAS) is the oldest regional inter-
governmental body in the world,214 existing in different formats since the 19th century, 
but this does not mean it is the most advanced or successful in implementing 
human rights. As mentioned above, the right to health is found in the American 
Declaration and the Protocol of San Salvador. The declaration applies to all member 
States of the OAS, however it is not legally binding. Initially there was also no 
monitoring or implementation procedure, until the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights was established in 1959.  The Protocol of San Salvador is an 
optional protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, which established 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.215 It has been suggested that the Court’s 
possibility of having a more advisory role in interpreting the Convention could 
improve upon the European Court procedures.216 However one major criticism and 
difference from Europe in the OAS system is that upon ratification of the Convention 
countries choose whether to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly in the 
Convention the right to health is also not mentioned although children are given 
specific mention with their own article guaranteeing their protection.217 Under the 
Protocol of San Salvador it seems that the right to health is brought within the ambit 
of the Court for those countries that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction and 
ratified the Protocol, but cases are only brought before the court by the Commission 
or by contracting States, and, as it is, very few contentious cases have been 
heard.218 This has the potential to develop, and it will be interesting to see a case 
adjudicating the right to health. At present it is the Commission that is the main 
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monitoring body of the OAS. The Commission acts slightly differently to its UN 
counterparts, with on-site visits, active investigations and reports, and the mandate 
to investigate all members of the OAS, regardless of ratification of the convention 
thus making its reporting process much more substantial. Also the Court can 
consider cases from States which accept its jurisdiction.219 Thus different States 
within the OAS are subject to different monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
with the reports and investigations of the Commission being the most common. 
Whilst these reports are more substantial than those of the UN Committees, and all 
members are potentially investigated, the OAS faces the same problem of hoping 
that the publicity and embarrassing nature of a negative report will be enough to 
persuade a State to change. 
 
  2.4.1.2 African Union 
 
The African Union, formerly the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),220 is much 
more similar to the UN Committees in its monitoring of human rights. The OAU had 
a doctrine of non-interference221 which became embarrassing for African nations 
given the atrocities that were occurring and frequently being ignored, and therefore 
the African Union has at least tried to be more aggressive with potential for real 
enforcement and even potential to intervene unilaterally to prevent war crimes.222 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established in 1987 
and receives reports from contracting parties to the African Charter every two 
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years.223 The OAU then adopted the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
in 1999 becoming the first regional binding document specifically on the rights of the 
child.224 All but 13 member States have ratified this Charter with only 4 neglecting to 
sign or ratifying it.225 A Committee of Experts monitors the rights in the Charter 
which can receive individual complaints or communications from any person, group 
or NGO recognised by the Union, meaning, promisingly, there is no victim 
requirement.226 This has led to cases being brought by individuals and NGOs for 
violations of various rights and law in general.227  Aside from this, the reporting 
mechanism is very similar to that seen in the UN, however a Protocol to the African 
Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1998) created a court whose jurisdiction “shall extend to all cases and disputes 
submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this 
Protocol, and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States 
concerned.”228 Twenty-six States now recognise the jurisdiction of the court with 
cases being brought by the Commission or States. The States themselves can 
decide if NGOs and individuals are allowed to bring cases to the court, with only five 
doing so so far. 229  The court’s decision is final and binding, and appropriate 
measures of redress such as compensation or orders to adopt certain provisional 
measures can be ordered. 230  This again has the potential to be a powerful 
enforcement mechanism of human rights that is not yet being fully realised. The 
African Union is too similar to the OAU it replaced in maintaining the doctrine of 
                                                          
223
 Smith RKM (n 49) 143; Murray R (n 220).  
224
 Van Bueren G (n 2) 22. 
225
 <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/child/ratification/> last viewed 02/09/2015. 
226
 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) Article 44 (1); Murray R (n 
220) 194. 
227
 Murray R (n 220) 199; see also for example Amnesty International case, Annette 
Pagnoulle [of Amnesty International] (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) vs. Cameroon. 
(African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 39/90, 1997). 
228
 Organisation Of African Unity, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights  (1998) 
Article 3. 
229
 Smith RKM (n 49) 144. 
230
 ibid. 




non-interference.231 The reporting system is weak, with the work of the Commission 
being called pathetic by some.232 Murray however criticises this and the space given 
in international law textbooks to the work of the Commission because it serves to 
feed a stereotype of poor human rights implementation.233 The Commission is very 
open in its participation and whilst Murray is right that it has found violations in many 
areas and commented on them, this has not led to drastic human rights 
implementation. Indeed the Commission has not found violations in many cases 
where it would seem obvious, and the naivety in accepting government’s responses 
is worrying.234 In some cases it has taken eight years for the Commission to reach 
decisions because of its determination to hear from governments.235 However, the 
court system has potential not yet realised. There is no criminal jurisdiction which 
has caused many problems for leaders accused of war crimes where the courts 
have refused to hear a case because of a lack of jurisdiction.236 However more 
countries could grant individual access to the court as well as for NGOs which could 
make a real difference if better enforcement mechanisms are put in place as well.237 
 
    2.4.1.3 Europe 
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Europe is widely considered as the most successful implementer of human rights.238 
It is different in its legal system to both domestic and traditional international law and 
has been compared to a constitutionalised system of government. 239  This 
comparison becomes important when discussing ways to think about international 
human rights in chapter six. As mentioned above, the right to health in Europe is 
only present in the European Social Charter and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union,240 which stem from the two separate bodies in Europe. The 
European Social Charter comes from the Council of Europe, the same body that 
established the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Social Charter is 
considered a complement to the Convention.241 The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
is part of the European Union. In discussing the complexity of Europe, firstly the 
Council of Europe will be addressed with the way it implements human rights. 
Secondly the European Union will be considered with its complex legal structure 
before finally analysing the interaction between the two separate institutions within 
Europe that help protect human rights. Each body is considered in turn. 
   2.4.1.3.1 Council of Europe 
 
The Council of Europe, founded in 1949, wrote the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), which entered into force in 1953, and was the first international 
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agreement to give human rights enforcement machinery. 242  It established the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which, along with the now defunct 
European Commission of Human Rights, has created detailed jurisprudence on 
rights and led to enforcement of human rights within the member States to the 
Council of Europe. The Court has sought to ensure that the Convention has real 
force and real impact: “The Court recalls that the Convention is intended to 
guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and 
effective”.243 As regards children, the Convention refers to “everyone” and children 
have successfully brought cases to the court.244 However, the ECHR only enshrines 
civil and political rights offering no protection for ESC rights.245 The right to health is 
in the European Social Charter and is therefore non-justiciable. It is monitored and 
enforced by a reporting mechanism and conclusions delivered by the European 
Committee of Social Rights. 246  The Charter is not binding and therefore is not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR.247  Every year State parties submit a report 
to the European Committee of Social Rights which then publishes its conclusions. 
Under an optional protocol248 to the European Social Charter, various NGOs are 
now able to submit complaints to the Committee, if the State has agreed and ratified 
the protocol, however only 15 of the possible 47 States have agreed to this with the 
                                                          
242
 Van Bueren G (n 2) 22. 
243
 Artico v Italy (1980) ECHR 6694/74, para 33. 
244
 See Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) ECHR 5856/72 where a 15 year old successfully 
challenged birching as a punishment as it breached his Article 3 rights; see also Nielson v 
Denmark (1988) ECHR 10929/84 where a 12 year old sought to find a breach of his Article 5 
rights when his mother requested his hospitalisation. The Court agreed that Article 5 applied 
to minors but found no violation in this instance as hospitalisation was a responsible 
exercise of parental rights. 
245
 Warbrick C, 'Economic and Social Interests and the European Convention on Human 
Rights' in Baderin M, and McCorquodale, R. (ed), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 
Action (Oxford University Press 2007) 241. 
246
 da Costa Leite Borges D (n 56) 340. 
247
 ibid 339. 
248
 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a 
System of Collective Complaints ETS No. 158 (1998). 




UK and Germany being notable absentees.249 There remains no mechanism for 
individual complaints.250 The European Committee of Social Rights has interpreted 
the Social Charter and Article 11, the right to the protection of health, to clearly 
envision a healthcare system that is accessible to all without any discrimination.251 
The Social Charter does make more specific reference to children, but focuses on 
hazards they are exposed to and work rights, rather than any detailed minimum of 
child health provision.252  
However, it is frequently suggested that the human rights enforcement of the 
Council of Europe and the Court has been, or at least is now, a resounding 
success.253 This is because the members of the Council of Europe are leaders of 
governments that have agreed to be bound by the jurisdiction of the Court, thus 
giving effect to judgments and negating the problem experienced in other systems 
where there is a lack of political will. In order to be a member of the Council of 
Europe a State must ratify the ECHR and ergo accept the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, 
which is one of the main reasons for such effective implementation and 
enforcement:254 “Compulsory jurisdiction of human rights courts, in the strong sense 
as a condition of membership, remains limited to the [European Court of Human 
Rights] ECtHR.”255 This compulsory jurisdiction was established with Protocol 11 to 
the Convention which all 47 members have ratified, which also allowed individual 
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complaints straight to the Court.256 This has been argued to be very effective, even 
in relation to children’s rights, where children have fully utilised the right of individual 
petition.257 The consistent case law and active powers of the Court serve as an 
excellent example for human rights enforcement for the rest of the world, even 
though different countries receive the decisions in different ways as the Convention 
does not require national courts be bound by its rulings.258 In Germany for example, 
any decision is given the status of ordinary law, and sits below the Constitution as 
an interpreting tool.259 Ordinary courts are obligated to apply the decisions however. 
In the UK, the decisions are not directly legally binding but are given effect by the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The UK Supreme Court should take in to account the 
decisions of the ECtHR, but on rare occasions it is open for it to not follow 
Strasbourg.260 This is the same situation as for international law with the level of 
incorporation dependent upon the State.261 This has led some to suggest that in 
actual fact the enforcement mechanisms of the EU legal order are stronger than 
under the Convention, because of the primacy of EU law accepted by all member 
States as opposed to not all accepting the supremacy of the Convention. The 
Convention, unlike a State or the EU, is not its own self-contained legal order which 
can enforce its own laws. 262  Additionally, despite the success of human rights 
enforcement of the Council of Europe there is still no hard enforcement of ESC 
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rights. The ECtHR has not, for example, favoured a general right to medical 
treatment, merely sticking to suggestions that it becomes a consideration as part of 
other rights such as to prevent discrimination or inhuman, degrading treatment.263 
Indeed in Powell264 it was specifically stated that health care policy may engage the 
positive elements of the right to life, but then the Court deliberately restricted itself 
from going further leaving the right to health elements of the convention very limited. 
The Charters go some way to addressing the issue but they do not possess the 
“strong implementation mechanisms which characterize the European 
Convention.”265 The reporting system is generally considered weak in universal and 
regional systems, because it is dependent on State compliance,266 and there is little 
that can be done to States that choose not to comply except a few minor 
deterrents.267  
   2.4.1.3.2 European Union 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is to be applied by member States and 
institutions of the European Union when they are applying EU law, is also not 
without problems and complications. The EU has established the European Court of 
Justice or the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which is separate 
from the ECtHR, and is likely to use the Charter “when determining if their practice 
is in conformity with the general principles of law recognized and applied throughout 
the Union.”268 The Charter is legally binding since the Lisbon Treaty (2009) giving 
the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties. It is argued that the binding effect 
of the Charter means it is likely that the CJEU will use it much more often in 
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decisions. 269  However, it only applies to EU member States when they are 
implementing EU law. The interpretation of this, and how effective the CJEU is in 
implementing the rights, especially to healthcare and whether this is considered 
implementing EU law, is complicated. It is suggested that the rights in the Charter 
cannot be applied universally but only in relation to the EU and action taken within 
its institutions or under the treaty.270 The EU has shown increasing involvement in 
health care law and policy,271 yet if an issue arises outside the scope of EU law then 
a human rights challenge would have to be brought before the ECtHR, if domestic 
remedies are exhausted.272  The enforceability of rights in the EU will likely operate 
against EU institutions rather than national authorities, so it has been suggested the 
EU Charter may not provide the health care rights enforcement it promises. 273 
Standing before the CJEU is different and more difficult as there is no direct 
procedure for individuals to complain about a breach under the Charter, even 
though it is enforceable before the court.274 
The right to health care in the EU Charter is contained in the Chapter entitled 
Solidarity where Article 35, which is based on Article 11 of the Social Charter,275 
ensures everyone access to preventive health care and benefits from national laws 
and policies.276 Children are also given their own separate Article, Article 24, which 
guarantees their protection and consideration of their views on matters which affect 
them in accordance with their age and maturity. There is also the primacy of the 
best interests doctrine when any institution makes a decision on an action relating to 
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children.277 Whilst the Charter has not long been in force (2009) Article 35 has most 
often been used in protection of health claims in connection with the environment or 
quality of goods.278 Health care also has an established jurisprudence in the EU in 
free movement claims where an individual is facing an undue delay to treatment in 
their own country and seeks treatment elsewhere within the EU and subsequently 
look for reimbursement for the additional expense.279 Recently such reimbursement 
from the national social insurance schemes has been very successful at the 
CJEU. 280  Such jurisprudence has focused on the combination of the European 
Community Treaty281 and Regulation No. 1408/71282, where the Treaty enables free 
movement and the regulation allows patients to gain authorisation for their treatment 
overseas. It has been suggested that such litigation could be undermining member 
States autonomy to make resource decisions and care priorities, however the 
position of EU law remains quite limited and its application is through the national 
courts.283 The greatest impact of the EU will be seen in the broader scope of health 
and regulation on a variety of things that impact on health.284 It seems that the EU is 
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uneasy determining more specificity about healthcare systems however because it 
would be seen as overstepping the fundamental rights at the national level and 
undermining national policy.285 Some may suggest this is a weakness and a missed 
opportunity, but equally making decisions on such rights could divert resources from 
another person, or another right, and may not be a decision the EU should make. 
This problem of which institution should make such specific decisions will be seen in 
the next chapter as well, where the role of the courts is discussed. It is not 
contentious to accept that it is the role of a democratically elected government to 
decide their healthcare priorities and resource allocation across all services, 
including education and rehabilitation for example. This demonstrates the problem 
of where the courts and supranational organisations should be involved, if at all. It 
will be argued that the moral obligation to provide a basic minimum of healthcare 
services demands fulfilment of the minimum core. Health policies beyond this are 
the prerogative of the government yet the courts have their role in ensuring the 
legality, proportionality and reasonableness of such decisions. For now, discussion 




2.4.1.3.3.1 Possible EU Accession to the European 
Convention 
 
The two institutions of Europe do not act separately and their interactions have 
progressively become institutionalised norms.286 This is the same for the Courts, two 
of the busiest international Courts in the world.287 The relationship between the two 
bodies is complicated and could change drastically as it is under consideration for 
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the EU to accede to the European Convention.288 However the CJEU has opined 
against this accession, most recently because it believes it is not compatible with 
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) for the EU to sign up to the ECHR.289  
“[T]he fact remains that the agreement envisaged fails to have regard to the specific 
characteristics of EU law with regard to the judicial review of acts, actions or 
omissions on the part of the EU law in CFSP [Common Foreign and Security Policy] 
matters.”290 The CJEU is also very uncomfortable with the idea that the ECtHR 
would be able to make decisions based on EU law and surpass the CJEU.291 The 
Court of Justice wants to preserve the autonomous EU legal order and its own 
jurisdiction over EU law. 292  The CJEU is very uncomfortable with the idea of 
accession by previously holding that the EU lacked the competence to enter into 
international agreements that would permit a different court to make binding 
decisions about EU law.293 
However others believe that since Protocol 14 to the ECHR, which allowed the EU 
to accede to the Convention, and Article 6(2) of the Lisbon Treaty of the EU, which 
made it an obligation to accede to the Convention, the legal path has been paved.294 
The relationship between the two European institutions is important and since 
Article 6 of the Lisbon treaty, exactly how interaction will operate remains to be 
seen.295  As Lock has argued, jurisdictional conflict is possible between the two 
courts and a resolution must be found. 296  This has been attempted with draft 
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agreements that have been reached, but as noted above, the Court of Justice in 
December 2014 opined that this was still not legally acceptable.297 It is argued that 
the EU acceding to the Convention would likely mean supremacy of the European 
Court of Human Rights as the CJEU will be bound by certain decisions.298 It will 
mean many other drastic changes as well such as an EU judge sitting on the ECtHR, 
as every party to the Convention has a judge on the court, and individuals being 
able to bring EU institutions before that Court.299 
2.4.1.3.3.2 General Deference 
 
This accession has yet to happen and so it is worth discussing the current legal 
situation in Europe and the unique nature of having two separate Courts that 
adjudicate on human rights, and the interaction between the two courts. The most 
important case to illustrate the respect the institutions give each other is widely 
accepted as the Bosphorus case.300 Here the ECtHR established the Bosphorus 
presumption,301 where the ECtHR will assume there is no violation if an action is 
taken in compliance with the obligations of membership of an international 
organisation if that organisation protects human rights in a manner equivalent to the 
Convention, and there was no discretion left to the State. The EU is considered 
such an organisation. Thus, this case established a presumption by the ECtHR that 
actions by the EU do not violate the convention. Lock says this is proof of the silent 
cooperation between the two Courts.302 This is illustrating a general trend that in the 
past the Courts have demonstrated great deference to each other.303 The EU’s 
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deference comes in the form of making the ECHR a minimum standard in EU law 
which is laid out in the EU Charter.304 Convention rights are minimums and when 
the CJEU is interpreting them it should consider the jurisprudence of both courts. 
However, the EU is also free to offer further protection and go beyond the 
minimum.305 This idea of a Convention being a basic minimum which others are free 
to go beyond and take further, but not go below, will be poignant in the concluding 
chapters and comparable to ideas on international law and global rights. The CJEU 
has acknowledged the rights guaranteed in the ECHR long before the EU Charter 
made them. As early as 1975 they confirmed the rights were protected in EU law.306 
2.4.1.3.3.3 Conflict  
 
Whilst Bosphorus shows that there is general cooperation and deference, there has 
not always been,307 and this is where two courts at the same level can create 
problems when they adjudicate on the same issue. In Emesa Sugar 308  it was 
argued that Treaty arrangements of the EU in not allowing comments on the 
Opinions of the Advocate General breached the right to a fair hearing under the 
European Convention. The CJEU found that the case law of the ECtHR did not 
apply.309 This was since accepted by the ECtHR310 but it is still suggested there has 
been friction between the Courts requiring a Memorandum of Understanding in 
2007.311 Indeed Callewaert goes as far as to say they seek changes in each other’s 
case law and discusses a few areas where there is still some disharmony between 
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the Courts.312 Avoiding such disharmony and confusion in court’s decisions is vital 
for appropriate, resepcted jurisprudence governments will be more inclined to follow, 
as will be seen in more detail in the next chapter when discussing suitable examples 
where there is a clear hierarchy and stare decisis, as opposed to inappropriate 
examples leading to excess litigation, confusion, and a failure to follow a court’s 
ruling.  
2.4.1.3.3.4 Is Accession The Answer? 
 
This is one of the reasons many support the accession of the EU to the ECHR; 
because it will help create legal certainty and ensure that the Convention is applied 
consistently.313 The cooperation that has been seen and the fact that the courts 
routinely refer to each other’s case law has created uniformity for the most part.314 
This is not based on a duty, but on comity. Accession may create a hierarchy in the 
European Courts and a stare decisis,315 but it would solidify the relationship, erase 
some concerns and create a lasting legal harmony. There is a legal difficulty 
requiring what Lock calls a paradigm shift in EU law if the CJEU is to be bound by 
the ECtHR; particularly as mentioned earlier, national courts are not required to be 
bound.316 It remains to be seen about where Europe goes from here. As regards to 
adjudicating the right to healthcare, as mentioned, it is generally limited to 
environment, goods quality, freedom of movement and reimbursement of costs for 
the CJEU.317 Healthcare is considered very rarely through the scope of the right to 
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life by the ECtHR.318 There is a seeming reluctance to discuss the nature of a 
countries health care system. 
This is a particularly contentious issue with courts being involved in ESC rights 
decision making and will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Dennis 
and Stewart argue it is necessary that ESC rights are non-justiciable319 and Sir 
Thomas Bingham M. R. summed up the difficulty in 1995: 
It is common knowledge that health authorities of all kinds 
are constantly pressed to make ends meet. . . Difficult and 
agonizing judgments have to be made as to how a limited 
budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the 
maximum number of patients. That is not a judgment which 
the court can make.320 
It is suggested that the difficult nature of courts being involved in such positive rights 
makes the right to health particularly difficult to enforce;321 it will be argued that this 
need not be the case. The discussion of the most successful human rights 
implementer across the world has been quite limited and not considered the many 
impacts it has via ‘soft law’ contributions or the multilevel systems across the EU.322 
This is because the main focus is on enforcement of existing human rights and the 
impact a court can and should have. This will be seen in further discussion later in 
the thesis.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
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It has been important to establish that children have rights, both in theory and in 
practice, and subsequently discuss some of the problems associated with realising 
those rights. At the start of the chapter it was seen that many of the problems 
around children’s rights are difficult to resolve and centre around the inability to 
effect their rights through the democratic process. Given the clear international 
standards and rights that were subsequently highlighted in this chapter, “[t]he 
attention of the international community is now turning to securing means for 
enforcement of those standards.” 323  Manfred Nowak has also argued that 
international law does not yet have effective enforcement, and that high standards 
and monitoring procedures without it may be counterproductive.324  
Nowak subsequently proposes his interesting, drastic changes to the universal 
human rights system, which includes a World Court of Human Rights. 325 
Buergenthal recommends beginning with a much weaker, non-binding United 
Nations Court for Human Rights,326 which will be further discussed in 6.2.3, but it is 
clear that the idea of an overseeing judicial forum is appealing to many authors.327 
The idea of judicial remedies for ESC rights is not new: in General Comment 14 the 
CESCR states that implementation of the right to health at the national level should 
be “based on the principles of accountability, transparency and independence of the 
judiciary”.328 Additionally, the 1986 Limburg principles on the implementation of the 
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covenant states that: “Legislative measures alone are not sufficient to fulfil the 
obligations of the Covenant. . . States Parties shall provide for effective remedies 
including, where appropriate, judicial remedies.”329 There are many different ways 
and strategies to protect, promote, and fulfil rights, but it has been suggested that 
the ideal way is preventive, so as to discourage and reduce the chances of 
violations occurring in the first place and provide a long-term solution. Knowledge 
that there is successful adjudication of ESC rights may provide this preventive 
measure as a more powerful deterrent to violation than being ‘named and shamed’. 
As Tripathi et al argue:  
Access to justice for victims, the potential punishment of 
perpetrators, and the reduction of impunity are all elements 
of this prevention. The widespread impunity that now 
prevails for abuses of economic and social rights, the 
extremely limited toolbox of legal responses, and the 
difficulties surrounding their justiciability are all challenges 
that need to be faced together if long-term solutions are to 
be found.330 
As can be seen from the example of Europe, judicial remedies may provide a 
powerful way of implementing human rights, but the right to healthcare, and ESC 
rights generally, are not yet included in a way that will impact globally by ensuring 
basic minimums and adjudicating on the healthcare system of a member State. 
Thus it seems necessary to discuss the strongly debated question of whether ESC 
rights can be adjudicated by the Courts in order to complete Part A, which has 
focused on exploring the problem. In Part B, discussion then addresses the issues 
by seeking changes to our philosophical mindset, the structure of a court system 
and adjudication, and general changes to human rights implementation.  
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Domestic Lessons for Enforcement of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
 
This chapter aims to continue the work of chapter two which highlighted some clear 
problems with the enforcement of the right to healthcare and with economic, social 
and cultural (ESC) rights more generally. In light of these problems and the lack of 
effective international change highlighted at the end of the last chapter, this chapter 
addresses the contested issue1 of whether the rights contained in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) are justiciable. To do 
this, this chapter is divided into two sections. First, discussion of whether ESC rights 
in general can be adjudicated will be undertaken by looking at various examples of 
cases from around the world; many in the countries discussed in chapter one. This 
will look at national legal systems and domestic cases because there is not a large 
body of international experience utilising the ESC rights in international treaties.2 
Despite this, certain domestic analysis can serve as a good example as will be seen 
in the second section which finds an appropriate guide for the justiciability of ESC 
rights. The two sections serve as excellent examples for ESC rights adjudication; 
firstly negative, and secondly positive. It is important to learn lessons from both. It 
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will be seen that some jurisprudence is not appropriate, yet others show how ESC 
rights can be justiciable in a way that assuages fears about lack of specificity and a 
court overstepping its role within a democratic government. This then wraps up Part 
A and the exploration of the current position and problem of children’s right to 
healthcare. Addressing the specific problems in this chapter will be undertaken in 
chapter five, where the lessons learnt here will be brought together in a framework 
posited as necessary for courts to follow to ensure appropriate adjudication of such 
rights. This will accept the use of the minimum core with the right to health, 
discussed previously in section 2.3.1.2, as well as an accountability for 
reasonableness test. It will be proposed that together these can form a framework 
that any court should use when adjudicating ESC rights and would serve to defeat 
suggestions that such rights are not justiciable.  
 
3.1 The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
 
The idea of justiciable ESC rights is a contentious one,3 with critics pointing to many 
potential problems, yet three main ones stand out. Firstly, there have been 
suggestions that ESC rights are idealistic goals that lack specificity and not 
something a court has enough detail to adjudicate on.4 Secondly, is the criticism of 
separation of powers and the independence of the court and role of democratic 
governments.5 Critics suggest it is impossible for a court to adjudicate an ESC right 
without overstepping into the ambit of the legislature as such decisions will 
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necessarily involve resource allocation choices seen to be exclusively within the 
domain of government.6 Section one of this chapter will address the first criticism, 
and section two will address the second although it is recognised that deference 
must be given to the third and final criticism; that implementing ESC rights is not 
assured even if these rights are considered justiciable. Accepting this problem from 
the beginning of this judicial chapter hopefully assuages criticisms of ‘judicial 
romanticism’ as it is understood a court’s powers derive from the political process, 
of which the court is only one part.7 An illustration of this point can be seen from 
1831 and the US Supreme Court. The Cherokee Indians were trying a new tactic as 
they sued the country for trying to remove them from their lands to west of the 
Mississippi river. Chief Justice John Marshall ruled in their favour. Despite this, 
President Andrew Jackson is reported to have said; “Well, John Marshall has made 
his ruling. Now let him enforce it!”8 The phrase is debated, but what is known is that 
Andrew Jackson exercised his executive power as Commander-in-Chief and 
despite the ruling, forcibly marched the Cherokee Indians to new lands west of the 
Mississippi on what is known as the ‘trail of tears’.9 In an eerily accurate prediction 
of such potential problems, Alexander Hamilton, founding father of the United States, 
commented in his famous Federalist Papers, that the judiciary would have “no 
influence over either the sword or the purse . . . It may truly be said to have 
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neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid 
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”10 The importance of this 
will be returned to later, but the first issue of whether ESC rights can be justiciable 
at all will be addressed by looking at various cases from the countries selected in 
the earlier comparison because of their constitutional right to healthcare. 
 
  3.1.1 India 
   3.1.1.1 Extending Directive Principles Through the Court 
 
India is one of the best known examples of a country that has established a 
justiciable right to health and has done so without the right being within the 
enforceable section of the constitution. The right to health is part of the Directive 
Principles of State Policy (DPSP). 11  Article 37 states this Part “shall not be 
enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless 
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to 
apply these principles in making laws.”12 Despite this clear limitation it is the case of 
Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerala13 that is considered to have opened the 
floodgates for the Indian judiciary to establish an enforceable right to health.14 Here 
the Indian Supreme Court restricted the right of the government to amend the 
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constitution in any way they see fit, ruling that they cannot amend the “basic 
structure or essential features of the constitution.”15 The court also discussed within 
this context the DPSP, recognising their importance to the enforceable fundamental 
rights and their complementary nature.16 In this case one Judge said: “In building up 
a just social order it is sometimes imperative that the fundamental rights should be 
subordinated to the directive principles”,17 which led to the belief that they were 
complimentary with “neither part being superior to the other.”18 It is suggested that 
after this case in 1973 and the state of emergency declared between 1975 and 
1977, the perception of the judiciary in India changed concerning “its role in the 
working of the Constitution.”19 Between 1975 and 1977, large scale rights violations 
occurred across India and the post-emergency period led to political realignment 
and a weak government that did not last long. 20  The judiciary stepped in and 
promoted the public–interest litigation (PIL) movement which, acknowledging that 
the majority of the population could not access the justice system, relaxed 
procedural rules so much so that even “writ petitions could be submitted on a 
postcard.”21  The post emergency period allowed the judiciary to become actively 
involved in the protection of those who were deprived of their most basic 
constitutional rights. PIL was the tool the Court used by disregarding the traditional 
requirements of locus standi. 22  This was clearly seen in Sunil Batra v Delhi 
Administration23  where a prisoner who was being tortured wrote a letter to the 
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Supreme Court, which was taken up as a petition and the court made orders for 
humane treatment. Progressively, the court began to expand its protection and 
interpretation beyond the basic rights guaranteed in the Constitution. As more 
destitute individuals were able to come before the courts, it was inevitable that the 
courts would have to decide if they were going to protect them or not. PIL has been 
critical in bringing ESC rights within the scope of the judiciary,24 and from this point, 
despite their non-justiciability in the Constitution, the Supreme Court took it upon 
itself to make some of the principles in the DPSP equivalent to the protected civil 
and political rights and has done this mainly “through the application of an 
expansive definition of the right to life.”25  
One palpable example of this expansion was in 1992 in Mohini Jain v. State of 
Karnataka, 26  which focused on the right to education, the expense of higher 
education and the charging of capitation fees for private colleges.27 In finding the 
fees illegal, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he right to education flows directly from 
the right to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual 
cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education.” 28  The 
extension of the right to life was one argument used, but the court also determined 
the interdependence of the DPSP and fundamental rights, stating: “These principles 
[DPSPs] have to be read into the fundamental rights. Both are supplementary to 
each other.”29 This argument was reiterated just a year later in a case that was 
brought by private colleges challenging State legislation regulating the capitation 
fees. In Unni Krishnan, J. P. v State of Andhra Pradesh30 the court went a little 
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further in clarifying it’s thinking behind the interdependence of the two parts to the 
Constitution. Using the same two arguments of the extension of the right to life and 
the importance and interdependency of Article 41, the right to education in the 
DPSP, the court held that Article 41 informed the content of the right to life, but that 
not every DPSP would inform what the right meant. The court decided that in this 
instance only Articles 41, 45 and 46 would determine the parameters of the right.31 
So the court established that the DPSP can inform the content of a right that has 
been found via extension of fundamental, enforceable rights in the Constitution. 
With this in mind the court ruled that children have a fundamental right to free 
education up to the age of 14, and beyond that it is subject to economic capacity.32 
The impact of this case can further be seen by the 86th Constitutional Amendment 
mentioned in chapter one; the addition of Article 21A, the right to primary education 
for 6 to 14 year olds within Part III of the Constitution.33 However given that the court 
had already established the justiciable right to education, such an amendment by 
the government seems strange unless it was purposefully designed to show 
acceptance of judicial enforcement and oversight for this right, and whilst doing so 
indicate that the government did not accept further extension by the judiciary of 
other DPSP within the ambit of Article 21 and attempting to reinforce the separation 
of powers doctrine. 
 
   3.1.1.2 Samity: A justiciable right to health 
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If this was the hidden intent of the government it did not work, as the right to health 
has also been included in this expansion. The key case is Paschim Banga Khet 
Mazdoor Samity and Ors v State of West Bengal 34  (Samity). Here a labourer 
suffered serious head injuries and a brain haemorrhage and was taken to eight 
State medical institutions over 14 hours. He was refused access to all of them either 
because of a lack of beds or lack of necessary facilities for his treatment. He was 
eventually admitted to a private hospital which cost Rs. 17,000.35 The court was 
very quick to establish the one important question it would use to decide the case: is 
the non-availability of treatment a denial of a fundamental right under Article 21?36 
Paragraph 9 of the decision leaves no room for doubt that they believe the right to 
health is an integral part of the right to life, and that this right had clearly been 
violated in such circumstances. The argument is based on reading the Constitution 
as envisaging a welfare State, which in turn establishes a government obligation to 
provide adequate medical facilities. The court held that failing the obligations of a 
welfare State would violate the right to life.37 
The court then, crucially, went beyond merely finding a violation to the right to health 
via the right to life and ordering redress, by proceeding to issue directions to the 
government on the exact facilities they had to provide. The court listened to an 
Enquiry Committee appointed by the state government and to other experts and 
“learned Counsel”38 to make further specific orders to the state government before 
ruling that these orders should apply to all other states within India as well as the 
national government.39 These ordered facilities were expansive, including a better 
communication set up, better ambulance services, and the upgrading of hospitals at 
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district and sub-division level.40 The court was focusing on the “essential minimum” 
of the right to health, which seems like some acceptance of the minimum core 
established by the CESCR.41 The court admitted that such expansive direction will 
require financial resources but merely commented in response that constitutional 
obligations cannot be ignored. There was no discussion or consideration of the 
financial implications or a possible resource allocation prerogative of the 
government and the obligation stands irrespective of any financial constraints.42 It is 
possible that the court believed the right to life, and via extension the right to 
emergency treatment, is so fundamental and a minimum core obligation of the 
government that it goes beyond resource constraints, but this discussion was not 
undertaken. All that was said was “[w]hatever is necessary for this purpose has to 
be done.”43 This expansive direction is where many criticisms of the Indian Supreme 
Court lie. Samity is one example, however the court also started to get involved in 
ordering petrol pump sites, rules of conduct for public authorities, control of 
automobile emissions, parking charges and many more trifling matters that should 
not be considered by any judiciary.44 
 
   3.1.1.3 Criticisms of the Court 
 
The Indian Supreme Court has faced many criticisms of illegitimately extending its 
jurisdiction into areas regarded as the prerogative of a democratic government 
through “overt judicial activism”45  leading to “continued non-implementation . . . 
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undermining the court’s authority.”46 Tobin highlights how India stands alone with 
such expansive judicial activism creating a precedent for an expansive interpretation 
and going beyond what is reasonable in other jurisdictions.47 The court however has 
remained stoic, arguing that it is filling the void of inadequate branches of 
government and that the importance of the policy decisions outweighs a strict 
adherence to separation of powers.48 It is suggested courts cannot decide on such 
issues seen as the role of the legislative and executive branches without usurping 
power. 49  The undermining of the court’s authority 50  raises questions about the 
legitimacy of the court and demonstrates a lack of respect for their decisions. One of 
the main problems causing this is the structure of the court, which hears thousands 
of cases, meaning it is impossible to keep track, leading to inconsistent decisions 
from different benches and a breakdown of the system of precedent.51 However 
elsewhere it is suggested that there has been a general acquiescence by the 
government to such judicial activism.52 There have doubtless been some cases 
where the government has disagreed with the court to such an extent as to pass 
legislation, or the cabinet has had to assert an ordinance, so that the order of the 
court is rendered void.53 The problem of non-implementation of judicial orders is a 
concern for the legitimacy of the court and shows a lack of respect for the decisions 
of the court echoing Andrew Jackson’s “now let him enforce it!”  
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In 2014, the Indian Parliament passed the Judicial Appointments Commission Bill. 
This is in response to the judiciary seizing the power from the executive to appoint 
judges and further illustrates the tension between the two branches in India. In 1993, 
the courts reversed the position in the Constitution that the president, after 
consultation with the Chief Justice, would appoint judges to the superior courts.54 
This was interpreted as concurrence, so the Chief Justice made recommendations 
to the President, who had limited scope to disagree. This was then changed again 
in an advisory opinion, that the Chief Justice together with some senior colleagues, 
known as a ‘collegium’ would recommend names to the President, who is then 
bound by the decision.55 This is another example of the court grabbing power that 
was not bestowed upon them and is the main reason for the long awaited Bill 
passed in 2014 which just awaits ratification and assenting by the state legislature 
and the President. The Bill will set up a national judicial commission to appoint 
senior judges which will remove the power solely from the courts. 
Despite this clear tension however, it is obvious that India now has a justiciable right 
to healthcare and has made moves to enforce ESC rights through the courts using 
an imaginative interpretation of the right to life. It is suggested however, that 
adopting such expansive interpretations in order to enforce such rights will not be 
the best method for international law.56 Tobin points out that given the expansion of 
the right to life and the lack of an enforceable right to healthcare within the Indian 
Constitution, “the automatic transferability of comparative case law is problematic 
and these cases arguably reveal more about the scope of civil and political rights 
within a particular jurisdiction, than the justiciability of the right to health in 
international law.”57 The former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health has 
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used the Samity case to argue “that there are health related rights that give rise to 
some immediate obligations that are not subject to resource availability.”58 Tobin 
replies that Samity does not provide such evidence when international law does not 
mention emergency care and highlights the need for progressive realisation.59 
I agree partially with Tobin, that the Indian cases do not provide the best model for 
international human rights law enforcement, but as will be seen later, I support 
elements of the right to health being beyond the availability of resources. Hunt 
argues this point and states that when resources are insufficient “it is incumbent 
upon those in a position to assist to provide international assistance and 
cooperation that will enable the Government to meet its immediate obligations.”60 
This point will be further discussed in chapter six. India it seems provides some very 
mixed results with PIL also leading to access to the courts for those who would 
otherwise have been ignored and an engagement of discussion on the fulfilment of 
their fundamental rights.  
 
  3.1.2 Brazil 
 
Brazil serves as an example that has a justiciable right to healthcare but has not 
had to create India’s extension of the right to life to do so. As seen in 1.2.2, Brazil 
has the right to health in its Constitution and subsequently created a universal 
healthcare system known as the SUS. Added to the knowledge that there is 
successful litigation on the right to healthcare in Brazil, it may be thought to be an 
excellent example for other countries as well as international law. Brazil has also 
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established a priority for a child’s right to healthcare, accepting the increased 
vulnerability of children and need to ensure their rights are not subordinated. The 
Superior Court of Justice has stated that it is a constitutional norm that children’s 
rights have absolute priority most especially with a right to healthcare.61 This sounds 
promising yet litigation in Brazil is not without some major problems.  
 
   3.1.2.1 Inequity in Court Access 
 
One of the problems of the SUS is the inequities in access to health care services. 
The poor have much less access to the care they need than those who are wealthy, 
and this problem, is actually exacerbated by the nature of Brazil’s healthcare 
litigation.62 Ferraz explains; 
[T]here is instead a high concentration of right-to-health 
litigation in the richest states, cities, and districts of Brazil. . . . 
access to courts and lawyers is beyond the means and 
reach of most poor Brazilians.63 
This exacerbation is partly because there is no public-interest litigation (PIL) system 
as seen in India,64 so plaintiffs are often relatively wealthy people.65 Cases are not 
often brought by the poorest that may need State funded medicines the most. This 
is a common problem with universal healthcare programs that may be ill thought-out 
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because they counterproductively increase healthcare inequality and increase 
spending on the richest who have greater access to services.66 
   3.1.2.2 Interpretation  
 
Many problems are also caused by the jurisprudence of the Brazilian Court and the 
specific way they have interpreted the right to health. It is considered a right of all 
individuals to have all of their health needs satisfied with the very best treatment, 
irrespective of cost.67 Failure to consider the limited resources is only one problem 
of the litigation in Brazil, with another being that collective complaints are almost 
never heard. Cases are individual and concern the provision of curative medicines 
to be enjoyed individually.68 Ferraz points out that in Brazil “the right to health is an 
individual entitlement to the satisfaction of one’s health needs with the most 
advanced treatment available, irrespective of costs.” 69  Tobin agrees and adds 
support that “[s]uch an approach is not only unsustainable because of its drain on 
Brazil’s limited resources, but it also skews the benefits of the right to health to 
those who have access to the courts.”70 Any such comprehensive program in a 
developing country, whilst promising, is likely to raise concerns of long-term 
affordability and sustainability. 71  The reasoning of the courts in accepting such 
arguments has been called ‘syllogistic reasoning’72 because they follow the clear 
pattern needed for a syllogism. The argument is simple: the Constitution guarantees 
a right to health for everyone; this individual has a medical need requiring certain 
treatment; therefore they are entitled to that treatment. It is said that “all that a 
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claimant must do to win his or her case under this interpretation is to prove that he 
or she has an unsatisfied health need as documented by a doctor’s prescription.”73  
   3.1.2.3 Over-Litigation 
 
Brazil is a civil law country therefore without the rule of stare decisis found in 
common law systems. Thus, one court decision does not affect change to all in a 
similar position and many similar if not identical cases have been decided. 74 
Interestingly, none of the common law countries in South America have recognised 
a right to health in their Constitution.75 The litigation in Brazil is thus made even 
more problematic by a large increase in the number of cases. Rio de Janeiro went 
from just 1 claim on such a case in 1991 to 2,245 in 2005, with federal courts also 
seeing large increases. The Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ), the second highest 
court in the country, went from 2 to 672 cases between 2001 and 2004.76 This may 
sound rather promising in that the right to health is being enforced by the courts in a 
clear, consistent and strong way. However the cost of such litigation must be 
considered and unfortunately “[j]udges by and large do not engage in any form of 
substantive cost or economic impact analysis of their decisions”.77 The number of 
successful litigations is very high, estimated at 90% in lower courts and 100% in the 
Supreme Court when an individual asserts the need for a particular health service.78 
There is thus a large negative impact of all this combined:  
The high rates of success, combined with the increase in 
litigation, means that a significant volume of resources 
allocated to the health care system are used to pay for 
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judicially mandated medication and treatment. . . . litigation 
allocates resources originally intended to treat a large 
number of people to an expensive . . . treatment that may 
benefit just a small group, regardless of the relative wealth of 
the plaintiffs.79 
The outcome of all of this has been a sharp increase in federal spending on 
judicially granted medicines. Ferraz highlights that in 2008 São Paulo was ordered 
to spend approximately R$400 million to purchase expensive drugs for 35,000 
claimants.80 He then goes on to present the problem powerfully: “This is roughly the 
same level of resources that the federal Ministry of Health has recently announced 
will be invested in a program of vaccination against pneumococcal bacteria to cover 
all 3.2 million children born every year in Brazil.”81 The overall federal spending on 
medicines ordered by the courts has also increased from R$188,000 in 2003, to 
R$26 million in just the first half of 2007.82 With this large increase in spending being 
ordered by most courts adhering to any litigant with a prescription, it seems Ferraz 
is right to state that resources are being diverted away from those who would 
benefit most to those who can access the courts.83 
Thus it seems Brazil’s courts indirectly make resource allocation decisions which 
are often considered to be the prerogative of government. One way of justifying 
such direction and decision making by a court is a ring-fenced core element of rights 
protected by the Constitution that the government therefore has no power to change. 
This maybe the view point of Brazil’s courts in their interpretation of the 
Constitutional right to healthcare however, it seems clear that even if this was the 
initial intention of the courts jurisprudence, it has moved far beyond this core 
protected element into the dangerous territory of the government having less and 
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less money to spend on health programmes it has highlighted as important because 
of the benefits granted to the successful litigants in court. Ferraz argues that the 
cumulative effect is retrogressive and it will be very hard for Brazil to change now it 
has started down this jurisprudential path. 84  Thus Brazil’s health jurisprudence 
exacerbates health inequities and over steps into the role of a democratic 
government. 
 
  3.1.3 Interim Concluding Remarks 
 
Both India and Brazil have a justiciable right to healthcare, but finding support for 
the justiciability of the right to health is not the same as showing the appropriate way 
to adjudicate it. India has established this justiciable right via an interesting 
expansion of the right to life, but has also done so for many other rights from the 
DPSP. This means the courts have decided which rights in the DPSP should 
become justiciable and have taken it upon themselves to amend the Constitution. 
This may be in response to inadequate and inert governments, yet it is clearly not 
an ideal model to follow. In Brazil, the Constitution establishes a justiciable right to 
healthcare, but it is the simplistic syllogistic reasoning of this right that leads to 
problems. A right in the Constitution, and then an individual having a medical need, 
should not necessarily require the State to provide that need regardless of cost. 
This, combined with the individual litigation and lack of collective complaints or class 
actions, leads to decisions with vast resource implications that deviate money from 
other programmes and is then spent on those who can afford to put themselves in 
court. So there is a difference between having a justiciable right to healthcare, and 
an appropriate way to adjudicate this right. More appropriate models for a 
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framework that should be followed by domestic and international courts when 
seeking to enforce a child’s right to healthcare are now looked at. 
 
3.2 The appropriate justiciability of ESC rights 
 
 
For the appropriate justiciability of ESC rights, constitutional recognition would seem 
to be required to at least minimise the possibility of such imaginative interpretation 
of the Indian Supreme Court, as well as an established jurisprudence which shows 
some deference to the resource allocation powers usually the preserve of 
government, so as to avoid the problems seen in Brazil.  Constitutional recognition 
or ‘codification’85 should prevent imaginative interpretation and also presents the 
rights in a similar way to the international treaties and conventions.  This idea of 
international human rights being compared to constitutional law has been 
mentioned briefly above and will be further discussed in the final chapter. To 
reiterate, this is the reason why adjudication of the right to health is analysed in 
countries that provide the right within a written Constitution and not the UK or US for 
example, the UK having no written constitution and the US having no right to 
healthcare. Such adjudication must be carried out in an appropriate manner as 
befitting the rule of law. Deference to government is an acceptance of the 
separation of powers doctrine which often includes the resource allocation decisions 
being the prerogative of the elected branches. The CESCR has roundly rejected the 
notion that ESC rights are not justiciable at all, and there is plenty of evidence to 
                                                          
85
 Byrne I (n 14); see also Easley CE, Marks SP, and Morgan Jr RE, 'The Challenge and 
Place of International Human Rights in Public Health' (2001) 91 American Journal of Public 
Health 1922, 1923.   




support this position.86 It is filling this gap between poor jurisprudence and judicial 
overstep on one extreme and complete lack of justiciability on the other that needs 
to be navigated. 
 
  3.2.1 South Africa 
 
Arguably the best known and most widely celebrated model that fits this description 
is South Africa, which has many ESC rights included in the Constitution, yet there 
have been very few significant cases decided by the South African courts.87  
 
   3.2.1.1 Establishing the Justiciability of ESC Rights 
 
From the very beginning of post-apartheid South Africa and the 1996 Constitution, 
there were challenges in South Africa to a courts ability to adjudicate on ESC rights 
culminating in “the First Certification case”88. Here the very inclusion of ESC rights 
within the Constitution was challenged before the Constitutional Court on the 
grounds that such inclusion was against the separation of powers doctrine because 
it would lead the court to making decisions, especially budgetary, that are the 
prerogative of the other branches of government. The court based its response on 
an argument already encountered above; that adjudicating ESC rights will not be 
different from adjudicating civil and political rights, as both sets of rights can have 
large budgetary impact and as the justiciability of civil and political rights is not 
contested, neither can the justiciability of ESC rights. The court added: 
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In our view it cannot be said that by including socio-
economic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred 
upon the courts so different from that ordinarily conferred 
upon them by a bill of rights that it results in a breach of the 
separation of powers.89 
 
The court also held that, at the very least, ESC rights can have negative protection 
so that they are not improperly impeded.90 Therefore it was made clear that ESC 
rights were justiciable and the courts jusridiction over them was expressly 
acknowledged.91 Berger points out that these short arguments put an end to the 
debate of the justiciability of ESC rights in South Africa, but the true meaning of 
winning this argument can only be seen in the context of considering the cases that 
came after such peremptory conclusions.92 Four highly significant such cases will be 
discussed in chronological order to see how South Africa has developed its 
jurisprudence on ESC rights. 
 
   3.2.1.2 Soobramoney 
 
The first case applies specifically to the right to healthcare and access medical 
treatment. The Soobramoney 93  case in 1998 and was the first instance the 
Constitutional Court “was asked to interpret the enforcement of a quintessentially 
socioeconomic right against the state”.94 Soobramoney suffered from chronic renal 
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failure and needed kidney dialysis to survive.  He petitioned the State to provide him 
with the necessary medical care arguing his rights under Section 27(3) of the 
Constitution, the right to emergency medical treatment, and the right to life in 
Section 11. The State had in place a policy that denied Soobramoney dialysis 
because he was not a candidate for a transplant and therefore did not meet the 
guidelines. Only 30% of patients with chronic renal failure met the guidelines for 
dialysis95 and the State in its defence argued that the policy was in place because of 
a lack of resources.  
The court ruled in favour of the State. It did not accept that chronic renal failure 
constituted emergency medical treatment saying section 27(3) envisaged sudden 
trauma not ongoing conditions and treatment. The court also dismissed the right to 
life argument stating that as there is a separate provision for the right to healthcare 
within the Constitution, the argument was unnecessary. In doing this, the court 
specifically referred to the Samity case of India and stated the differences in 
jurisprudence because of the specific provision in the South African Constitution.96 
The court stated that the arguments made by the appellant should have been based 
on sections 27(1) and (2), but then went on to rule that even on these arguments 
the claim would not have succeeded because the healthcare guaranteed must be 
within the States available resources. The court accepted the resource limits of the 
State, noting that it had actually over-spent on its budget,97 and appreciated the 
“difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health budget”,98 
stating they would be slow to interfere when rational decisions were taken in good 
faith.  
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Crucially the court did not look at the case individually and regardless of cost. The 
case was decided more generally and it was accepted that the decision would have 
an impact on all patients in Soobramoney’s position which is a basic tenent of the 
rule of law which requires that similar cases be treated similarly99 and therefore 
would have an impact on the wider State health sector. Helping Soobramoney 
would directly impact on someone else’s healthcare.100 This is a communitarian 
position in which individual rights are subject to the interests of the community as a 
whole with equity being the dominant consideration.101 This is also the situation 
seen in Venezuela.102 Sachs J, a judge in the Soobramoney case, later argued that 
if all chronic illnesses and their treatments were to be emergency situations, the 
effect of the health system would be enormous with no funds left for many other 
important areas of health care.103 Knowing that an individual rights analysis, as in 
Brazil, can be dangerous and lead to problematic conclusions, 104  the question 
changed. The court was asking itself, not whether the State could afford just one 
more kidney dialysis patient, but many more, and thus the court assessed the 
appropriateness of the guidelines that restricted dialysis to those with acute renal 
failure. The court noted how stretched the services were, before stating: 
It has not been suggested that these guidelines are 
unreasonable or that they were not applied fairly and 
rationally105 . . . If everyone in the same condition as the 
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appellant were to be admitted the carefully tailored 
programme would collapse and no one would benefit from 
that.106 
Thus, whilst regrettable, there were legitimate resource constraints on the State, 
and the guidelines they had therefore applied because of this were found to be 
reasonable. The deference to the State to decide what was best given these 
constraints was the beginning of an important test of reasonableness, and 
maintaining an important margin of appreciation which will be seen throughout the 
South African jurisprudence on ESC rights. Berger suggests that Soobramoney 
shows that a right to healthcare “does not impose an obligation on the state to 
provide everything to everyone”.107  The court made this point itself acknowledging 
that many South Africans did not have housing, food, water or many other 
necessities, but the State had to manage its limited resources to do what it could.108 
This test of reasonableness has its roots in the English case of Wednesbury,109 and 
is in actual fact the well established test of proportionality.110 It may look different on 
the surface but it is argued that the common theme of a balancing exercise between 
competing rights and public interests means they are the same underneath.111 The 
words reasonable and proportionate, and unreasonable and disproportionate can 
replace each other. In fact, much of South African jurisprudence is similar to that 
seen in the UK with judicial review cases and the deference and margin of 
appreciation generally given.112 This margin of appreciation is important for the UK 
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which, as seen in chapter one, has a very different healthcare system to Germany, 
but both would generally be considered to realise the right to healthcare. The 
similarity of jurisprudence between the UK and South Africa is not so surprising as 
the English courts serve as a good example, but it is more appropriate to focus on 
the development of a clear codified right in South African case law for eventual 
comparisons with the international human rights to healthcare, later in this thesis. 
The difficulty associated with adjudicating ESC rights and the hardship involved with 
the search for appropriate jurisprudence can be demonstrated by the fact that 
Soobramoney died two days after this ruling.113 The court had to make this legal 
decision knowing a man’s life was in their hands. Albie Sachs has written of the 
emotional nature of some of the Constitutional Courts cases, particularly describing 
Soobramoney as a “most painful case. The Court’s decision could help prolong his 
life or else conduce to his early death.”114 This shows the difference ESC rights 
justiciability can make and therefore the difficulties presented with such rights 
necessarily being restricted by resources. 
 
   3.2.1.3 Grootboom 
 
The second case to come before the Constitutional Court on ESC rights shows 
similar elements of this difficulty despite it being the first time the court found the 
State in breach of its ESC rights obligations.115 In Grootboom116 the right in question 
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was the right to housing, guaranteed by Section 26 of the Constitution, and also 
Section 28 which focuses specifically on children’s rights with 28(1)(c) mentioning 
basic shelter. They had no water, sewage or refuse disposal. 117  The 900 
respondents118 lived in what little space they could find on the Wallacedene sports 
fields, so Mrs. Grootboom and the other respondents applied to the State to provide 
basic temporary shelter under their Constitutional rights protected by Section 26 and 
28 for the children (of this population 510 were children, 390 were adults).119  
The High Court only found a breach of Section 28(1) (c), not of Section 26.120 The 
court accepted the shortage of available housing and resources but felt the housing 
programmes in place were acceptable. For Section 28 however, the High Court held 
that the right imposed immediate obligations of basic shelter and was not dependent 
on resources. The High Court therefore ordered the immediate provision of basic 
shelter for all children, and one parent of each dependent child, under Section 28, 
but nothing under Section 26. On appeal the Constitutional Court found problems 
with this approach:  
This reasoning produces an anomalous result. People who 
have children have a direct and enforceable right to housing 
under section 28(1) (c), while others who have none or 
whose children are adult are not entitled to housing under 
that section121. 
The Constitutional Court accepted the overlap between Section 26 and 28, but not 
that this overlap meant separate rights for children and their parents that are 
independent of other rights in the Constitution.122 As the children were not in State 
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care, there was no State obligation to provide those children with shelter, and 
through them, their parents.123 Importantly, the Constitutional Court was worried that 
the High Courts approach would make children a means to an end, and treat adults 
who had children differently in regards to their right to housing. However they did 
rule in the respondents’ favour with regards to Section 26. Whilst stating that neither 
Section entitles immediate claims to shelter or housing, the Constitutional Court 
stated that Section 26 does impose an obligation on the State to put in place a 
programme that will provide relief for those desperately in need. 124  Thus, the 
Constitutional Court found that Section 26 imposes an obligation on the State to 
devise an adequate housing plan, within its available resources, that takes into 
account those in desperate need, and the current plan did not do this. Deference to 
government and the prerogative to make budgetary decisions is evident – as in the 
Soobramoney case however, there was an order for the government to adhere to 
but the precise allocation was for government to decide.125  
Despite this court ruling, Mrs. Irene Grootboom died homeless 8 years after this 
case, and a supposed ‘victory’, bringing once again to mind Andrew Jackson’s “let 
him enforce it!” Bilchitz comments that this indicates “quite graphically that socio-
economic guarantees may well amount to very little if not enforced strictly and with 
the necessary institutional mechanisms.”126  In Grootboom, the court once again 
considered the reasonableness of the State programme that was in place, finding it 
unreasonable to not consider and provide relief to those in desperate need. 
However, further specifics of what this unreasonableness meant and the content of 
the right were not ordered despite being explored by the court. There was promising 
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discussion by both courts of the UN minimum core established in General Comment 
3 of the ICESCR127 but it was decided not to use this method of specifying the 
content of the right. In deference to government, the court stated “[i]t is not in any 
event necessary to decide whether it is appropriate for a Court to determine in the 
first instance the minimum core of a right.”128 However, the court did not reject the 
idea of a minimum core outright as some have mistakenly argued.129 The court 
acknowledged that the “[m]inimum core obligation is determined generally by having 
regard to the needs of the most vulnerable group that is entitled to the protection of 
the right in question.”130 This is similar to the finding that the current programme was 
in breach of Section 26 for not considering those in desperate need. However, the 
court did not believe it had enough information to create a minimum core itself or to 
define its content. It accepted that the CESCR was in a position where it could 
develop the content as it had gained experience over many years via extensive 
reports, but held that it could not because of the need to identify all the various 
needs and opportunities which will depend on a variety of factors such as income, 
unemployment, land, poverty, and rural and urban differences.131 The court stated: 
All this illustrates the complexity of the task of determining a 
minimum core obligation for the progressive realisation of 
the right of access to adequate housing without having the 
requisite information on the needs and the opportunities for 
the enjoyment of this right.132  
The court also could not use information or reports by the Committee because 
South Africa had not ratified the ICESCR. It is argued in the next section that this is 
a missed opportunity and that a minimum core will add much needed content to 
                                                          
127
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  (1966). 
128
 The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
(CCT 11/00), [2000] No. ZACC 19, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 33; see also Davis DM (n 94) 
307. 
129
 Chowdhury J (n 2).  
130
 The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
(CCT 11/00), [2000] No. ZACC 19, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 31. 
131
 The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 
(CCT 11/00), [2000] No. ZACC 19, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 32. 
132
 ibid. 




ESC rights which will help to meaningfully adjudicate them, something which may 
happen in future with South Africa’s recent ratification of ICESCR. 
It may be thought that South Africa has not achieved as much as might seem 
possible through its jurisprudence. Forman has argued that the South African 
“limited approach certainly misses opportunities for advancing the realization of the 
right, [but] it nonetheless has had a positive influence on national health policy.”133 
Above it was suggested that the South African judicial approach is a more 
acceptable way to adjudicate ESC rights, especially as a framework for international 
courts and enforcement of international human rights law. However the cases 
considered so far have failed to produce promising changes, questioning their 
impact and surely their use as a model even if the jurisprudence seems more 
appropriate than India or Brazil. There is however one more case to consider, in 
which the Constitutional Court of South Africa used the same test of 
reasonableness and which shows that decisions of this court can carry meaning and 
lead to significant changes in the implementation of ESC rights. 
   3.2.1.4 Treatment Action Campaign 
 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)134 was mentioned in chapter 
one because of the changes it has led to. The TAC is a powerful NGO that brought 
this case against the government because of the policy on the ARV drug nevirapine 
which would prevent mother to child transmission of HIV. The drug was only 
available at a limited number of centres which focused on research because the 
government questioned its safety and effectiveness as well as the connection 
between HIV and AIDS.135 The TAC argued this policy was in breach of Section 
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27(1), the right to access health care services. The government’s defence was 
based on the need for continued research and a lack of resources to provide the 
drug nationally. The government argued that at the sites where nevirapine was 
available, a full comprehensive programme was used including counselling and 
breast-milk substitution which is why it was effective and it lacked the resources to 
roll this out to other hospitals. Key to defeating this argument was that nevirapine 
had been provided free of charge to South Africa for five years by Boehringer 
Ingelheim, and that without the full programme the drug would still save many 
lives.136 Thus it was found unreasonable for the government not to provide the drug 
at State hospitals and the court therefore required the government “to devise and 
implement within its available resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated 
programme to realise progressively the rights of pregnant women and their newborn 
children to have access to health services to combat mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV.”137 The court ordered nevirapine be made available at other State hospitals 
allowing its use to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV. This is perhaps as 
specific as the South African Court gets with regards to directing government action. 
Whilst the deference to government may be consistent with separation of powers 
Byrne138  argues the limited approach and lack of detail leads to problems with 
implementation of the courts orders “since it took several months of campaigning 
and lobbying by TAC and others to force the authorities to act and start supplying 
the drugs.”139 
Since then however, as seen in chapter one, South Africa has made huge steps in 
the availability of ARV drugs and treatment. Other elements to enforcement of ESC 
rights are important, but an appropriate court judgment can serve as a powerful tool. 
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The codification of ESC rights in South Africa, considering cases with regards to 
collective rights and finally the deference to government making difficult resource 
allocation decisions, overall makes the jurisprudence of South Africa a good model 
for the justiciability of the right to healthcare. Tobin agrees and argues: 
[T]he comparative exercise can be used to demonstrate the 
justiciability of the right to health in international law and in 
this respect two cases arising under the South African 
Constitution are particularly revealing.140 
Tobin refers to Soobramoney and TAC. Byrne however, does not see South Africa 
as a perfect model to follow and whilst accepting the fine line courts must walk, 
argues South Africa and India are on opposite sides of that line, with neither being 
successful; India requiring contempt of court proceedings and South Africa requiring 
further lobbying.141 
Courts have a role in protecting the rights encoded in a Constitution and ensuring 
that these rights become tangible guarantees, 142  yet this must be done with 
deference and constant mindfulness that they are not the elected branch of 
government. The South African Constitutional Court has defended its approach in 
the TAC case arguing their jurisprudence achieves an appropriate balance because 
their decisions are not in themselves directed at rearranging budgets. 143  Whilst 
South African jurisprudence is not perfect and Byrne may be right that some more 
assertive elements may be required, the cases still provide appropriate lessons for 
the justiciability of ESC rights. Specifically for children however, South African 
jurisprudence may present some problems. It is argued that in the TAC case, the 
Constitutional Court rendered Section 28 not directly applicable. On the face of it, as 
not expressly qualified, it may be assumed that Section 28 of the South African 
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Constitution imposes a direct and immediate obligation on the State to ensure such 
rights to children, but this has not been the courts treatment in practice. 144 
Liebenberg argues “the Court in TAC adhered to its reasoning in Grootboom and 
did not conclude that children had a direct, individual entitlement to basic health 
care services in circumstances where their parents were too poor to afford these 
services.” 145  A concurrent argument by Nolan also points out the court’s 
jurisprudence, in not accepting direct and immediate obligations to ensure a child’s 
right, ignored the text and purpose of the constitutional provision.146 
Despite the appropriateness of the reasonableness test used by the South African 
Constitutional Court, a failure to ensure a basic minimum, especially for children, 
under the right to health, means slightly more assertive measures should have been 
taken. In these cases, the court declined the use of a minimum core but left open 
the possibility of using it later on. One of the main reasons for not using such a 
measure was a lack of institutional capacity of the court to decide on an appropriate 
minimum for the content of the rights in question. The opportunity to add such 
content and demand a basic minimum arose perfectly for the court in 2010. 
 
   3.2.1.5 Mazibuko 
 
In Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg147  the Court was dealing with the right of 
access to sufficient water. The residents of the Phiri township, Johannesburg 
argued, inter alia, that the city’s free monthly allocation of 6 kilolitres of water per 
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household per month was unreasonable.148 The actual consumption rate was a lot 
higher149 and the revenue generated, because of a culture of non-payment, was 
substantially out of proportion to the amount of water being supplied to the area yet 
Johannesburg Water wanted to improve the rate of payment.150 The free 6 kilolitres 
or 25 litres per person per day, of water was seen as the sufficient amount required 
under section 27 (1) (b) of the Constitution.151 The applicants argued however that 
this set minimum was too low and should be 50 litres per person per day as this is 
the amount needed for a dignified life.152 The court held that this argument must fail 
for the same reasons as the minimum core failed in Grootboom and TAC. The court 
did not have the capacity or authority to set a minimum core, and only a 
reasonableness test should be used in establishing whether the government has 
carried out its’ duty to progressively realise the basic necessaries of life.153  
Expert evidence put forward and considered in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
decision used General Comment 15 on the ICESCR, and evidence from an affidavit 
from I.H. Palmer and an article by P.H. Gleick and focused on two possible 
minimums; one of which was 50 litres per person per day; the other stated 42 litres 
per person per day.154 So in contrast to the previous cases, the applicants were able 
to produce specific international expert evidence on the minimum core content of 
the right to water. Unfortunately these arguments were not engaged with at all by 
the Constitutional Court. As the applicants accepted that the government provided 
the absolute minimum necessary the possible arguments down this line were 
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drastically weakened, and the applicants went too far in asking the court to define 
the right to water in its entirety which the court rejected completely.155  A more 
specific challenge should have been made to the minimum of 25 litres per person 
per day to force the court to engage with the studies and expert evidence and 
consider defining a minimum core of the right. With the evidence presented it cannot 
be said that the court did not have the capacity, expertise or information to make a 
decision on a basic minimum. The court maintained that it is ordinarily inappropriate 
for it, as an institution, to determine what steps should be taken to realise a right 
and precisely what that right entails.156 Whilst it can be argued that not determining 
the full content of the right was correct,157 the court missed a chance to seriously 
debate the minimum content of the right and then question government with a 
presumption of unreasonableness158 of this is not being fulfilled. Thus it is argued 
here that South Africa has done well establishing reasonableness and toeing the 
line of adjudication and separation of powers, but an opportunity was missed to add 
minimum core content of constitutional rights to the reasonableness test. 
However, Humby and Grandbois argue that Mazibuko was the correct decision 
because of South Africa’s limit resources to provide the amount of water needed.159 
This somewhat misses the purpose of a minimum core that is subject to resource 
constraints. It merely contends that if a minimum core is not being fulfilled serious 
questions have to be asked of government. If it can be justified by a lack of 
resources then there is no breach of the right. Ought implies can.  
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  3.2.2 Columbia 
 
Fortunately, whilst South Africa provides us with an example of one part of 
appropriate ESC rights jurisprudence framework, the test of reasonableness, the 
other aspect with regards to the minimum core and direct entitlements for children 
can be found in the example of the Columbian Constitutional Court.160 The first of 
two important cases was in 1998 and focused on children’s access to vaccines.161 
Indeed Columbia is promising for children’s rights because in a way similar to Brazil, 
which established the priority of child’s rights as a constitutional norm, the 
Columbian Constitution explicitly states in Article 44 that children have the right to 
health and that “[t]he rights of children prevail over the rights of others.”162  
 
   3.2.2.1 SU-225/98 
 
Case SU-225/98 on a child’s right to healthcare services was brought by the parents 
of 418 children in Bogotá. It was argued that these children were particularly 
vulnerable and at high risk because of their living conditions and because the 
parents could not afford to meet the costs of the necessary vaccines to prevent 
meningitis to these children, thus violating their constitutional rights. The 
Constitutional Court agreed163 accepting such basic care as part of the minimum 
content of the right to health. The Court also established immediate application of a 
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minimum core beyond politics and decisions of representatives.164 In exercising an 
appropriate amount of discretion, the Court concluded “that only the essential 
content of the right can be directly applied by the judge, while it is legislature which 
must define the full scope of the right.”165 
Thus the Court found that the vaccination was part of the minimum core and subject 
to immediate application thus the failure to provide it was a breach of the right. This 
essential content being immediate entitlements, yet allowing deference to the 
government to further the scope of the right to health, is the jurisprudence of 
Columbia further developed in the next case. Decided 10 years later by the same 
court, it would seem to address the problems seen in Brazil of a flood of litigation 
due to directly enforceable rights and easy access to the courts. Nolan argues that 
failure to make the right a direct claim for children risks allowing the right to be 
meaningless but acknowledges the risk of such a position to a flood of litigation like 
that seen in Brazil.166 
 
   3.2.2.2 T-760/08 
 
In 2008 the Columbian Constitutional Court made a landmark decision that 
completely changed the country’s health policy. 167  Columbia accepts individual 
claims for rights much like Brazil via tutela’s (protection writs) which, similarly to the 
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Public-Interest Litigation of India, has enhanced access to courts by ensuring limited 
procedural requirements. Much like Brazil, this led to high amounts of litigation168 
with a similar success rate of approximately 80% of tutelas being granted in order to 
resolve the individual case before the court. 169  In the case of T-760, the 
Constitutional Court brought together 22 tutelas to illustrate the structural and 
systemic problems in the health system that had led to overuse of tutelas. Whilst 
resolving these 22 cases the court called for a complete systemic transformation 
because the government had not established a way of guaranteeing the right to 
health without recourse to the tutela.170 In directing this transformation the court 
reiterated its own previously established jurisdiction on the enforcement of the right 
to health and importantly reiterated its jurisprudence on the minimum core 
obligations of the State. In Columbia there was a two-tier system of health benefits: 
the contributory regime (Plan Obligatorio de Salud or POS) for those earning twice 
the minimum wage, and the subsidised regime (Plan Obligatorio de Salud 
Subsidiado or POSS) for those earning less, which also provides significantly less 
benefits of the POS.171 They were generally successful as before 1993, 24% of the 
                                                          
168
 Gianella-Malca C, Gloppen S, and Fosse E, 'Giving Effect to Children's Right to Health in 
Colombia? Analysing the Implementation of Court Decisions Ordering Health System 
Reform' (2013) 5 Journal of Human Rights Practice 153, 167 where it is highlighted that in 
2008 alone more than 140,000 right to health claims were taken to the courts. This dropped 
to 94,500 in 2010. 
169
 Yamin AE, and Parra-Vera O, 'How do courts set health policy? The case of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court.' (2009) 6 PLOS Medicine e1000032; see Sentencia No. T-
760 de 2008 J. Magister Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa (Corte Constitucional de Colombia) 
at 6, “la adopción de órdenes encaminadas únicamente a resolver los casos concretos es 
insuficiente ya que, además de que las mismas situaciones se siguen presentando 
reiteradamente, el número de tutelas para acceder a servicios de salud tiene una sólida 
tendencia a crecer”. The adoption of orders directed only to resolve individual cases is 
insufficient because, in addition to the same situations occurring repeatedly, the number of 
tutelas to access health services has a strong tendency to grow. 
170
 Yamin AE, and Parra-Vera O (n 169).  
171
 POS included approximately 60% more services than the subsidised scheme POSS; see 
Gianella-Malca C, Gloppen S, and Fosse E (n 168) 157; see also Giedion U, and Villar Uribe 
M, 'Colombia's Universal Health Insurance System' (2009) 28 Health Affairs 853; This 
system is based on Law 100 of 1993 which created Empresas Promotoras de Salud ((EPS) 
Health Promoting Entities) that are either public, private or mixed to offer health insurance 
under one of the two regimes. 




population had health insurance, and in 2007 this was above 80%.172 The benefits 
provided in these systems have been interpreted by the court as defining the 
minimum core of the right to health.173 
In 2008, the court reiterated this jurisprudence but went further in calling for specific 
changes to the plans themselves. “The judgment seeks progressive realisation of 
universal coverage by 2010, with compliance deadlines in 2008 and 2009.”174 As 
part of this universal coverage, unification of the POS and POSS systems was 
ordered, as the minimum content was not being fulfilled in the subsidised regime. It 
was also reaffirmed that these systems constitute the minimum core content of the 
right to health which is immediately enforceable and more urgent in the case of 
children.175 
It has been suggested that several cases in Columbia have explicitly embraced the 
minimum core content of ESC rights, 176  with the aim of reducing unnecessary 
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litigation via the tutela. 177  Importantly the court did not defer entirely to the 
government on the content of the right once these orders had been made. The court 
explicitly adopted the CESCR’s minimum core and the definition of the right to 
health given by General Comment 14. 178  The court reiterated in its ruling the 
immediately enforceable nature of the minimum core, whilst accepting the 
progressive realisation of other elements of the right to health subject to resource 
constraints.179 
 
  3.2.3 Guaranteeing the Rights of the Child 
 
Columbia is of particular importance for the rights of the child. In 2010, 56% of 
children were from households considered poor, which meant, before T-760/08, 
they could only gain access to the more limited POS-S health plan.180 As noted, the 
court focused on the special protection given to children by the constitution and 
gave a specific order, order 21, that child POS should be unified as a matter of 
highest priority by October 2009. 181  Of course, such judgments, whilst very 
promising, are not a panacea and guarantor of a substantial improvement in 
healthcare. As predicted by Hamilton and epitomised by Jackson, courts have a 
vital role, but how effective their role and decisions actually are, is decided by the 
executive and legislative branches. There have been suggestions that children from 
poor families still face barriers to accessing those services found in the more 
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substantial POS, and these are often administrative, only adding to the 
disappointment.182  
 
  3.2.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
When a breach of children’s rights is found, then appropriate adjudication and 
orders are required such as those seen in Columbia and South Africa. The specific 
orders of the Columbian Constitutional Court of restructuring and the immediate 
implementation of a minimum core may be thought to overstep the division of 
powers in a democratic State and lead to the pitfalls seen in India or Brazil, but 
some commentators have suggested the structural approach taken avoids these 
problems.183 Yamin and Parra-Vera point out that “the Court does not assume it 
knows best what benefits should be included under the POS/POSS, nor the precise 
ethical grounds for making these determinations.” 184  Thus the court avoids the 
specifics, deferring to government to make those decisions as to detail, but instead 
decides to order government to make those decisions in line with its international 
obligations under General Comment 14.185 This goes to show, in contrast to South 
Africa, how a minimum core content of the right to health established in international 
law can be used in constitutional courts. South Africa focused on a test of 
reasonableness, whether the policies of government were understandable given the 
circumstances, whereas Columbia focused on ensuring government protected the 
basic minimum of the right to health, but deferred to government to decide the 
specific details. It is argued here that both of these types of jurisprudence on the 
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right to health provide lessons for the enforcement, implementation, and justiciability 
of ESC rights in international law. These two approaches will be amalgamated in the 
next part to form a jurisprudential framework that could avoid many of the pitfalls 
seen on both sides of the fine line courts have to walk. These two courts show that 
a courts general role to make governments accountable, can be extended to 
fundamental ESC rights.186 
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Addressing the Problem 
 
Part B now seeks to address the problems raised and explored in Part A and by 
doing so, will answer directly the fundamtenal, single research question of this 
thesis: can we find a way to convince everyone of a child’s right to healthcare, and, 
if so, can we find ways of ensuring it through better enforcement? By directly 
addressing the two parts of that question, even the most minimal moral obligations 
of the State will be found to contain a child’s right to healthcare; and better 
implementation and enforcement of international human rights law will be proposed 
with specific suggestions of change. 
The focus for the philosophical arguments at the start of this Part of the thesis is the 
most ardent, ‘right-wing’ Republican views in the United States, which firmly 
believes healthcare is a commodity to be bought on the open-market and that 
government has no place infringing freedom by spending taxes on the healthcare of 
others. It seems certain that such individuals would remain completely unconvinced 
by such theories as the capabilities approach and so to answer the first research 
question of Part B, a more minimal, conservative theory of justice, which seeks to 
argue the very basic principles a State must have in order to be considered just, 
such as John Rawls’ Theory of Justice, might be more persuasive. Therefore if a 
right to healthcare can be found through such a theory, it could go a long way to 
changing the mind-set of people opposed to the idea of healthcare as a State 
obligation. The problem of children within such a theory needs to be addressed in 
order to establish their position, especially given some of the confusion in the 
literature. This is undertaken and clarified before moving the theory of justice 
forward and applying it globally. This is done in opposition to John Rawls himself, 




but it has been widely argued that his own extension of his theory is contradictory, 
and that actually the moral arguments used in the Theory of Justice naturally make 
a child’s right to healthcare a global as well as a State obligation, in beginning to 
answer the second research question as to whether the geneal thesis arguments 
can be globalised. If this moral argument is accepted then there is a clear deficit in 
the current system, as seen in Part A, and therefore discussion in this part finishes 
with suggestions as to how this can be done. This is the aim of the second section 
of chapter five, which brings together the lessons learnt in chapter three in order to 
suggest an appropriate way to adjudicate the right to healthcare on a global scale. 
Chapter five focuses on globalising the main ideas in this thesis; Rawls’ moral 
underpinning requiring a minimum standard of children’s healthcare; and the 
effective implementation and enforcement of a child’s right to healthcare via 
effective and respected adjudication. This then moves discussion onto the final 
chapter, which focuses on how these lofty goals may be achieved in direct answer 
to the final research question of how the global application of the ideas would look in 
practice.. From discussing a World Court of Human Rights, to rearranging the 
finances of the World Bank and the IMF, the focus is clear in demanding change if 
we are to realise and effectively implement and enforce a child’s right to healthcare 















Justice and the Role of the State 
 
The thesis now turns to more philosophical discussion of the role and obligations of 
any State that considers itself just and will use the famous work of John Rawls as its 
paradigm. It will discuss the hypothetical exercise Rawls’ proposes as a major 
deviation from traditional social contract theories in order to establish the governing 
principles for a just society. In discussing the impact of Rawls’ theory, it will be found 
to include healthcare with the work of Norman Daniels largely being followed. 
Daniels argues convincingly that the principle of equality of opportunity means 
protecting health just as much as it means providing education (which Rawls himself 
argues),1 and therefore Daniels successfully extends Rawls’ theory to include a 
State obligation to provide healthcare. This extension through the second principle2 
is especially poignant for children who require even more opportunities,3 and a 
necessary part of the opportunity to be healthy is the provision of healthcare. There 
remains no right to health as there can be no guarantee that someone will be 
healthy, but the opportunity must be equal. This necessitates equal access to 
quality healthcare services. 
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After discussion of this aspect of a theory of justice, the difficult challenge of 
incorporating children within it will be explored. As a form of social contract theory, 
John Rawls imagines rational adults, who are ignorant of personal knowledge, 
developing principles of justice, and at first sight children seem to be absent from 
this process and not contractors themselves. The aim is to show that the State still 
has obligations towards children in accordance with the basic principles of justice. 
Starting from the premise that one of the most fundamental and universally 
accepted obligations of the State is to ensure a just and fair society, this chapter 
begins with discussion outlining John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness. Such an 
approach may be questioned if the aim is to ground a right to healthcare, yet it will 
be shown, and has been widely accepted from a human rights perspective, that 
“health is a matter of justice”.4  
Rights can merely be considered as “bawling upon paper”5 without philosophical 
justification. Thus, it is inappropriate to jump straight to the word rights and expect 
persuasive resolutions of distributive justice.6 “Rights are not moral fruits that spring 
up from bare earth, fully ripened, without cultivation. Rather, we may claim a right to 
health or health care only if it can be harvested from an acceptable general theory 
of distributive justice”.7 This explains the Rawlsian starting point and the use of a 
theory of distributive justice. Whilst not a full acceptance of Rawls, the influence of 
this theory,8 as well as its comparatively minimalist principles to other theories that 
provide similar justification for the State to provide healthcare to all children, explain 
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why this is the chosen groundwork. As one of the main opponents of Rawls, who 
does submit a more minimal theory, has admitted, “[p]olitical philosophy now must 
either work within Rawls’ theory or explain why not.”9 Rawls’ theory is considered 
the most minimal that can find a right to healthcare and also can be appropriately 
applied to society.10 
The work of Rawls used in this chapter, applies his theory as it stands, without need 
for amendment or drastic extension, and will establish that children have a moral 
right to healthcare in any society, of any size, that can be considered just, which in 
turn has an obligation to provide it. This powerful jurisprudential grounding of a 
child’s right to healthcare then allows for more pragmatic discussion on what has 
been, and can be, done to fulfil this right.  For now, the thesis returns to outlining the 
minimal theory of justice to argue that if a child’s right to healthcare can be found 
even on such a limited theory of what any just society must provide, the conclusions 
are surely more powerful than on more elaborative ones that require much greater 
justification for the obligation.11 
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4.1 A Just Society and the Obligations of the State 
 
 
John Rawls’ theory of justice argues for basic, minimal, principles that should 
govern a just and fair society.12 Rawls argues that this basic structure of society and 
how institutions distribute rights is the primary subject of justice. 13  Rawls is 
concerned with the institutions of a society and not the justice of individual actions, 
thus he argues for different principles which, if adhered to by the various institutions, 
would ensure a just and fair society. These ground rules would be chosen in 
advance by some fair procedure and Rawls explains the name for this basic 
concept of the theory; ‘justice as fairness’.14 The term “conveys the idea that the 
principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair”,15 not that justice 
and fairness are the same.  
 
  4.1.1 The Veil of Ignorance 
 
Rawls himself successfully circumvents critics who disagree with the pragmatics of 
his theory by making his social contract a hypothetical exercise rather than a 
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historical reality. He emphasises this point by making his “single most important 
departure from traditional social contract theory”,16  the ‘veil of ignorance’.17  The 
purpose of this veil is to make the contractors ignorant of who they are, their desires, 
skills, and so on, so that when deciding the principles there is no way the 
contractors can manipulate them to their own advantage. Rawls describes at length 
the ignorance contractors will have in the original position: 
[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or 
social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution 
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, 
and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception 
of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even 
the special features of his psychology such as aversion to 
risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I 
assume that the parties do not know the particular 
circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know 
its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization 
and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the 
original position have no information as to which generation 
they belong.18  
In this way it can be seen how Rawls creates his initial situation that is fair,19 
because he removes all knowledge of all morally arbitrary attributes an individual 
may possess. Rawls argues that contractors should be put in to this original position, 
or behind the ‘veil of ignorance’, and only when this is done can fair principles of 
justice be reached that should be followed in the contractors’ society. This 
philosophically favoured interpretation of the hypothetical original position ensures 
that agreements reached will be fair and the principles can be appealed to in any 
disputes over justice once the veil is lifted.20 These principles cannot be to any 
individual’s advantage, partly because of each individual’s lack of knowledge, but 
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also because these principles have to be agreed to unanimously by all the 
contractors.21 Thus these principles will also be minimal as the original position is 
“designed to reconcile by reason . . . what all parties to the discussion hold in 
common.”22 No inappropriate reasoning is allowed behind the veil and in this way 
the veil of ignorance is thick, as opposed to thin, which means any and all undue 
influences will not exist behind the veil. A thin veil may allow some knowledge over 
who the individuals are or the society they will enter, whereas a thick veil removes 
all such knowledge. Rawls defends this by, in essence, appealing to minimalism 
which is also one of the main reasons I invoke Rawls’ conception of justice. A thick 
veil of ignorance could be a weakness because it does not allow the use of 
comprehensive doctrines, which are of great importance, yet Rawls defends this by 
essentially saying that is the whole point of his theory. In a society there will be 
many diverse comprehensive doctrines which may all be reasonable, and the 
objective of the political conception of justice is to be able to gain the support of all 
citizens, even those with differing doctrines. Thus Rawls is seeking for that 
overlapping consensus which all citizens can agree to.  
Putting peoples’ comprehensive doctrines behind a veil of 
ignorance enables us to find a political conception of justice 
that can be the focus of an overlapping consensus and 
thereby serve as a public basis of justification in a society 
marked by the fact of reasonable pluralism.23  
Given the hypothetical exercise that this contract is, and given the lack of 
knowledge each contractor has, Rawls is right in suggesting that each individual 
who undertakes such an exercise will decide on the same principles. The individuals 
in the original position must all be rational beings, and with their ignorance about 
themselves, it is argued that this means all contractors are so similar as to render 
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the need for consensus and placing more than one party in the original position, 
obsolete.24 Rawls, whilst not explicitly saying so, would seem to admit part of this.25 
The contractors are different people but they do not know how they are different. So 
consensus is required even though they will be convinced by the same arguments 
because the knowledge that consensus is required, and thus the publicity of 
arguments, will influence the principles proposed and chosen. The principles are 
based on what all the contractors have in common, which is a large part of their 
justification,26 and contrasts with the idea of consensus being obsolete because the 
contractors are so similar, that is rational beings with no personal knowledge.27 The 
principles must be chosen as a public conception and thus the rationale behind the 
principles must be available to everyone and acceptable to all members of society. 
So the contractors know they must all agree, even though they are all influenced in 
the same way, and it is argued by Rawls that this knowledge is what makes the 
contract and requirement for consensus valuable and not redundant.28 
Rawls argues that the principles that can be agreed to will be a small list, and much 
smaller than the list of things contractors may rationally choose. Thus he is stating a 
difference between the class of things contractors would want, and the principles 
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they would agree to, to govern their society. These principles would be minimal and 
universal because of knowledge of the contract, the necessary unanimous 
agreement, and the knowledge that they must be obeyed once the ‘veil of ignorance’ 
is lifted.29 Broadly speaking these principles are, firstly, equal basic liberty, and 
secondly, that inequalities are acceptable only if the worst off are better off and 
there is equality of opportunity.  
Rawls suggests that any rational person can, at any time, undergo this hypothetical 
exercise and pull the veil over themselves. Rawls’ argument is that if we do that, 
and then try to form principles of justice for our society, we will inevitably come up 
with the same basic and minimal principles he argues for. As Ronald Dworkin 
explains: 
Rawls does not suppose that any group ever entered into a 
social contract of the sort he describes. He argues only that 
if a group of rational men did find themselves in the 
predicament of the original position, they would contract for 
the two principles. . . Rawls supposes, for example, that his 
men would inevitably choose conservative principles 
because this would be the only rational choice, in their 
ignorance, for self-interested men to make.30 
With no information about ourselves, we would be forced to approach the principles 
of justice from a “disinterested vantage point”.31 The aim of the ‘veil of ignorance’ is 
to “nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt 
them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.” 32 
Moreover, “[t]he agreement or contract is explicitly a hypothetical one, expressing 
what free and equal rational persons would choose for their conception of justice.”33 
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The ‘veil of ignorance’ is also the paragon of another concept Rawls has established 
in his theory of justice; that of pure procedural justice.34  The idea behind pure 
procedural justice “is to design the social system so that the outcome is just 
whatever it happens to be, at least so long as it is within a certain range.”35 Rawls 
illustrates this using gambling and engaging in fair bets. As long as the bets are fair 
and entered into voluntarily, then the outcome, whatever it is, is fair. Pure 
procedural justice “obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right result: 
instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct 
or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed”.36 It is 
the background circumstances that ensure a fair procedure. This is also what 
ensures that the principles designed in the original position are the principles of 
justice.37 So it can be seen how creating the ‘veil of ignorance’ in the way that Rawls 
does is designed to be the first and most fundamental example of pure procedural 
justice, and ensure that the outcomes from the original position will be fair and just. 
 
  4.1.2 The Principles of Justice 
 
Despite this hypothetical veil of ignorance as an example of pure procedural justice 
to ensure fair and just principles, Rawls does not leave his theory there for us to 
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think about. Instead he offers his own extensive arguments on what basic, minimum, 
uncontested principles would logically be chosen by the rational beings in the 
original position.38 As mentioned, the requirement of publicity and the thought that 
will occur to the contractors that the principles they decide must be acceptable to 
everyone, will lead to the minimal principles Rawls suggests.  
The final formulation Rawls presents of the two principles is; 
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme 
is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the 
difference principle).39  
The relationship between the original position and the principles of justice is a 
deductive one,40 and Rawls uses many arguments to defend his position that these 
are the two principles that would be chosen in the original position. One strategy 
used is that this conception of justice would be seen as better than the alternatives, 
particularly utilitarianism, as it makes the position of the worst off better than other 
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viable options. 41  Another general argument Rawls uses, is a focus on the 
consensus required making the two principles the only feasible proposal. He argues 
the parties “can rely on one another to adhere to the principles adopted”42 since 
everyone’s good is affirmed, there are no consequences that would be seen as 
unacceptable, and no one is asked to accept less liberty or a loss of freedom, as 
may be the case in some alternatives such as utilitarianism.43 This conception of 
justice therefore publicly expresses respect for each individual in a scheme of 
mutual benefit, adding to the generation of its own support and thus stability as 
everyone’s good is affirmed, and enhances the argument that these principles are 
the best feasible proposal.44 
A final argument Rawls uses is an appeal to intuition. Hare argues that Rawls would 
not call himself an intuitionist but acknowledges we cannot avoid all appeals to 
intuition. 45  Hare criticises the theoretical structure as tailored to fit Rawls’ own 
subjective, intuitionist position, whereas Rawls believes that he is arguing 
objectively for the principles that would be chosen if people are put in such a 
position and think long and hard enough about it.46 However, one basic notion of 
intuition will be used to ensure that the principles chosen do not disagree with our 
most basic notions of justice, or common sense convictions,47 and thus by going 
back and forth with this we will eventually reach what Rawls calls reflective 
equilibrium. The starting point for a reflective equilibrium is that anyone has the 
capacity to reason and a sense of justice providing them with certain convictions all 
of which could be rational and reasonable. However the need for consensus 
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requires these separate convictions to be analysed and carefully considered as 
some will need to be withdrawn. Our considered judgments duly adjusted will lead 
to matching principles; this adjustment is reflective equilibrium. As the contractors 
have the same public conception of political justice they can all think through with 
considered judgements from various perspectives and at this stage they reach full, 
general, reflective equilibrium.48 But by removing the individual conception of the 
good from the contractors, the intuition could be said to come from what the parties 
will agree, and in this way there is no reason to suppose that Rawls is wrong to 
suggest his intuition would not fit everyone else’s in the same position.  
Rawls also suggests that in the original position the parties will agree there are 
certain things called ‘primary social goods’.49 These “are things which it is supposed 
a rational man wants whatever else he wants”50 and regardless of his life plan 
because more of them would always be preferred over less. They are designed to 
be universal and timeless,51 although he admits they may be added to should it 
prove necessary.52 The primary social goods Rawls proposes, “in broad categories, 
are rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth”53 as well as self-
respect which Rawls discusses later.54 Questions have been raised about how one 
might weigh important factors against these primary social goods, such as health 
status,55 and Rawls’ response, that his theory is an ideal theory envisaging an ideal 
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human condition, is far from a satisfactory one.56 Fortunately, Barry has stated that 
we can see the primary social goods as a means to those important ends,57 and 
Daniels has also taken up this challenge by extending the second principle and 
provided a much more palatable response to be discussed in more detail later. 
Rawls suggests that in the original position it will be agreed these primary social 
goods will be distributed equally; 
[T]he sensible thing is to acknowledge as the first step a 
principle of justice requiring an equal distribution. Indeed, 
this principle is so obvious given the symmetry of the parties 
that it would occur to everyone immediately. Thus the parties 
start with a principle requiring equal basic liberties for all, as 
well as fair equality of opportunity and equal division of 
income and wealth.58  
Yet as rational, intelligent beings, the intuition of those in the original position will 
lead to the question, what if some inequalities make everyone better off?59 Rawls 
thus defends his difference principle, that inequalities in wealth are acceptable as 
long as the worst off are better off.60 Yet less than equal liberty will not be allowed, 
because this is against the intuition of basic justice and one of the key arguments 
against utilitarianism and so the principles are lexically ordered, giving priority to 
liberty and meaning liberty can only be restricted for the sake of liberty. A line will be 
drawn, and allowing less than equal liberty for the sake of any other good will not be 
accepted, thus explaining the lexical ordering of the two principles.61 
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Rawls himself accepts that these principles may need to change and that additions 
will be made.62 As part of his appeal to intuition he suggests that we will reflect on 
the conditions of the original position63 and if they yield obviously unjust outcomes 
then they may be changed. Rawls believes there are more universal principles to be 
added which only serves to support the basic and minimal nature of the two he does 
set down. Yet it is the justification for equality that is most important for establishing 
a right to healthcare, and the principle of equality of opportunity that the ‘obvious’ 
thoughts of the parties would lead to. In actual fact it is the principle of fair equality 
of opportunity, which is stronger than formal equality of opportunity because it 
demands effective equal chances regardless of the natural lottery and the talents 
one may or may not have.64 Fair equality therefore demands rectification of being 
dealt a bad hand in the natural lottery to realise equal opportunity, as opposed to 
formal which would merely have the principle in law but seldom in reality. This is 
poignant for healthcare as for those born in ill-health, every effort should be made to 
make them healthy and able to realise the same opportunities as those fortunate 
enough to be born healthy. This requirement of fair as opposed to formal equality 
can be used to justify the cooperation built into the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. 65  The Convention envisages international cooperation to help ensure the 
rights of children in developing States and Rawls’ theory can support this legal 
pragmatism.66 
 
  4.1.3 Lifting the Veil 
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After the contractors accept Rawls’ principles of justice, the difficult work begins as 
the veil of ignorance is partially lifted and the society is challenged with crafting a 
constitution and legal structure, all in accordance with the basic principles. As Rawls 
explains; “they are to choose the most effective just constitution, the constitution 
that satisfies the principles of justice and is best calculated to lead to just and 
effective legislation.”67 Rawls proposes a four stage sequence, the first being the 
original position and the later three stages where the principles gradually become 
more elaborated in detail as specific interpretation of the law of the society takes 
place. The additional stages are; constitutional, legislative, and judicial. “[T]his 
sequence may give us a schema for sorting out the complications that must be 
faced. Each stage is to represent an appropriate point of view from which certain 
kinds of questions are considered.”68 The contractors still lack some knowledge of 
their own personal interests, but even if the veil is only lifted slightly, this removes 
any guarantees of unanimous agreement. Yet the principles of justice have been set 
down. The underlying principles that govern such a society have been decided and 
help ensure that despite all the politics that comes afterwards, the society will 
remain fair. The principles of justice have the paradox of being fundamentally 
paramount, a phrase which is a parallel juxtaposition because it places the 
opposites of basic and supreme together, yet it is a paradox because it is true for 
the principles of justice. They are fundamental as they are minimal, base 
conceptions that hold such paramount importance in governing and ensuring a just 
society, but will be largely forgotten once the constitution is written and legislation 
passed. They are universal minimums, but their importance cannot be 
underestimated. This ideal society, governed by the principles of justice as fairness, 
is unlike any we know. Rawls’ hypothetical exercise helps us think purely about 
what a just and fair society would be like. “The picture that comes into focus is not 
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that of our blemished actual society, but rather of that society purged of its 
conspicuous injustices, and true to its noblest ideals.”69 
There are many things about Rawls’ substantial theory that are omitted in this 
discussion, and some criticisms that will be addressed below. However, whilst 
further discussion of Rawls is interesting, it is the ‘veil of ignorance’ and the minimal 
principles of justice that are important for establishing a right to healthcare. This 
thesis also looks at establishing a child’s right to healthcare, so children in a 
‘Rawlsian society’ will need to be given specific focus, as well as the international 
law aspect of the thesis, meaning discussion will turn to laying out the part of Rawls’ 
philosophy that focuses on global justice in the next chapter. 
 
4.1.4 Critics  
 
As a form of social contract theory, Rawls’ theory of justice imagines members of a 
society to be contractors who have agreed to certain fundamental conditions and 
governing principles before entering their society.70 Critics have argued that such an 
approach ignores human nature and the struggles of humanity, which any theory of 
justice cannot simply ignore.71  They point to its incompatibility with any human 
society, past or present, as evidence that it cannot fit or comply with human nature. 
Miller uses Marxist theory and the idea that the ruling best-off individuals have never 
given up any power voluntarily to argue that Rawls’ difference principle, the idea of 
ensuring the worst-off are as best off as possible, would not work.72 He assumes 
that the ruling class would be against the changes required by the difference 
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principle even if they had a sense of justice as defined by Rawls’ principles.73 
Daniels uses similar arguments stating that Rawls’ theory will produce inequalities 
of liberty disagreeing with Rawls’ first principle. He suggests that allowing 
differences and inequalities in wealth will allow a best-off class to be established 
that historically has always had more liberty and more ability to express 
themselves.74 The argument is that money equals speech, in much the same way 
as we have political parties requiring money for campaigning today. Rawls’ 
response is that liberty and the worth of liberty are different; people would still be 
free and liberty itself remains the same, but the worth of liberty will be more for 
those who can exercise it better.75 Both of these arguments boil down to the fact 
that Rawls’ theory would not work perfectly in practice, even with the best of 
intentions, in much the same way as George Orwell’s Animal Farm where 
seemingly fair and strict rules are slowly changed and broken by a ruling class that 
inevitably materialises.76 However, it is important to note that such criticisms miss a 
major point of Rawls’ theory; its concern with ideal theory.77 Rawls is concerned with 
establishing a just society in which the principles of justice are followed, and 
nowhere does Rawls pretend or even hint that this has occurred anywhere in 
human history. To say that Rawls’ theory does not comply with society now or any 
that has existed in history is to say that societies past and present have not been 
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just: A statement which will cause scant controversy.78 One of Miller’s strongest 
arguments however is that if it can be shown that Rawls’ theory will not work in 
practice, the contractors will know this lack of pragmatism and therefore will not 
choose the principles proposed, particularly the difference principle.79 However this 
is not entirely convincing. Miller argues that we cannot remove consideration of 
probable outcomes from the original position,80  but what he fails to then follow 
through with is that even if correct, the majority of contractors will not be, or end up, 
in the ruling class, so they will also consider this with the possible outcomes. This is 
part of Rawls’ argument that the contractors would not gamble against the principles 
on the chance that they might be the best-off.81 Barry is not convinced contractors 
would not gamble.82 He believes that when the chance is below a certain point, we 
would gamble, but on Rawls’ theory the contractors must not. Rawls states that the 
contractors would rationally choose considered conservative principles, imagining 
what it would be like to be in the position of the worst-off, hence the difference 
principle; maximising the minimum.83 It would be rational for people in the original 
position to consider this even if they think it may be difficult in practice, in much the 
same way as equal liberty will be broken when someone breaks the law. The more 
practical implications of exercising these principles will be considered after the veil 
of ignorance has been lifted. Behind the veil, the knowledge is highly restricted and 
the economic circumstances and type of society is unknown. Rawls’ difference 
principle is not designed to state that all decisions post original position that are 
even a slight gamble are irrational, but that the structure of society agreed would be 
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to ensure the minimum is maximised via things such as welfare and opportunity 
(things to be further elaborated upon after the original position).84 It makes perfect 
sense not to gamble on things such as liberty, welfare, opportunity and so on, 
because the cost of losing is so severe. If the position of the worst off is intolerable, 
there is a justice deficit in that society,85 therefore we would choose a difference 
principle to try to ensure against this. Rawls himself considers some practical 
criticisms against the difference principle by acknowledging that in theory improving 
the position of the best off by an incredible amount would depend on increasing the 
position of the worst off by even the smallest amount.86 “[I]t seems extraordinary 
that the justice of increasing the expectations of the better placed by a billion dollars, 
say, should turn on whether the prospects of the least favoured increase or 
decrease by a penny.”87 Rawls’ response is that this would not really arise and 
become a problem, which is probably true, and certainly for a well-structured and 
fair society yet additionally that extra penny to the worst off is worth a lot more than 
an extra billion dollars to the best off, and this is the whole point of the difference 
principle and one its key strengths. 
 
4.1.4.1 Feminist Critics 
 
With a focus on children in this thesis and the subsequent discussion of children in 
the Rawlsian society, the critique of feminist literature on Rawls’ theory of justice 
should be considered. Much of the focus is obviously on women, children, and the 
family, and their consideration or lack thereof in the theory. There is a reason 
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however why such criticisms have not gained much traction in the literature; they 
are based on a fundamental misconception of Rawls. 
The first to consider is that by Carole Pateman, who in the Sexual Contract,88 
argues against the idea of a social contract as a whole because it seeks to 
legitimate the subordination of women. For Rawls specifically, she argues that he 
seeks to find an original position that will “confirm ‘our’ intuitions about exisiting 
institutions, which include patriarchal relations of subordination.”89 A social contract 
seeks the conventional origin of political right, which insists men’s right over women 
has a natural basis. 90  As men, women, relationships and the family are not 
considered in Rawls’ theory, this, according to Pateman, means that it is even more 
likely that the state of nature as portrayed will accept and legitimate the subjugation 
of women. In actual fact, traditional contract theory is preferred by Pateman for at 
least considering gender and relationships.91 So Pateman attacks Rawls for what is 
regarded as one of his biggest strengths; the thick veil of ignorance. She attacks a 
theory designed by its very nature to remove prejudice and the ability to subjugate 
anyone, by preferring to have prejudice and subjugation. The feminist is 
disappointed women are not given special treatment and consideration in a 
completely gender free society. The argument also goes that the subordination of 
women is part of our intuition, which, aside from being a sad state of affairs to 
believe, also does not consider the contractors, who may well be women 
themselves. This is why the subjugation of anyone, including women, would not be 
allowed by the principles of justice. They are guaranteed equal liberty and equal 
opportunity. Everyone is. Gender is not a consideration. Nor should it be. To bring 
gender and relationships into consideration behind the veil changes the theory and 
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its purpose drastically. This moves us neatly onto the next feminist criticism of 
Rawls, which is the claim that the principles of justice do not apply to the family. 
Okin and Nussbaum posit a more challenging critique of Rawls in seeing the failure 
to subject the family to the principles of justice as a fundamental flaw of the theory.92 
They argue that the family is not a private association as Rawls suggests but in 
actual fact; “The state constitutes the family structure through its laws, defining 
which groups of people can count as families”.93 Thus the family is, to a large extent, 
a State creation and therefore the principles should apply. Nussbaum’s argument 
that the family is to a large extent the creation of the State is surely contentious as 
societies idea of family is not always the same as the law, and indeed both have 
changed even over the last few years, for instance with gay marriage and the law 
responding to societies changing views. Okin argues a similar point that it is the 
structure of the family that should be subject to the principles of justice or else the 
gendered family structure that will result will not be just and will promulgate the 
ancient subjugation of women. 
[A]lthough one has some choice (albeit a highly constrained 
one) about marrying into a gender-structured family, one has 
no choice at all about being born into one. Rawls’s failure to 
subject the structure of the family to his principles of justice 
is particularly serious in light of his belief that a theory of 
justice must take account of “how [individuals] get to be what 
they are” and “cannot take their final aims and interests, their 
attitudes to themselves and their life, as given.”94 
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Rawls responds directly to this criticism by failing to see the problem within the 
scope of his theory. The objection that the principles do not apply to the family is 
one Rawls has no problem with because it is not what his theory is trying to achieve, 
yet the objection that this lack of application will mean unequal justice for women 
and children is also one Rawls rejects. In a direct response to Okin, Rawls states; 
This is a misconception. It may arise as follows: the primary 
subject of justice is the basic structure of society understood 
as the arrangement of society’s main institutions into a 
unified system of social cooperation over time. The 
principles of political justice are to apply directly to this 
structure, but they are not to apply directly to the internal life 
of the many associations within it, the family among them.95 
The principles are not and never were designed to be applied to the family structure. 
If they were to be applied, as is called for, Rawls hardly sees this as desirable, as it 
would require raising children in accordance with political principles determined by 
society. Whilst there should be some conception of justice, at some point the natural 
affection of parents must be trusted by society, so feminists should be wary of 
treating the family structure and children as State institutions to be governed by the 
principles of justice.96  
   4.1.4.2 Habermas and Rawls 
 
Jürgen Habermas has also commented extensively on Rawls’ work in light of his 
own theory geared towards ideal discourse. The focus for the criticism of Habermas 
is on the constraints Rawls’ places on his theory, particularly on the original position 
and the two principles thereafter. For Habermas, these principles are not necessary, 
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and the entire theory, by its constrained nature, is dependent on Rawls’ own 
substantive normative assumptions as a US citizen.97 Habermas’ theory is one of 
so-called ideal discourse which Rawls’ suggests is based on another difference 
between them; Habermas is concerned with a comprehensive doctrine, whereas 
Rawls has limited himself to the political.98 From this difference, Habermas takes up 
ideal discourse as opposed to Rawls who uses the original position.  
For Habermas, the principles of justice are unnecessary because such constraints 
to ensure just and reasonable outcomes will occur naturally in democratic discourse. 
Post original position, for Rawls, the two principles constrain majority rule to ensure 
a just outcome. For Habermas, this substantive constraint is unnecessary as there 
is no criteria for what constitutes the right answer before argumentation, yet there 
are guiding values for ideal discourse.99 These values are to ensure that discourse 
is ideal which in turn will then lead to natural constraints to ensure just outcomes 
without the need for substantive pre-approved constraints. However Rawls argues 
that these values are by their nature the substantive constraints Habermas seeks to 
avoid. These values are included in the procedure of discourse to ensure outcomes 
are just and reasonable, so by their nature they are substantive principles.100 
Secondly Habermas has also mentioned that the entire theory is constrained by 
Rawls own view as the theorist and designer, necessarily predicting the 
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assumptions to be made. 101  However this is the very reason Rawls uses pure 
procedural justice at the highest level of his theory in the original position.102 The 
just outcome is unknown, but the procedures are fair so the outcome will be also. 
Rawls only allows reasonable doctrines within the original position because 
unreasonable doctrines will be banished by the conditions imposed by the veil of 
ignorance. This will therefore lead to an overlapping consensus that justifies the 
theory as universal and not merely the conceptions and views of John Rawls with 
his prejudice.  
 
   4.2.4.3 Nozick and Pogge 
 
Any discussion and justification of using Rawls cannot be complete without analysis 
of Robert Nozick’s “most important and thought-provoking”103 response to Rawls in 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.104 For a long time this response seemed to defeat the 
importance of Rawls’ theory, until Thomas Pogge highlighted the key and 
fundamental misunderstandings of Rawls work that Nozick presents to offer his 
critique.105 One of Nozick’s main concerns is that Rawls does not consider historical 
entitlement theories and Nozick believes, because of the difference principle and 
lack of moral entitlement, Rawls’ theory will require some unwarranted and 
unacceptable intrusion into a person’s holdings by an organisation or established 
authority.106 Nozick personally believes such measures are inappropriate because 
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distribution of property and other patterned principles107 and holdings should be 
based on moral merit determined by such things as usefulness to society and 
intelligence. Nozick therefore believes the intrusive measures Rawls’ theory 
requires are inappropriate and disagrees that any differences in holdings that arise 
due to differences in natural assets means a later redistribution should occur as the 
difference principle requires.108 However, as Pogge points out; “Nozick expends 
much effort attacking a view that is not Rawls’s.”109 Nozick attacks many positions of 
Rawls’ using examples that would be post original position and he fails to 
distinguish between how the ground rules (the principles of justice) of a society 
ought to be designed, and individual actions and how people or organisations 
should act within such a society whose terms are fixed.110 Nozick focuses a lot on 
the cooperation of the best off and the worst off and how the difference principle 
would appeal to them or not.111 However, this argument is post veil as in the original 
position the contractors would have no idea whether they would be best off or worst 
off. Nozick even accepts this,112 but then mistakenly considers that the individuals 
behind the veil might consider the possibility of being in the best off situation and 
criticises Rawls for not having such a discussion of cooperation between the best 
and worst off individuals behind the veil. This again mistakes the very point of Rawls’ 
theory, as such a discussion could not occur between the individuals who do not 
know to which category they belong and considering themselves to be in the best 
off situation is something Rawls does not accept. 113  The contractors would not 
gamble on that possibility, and would design the principles imagining themselves to 
                                                          
107
 Patterned principles are those where distributive justice is considered based on the 
pattern of distribution at a given time. This is a major difference between Rawls and Nozick. 
Rawls has patterned principles; Nozick has historical entitlements. 
108
 Nozick R (n 9) 226. 
109
 Pogge T (n 27) 17. 
110
 ibid 17. 
111
 Nozick R (n 9) 189-198. 
112
 ibid 196-197. 
113
 Rawls J, A Theory of Justice (n 12) 144. 




be in the worst off position therefore ensuring this would be tolerable. This is the 
very idea of the difference principle; designing a principle they would all accept, 
even if they were in the worst off position and not looking at it through the eyes of 
possibly being one of the best off. 
One of Nozick’s key misunderstandings of Rawls is his concern that the theory 
purports some intrusive redistribution that Nozick would find an anathema.114 Nozick 
thinks that some authority (the government) will come to your house and take any 
spare money to support a large scale redistribution of wealth it is carrying out. 
Pogge rightly argues that that is not what Rawls’ theory would accept or encourage 
at all.115 The purpose is that the institutions that control economic distribution of 
resources should be changed, and be different to what they are now, in the first 
place.116 In much the same way as tax is taken out of a pay cheque before you see 
it or have the chance to spend it, the idea is that the redistribution that Nozick fears 
would never occur because it has already happened. This economic 
misunderstanding continues when Nozick criticises the patterned principles of 
Rawls’ theory which Nozick thinks will predetermine who gets what, and that such a 
predetermined distribution will be vulnerable to corruption by independent choices of 
individuals.117 Nozick favours unpatterned principles which would set out procedures 
through which one can acquire holdings, and then leave it alone.118 Nozick again 
mistakes Rawls and actuarially fails to see some similarities in their work. It is true 
that the difference principle involves the patterned principle idea that some 
economic distributions are better than others. But much like Nozick’s unpatterned 
idea, the difference principle is laying out the ground rules as the most just system, 
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and then, if followed and it is in fact the most just system, Rawls would also leave 
distribution alone as there would be no need to interfere.119  
Nozick believes that Rawls’ position encourages an infringement of what he 
believes are fundamental rights, such as property,120 but again it is argued from a 
position post veil of ignorance. Rawls’ theory would not support infringement of such 
fundamental property rights, but would hold from a higher level that such rights are 
not so fundamental and therefore should not exist in the first place.121 However for 
Nozick, any first acquisition of land, grabbed in a fair way using any talents, is just 
and so one individual could hold 100% of land which for Nozick would be a just 
holding. That individual alone can coercively decide what subsequent acquisitions 
may take place. 122  Nozick argues this would be micro acquisition, between 
individuals, and that it would be infringed by the macro acquisition Rawls’ 
institutions would adopt.123 For Nozick, it would be unacceptable for principles to 
exclude such micro acquisitions from consideration as he argues Rawls’ theory 
does.124 However, the individual transfer is not a small scale issue so as to make it 
micro as opposed to the large scale conduct between institutions which would be 
macro.125 Both of them raise questions about the conduct within institutions instead 
of about institutions, which is what Rawls is concerned with. “Rawls focuses on the 
fundamental “rules of the game” and not on what moves players are morally free or 
constrained to make within a particular game in progress.”126 This is once again the 
same key to Nozick’s fundamental misunderstanding of Rawls. Nozick criticises 
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Rawls for what may happen after the veil. What he thinks may happen is mistaken 
and it is also not Rawls’ focus.  
It is hoped that some major critics of John Rawls’ theory have been successfully 
addressed in so that A Theory of Justice will serve as a solid grounding for further 
discussion of a child’s right to healthcare and the State’s obligation to provide it. The 
following discussion of potentially placing children in the original position and the 
rational nature of the contractors will show that the principles of justice will be 
applied equally to children after it is shown that the principles do indeed provide for 
a fundamental right to healthcare.  
 
4.2 Interpreting the principles 
 
 
To reiterate, behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ and in a hypothetical original position in 
which we have no knowledge of who we are as individuals, John Rawls argues we 
would decide on two minimal principles of justice with which to govern our society 
once the veil is lifted. These principles are; 
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme 
is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the 
difference principle).127  
These principles are the base, underlying conditions for society. Once the veil is 
lifted and society forms having gained knowledge of themselves and their 
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generation, the people will come together to create a constitution and set up 
institutions in accordance with these principles. In time the principles will cease to 
be used, yet the society will still be a just one as all the institutions, legislation and 
the constitution will have been formed and created in accordance with these 
principles. This is all hypothetical of course. 
It is argued here, as have others before,128 that a right to healthcare will arise from 
Rawls’ minimal principles of justice, thus providing a strong argument for a moral 
obligation of the State to ensure healthcare to all, especially children. Leary 
suggests that justice is one of the fundamental principles of human rights, and the 
concept of a right to health makes justice a relevant issue to healthcare.129 This 
connection of health being a matter of justice is a major theme of this chapter and 
why a strong theory of justice such a Rawls is used. In particular, it is the second 
principle of justice, fair equality of opportunity, which is suggested to lead to this 
right. 
 4.2.1 Equal Opportunity, Equal Healthcare 
 
Norman Daniels first made the connection between Rawls’ second principle and 
healthcare in 1985 in his book Just Health Care. His later work, Just Health (2008) 
follows the same discussion of Rawls but focuses, as the name suggests, on health 
as opposed to healthcare. Daniels explains this change as attributable to being 
persuaded as to the importance of public health in ensuring the health of a 
population, and that healthcare is just one aspect of this. Whilst this is true, for the 
purposes of this work and the focus on healthcare systems as seen in chapter one, 
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as well as the legal arguments around the right to health, the focus will be on 
healthcare provision by the State.  
Daniels’ extension from Rawls’ principle of equality of opportunity is actually fairly 
simple and follows arguments Rawls uses for education. Throughout a theory of 
justice Rawls mentions the importance of public education for the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity.130  
I assume also that there is fair (as opposed to formal) 
equality of opportunity. 131 Proportional expenditure (or 
income) taxes are to provide revenue for public goods, the 
transfer branch and the establishment of fair equality of 
opportunity in education, and the like, so as to carry out the 
second principle.132 
The first point Daniels makes to encompass healthcare, is to compare health needs 
and educational needs. 133  Both are not equally distributed and various factors 
(social and natural) may produce special needs for each. Both are also vital 
contributors to the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Thus Daniels argues that 
“Rawls’s argument about the importance of public education for fair equality of 
opportunity is readily broadened to include health care. Any justification for the one 
extends to the other.” 134  The simplicity of Daniels’ argument is clear from his 
summary:  
(1’) Since meeting health needs promotes health (or normal 
functioning), and since health helps to protect opportunity, 
then meeting health needs protects opportunity. (2’) Since 
Rawls’s justice as fairness requires protecting opportunity, 
as do other important approaches to distributive justice, then 
several recent accounts of justice give special importance to 
meeting health needs.135 
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Daniels argument is that protecting health needs protects opportunity and since 
there is an obligation to protect opportunity, there is an obligation to protect health 
needs. Part of protecting health needs is by ensuring healthcare, which, much like 
public education, requires a public and universal system if it is to be provided to 
everyone as justice requires. In other words: a theory of justice requires the 
provision of healthcare, because of the opportunities being healthy provides. No one 
should be disadvantaged in life because of factors that are beyond their control, and 
it is fundamentally unfair for someone’s life to go better because they have been 
provided with substantially more opportunities and resources.136 Archard agrees that 
with this argument and in particular with childhood which has even greater 
importance137 with children having more need of opportunities. 
One vitally important aspect of Daniels’ extension is that Rawls himself accepted the 
argument some years after Daniels first proposed the idea, writing in 2001 that:  
[P]rovision for medical care . . . falls under the general 
means necessary to underwrite fair equality of opportunity 
and our capacity to take advantage of our basic rights and 
liberties, and thus to be normal and fully cooperating 
members of society over a complete life.138 
Given that “ordinary mortals can be reasonably confident that they will, at some 
point, find themselves capable of benefiting from some kind of health intervention, 
and that providing for such an eventuality would be wise”,139 protecting everyone’s 
opportunities requires ensuring everyone has access to medical care. Interestingly, 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also made this 
connection between health and opportunity in General Comment 14. In paragraph 8 
the Committee states that the normative content of the right to health “provides 
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equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health.”140 
Additionally the Committee has mentioned the need for judicial remedies to help 
ensure such rights and provide appropriate definition. 141  This finds academic 
support from Michaelman who also accepts that in order to effectuate fair equality of 
opportunity, health care guarantees must be in place which are themselves 
amenable to adjudication. 142  The appropriate justiciability of rights such as 
healthcare will be discussed in much more detail in chapter five. 
Thus a powerful, convincing and minimal theory of justice, finds an obligation for the 
State to provide healthcare, at least at a basic level, to ensure everyone has access 
in order to protect equality of opportunity. The basic level of care is mentioned for 
two reasons. Firstly it acknowledges that other services protect opportunity, such as 
education as discussed, and so provision of healthcare cannot be the only way the 
State ensures protection of opportunity. Secondly, ensuring at least a basic level of 
healthcare accepts that a State is restricted by resources. This basic level 
requirement also connects neatly with later discussion on the human right to 
healthcare and enforcement of the right which has to start with fulfilling the 
‘minimum core’. Until this fulfilment is achieved, there is little point in striving for 
more in States that cannot afford it, or the obstinate ones that actively refuse their 
obligations.  
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 4.2.2 Objections 
 
One criticism of the second principle comes from Barry who focuses on the 
economic inequalities in a similar way to Rawls.143 Barry’s main focus is on the 
difference principle and the redistribution of wealth it requires, which is important for 
discussion on global economic redistribution in chapter 6. Barry’s main objection is 
that fair and equal distribution is not as straightforward as supposed by Rawls 
theory.144 Michaelman makes similar points with Rawls focus on monetary transfer 
schemes and suggests that if it was really that simple then the difference principle 
would not allow welfare rights as such within it.145 Barry’s comparable argument is 
that redistribution of wealth is not the only element to fair distribution of social goods, 
or as Michaelman is searching for, welfare rights. Pogge argues that searching for 
the right to health through the difference principle would violate a central element of 
Rawls’ theory as it would value life and health unequally, with their fulfilment being 
focused on providing the best economic and wealth outcome. 146  However the 
difference principle is not what is used in the search for healthcare within Rawls 
theory in this thesis.  
As regards to the opportunity part of the second principle Barry accepts that this 
raises barely any difficulties. 147  He accepts the principle aims to achieve a 
meritocracy and uses Michael Young’s definition of IQ + effort.148 This shows that 
nature cannot be fully controlled for, but there are other elements to a fair and just 
meritocracy. One of these elements is effort, yet in order to be able to put in the 
effort, the opportunity to do so is needed. Whilst Barry accepts the opportunity part 
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of the second principle, he does not look for health care provision within it. Instead 
he argues that healthcare would be assured in the original position because of the 
conservative nature of contractors not gambling and wanting to protect themselves 
against being one of the severely ill in a world where they cannot afford 
healthcare. 149  This is a possible extension with the contractors obviously 
considering various possibilities, such as the presence of children and applying the 
principles to them. Michaelman however, in his search for welfare rights, highlights 
that Rawls cannot and does not want basic needs such as healthcare to be the 
approach of his theory because this would necessarily require an objective 
approach towards them.150 Rawls does not want such specificity and objectiveness 
in the original position but instead accepts delaying that until the later constitutional 
phases. The aim for Rawls is to keep the original position as minimal and as 
uncontroversial as possible with complete overlapping consensus. This assures the 
principles’ universality, and then if a necessary extension of those fundamentally 
paramount principles is free healthcare in order to abide by justice as fairness, it 
provides a stronger argument that even a minimal theory of what it takes to be a just 
and fair society requires equal provision of healthcare services.   
One of the main and surprising critics of Daniels’ extension is Pogge. His discussion 
and mistaken criticism of Daniels’ approach is however plagued with confusion on 
his own thoughts as he proposes his own ideas. Pogge believes Daniels position 
has serious problems because Daniels allows inequality in healthcare, to those who 
need it the most, but not education.151  This is a complete misunderstanding of 
Daniels’ position, which is not a priority of health and healthcare over education, but 
simply an argument that health and healthcare in a way similar to education strongly 
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influence equal opportunity and is therefore a matter of justice.152 There will be 
some people who require more education and special attention in school for 
example in order to realise equal opportunities to other compatriots more naturally 
talented, in the same way that some will require more medical care than others 
because of life-long chronic conditions. Daniels is merely arguing that it is a matter 
of fundamental justice that those who are not naturally as talented or as healthy are 
given the same opportunities, which requires access to quality healthcare.  
Pogge suggests that his arguments are quite different from Daniels, however it can 
be argued that both ideas are actually very similar. Pogge surprisingly states: “As 
far as justice is concerned, medical need as such does not the support a valid claim 
to medical care. It is not an injustice, even in a very affluent society, if little is spent 
on health care (or education).” 153  Pogge also criticises a difference between 
education and healthcare in Daniels’ work that does not exist, and then contends 
that we conceive of health as a social good in the same way as education and 
employment, but calling it health protection, meaning that we have access to 
medical care when needed.154 Allocations to the medical systems should be decided 
by the political process as a matter of pure procedural justice. Pogge here is 
showing a surprising confidence in the political process and that no matter what 
resource allocation decisions are made, they will be fair as long as done via pure 
procedural justice. In themselves, the social goods funded by such decisions do not 
raise questions of justice. This is where Daniels’ extension of the second principle is 
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superior as it creates healthcare, at least at a basic level, as a matter of a just 
society.  
Thus when Pogge proposes health protection instead similarly to education and 
employment as something we will get when needed, and, that given the difference 
in natural constitutions something which will not be provided completely equally to 
everyone,155 it is based on a misunderstanding that Daniels believes that providing 
needed healthcare no matter the costs is the only way to fulfil Rawls’ second 
principle. Pogge suggests that the equal opportunity principle requires only 
minimally adequate healthcare for natural conditions and full protection for any 
health conditions that are socially produced.156 He proposes that the opportunity 
principle requires formal equality of medical opportunity as well as education and 
employment opportunities157 and that the barometer of what is acceptable is not 
equal opportunity in itself but how far opportunities fall below the middle range.158 
The crucial problem that arises from such a view is that Pogge sees no problem 
with very little being spent on healthcare. The middle range can be very low 
because nothing is spent on healthcare or education. Daniels finds the obligation to 
ensure at least basic health care services to ensure protection of opportunity as we 
must constantly help those who have limited opportunities. 
Whilst Daniels invokes Rawls most and discusses A Theory of Justice more 
extensively, he also argues that other prominent theorists support the importance in 
healthcare and that unlike Pogge see a minimum standard as a matter of justice. 
Perhaps the most important and influential alternative to Rawls is the capabilities 
approach developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. This is a different 
approach to Rawls, who does not want basic needs to be part of the theory as this 
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would go beyond the minimal nature and require a much more objective and 
specific approach. The capabilities approach however goes further and requires 
much more as a matter of justice. This alternative theory will be briefly discussed 
below to show that healthcare will be found within this as well, but also to show how 
specific and all-encompassing this theory is which explains the dominance of Rawls 
in this thesis as a minimal theory which therefore is more likely to see universal 
agreement. In the following section the position of children within Rawls’ theory will 
be clarified to show it is perfectly acceptable to use such a strong, minimal theory of 
justice to defend children’s rights, and that use of much more specific, elaborate and 
therefore objectionable theories like the capabilities approach, are not as necessary 
as many seem to suggest. 
 
 
4.3 Application to Children  
 
 
An attempt to incorporate children into the Rawlsian society outlined above will now 
be undertaken. It has been suggested that traditional social contract theories 
struggle with entitlements for children. 159  Rawls however, does not propose a 
traditional social contract theory.160 To begin with, the position of children within 
Rawls’ theory will be established by acknowledging that although children are not 
contractors themselves, it can be shown that they are considered in the original 
position. Given this consideration, it is argued that the two principles of justice will 
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apply to children once the veil is lifted. It is necessary for some extensive discussion 
on the absence of children in the original position as there is limited literature written 
on the topic and much of what there is seems largely mistaken. Bestowing the 
principles on children will lead to a conclusion that children will possess the various 
rights that stem from them. 
  4.3.1 Children in the Original Position 
 
So what is the position of children within such a theory? Rawls does not deal 
extensively with the position and rights of children,161 although I think what he does 
do is enough, and we can also search for the answer by looking at the persons in 
the original position. As mentioned, the contractors in the original position are 
rational beings and Rawls explicitly states that children do not possess the ability to 
“rationally advance their interests”.162 Therefore it seems that as children are not 
rational beings according to Rawls they would not be contractors in the original 
position. However, there is some inconsistency within Rawls’ theory when he 
suggests that the parties in the original position would not know to which generation 
they belong.163 Some authors mistakenly believe that this means it is possible for 
the contractors to find themselves as children once the veil is lifted, and it is this 
possibility that would make them protect children with the principles of justice.164 But 
given the requirement of rationality, and the irrationality of children, the contractors 
would be able to deduce that they are not young children at the very least. Shaw 
agrees with this yet believes it is a flawed ‘peeping’ through the veil. Yet this in no 
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way changes the principles and so is not something to concern ourselves with.165 
DiSilvestro mistakes much of Rawls’ arguments when he contends that the fact that 
moral persons are capable of having a conception of the good and a sense of 
justice, shows the capacities those in the original position have, even if they are not 
fully realised yet.166 DiSilvestro thinks this means contractors could become children 
and so they would protect against this possibility. Yet as will be shown in the next 
section in more detail, Rawls is simply bestowing the principles of justice on children 
because they have the capabilities to become rational beings with a conception of 
the good and a sense of justice. In a catastrophic misunderstanding of the veil of 
ignorance, DiSilvestro spends a lot of time arguing that the contractors would 
protect against the possibility that they will become incapacitated once the veil is 
lifted167 – ignoring the possibility that such individuals themselves would be irrational 
and therefore not in the original position. The people in the original position are the 
same as they are when they are out of the original position and the veil of ignorance 
is lifted. It is a hypothetical exercise all rational adults can try themselves; this is why 
it is called a veil of ignorance. Considering what a veil is designed for, it shows that 
the talents and interest and so on are hidden from the contractors. They have them, 
but they do not know they have them. Contractors are ignorant of their talents and 
interests because they are hidden from them behind a veil. It must be assumed then 
that the parties in the original position are rational adults, and potentially rational 
adolescents, but not irrational children. It cannot be the case that in the original 
position only rational beings are present, yet find themselves as irrational one year 
olds, for example, once the veil is lifted.  
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  4.3.2 Applying the Principles to Children 
 
In a very short article which appears to be one of the few that refers to Rawls and 
children in a similar way to that used here,168 Evers states that since the parties in 
the original position “know they are contemporaries and they know they are not 
irrational children, they know they are adults and hence know of their common 
status as adults in the society after they leave the original position.”169 Evers’ key 
idea is that children and the descendants of the adult contractors “may not accept 
these ancestors as spokesmen”,170 which would thus weaken the intergenerational 
elements of Rawls’ principles. Yet I suggest that Evers misses a key point of Rawls’ 
theory: the hypothetical nature allowing any rational being to undertake the exercise 
at any point and go behind the ‘veil of ignorance’. 
That the contractors know they are necessarily rational beings changes nothing. 
Whilst I agree with Evers that only adults, or certainly rational beings - which 
excludes many children, are present in the original position, he stretches his 
argument too far when suggesting that this means Rawls is wrong to say that “no 
one knows his situation in society, . . . and therefore no one is in a position to tailor 
principles to his advantage”.171 Here, Evers is suggesting that the rational beings in 
the original position will be able to modify the principles of justice to their advantage 
because they have knowledge of who they are, because they know they are rational 
beings, and therefore most probably an adult. However, this is not as 
straightforward as Evers suggests. Knowing yourself and other contractors are 
adults would not be enough to tailor the principles. This knowledge is the same, 
according to Rawls’ ideas, as knowing that you, and others around you, are rational. 
                                                          
168
 Others include, Shaw DM (n 165); MacDougall DR (n 51) who focus on slightly different 
issues such as what extending the principles to children would mean for abortion. 
169
 Evers WM, 'Rawls and Children' (1978) 2 Journal of Libertarian Studies 109, 109. 
170
 ibid 110. 
171
 Rawls J, A Theory of Justice (n 12) 120-121; Evers WM (n 169) 110. 




No other knowledge about yourself is gained. There are still endless possibilities as 
to who you may be once the veil is lifted. You may be a young adult, or old. You 
may be a man or a woman. You may be black or white, smart or stupid, talented or 
lacking in many basic skills. Nothing is known about yourself except that you are 
rational and merely knowing you are rational, and probably an adult, cannot be 
nearly enough to manipulate the principles in your favour as Evers suggests. As 
mentioned earlier, Shaw makes the same suggestion as Evers, however, whilst it is 
unclear whether Shaw believes the principles will be manipulated, he states that it 
will not affect children because despite knowing we cannot be children, we would 
still choose principles that would protect them.172 
The prospect of the contractors’ descendants having to abide by the principles and 
therefore not accepting them or their ancestors as spokesmen for themselves is 
also an idea I find fault with. These descendants can go into the hypothetical 
original position themselves and will decide on the same principles. This is similar 
for children as they will gain rationality and eventually be able to undertake such an 
exercise to decide on the two principles as well. Obeying the principles in the 
meantime is similar to how children are expected to obey laws they have no say in, 
but may well understand and appreciate when they grow up.173 Adults accepting the 
principles bestowed upon them when they were children, involves a form of future-
oriented consent:174 the idea that the children will come to understand and accept 
the principles when they themselves are adults. In this way children are passive 
beneficiaries and have had their interests protected, as discussed in 2.1.1.  
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The main argument in favour of bestowing the principles on children and affording 
them the same protection, is  the concept of intergenerational justice which is pivotal 
to incorporating children into a Rawlsian society as it shows that even in the original 
position, children will be considered. Rawls suggests that the adults are 
representing family lines and therefore will be concerned with the welfare of 
subsequent generations:  
[W]e can assume that they are heads of families and 
therefore have a desire to further the well-being of at least 
their more immediate descendants. . . . I believe that the 
whole chain of generations can be tied together and 
principles agreed to that suitably take into account the 
interests of each (§§24, 44). If this is right, we will have 
succeeded in deriving duties to other generations from 
reasonable conditions.175 
Thus the contracting parties are aware of generations before and after themselves 
and as such are concerned with them. This fits neatly with the hypothetical nature of 
Rawls’ original position in which the parties are not sure to which generation or 
society they belong; it could be the very first, last, or one in between, but this makes 
no difference to the principles of justice that will be decided. Each generation and 
society will imagine the possibility of those before and after, whilst also deciding 
principles for itself with no knowledge of the society they will enter into.176  
It is clear then that rational beings are alone present in the original position, which 
means predominantly adults, however they think clearly about subsequent 
generations and children, by “imagining themselves to be fathers . . . they . . . 
ascertain how much they should set aside for their sons and grandsons by noting 
what they would believe themselves entitled to claim of their fathers and 
grandfathers.”177   
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Rawls here is talking of the ‘just savings’ principle, an omission from the above 
discussion.  It is enough for our purposes that the principle focuses on explaining 
the suitable amount of real capital accumulation and savings required by justice 
between generations in order to help establish and preserve the basic structure over 
time.178 The important point is that children are thought of by the parties in the 
original position,179 even if they are not present themselves. Rawls’ later changes 
the motivation for this consideration in answer to difficulties raised, 180  yet 
subsequent generations are still considered and legitimate expectations made of 
them. Different generations being in the original position justifies the just savings 
principle, and imagining subsequent generations is a natural corollary of that. It is 
also clear that children are thought of in a favourable way, and that the rational 
beings in the original position do not have enough knowledge, by knowing they are 
probably adults, to tailor the principles in their favour.  
 
  4.3.3 Extension through Freeman and Dworkin  
 
There is another option which supports finding the principles bestowed on children 
in Michael Freeman’s work on Rawls, although he focuses much more on 
respecting the autonomy of children that prove themselves rational.181  Freeman 
leans on Dworkin’s invocation of Rawls and then extends it to include children in an 
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interesting way. I will return to Freeman’s arguments shortly, but first I turn to 
Dworkin. 
Dworkin himself likes Rawls’ idea of the ‘veil of ignorance’ being used to form the 
principles and structure of society, but believes the actual contract argument is more 
of a halfway point in a “deeper political theory that argues for the two principles 
through rather than from the contract.”182 Dworkin believes the original position is an 
intermediate conclusion in this deeper theory because of Rawls’ arguments that we 
should accept the original position despite its hypothetical nature as the conditions 
imposed by the description are ones that we would accept or can be persuaded to 
accept by philosophical reflection.183  Dworkin thus searches for features of this 
deeper theory and finds that as Rawls’ focuses on “the value of individual thought 
and choice”184, Rawls’ theory is a natural extension of a rights-based theory.185 This 
enforces practicality on the parties as they cannot delay their decision, and 
distinguishes between vetoes made based only on an interest, and those made 
based on a fundamental right.186 There will be one right on which Rawls’ theory is 
based and Dworkin argues that because of the ignorance in the original position, 
that single basic right must be abstract. There are only two candidates for this right; 
liberty and equality,187 and Dworkin argues that equality is more abstract and so the 
basic right from which the theory and the principles arise is the right to equal 
concern and respect, which Rawlsian men and women must protect, 188  as he 
explains: 
The state of ignorance in the original position is so shaped 
that the antecedent interest of everyone must lie . . . in the 
same solution. The right of each man to be treated equally 
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without regard to his person or character or tastes is 
enforced by the fact that no one else can secure a better 
position by virtue of being different in any such respect.189 
The original position then, according to Dworkin, is a device for testing the 
competing arguments, and a tool for enforcing, this abstract right which is the 
“fundamental concept of Rawls’s deep theory.”190 This right is not a product of the 
contract, but rather a condition of entry to the original position as it follows from 
possession of the moral personality of those who can give justice. Those who can 
give justice are the only people allowed to contract – rational adults with an innate 
sense of justice and possessing this moral personality.191 Dworkin thus supports a 
right to equal concern and respect as the morally fundamental idea for Rawls’ 
theory, however Freeman argues Dworkin does not take us far enough. Freeman 
extends Dworkin’s work in two ways. First, Freeman generalises Dworkin’s right of 
equal concern and respect for all citizens, and argues that this includes children.192 
Secondly, Freeman argues equality by itself is not enough to explain the importance 
of rights and suggests the addition of autonomy. As he explains:  
One of Dworkin’s insights was to link Rawlsian contractarian 
theory to the language of rights. One of his failings was to 
fail to appreciate that both notions at the root of Kantian 
moral theory (equality and autonomy) were equally morally 
significant.193 
Freeman thus invokes Dworkin to bring in rights but argues that a plausible theory 
of rights requires the normative values at the root of the Rawlsian contractarian 
conception, equality and autonomy. This then leads into discussion of respecting 
those children who show themselves to be rational and autonomous: an interesting 
discussion but not one required here. Freeman is more concerned with respecting 
children and their autonomy, whereas arguing specifically for a child’s right to 
                                                          
189
 ibid 530. 
190
 ibid 532. 
191
 ibid 532; see also, Rawls J, A Theory of Justice (n 12) 441-449. 
192
 Freeman MDA (n 181) 61. 
193
 ibid 64. 




healthcare I believe is more concerned with protecting children and their interests (a 
discussion undertaken in 2.1). Freeman does recognise the need for protection also, 
but this appears not to be her main concern: 
We have to treat them as persons entitled to equal concern 
and respect and entitled to have both their present 
autonomy recognized and their capacity for future autonomy 
safeguarded. And this is to recognize that children, 
particularly younger children, need nurture, care and 
protection.194 
Freeman argues that we should respect children’s autonomy except in 
circumstances where to do so would harm their future autonomy. He acknowledges 
that children’s choices can have a deleterious impact on their life and that the 
reluctance to interfere with an adult’s autonomy is not the same as with children. 
Dworkin also makes this point in Paternalism195 when arguing that children often do 
not have an appropriate conception of present and future interests and find it very 
difficult to delay gratification. Because of this, Dworkin argues parents have a duty 
to restrict children’s freedom,196 but he adds the important moral limitation of future-
oriented consent. In order to justify paternalism, the child must come to understand 
and welcome the steps taken as part of the long term goal of children becoming 
autonomous adults.197  
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Freeman challenges those that would deny children’s autonomy, stating “[t]he onus 
lies on those who wish to discriminate.”198 Those who would deny children respect 
of autonomy should provide the appropriate reasoning as to why they would do so, 
and respect for autonomy of all humans should be assumed absent such ‘good 
reason’.199 I agree with the onus being on those who would deny children respect of 
autonomy but believe justification for such discrimination can easily be found, 
especially for younger children, with Dworkin’s argument of duty providing there is 
an appropriate moral limitation. This is not to deny such children rights, rather it is to 
change the basis of their rights; an argument made in chapter two. One potential 
problem with this approach is that paternalism could lead to a complete avoidance 
of childhood autonomy. As Freeman states, “[a]ll paternalistic restrictions require 
moral justification.”200 For healthcare however, paternalistic restrictions, especially 
for younger children, are unlikely to be contentious.201 Freeman suggests that the 
principles of justice “confine paternalism . . . without totally eliminating it,”202 and 
argues those in the original position will know of the limited capabilities of others 
and it will be agreed therefore that some interventions are acceptable for protection 
                                                          
198
 Freeman suggests, as an example of the either/or for protection and autonomy, that the 
reasons for restriction of autonomy are not convincing because protection of children is poor. 
He argues the institutions we have now that are designed to protect children do not actually 
do so. This is a flawed argument however, at least the way it is used, because it is an attack 
on the institutions and the way they work, not on the reasons for those institutions in the first 




 ibid 68. 
201
 Of course capacity gradually increases and adolescences may achieve Gillick 
competency, yet I will not deviate and become distracted by discussion of the point that 
competency is gained mostly because international law is silent on the issue of child consent 
to medical treatment. There is mention of decisions that are taken being consistent with a 
child’s evolving capacity in the CRC, article 5 and 14, but not more specific detail. See  
Hollingsworth K, ‘Theorising Children’s Rights in Youth Justice: The Significance of 
Autonomy and Foundational Rights’ (2013) 76 The Modern Law Review 1046, 1060 who 
points out that the commitment to allow children to become fully autonomous is palpable in 
the denial of their right to refuse medical treatment that would be detrimental to their health. 
However, this is a side issue with difficult discussion itself with commentators comparing 
Gillick competency to the search for the Holy Grail; see Chell B, 'Competency: What It Is, 
What It Is Not, and Why It Matters' in Morrison EE, and Furlong B, (ed), Health Care Ethics: 
Critical Issues For The 21st Century (Third edn, Jones and Bartlett Learning 2014) 129; see 
Van Bueren G (n 65) 311; see also Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority 
[1986] AC 112 House of Lords. 
202
 Freeman MDA (n 181) 67. 




against irrational decisions and actions. Such actions may only be perceived as 
irrational however when it is manifest that they will “undermine future life choices, 
[and] impair interests in an irreversible way.” 203  Such potential future detriment 
would undermine a person’s opportunities, something that would be most harmful to 
children as Freeman points out: 
[W]e also would be failing to recognize a child’s integrity if 
we allowed him to choose an action, such as using heroin or 
choosing not to attend school, which would seriously and 
systematically impair the attainment of full personality and 
development subsequently.204 
Thus Freeman’s theories align Dworkin’s thoughts of accepting a duty to be 
paternalistic but Freeman is perhaps slightly stronger with his concerns and need 
for its limitation. Nolan also agrees with Freeman’s confinement of paternalism, 
legitimising intervention only in the case of conduct which is irrational and to prevent 
immediate harm.205 In this way it can be seen how protecting children is important 
because of their future. Their capacities for rational choice, or their opportunities 
and future life choices are important and need to be protected. For now, I suggest a 
more direct appeal to Rawls’ theory can be made and may therefore provide a more 
convincing and powerful argument, certainly for the obligations of the State towards 
children.  
 
  4.3.4 Direct Application 
 
Using similar methodology to Freeman in extending Dworkin’s thesis to children and 
defeating discriminating arguments, one can put the onus onto those who would 
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discriminate206 and ask why would the principles of justice not be applied to children? 
Thus those who would argue that these principles would not be applied to children 
have to find the convincing arguments and reasons, yet this seems to be a 
challenge. For example, a claim that discrimination is justified because children are 
not contractors themselves, is addressed above by showing that children are clearly 
considered in the original position by the parties as well as rights bestowed on them 
that they may not understand in childhood but appreciate later on. An example of 
this is compulsory education (as mentioned by Freeman) despite children possibly 
not wanting to go to school, or preventive healthcare such as inoculations despite a 
child’s protests: both are apt examples of ‘future-oriented consent’.207 The idea is 
that the child would look back in the future and appreciate what was done. Both 
education and preventive healthcare can fall into this category, but so can the 
principles of justice as mentioned above.208  
I maintain a more direct appeal to Rawls can be used, especially when Rawls 
agrees that children should be protected by the principles because of the necessary 
protection of their future. He argues; 
[E]qual justice is owed to those who have the capacity to 
take part in and to act in accordance with the public 
understanding of the initial situation. One should observe 
that moral personality is here deﬁned as a potentiality that is 
ordinarily realized in due course. It is this potentiality which 
brings the claims of justice into play.209  
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A being that has this capacity, whether or not it is yet 
developed, is to receive the full protection of the principles of 
justice.210 
This is clearly intended to bring children who do not yet possess capacity within the 
scope of the principles of justice and to provide them with equal protection. The aim 
is to allow a fully autonomous person to develop and to do this requires equal 
justice, which means bestowal of the principles of it. The quote also mentions the 
basic rights of children, helping to show why a direct appeal to Rawls can establish 
rights and an ancillary invocation of Dworkin’s singular right-based theory is not 
necessary.211  
There is however, some further criticism for those individuals that lack capacity and, 
more poignantly, potential for gaining capacity. Nussbaum and others have pointed 
out the problem of social contract theories in giving people who have severe 
cognitive disabilities justice,212 which could include children and is clearly a concern 
for healthcare. If the focus of bestowing the principles of justice on children is 
potentiality, and those with severe cognitive disabilities do not have the potential to 
gain capacity, then this presents a serious problem for Rawls who does not seem to 
answer this problem.  
It is contended here then that the needs of those with severe cognitive disabilities 
are to be dealt with at some point once the veil is lifted, but there is no thought 
about them in the original position, and as non-rational beings, they are not present 
themselves. Nussbaum complains that “[i]n effect, they are to be dominated, though 
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the domination is to be beneficent.”213 Rawls’ dilemma here is not his emphasis on 
capacity as Nussbaum and Richardson214 have mistakenly suggested, but as seen 
above, it is his emphasis on potential for capacity. Those without capacity are dealt 
with by Rawls when he considers children and their potential as being enough for 
equal justice. Yet the criticism is right that it is only at a later stage, when the veil is 
lifted, that people with severe cognitive disabilities will be considered, because they 
do not have such potential, thus making it difficult to see how the principles of 
justice can be applied to them. Whilst this is a disappointing element of Rawls’ 
theory, and one which he failed to extensively engage with,215 I am not convinced of 
its severely negative connotations.  
Richardson explores the prospect of adding the thought of those with severe 
cognitive disabilities to the contractors in the original position, in a similar way to 
how children are considered, thus giving them concern and likely bestowal of the 
principles of justice. However, to do so Richardson changes the motivation of the 
contract so that the basic principles Rawls suggests would not be proposed behind 
the veil of ignorance.216 Essentially Richardson alters the original position to add in 
the list of capabilities, proposed by Nussbaum and discussed later in section 4.4. 
This is an attractive and tempting way out of this dilemma, which others have 
considered,217  but it is uncertain why Richardson changes the theory so much 
except to alter Rawls to fit his own desires.  
The problem with this is that one of the main strengths of Rawls, its minimal, basic 
nature decided by ignorant yet rational parties, is lost. By adding in a specific list of 
what Nussbaum calls central capabilities, the theory becomes much more detailed, 
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losing its minimal and likely universal appeal. More exploration of considering 
people with severe cognitive disabilities in the original position would have been 
useful, but it is contended that the principles would still be applied, especially with a 
quick glance at Rawls’ words already seen in this thesis: “. . . as far as possible the 
choice of principles should not be inﬂuenced by arbitrary contingencies. Therefore it 
is reasonable to say that those who could take part in the initial agreement, were it 
not for fortuitous circumstances, are assured equal justice.”218 It is hoped to be 
acceptable that as it is, such individuals will be considered at a later point, once the 
veil is lifted and the principles become extended and interpreted. In this way Rawls’ 
theory is not altered or changed in what could be a controversial manner, so only 
the natural extension of the basic principles needs to be explored.  
Nussbaum and Richardson however, are quite critical of postponing consideration 
of those with severe disabilities as they believe when we do eventually consider 
them our basic ideas of justice will change.219 If true, this could be very difficult as 
Rawls’ principles would therefore be inadequate for our new ideas of justice which 
places a dilemma on Rawls’ theory as there will be no way of changing the 
principles. If individuals, with the new ideas of justice, decide to go behind the veil 
afterwards, which is one of the main strengths of Rawls’ theory, their ignorance will 
be the same as it was before they considered those with severe disabilities and thus 
the principles agreed to will also be the same.  Richardson sums up the general 
arguments Nussbaum puts forward against postponement; 
1. The pervasiveness of dependence and disability  
2. The universality of care 
3. The continuum of disability 
4. The moral imperative to avoid drawing a dichotomy 
between the disabled and the non-disabled220 
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The problem as I see it is that none of these points are very convincing. The 
prominence of dependence and disability is not evidence of a problem if its 
consideration is only to be at the constitutional (post veil) phase of discussion for 
example. In fact, such prominence will mean that consideration will likely occur at 
the earliest possible stage, just not behind the veil of ignorance. The universality of 
care offered above proposes nothing to the debate; it is merely a comment on 
human life and not a consideration of justice. The continuum of disability is similar 
and ties in with the fourth point about drawing a dichotomy. Whilst it may be that 
there is a continuum, and I certainly share the objection to the idea of a dichotomy, 
such idealism can never be realised. A line has always been, and will always be, 
drawn somewhere by the legislature for people with severe cognitive disabilities in 
order to protect them and/or others.221 Often their autonomy is restricted and things 
are done in their best interests in a similar way to children. These things are decided 
by rational adults, therefore creating an unavoidable dichotomy simply by deciding 
who receives extra benefits and support for their disability.   
However Nussbaum is correct that modifying Rawls’ theory to deal with the issue of 
justice and disability is not easy.222 Any thought after the original position does not 
make such consideration one of fundamental justice, yet there are two ways already 
proposed that this could be rectified. Firstly is the extension by Richardson, briefly 
explored, that the contractors would acknowledge the possibility of those with 
severe cognitive disabilities in the original position, in much the same way as 
children. And secondly, whilst for children I argued such circumvention was 
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unnecessary, appealing to Dworkin and then Freeman can extend Rawls by 
ensuring a fundamental right to all citizens to equal concern and respect. However, 
consideration after the original position will still ensure basic rights, protection and 
respect to people with severe cognitive disabilities.    
Richardson does express one practical concern about applying the principles of 
justice to the disabled, specifically, that “providing equal opportunity for the more 
disabled is relatively difficult, and since the more disabled are likely to be among the 
least advantaged members of society, this interpretive shift has radical practical 
implications.”223 It is clear that not all groups will or should be treated the same in 
fulfilling the principles of justice and that is why as part of fulfilling equality of 
opportunity for children, education will be guaranteed, whereas it will not be for 
adults.224  
Children are different, since we are trying to promote the 
development of adult capabilities. . . . we must always justify 
coercive treatment of children with reference to the adult-
capability goal.225 
Once the veil is partially lifted, in deciding what children require, different principles 
will carry different weight. It certainly would seem that the most important principle 
for children that will perhaps lead to the most rights and guarantees is the second 
principle and more particularly the equality of opportunity. It cannot be contentious 
to suggest that the generation which requires the most opportunity once the veil is 
lifted is that of children, who have their whole lives ahead of them and have yet to 
consider who or what they want to become.  
That the principles of justice are bestowed on children is a powerful theory that need 
not be more complicated than that. Equality of opportunity is the vital principle for 
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children it is enough that healthcare is very much in the interests of children and a 
right that should be bestowed upon them. Up until now discussion has very much 
focused on the areas of Rawls that are generally agreed with and defended and the 
bestowal of a minimal theory of justice upon children. In the next chapter arguments 
move to the areas of Rawls that are not as well accepted, and where new ideas 
have been proposed. How the theory applies in a global setting shall be addressed 
and it will be seen that Rawls’ own scant ideas on the topic do not follow his earlier 
theory and following the earlier work is more than palatable to find global justice. 
 
4.4 An Alternative Theory? 
 
 
The capabilities approach is a “new theoretical paradigm in the development and 
policy world [which] begins with a very simple question: What are people actually 
able to do and to be? What real opportunities are available to them?”226 Nussbaum 
says the approach is a “comparative quality-of-life assessment”227 and a theory of 
basic social justice focusing on choice, freedom, and the real opportunities available 
to each person. “It [also] ascribes an urgent task to government and public policy – 
namely, to improve the quality of life for all people, as defined by their 
capabilities.”228 Sen and Nussbaum differ slightly in that Sen focuses on the idea 
that capability is the best ‘space’ for quality-of-life assessment and discussion and 
he does not provide a definitive list of capabilities. Sen also focuses on the idea of 
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capabilities as freedom and agrees with Rawls’ priority of liberty.229 This approach is 
criticised by Nussbaum because it is seen as a general good without considering 
that some freedoms are bad, and that all societies pursuing equality and social 
minimums restrict freedom in some ways.230 This is part of Nussbaum’s justification 
for focusing on a core group of entitlements as she instead structures a basic theory 
of social justice and composes a specific list of Central Capabilities necessary for a 
life worthy of human dignity.231  
For Sen, capabilities “are not just abilities residing inside a person but also the 
freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the 
political, social, and economic environment.”232 Nussbaum argues for a focus on 
human development, dignity and equality by governments, non-governmental 
organisations, businesses and multi-national corporations. However, the main task 
of securing at least a threshold level of these capabilities, falls on to governments to 
allow for a dignified and minimally flourishing life, and Nussbaum proposes a list of 
ten central capabilities that, as a bare minimum, are necessary for a life worthy of 
human dignity.  
 
 4.4.1 A Minimal Theory? 
 
“[G]overnment is accountable for the presence of the ten capabilities on my list, if 
the nation is to be even minimally just.” 233  Nussbaum argues that her list of 
capabilities is minimal, yet given the long list and detail she adds, this seems 
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unconvincing.234 The list includes plenty of very specific freedoms which could be 
covered by Rawls’ first principle of liberty, which could be seen as similar to Sen’s 
more general freedom. Nussbaum has criticised this, but unlike Sen, Rawls’ liberty 
principle is allowed to be restricted, if only for the sake of liberty, as previously 
discussed in section 4.1.2. Nussbaum also includes some capabilities that seem 
strange because it would seem rather peculiar to place them at the fundamental 
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1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or behave one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 
2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be 
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against 
violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities 
for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, imagination, and thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, 
and reason – and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and 
cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy 
and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and 
thought in connection with experience and producing works and events of one’s own 
choice, religious, literary, musical and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways 
protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and 
artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable 
experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; 
to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, 
to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s 
emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability 
means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in 
their development.) 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the 
liberty of conscience and religious observance.) 
7. Affiliation. (A) Being able to live with and towards others, to recognize and show 
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to 
be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means 
protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also 
protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.) (B) Having the social 
bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified 
being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, 
national origin. 
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature.  
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.  
10. Control over one’s environment. (A) Political. Being able to participate effectively in 
political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, 
protections of free speech and association. (B) Material. Being able to hold property 
(both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with 
others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having 
the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a 
human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships 
of mutual recognition with other workers. 




level of being necessary for dignity. For instance, “being able to live with concern for 
and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature”,235 whilst important in 
many ways, is not something which may be considered necessary to securing a life 
of human dignity given some of the problems facing the world. Therefore, as 
mentioned, I question the minimal nature of Nussbaum’s capabilities and that is part 
of the justification for my focus on Rawls.  
 
 4.4.2 Opportunity or Capability? 
 
Daniels also suggests that there are not really any important differences between 
Rawls theory of justice and the capabilities approach. The argument by Daniels can 
once again be summed up by a relatively simple question: what exactly is the 
difference between capabilities and opportunities?236 Sen and Nussbaum argue that 
the important target of justice is to ensure people have equality of capabilities, as 
opposed to the primary social goods that Rawls proposes, of which equality of 
opportunity is only one. Nussbaum criticises Rawls’ ‘resource-based approach’ and 
the focus on the primary goods because she believes it is egalitarian to the GDP 
approach (which she rightly criticises for focusing on overall wealth at the top and 
not considering development, capabilities, or what those at the bottom have). 
However, it is telling that Nussbaum only focuses on the primary social goods of 
income and wealth, and at no point mentions or discusses rights, liberties, or 
opportunities.237 To completely ignore Rawls principle of equality of opportunity, and 
state that a key strength of the capabilities approach is that it asks what people can 
                                                          
235
 ibid 34. 
236
 Yamin AE (n 4) 47, for example Yamin argues we are concerned with preserving the 
normal opportunity range, or achieving their capabilities. Discussing these in the same 
sentence as the reasons to why we value health clearly shows their similarity.  
237
 Nussbaum MC, Creating Capabilities (n 212) 56-58. 




really do or be, is to misrepresent and misunderstand what Rawls more complete, 
yet minimal theory can achieve.  
Daniels argues that, especially given the extension of Rawls that he provides, the 
difference between capabilities and opportunities barely exists. “Meeting health 
needs is crucial to sustaining capabilities for the same reason that it is crucial to 
protecting a fair share of the opportunity range: Normal functioning is critical to 
both.”238 To be capable of doing something, one must have the opportunity to do it, 
and to realise an opportunity, one must be capable of achieving it. Lennart 
Nordenfelt argues along similar lines with his focus on health as an ability to achieve 
vital goals in one’s life.239 Vital goals are what one holds most essential in life and 
health is the possession of necessary abilities to realise such goals.240  
It could even be suggested that, given the extension of Rawls’ opportunity principle, 
the ten Central Capabilities Nussbaum proposes would fit into such an extension 
and could be decided upon once the veil of ignorance is lifted. “The [capabilities] 
approach is therefore very similar to Rawls’s approach using the notion of primary 
goods. We can see the list of capabilities as like a long list of opportunities for life-
functioning, such that it is always rational to want them whatever else one wants.”241 
Such an idea is also more attractive than Richardson’s blending of the two 
theories242 as it maintains the basic and more minimal Rawlsian argument, yet uses 
the strength of the capabilities approach suggesting the list maybe added in the 
subsequent three stages once the veil is lifted.  
For the purposes of this thesis it is enough to demonstrate that opportunities and 
capabilities are irreversibly connected, and for the purposes of justice and the 
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requirement of the provision of healthcare, they are very similar. For example, in the 
literature, they are often interchangeable, as seen by Nussbaum and Sen 
themselves: 
Notions of equal opportunity certainly have an important role 
to play in a [capabilities approach]. The very idea of 
capability is an idea of substantive opportunity243. 
What is particularly serious as an injustice is the lack of 
opportunity that some may have to achieve good health . . . 
This calls for the further distinction between health 
achievement and the capability to achieve good health.244 
So in the discussion of healthcare, not only are opportunity and capability 
interchangeable, but Sen also shows the importance the capabilities approach 
places on meeting health needs. Nussbaum also includes health on her list of ten 
Central Capabilities,245 thus as Daniels says, prominent theories find an obligation to 
provide healthcare even if for slightly different reasons.  
 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
Having considered competing theories, the intention of this thesis is to seek a 
solution to the problems discussed in Part A by focusing primarily on that of Rawls 
because it is the most fully developed general theory of justice providing an 
argument for fair equality of opportunity, which informs the obligations of the State. 
That Rawls provides a more complete theory is also accepted by Nussbaum when 
she suggests that there are many areas that are not covered by the capabilities 
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approach and still need to be discussed in the future such as, how inequalities 
above the minimum threshold demanded by the theory should be handled.246 Rawls 
answers such queries with the difference principle: inequalities, particularly in 
income and wealth, are only permitted as long as they make the worst off better off 
than they otherwise would be with complete equality. Rawls’ theory is also the most 
minimal theory of justice that is pragmatic in that it accepts the world as we have it 
now with developed States, thus it stands a much greater chance of being 
universally acceptable and provides a jurisprudential foundation for practical 
discussion of current law. Finding an obligation to provide at least basic healthcare 
even within such minimal principles, serves to strengthen the argument of a State’s 
duty to ensure every child has access to healthcare. Having established the 
credibility of such an argument this thesis will now focus on addressing Daniels’ 
challenge to the next generation of academics. It has been seen from Daniels’ 
extension that justice requires the reduction of domestic health inequalities as the 
obligations of the State have clearly been established. However Daniels wants 
others to pursue international obligations and assistance beyond State borders, yet 
between strong statist ideas that social justice is the singular responsibility of the 
State, and cosmopolitan claims that the principles apply to individuals regardless of 
borders and institutional design.247 Navigating this difficult gap, and bringing these 
moral arguments into pragmatic international legal debate, is the ultimate aim of this 
thesis. 
The argument thus far in Part B has been a focus on Rawls’ theory of justice as it 
stands, claiming that this strong yet minimal theory can find a child’s right to 
healthcare as a moral, State obligation. Now this has been established, discussion 
moves on to areas of extending the work so far. Chapter five therefore advocates 
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for the globalisation firstly of Rawls’ work, something he himself disagreed with; and 
secondly, the appropriate way to adjudicate the right to healthcare.  





A Global Theory 
 
The previous chapter laid out John Rawls’ theory of justice and effectively 
established that children have a place in a Rawlsian society and the protection of 
the two principles of justice should be bestowed on them, which, via a natural 
extension of equality of opportunity, in turns leads to a right to healthcare. Whilst an 
important underpinning, this last chapter does not by itself apply those obligations 
that are found in a global setting. Extending Rawls’ theory, along with the idea of 
adjudicating such rights for effective enforcement, to a global setting, is what this 
chapter sets out to achieve. First the global picture and the application of Rawls’ 
theory will be discussed. Rawls himself has stated that his theory does not apply 
universally but rather only to small societies, which in modern day practice means 
States as we know them. As a thesis that largely accepts Rawls’ theory of justice, it 
is necessary to explain Rawls’ own international perspective in The Law of Peoples 
to show why the original authors own extension is not used. It will be shown how 
much criticism this opinion of Rawls about his own theory has received in the 
literature from many advocates of Rawls’ original Theory of Justice. Whilst 
accepting the overarching principles of his theory discussed above, it will be shown 
that Rawls’ own extension of his theory to a globalised world is found wanting. It is 
argued strongly that application of his theory of justice to the global milieu is not 
merely advantageous for the purposes of this thesis, but is also a basic premise of 
his initial theory, something Rawls himself failed to realise.  
After establishing the globalised nature of this theory, the lessons in chapter three 
will be brought together to propose a framework for international jurisprudence on 
the right to healthcare. It is argued that adjudication through international courts 




could provide strong enforcement mechanisms which are presently lacking, as seen 
in chapter two, and yet if such a proposal is to be undertaken, it must be done 
carefully and appropriately avoiding some of the more contentious methods used 
which have led to contempt of court proceedings. The globalisation of this thesis 
requires that the fundamental obligations found, which by extension include 
healthcare services, are the focus and responsibility of the entire world. This informs 
discussion on international human rights, their enforcement, their international 
adjudication and the global redistribution of resources to be discussed throughout 
the remaining chapter of the thesis.  
 
5.1 Globalising Rawls 
 
 
The key to globalising Rawls’ theory of justice lies, I believe, with the work of 
Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz.1 As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
Rawls’ own idea of extending his theory to international relations and a global theory 
of justice has been criticised and Pogge and Beitz are amongst the critics who 
propose a different method which is a much more natural extension. Firstly it is 
necessary to present Rawls’ ideas whilst also critiquing them in order to justify not 
using the authors own perspective of his theory. After this the appropriate 
globalisation of Rawls’ theory of justice as proposed by Beitz, and, more specifically 
for this thesis, by Pogge, shall be discussed.   
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5.1.1 The Law of Peoples 
 
  5.1.1.1 The Second Original Position 
 
In the Law of Peoples, Rawls uses similar arguments to those seen in previous work, 
as highlighted in the last chapter and proposes the use of a second original position. 
The parties in this ‘second’ original position are behind a slightly different veil of 
ignorance and now represent liberal peoples. Rawls reiterates that the original 
position with a veil of ignorance is a model of representation which again prevents 
parties involving inappropriate reasoning. 2  In this second original position, the 
representatives are to specify the Law of Peoples; an agreement on justice between 
societies and based on the liberal conception of justice already chosen in the first 
original position.3 There will again be a basis of equality of peoples and not of 
primary social goods. This veil of ignorance is “properly adjusted for the case at 
hand”4 meaning the parties do not know certain facts such as the size of their 
territory, population, strength of their people, natural resources or economic 
development. They do know however, that reasonably favourable conditions apply 
as they know they represent liberal societies and thus will have constitutional 
democracy. The second original position then is a model of representation in exactly 
the same way as the first, creating features we would accept as fair in determining 
the basic terms of cooperation among peoples who see themselves as free and 
equal. The difference between the first and second original positions is not in how 
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they are used but how, as a model of representation, they need to be tailored 
differently for the parties and subject at hand.5 
In turning to the actual principles of the Law of Peoples, Rawls follows Kant in 
Perpetual Peace6 in that the principles will make room for cooperative organisations 
and institutions but will not lead to a world-State that would mean either global 
despotism or a fragile empire continuously torn apart by civil struggles. Rawls’ 
cooperative organisations do however envision a United Nations type of 
organisation with authority to condemn unjust domestic institutions and violations of 
human rights and use economic sanctions and military intervention in extreme 
cases.7  
Rawls then lays out his admittedly incomplete list of eight principles and points out 
that others will need to be added. The most interesting and relevant for this thesis 
are: 
Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
Peoples have to honor human rights. 
Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under 
unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or 
decent political and social regime.8 
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Much like the first original position the parties begin with equality, but the second 
time it is equality and equal rights of all peoples as opposed to primary social 
goods.9 Rawls contends that he has taken the eight principles from “the history and 
usages of international law and practice.”10 Unlike the first instance, the parties are 
not given alternative principles and ideals from which they have to choose but they 
reflect on the eight principles and see no reason to seek alternatives or not to 
accept them. Any alternatives that might be thought of would be rejected by liberal 
peoples so it is more the interpretation of these eight principles that is discussed in 
the second original position.11 
 
5.1.1.2 Problems of the Second Original Position 
 
One major criticism in the literature of Rawls’ theory is that of the second original 
position and the problems it creates. Firstly it has been argued that it would lead to 
excessive inequalities that would not be immediately obvious. In a similar way to the 
domestic theory and being concerned with the worst-off individuals because these 
could be themselves, they would be concerned with their position and would remain 
naturally risk-averse. Splitting the concern between the two original positions 
however, means that the resultant excessive inequalities may not be realised, as 
Pogge explains: 
[S]uppose income inequalities are constrained by a ratio of 
30:1. . . . Income in the poorest state (with per capita gross 
national product of 200) might vary between 360 and 12, 
while in the richest state (with a per capita gross national 
product of 6,000) the spread is between 60,000 and 2,000. 
Imposing two separate 30:1 limitations comfortably permits 
inequalities of 5,000:1 (a spread of 60,000 to 12).12 
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Thus two original positions instead of one and separate considerations create gross 
inequalities we would find unacceptable and which will also affect the bargaining 
power of peoples leading to further economic problems and pressure,13 discussed in 
more detail below.  
The second problem with two original positions which Pogge highlights is that at the 
start of the second, the parties must realise that their society is not a closed and 
self-sufficient one as first thought, but part of some multinational scheme.14 The 
problem with this, Pogge suggests, is that the parties will then come to regret their 
choices in the first original position. He argues that they would naturally consider the 
globally worst-off social position when assessing all basic institutions, because of 
their concern for the economic strength of their own people, thus they would want to 
substitute their prior domestic agreement for one where the basic institutions are 
governed by the two principles of justice, but interpreted globally.15 
A third problem that is highlighted with the second original position is that it 
assumes priority of the domestic situation as it occurs before the international one.16 
If the domestic original position takes place first and is then complemented by the 
international case, then there is an assumption that the national basic structure can 
be developed without considering the international system within which peoples 
exist, which is implausible and unnecessary.17 When considering such a scheme 
consideration should be given to the international scheme rather than assuming 
national isolation.18 Both national and international basic structures have a strong 
impact on each other, on their stability, and they are closely interrelated so Pogge 
argues we should consider the basic structure from a global point of view to aim for 
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integration whilst ensuring distribution that is fair globally and nationally. This leads 
naturally to arguments for global social cooperation,19 and a “single unified original 
position global in scope”20 will be discussed in the next section. 
Finally, Pogge also criticises the flexibility Rawls has given to the original position in 
using a slightly different second one in establishing his Law of Peoples. Pogge 
argues that because the original position is so flexible this makes the desired 
conclusions unremarkable if you can change the rules to anything that will give you 
the answer you want,21 thus removing one of the main strengths behind Rawls’ thick 
veil of ignorance. In the international case, the rules are endorsed directly in the 
second original position and with little option for different interpretations or 
institutional design to find the best method of achieving the aims of the rules.22 
Internationally the direct question leads to an inflexible response. This in turn leads 
to the consequence of past decisions by previous members of the society being 
borne by its present members. Pogge points out that some societies feeling the full 
consequences of unfortunate past decisions or unfortunate natural circumstances is 
unjust and punitive to those who had no say or role in the decisions made, 
especially children, for example.23 This problem is addressed domestically with the 
flexibility allowed post veil and the difference principle which requires some burden 
sharing, yet this is denied internationally for reasons that are unclear. The more rigid 
Law of Peoples, is completely unchecked by any general rules, principles, 
boundaries or expectations, and does not allow for arguments of substantial change 
in the global economic order. Pogge highlights this problem and states that Rawls’ 
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economic order is based on unconstrained free bargaining which allows stronger 
societies to shape the terms to their own advantage.24 
More on this problem of free bargaining in creating the global economic order will be 
discussed below as this has helped create the current economic order which leaves 
many countries without enough to afford minimum basic healthcare even if the 
policies and aspirations were in place. As seen in chapter one, there is the tragic 
irony that the richest country in the world and largest benefactor of the free 
bargaining which created the current unjust economic order 25  does not have 
appropriate policies in place to ensure a minimum standard of healthcare for every 
child. Returning to the critique of Rawls, the reasons behind the use of peoples 
must be considered which Rawls argues provides moral character, although this 
has been criticised as being at odds with his earlier work. 
 
  5.1.1.3 Peoples not States 
 
Rawls’ The Law of Peoples26 applies a “political conception of right and justice . . . 
to the principles and norms of international law and practice.”27 With Rawls looking 
to the norms of international law and practice, an obvious question which arises is 
why the Law of Peoples and not States? Rawls realises this question and spends 
some time justifying his title. Peoples cannot be any random collection of persons 
but must be related to each other in such a way that their society is well-ordered. 
These necessarily liberal peoples will also have a commonality between them and 
about how affairs should be ordered. Rawls argues that liberal peoples have three 
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basic features: a just constitutional democratic government serving their basic 
interests; citizens united by common sympathies; and a moral nature.28 Thus firstly, 
peoples have a government that is under their own political and electoral control, 
and is not an autonomous agency that is directed by private interests free from 
accountability.29  
Secondly, Rawls argues that peoples must possess common sympathies and are 
more than just a collection of individuals.30 Peoples have an amour-propre which is 
one of their main distinguishing features from States and is a proper self-interest 
according to Rawls. 31  This is a self-love based on their common history and 
achievements and helps create a people’s identity. This is what will lead them to 
demand that other just peoples treat them as equals with proper respect and make 
them treat others the same.32  
Finally the moral character of peoples means they are reasonable and rational and 
as such will “offer fair terms of cooperation to other peoples. A people will honor 
these terms when assured that other peoples will do so as well. This leads to the 
principles of political justice in the first case and the Law of Peoples in the other.”33 
People’s self-interests are limited much more than that of States, to what is 
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reasonable, which therefore limits the power of sovereignty.34 It is argued that the 
law of peoples would deny the traditional unrestricted autonomy of the State 
because peoples and States are not the same because of people’s moral status.35 
Rawls points out that the basic features of peoples indicated above and the 
distinction from traditional sovereignty justifies the use of peoples and not States.  
The term “peoples,” then, is meant to emphasize these 
singular features of peoples as distinct from states, as 
traditionally conceived, and to highlight their moral character 
and the reasonably just, or decent, nature of their regimes.36 
States still struggle for power, prestige and greater wealth whereas liberal peoples 
limit their interests and they are fully prepared to grant respect and recognition to 
other peoples as equals.37 This final interest is peoples’ insistence on respect from, 
and equality to, other peoples which is a crucial difference to States.38  
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  5.1.1.4 Difficulty of Peoples 
 
Pogge suggests the use of peoples is difficult because if its use is based on the 
moral valuation of peoples then it disagrees with Rawls’ own theory of justice which 
provides no moral reason for valuing political boundaries and therefore the people 
that Rawls puts in the international original position. The alternative possibility is that 
peoples reflects facts of the world and is designed to be realist and pragmatic, 
although this is doubtful as Rawls makes no effort to justify this point. Indeed it is 
suggested that this cannot be the case as peoples are States with moral and 
cultural character. Rawls wishes to work within the confines of idealised States and 
reject States conceived by realism.39 Therefore Rawls fails to adequately justify his 
use of peoples as it contradicts his own theory of justice and cannot be a realist 
approach.  
Another problem Pogge highlights with the use of peoples is its lack of definition. It 
is unclear what groups are considered people and how this is to be decided. Do we 
isolate them in States? Such as Britain? Or England? People from Manchester? 
Christians? Catholics?  All of these groups could be considered peoples within the 
theory, and there is a further clear problem that someone could easily fall into more 
than one definition of peoples, such as the author falling into all of the above 
suggestions.40 
Thirdly, there is a problem of flexibility of the original position and changes to the 
consideration of individual interests, creating a difference between the domestic and 
international theories with moral weight given to individuals in the domestic instance, 
which is ignored in the international case. With collectives and associations, for 
example, the reverse is true in that they are not considered to have moral weight in 
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the domestic case. Pogge pointed out from an early stage that Rawls’ ideas on 
peoples disagreed with a central point of his previous theory of justice; the focus on 
the basic structure and conception of all human beings as free and equal moral 
persons.41 The obligation by rich peoples to help those burdened societies that may 
become liberal or decent is only to the absolute minimum necessary and Pogge 
points out that this is because there is no thought given to the interests of 
individuals in the law of peoples; otherwise the obligation of the rich would go further 
and not aggravate the stark economic inequalities we have now.42 Rawls argues 
that disregarding individual interests in the international theory is necessary to 
accommodate the decent (non-liberal) societies he wishes to include. 43  Pogge 
disagrees stating that “[a]ccommodating decent societies is . . . necessarily 
compatible with incorporating into the international original position a concern for at 
least the jointly recognized interests of individuals, alongside the interest of each 
people in maintaining a stable well-ordered domestic regime.”44 Pogge also argues 
that incorporating individual interests could have an impact on forming the rules for 
good conduct of States, such as avoiding severe poverty.45 Thus Rawls’ justification 
for failing to include individual interests in the international theory fails. Pogge 
argues the individualistic nature of Rawls’ initial theory of justice should not and 
cannot be removed and ignored and indeed should, in using Rawls’ earlier 
conception of background justice, lead to an “interpretation of the original position 
on which the global parties represent persons and therefore assess a global 
institutional scheme by the worst representative individual share it tends to 
produce.”46 Pogge’s ideas on this will be discussed more below, yet the global 
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nature of Rawls’ theory is also something Pogge has criticised. In arguing the 
reasons for and against The Law of Peoples it will be shown that it is possible for A 
Theory of Justice to apply globally and therefore Rawls’ own defence and extension 
is flawed and unnecessary.  
 
5.1.1.5 Is ‘The Law of Peoples’ Needed? 
 
Up to now discussion has been critical of the content of The Law of Peoples and the 
theory as disjointed from Rawls’ earlier work. Whilst such criticism can reject the law 
of peoples, it does not provide us with sufficient scope for a global theory of justice. 
In order to achieve this, attention must be given to a third area of criticism regarding 
Rawls’ law of peoples; the need for it. Rawls argues that his theory of justice must 
not be applied globally yet many critics suggest that by its very nature, it should be, 
therefore rendering the flawed, law of peoples, unnecessary. It is this discussion 
that will now be briefly embarked on to justify not using Rawls’ global extension of 
his own theory but instead to justify use of A Theory of Justice on a global scale.  
Rawls argues that the law of peoples is necessary because of the increased 
diversity when applying a theory globally, meaning there will be an increase in the 
diversity of comprehensive doctrines which will lead to reasonable disagreements. 
Indeed this diversity is essential for Rawls’ domestic-international shift.47 There will 
be many more reasonable disagreements on the global scale as opposed to the 
domestic, thus Rawls justifies his domestic-international split because there is 
necessarily an asymmetry of justice; a difference of justice within societies to one 
between societies. It is the difference between the interests of peoples and 
individuals that make this asymmetry of justice and requires a necessary split in the 
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theories.48 Cosmopolitans however, disagree and see no reason why the number of 
reasonable disagreements would increase globally especially considering the 
necessary liberalism Rawls imparts on his decent peoples. 49  Rawls’ anti-
cosmopolitan view has some support from Audard who argues that trying to apply 
the liberal principle of justice to all peoples is wrong and gives no moral status to 
non-liberals, who may still be decent peoples.50 In response it can be argued that 
justice is justice and we should not shy away from our considered judgments for 
fear of offending people if we believe we are right and fair; “justice is cosmopolitan, 
not parochial.”51 Pogge also asserts that using two different viewpoints of justice will 
lead to substantial inequalities which our initial intuition would not accept. 
This parochial belief and focus on the difference between the domestic and the 
international means Rawls fails to create a background principle of justice for the 
Law of Peoples because he, mistakenly, believes problems that occur in a society 
(poverty, deprivation, for example) are domestically caused and Rawls ignores 
global interdependence and the effect it may have in creating such problems.52 This 
is an example of explanatory nationalism, the belief that poverty and deprivation are 
caused domestically. As many have pointed out before, ignoring global 
interdependence and external factors is an incomplete and misleading argument.53 
Rawls does not completely ignore the need for international help and responds with 
a very minimal call for assistance but he does argue that when societies do not 
thrive “the problem is commonly the nature of the public political culture and the 
religious and philosophical traditions that underlie its institutions. The great social 
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evils in poorer societies are likely to be oppressive government and corrupt elites”.54 
These evils in poorer societies and problems with the political culture may well be a 
truth, but they are not the truth. Indeed as Pogge points out “there is a distinct 
possibility that the domestic factors he [Rawls] cites are themselves significantly 
shaped and sustained by external factors.”55 Pogge uses the example of eminent 
domain powers for those in charge of a country, regardless of how they achieved 
their power as an example.56 Beitz also highlights that the terms of cooperation are 
set by the wealthy in establishing a coercive relationship making them the more 
powerful partner.57 Thus it seems merely holding that the rich societies have a 
positive obligation for minimal assistance is not an accurate assessment of the 
problems encountered in a poorer society, and Pogge differs from Rawls in that he 
argues for a failure of a negative duty by the rich societies to not cause harm, which 
they breach by imposing the current global economic order that foreseeably causes 
avoidable human suffering.58 
Another reason Rawls is insistent that his theory of justice should not be applied 
globally 59 is the Kantian argument against the practicality of a world government.60 
Pogge responds by firstly pointing out that we can see such divisions of power 
working in practice as seen in the European Union, so Rawls’ reasoning does not 
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stand up in practice.61 Secondly, Pogge contends that such a limitation to Rawls’ 
theory of justice, not to be applied globally, would mean therefore that other 
limitations would necessarily need to be established, such as population size for the 
society, something Rawls does not consider. Without this knowledge national 
boundaries have no moral significance and social cooperation would be understood 
as global, therefore leading to global application of the principles of justice.62 And 
finally it is argued that the infeasibility of a world-government does not itself defeat 
the potential globalisation of Rawls’ theory because it allows many different feasible 
institutional designs within it.63  
It is agreed here that Rawls’ reasoning for the difference between his two theories is 
wanting as the only defence Rawls offers is that the representatives would find no 
reason to depart from the eight principles proposed. In fact, Pogge finds this 
reasoning of Rawls not only scant defence, but also false, as he believes the 
representatives will have reason to consider explanatory nationalism, false. Thus 
they would agree to design the global institutional arrangements in a way that does 
not exert “centrifugal force”.64 Thus Pogge concludes that “the parties in Rawls’s 
international original position would agree to constrain the treaty making of well-
ordered societies to rule out a global economic order that would tend to aggravate 
and reinforce international economic inequalities.”65  
In writing The Law of Peoples, it is argued that Rawls recognises the cosmopolitan 
nature of his theory of justice.66 Rawls focuses on his domestic theory’s institutional 
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assessment and how additional principles of justice that govern international 
relations might help and compliment his theory. Yet many believe the necessary 
requirements in Rawls’ theory of a closed system that is self-sufficient fits even 
better within an international theory than a domestic one.67 In deciding to globalise 
Rawls’ theory, Pogge suggests Rawls would agree with Kant that just institutions 
are only required when there is unavoidable interaction. Thus it is argued since 
there is global interdependence, 68  and that “all agree there is and [it] will be 
extensive”,69 we must look at the conception of justice through adaptation to the real 
world, and not the closed system societies Rawls suggests. Essentially the 
argument is to throw out the law of peoples, and adapt A Theory of Justice so as to 
provide a better theory for the realities of the world and the effect of global 
interdependence.70 
 
5.1.2 A Global Theory of Justice 
 
The general advantages seen in applying A Theory of Justice globally have been 
highlighted by Pogge: 
Applied globally, it would instruct us to design global political 
institutions that would secure the basic liberties of human 
beings as far as possible and to design the global economic 
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order so that fair equality of opportunity is realized 
worldwide.71 
It is strongly suggested by many 72  that to consider globalising Rawls’ entire 
conception of justice is not incompatible with the most essential elements of his 
theory. It is the idea of a global difference principle that is most central for the 
purposes of this thesis and so to briefly recap; inequalities are only allowed if they 
ensure the worst off are better off than they otherwise would have been. The parties 
in the original position will initially desire a principle of equality, however if there are 
inequalities within the basic structure of society that would make everyone better off, 
they would logically prefer this structure.73 
In the Law of Peoples Rawls’ argues for a duty of assistance as opposed to a duty 
of justice as found in A Theory of Justice. As Scanlon points out, the duty of justice 
leads to a much stronger claim than the duty of assistance, so it makes a 
considerable difference where the boundaries are drawn.74 This idea takes further 
the criticism above that Rawls does not impose limits of his theory of justice but 
merely states it should not be applied globally. He does not however point out any 
limits in terms of population or area size to suggest what the envisioned limits might 
be.75 Thus with a duty of justice applying to all those in cooperative enterprises who 
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cannot avoid mutually influencing each other,76 where would we draw the line or set 
the boundaries? The simple argument is that it is clear we could not draw any. 
There is much interdependence globally and States participate in various forms of 
relationships with each other, 77  as well as international institutions which are 
therefore required to be just. Scanlon highlights, aside from the impact of developed 
countries setting an unjust global economic order, that; 
[C]onsiderations of justice apply at least wherever there is 
systematic economic interaction; for whenever there is 
commerce there is an institution in Rawls’ sense, i.e. a 
public system of rules defining rights and duties etc. Thus 
the Difference Principle would apply to the world economic 
system taken as a whole as well as to particular societies 
within it.78 
Barry and Beitz make a similar point and see no reason why representatives of 
countries in an original position would not agree to an international difference 
principle, or maximin if moving away from principles of justice to the uncertainty of 
economics.79 The same arguments used in A Theory of Justice to maximise the 
worst-off would also apply when the scope of the original position is enlarged to 
decide a global minimum which would not “depend capriciously upon the good luck 
of being born in a rich society” or vice versa. 80  Beitz suggests the difference 
principle would be global because of the justice of natural resources, which would 
be considered in the same vein as talents in the domestic original position. It is not 
just or unjust to have different talents or natural resources, what is unjust is the way 
institutions allow this difference to make people suffer for factors beyond their 
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control.81 Pogge agrees with this general expansion, but goes into much more detail 
and establishes his own edited theory.82  
The idea that the richer nations in the world only have a positive duty to aid poorer 
nations, is considered false by Pogge, who also contends that such a duty 
possesses a much weaker claim than one considered as a matter of justice.83 
Pogge argues that every person and State has a negative duty not to unduly harm 
others and seeks to tackle the assumption of the consensus view that the richer 
countries in the world are not actively harming the poorer countries and therefore 
only have a positive duty of aid.84 Thus, our negative duty to not unduly harm others 
is invoked if the poverty and suffering caused in those places is due to, or even 
aided by, ourselves.85 A global difference principle would lead to establishing a 
minimum standard to be guaranteed86 and Pogge points out that nationally these 
arguments are not controversial but he fails to see the difference globally. 
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Pogge believes Rawls was right in the first instance and that the parties in the 
original position should be consistently conceived as representing individuals.87 The 
parties still will not know their place in society or hold any information to warrant risk 
taking or bias, and as such will still be guided by the desire for social primary goods 
and will choose, in the same way, a maximin criterion and a difference principle.88 
So using Rawls’ thick veil of ignorance from A Theory of Justice to support this idea, 
Pogge leaves Rawls’ argument for the two principles of justice completely intact.89 
Much like the other cosmopolitan commentators, the two principles are now merely 
directed at the entire world order as the closed system is no longer an individual 
society (not defined by Rawls anyway) but the world at large.90 
One may question why Pogge could not simply desire Rawls’ domestic theory of 
justice to be applied in every State? Pogge contends however that his idea is 
superior to that possibility because Rawls theory does not guarantee powerful 
States will not abuse their power in the free bargaining that is allowed. Applying 
Rawls’ theory in each State will still allow and lead to unfair, coercive international 
interactions and thus create large distributional inequalities.91 Betiz also considers 
this possibility and notes that States will enter into various relationships with one 
another and the more powerful State will be able to threaten the vulnerable State as 
a break in the relationship will cost them much more.92 Pogge also argues that his 
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theory will lead to effective mechanisms of adjudication and enforcement to help 
ensure governments would comply.93  
 
  5.1.2.1 Objections 
 
The most difficult criticism of applying Rawls globally according to Pogge is that of 
cultural diversity. Rawls’ theory might appeal to us and our culture, heritage and 
values but it may be inappropriate for the vast cultural diversity and traditions in the 
rest of the world. Such a possibility is one which cannot be ignored and which we 
cannot escape.94 There will not be a neutral criterion across all values and cultures 
and it is surely wrong to impose ours upon others.95 Therefore it would seem we 
cannot impose Rawls’ rationale of justice globally. However what Pogge suggests is 
that this does not mean we cannot support the idea of using Rawls’ principles of 
justice globally because they are the conclusion of the rationales of justice, and 
many different premises, criterions and conceptions of justice can yield the same 
political judgments and conclusions.96 Thus the counter argument must show that 
there will be no overlapping consensus or even a slight possibility of convergence 
and agreement upon a criterion of global justice. Pogge’s impressive response is 
that the difficulty is not restricted to the global, which is just one case of diversity in 
considered judgments, rather that Rawls’ conception of justice is based on a small 
set of accepted values with such flexibility as to accept and incorporate cultural 
diversity easily.97 
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Another objection to a globalised theory of justice based on the dominant national 
focus is because of the belief in explanatory nationalism. Pogge does not exclude 
this view holding that it can be true and indeed for the most part is,98 but believes 
that such a focus is one-sided and does not present an accurate or fair picture. It is 
clear there is global interdependence and that we live in an increasingly globalised 
world. Thus even accepting explanatory nationalism it is argued that in a different 
global environment, lack of fulfilment of human rights would occur less frequently, 
but we tend to not ask whether there is such a negative duty for those who shape 
the global institutions.99 
The global poor have done nothing to deserve their situation. Indeed many of them 
are children.100 Add to this the argument that global factors, institutions and the 
economic order support the establishment and maintainence of such oppressive 
regimes, it is easy to see how the negative duty not to unduly harm others is being 
violated. 101  These problems are all permitted through the current international 
financial markets, the rules of which have been dictated by the richer countries of 
the world.102 Thus Pogge, Scanlon and Beitz’s arguments applying Rawls globally, 
requires us to apply a global difference principle. In practice, it will be seen that the 
institutions that currently exist do not support this idea but instead actively harm 
poorer nations.  
The globalisation of Rawls’ theory of justice provides a strong, philosophical, moral 
underpinning and argument for a child’s right to healthcare on an international scale, 
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so as to better justify calls for strong global enforcement. It is contended here that 
one of the best ways to achieve this strong enforcement is through the courts, but 
this must be done appropriately. Thus, drawing on lessons from chapter three, this 
globalising chapter will now suggest a framework for how a domestic and 
international court should adjudicate a right to healthcare. 
 
 
5.2 A Global Framework for the Justiciability of ESC Rights 
  5.2.1 Reasonableness 
  
The proposed framework here will be an amalgamation, or so called combination 
approach,103 of the test of reasonableness and the enforcement of a minimum core 
as used in Columbia.  There is plenty of literature that argues South Africa provides 
an excellent example of ESC rights justiciability and the best argument against 
critics who believe it is impossible for a court to make such decisions in a 
democracy with a separation of powers doctrine.104 A test of reasonableness is 
important because it circumvents criticisms of resource allocation decisions being 
taken by the court. A test of reasonableness is not a political one of whether the 
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policy is correct; it necessarily allows for reasonable disagreement as well as 
different systems, such as that seen in Germany and the UK, through the  important 
margin of appreciation. 105  Some suggest that judicial review removes choice 
between policies,106 yet this is mistaken as it only removes “the possibility to choose 
an unreasonable – disproportionate – policy.”107 In Soobramoney the court said “[i]t 
has not been suggested that these guidelines are unreasonable or that they were 
not applied fairly and rationally”.108 Thus the court began to think along the lines of 
whether the policy the government had in place was reasonable given the 
circumstances. The court considered that to progressively fulfil the right “the 
Constitution states in so many words that the state must take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resources”. 109  It is clear that 
reasonableness is the measure that is used by the court and part of this is 
availability of resources. The court also avoided the temptation to analyse the right 
to health individually as in Brazil. Albie Sachs was wise to the difficulties such 
precedent would set arguing that “to have upheld his [Soobramoney’s] claim as 
against others waiting for treatment, could well have meant in practice that those 
with the most money could run to court to get help and leave the disadvantaged 
without treatment.”110 This is exactly the problem Ferraz and others have argued is 
seen in Brazil.111 
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In Grootboom, the court elaborated and consolidated its test of reasonableness. 
The court reaffirmed that the test of reasonableness does not cross into the politics 
of government policy: 
The precise contours and content of the measures to be 
adopted are primarily a matter for the legislature and the 
executive. . . .The question would be whether the measures 
that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to 
recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be 
adopted by the state to meet its obligations.112 
 
Thus clear deference to government and different political ideas can be seen with 
the court accepting that there will be many different plans and ideas that will fulfil the 
reasonableness test and which one is the best, is not for the court to decide. The 
court added that the State has a constitutional obligation beyond legislative 
measures to directed policies and programmes that themselves must be reasonably 
implemented. 113 Thus, the court attempted to be more assertive in the 
implementation and follow up to the orders and measures taken. As was seen 
earlier however, for Grootboom this did not work. This does not mean that the 
jurisprudence of the court was wrong. The test of reasonableness had been clearly 
defined and the State’s housing plan had been found to be unreasonable, yet no 
further orders were made, not even as to costs. Despite this minimal decision there 
has still been a lack of political adherence, which will always be a concern and 
potential problem; the best a court can do is to establish a respected and consistent 
jurisprudence as they have “no influence over either the sword or the purse”.114 
 
  5.2.2 Accountability for Reasonableness 
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This idea of a test of reasonableness finds support from the salient authors 
discussed in the last chapter. Daniels extends an element of Rawls’ theory of justice 
to establish his “accountability for reasonableness”.115 The idea behind this concept, 
Daniels states, is to establish a fair process within which to set health priorities. 
Daniels thus tries “to characterize the general conditions such a process must meet 
if it is to yield outcomes that are perceived as fair and legitimate.” 116  If these 
conditions are characterised and met, it will ensure a fair process for decision 
making, which is the idea of an accountability for reasonableness. In terms of 
allocating resources to healthcare, it is unknown or uncertain what the correct 
decision is as Daniels points out, fair-minded people will disagree. Thus if a 
framework is followed, then the decision is fair and just even if hindsight shows it to 
be wrong. However it will be argued that the first stage of allocating resources to the 
right to healthcare will establish a basic minimum and anything different must be 
part of what Daniels puts forward as the appeals condition which will be returned to 
below.  
I connect Daniels’ accountability for reasonableness to the jurisprudence of the 
South African Court as an example of imperfect procedural justice and a fair 
decision making process. As mentioned, the court acknowledged that there could 
be many different policies that are reasonable, but the role of the court was not to 
decide which reasonable policy is best. Daniels makes a similar point with reference 
to his accountability for reasonableness stating that reasons for a policy must be 
publicly available and ones that fair-minded people agree are relevant.117 
This was seen, but not explicitly established as part of the test, in the TAC case 
when the court found any argument based on lack of resources would be 
                                                          
115










unreasonable as nevirapine was available to the State for free, thus making 
resource constraints not relevant to the argument and therefore any argument 
based on this, unreasonable. Daniels clarifies that policies must be based on 
reasons that “fair-minded people consider relevant in providing high-quality care to 
all with limited resources.”118 
The idea is to establish a framework for the decision making process at the first 
instance, within government. If this is adhered to then there would be no need for 
litigation and a justiciable right to healthcare, although such options should remain 
available. So the framework for adjudicating the right to healthcare in essence 
should test whether the government has followed the decision making process in 
making an appropriate, or reasonable, decision. Daniels puts forward four 
conditions as integral to this; the publicity condition; the relevance condition; the 
revision and appeals condition; and the regulative condition.119 For the purposes of 
the justiciability of ESC rights, it seems that the revision and appeals condition is the 
part of Daniels theory that can be extended as it demands the opportunity to 
challenge decisions and, in assessing that challenge, reasonableness will be 
considered. Part of this consideration will be the publicity and relevance conditions 
and whether they have been met. Daniels goes into much more detail about these 
conditions, such as discussing cost-effectiveness and the way to vet relevance of 
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reasons,120 but focuses more on the decision making process and specific appeals 
by patients. In this instance, Daniels favours an internal system of revision and 
appeals but does suggest that in general policy appeals with broader elements, the 
courts may be used. Thus it seems Daniels would fully support a test of 
reasonableness as seen and used in South Africa.  
 
  5.2.3 Addition of the Minimum Core 
 
It has been suggested above, that certain decisions will not need to go through this 
decision making framework to ensure that whatever decision is made is fair, just 
and reasonable because they are so fundamental and obvious that fair-minded 
people cannot disagree. This idea is the amalgamation of the South African test of 
reasonableness and the Columbian use of the minimum core. The test of 
reasonableness is necessary to defer to government and accept the difficulties of 
making certain resource allocation decisions, yet the minimum core concept adds 
the addendum that this deference only occurs beyond a certain point. It is also 
suggested that the reasonableness test alone fails to provide meaningful content to 
ESC rights as it is rather subjective and the minimum core very much adds this 
specific content.121 Rather than use two tests however, it is postulated here that 
simply adding the minimum core to the test of reasonableness can provide the 
appropriate framework and jurisprudence. It can be simply contended that failure to 
fulfil the minimum core is unreasonable. This is not a novel proposition, nor is it 
exclusive to academia. In Grootboom the court’s focus was on relief for those in 
desperate need and it was considered unreasonable to not provide for such 
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people.122 Davis explains how the most vulnerable were also required to be the first 
group considered, offering a striking resemblance to the idea that not realising a 
minimum core first and foremost, is unreasonable. 123  The court came close 
therefore to incorporating a minimum core within its reasonableness test, but 
avoided doing so because of an apparent lack of information. 124  Yet the court 
specifically noted that the minimum core could be an aspect in determining 
reasonableness.125  
In the later TAC case the court stated that if a minimum core approach was used it 
would itself still be subject to a reasonableness test.126 Thus it would not become an 
automatic and direct demand for everyone. The court is thus saying that if the 
minimum core were to be used, it would be used in the context of reasonableness in 
that it would be admissible because it is considered unreasonable to not provide a 
minimum core to the right. This proposal, whilst not adopted by the court, is 
precisely the framework that should be adopted to ensure appropriate deference 
with a reasonableness question, yet demanding adherence with the specificity a 
minimum core can provide.  
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Exactly how much specificity there should be is difficult but the Columbian Court 
avoided such problems by not adding details of the protected health services but 
ordering the government to determine what services were to be part of the minimum 
core.127 It also ordered that these services were to be immediately enforceable and 
beyond resource constraints as part of their ‘structural approach’. The content of the 
minimum core had to be in line with the country’s international obligations under the 
ICESCR and more specifically General Comment 14. This is of course something to 
add to the reasonableness framework. The requirements of availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and quality under General Comment 14 should be considered as part 
of the minimum core. 128  It would be unreasonable to have a basic minimum 
guarantee to respect, protect and fulfil a certain health service beyond resource 
constraints, because it was so vitally important, but not ensure it is accessible to all 
and universal for example. Such international obligations should be ensured as a 
bare minimum, along with fulfilling the minimums put forward by the WHO, such as 
those seen in chapter one for example. If those minimums are considered and 
constitute part of a country’s minimum core, along with the requirements under 
General Comment 14, in essence a ‘minimum’ minimum core can be established. 
States can add other healthcare services to their minimum core if they choose, 
which arguably developed regions should do, but even for the poorest nations there 
is a ‘minimum’ minimum core that they must look to fulfil. This idea is similar to 
Bilchitz arguing for two obligations that arise from a single right to health, the first of 
which is a minimum that is beyond resource constraints. This minimum is so basic 
and focuses on survival needs as to be compared to the idea of ‘minimum’ minimum 
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core. These “minimum subsistence rights” 129   are also seen in the Limburg 
Principles as the immediate obligations beyond resource constraints. After this, 
progressive realisation requires incremental improvement to what resources allow, 
as Bilchitz explains with regards to the two obligations that arise:130  
[T]he first is to realise a certain minimum level of provision 
without delay, and the second is to improve the level of 
provision beyond this lower threshold by taking reasonable 
measures to meet a higher threshold that must be attained if 
the right is to be fully realised. Such an approach thus 
recognises that there is only one right, but such a right gives 
rise to two different obligations upon the state.131 
 
  5.2.4 Presumption of Unreasonableness 
 
Using the minimum core in this way also has advantages for enforcing the rights in 
the courts because of what Liebenberg and Young have suggested as a shifting of 
the onus of proof.132 Liebenberg suggests a “presumption of unreasonableness”133 
when it can be shown that basic goods are not being provided to those in need. She 
argues this idea does not demand one inflexible policy but does require the use of 
the minimum core concept levels of provision; “this approach does not require the 
setting of inflexible minimum standards of delivery. . . . However, it does require 
placing a strong burden of justification on the state in relation to the absence of 
basic levels of provision for groups living in poverty.”134 Liebenberg agrees with the 
South African Constitutional Court in Grootboom that different circumstances for 
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different people will mean different needs and an inflexible minimum core would be 
insensitive to that.135 In essence different policies may achieve different needed 
outcomes yet she argues the presumption of unreasonableness should be 
established when basic services that are required to sustain a basic level of 
functioning are not provided.136 This is similar to what the minimum core seeks to 
ensure for all people. If a minimum core can be established that ensures and 
protects the “basic level of functioning”137 for all, it would create the presumption of 
unreasonableness if not being guaranteed, unless, according to Liebenberg there 
was evidence that this minimum core was not in that individual’s interests. The 
presumption of unreasonableness fits with the accountability for reasonableness 
proposed that requires fulfilment of the minimum core as a first step. If this is not 
achieved, it can be presumed unreasonable, and the onus of proof shifts to the 
government failing to provide the minimum core, which in turn requires strong 
justification for its policies and resource constraints. Thus Liebenberg’s strength is 
the presumption of unreasonableness. Her weakness is failing to acknowledge that 
the minimum core is an important part of establishing unreasonableness, as Young 
has suggested.138 Using Liebenberg’s argument, Young points out how important 
the minimum core can be to reversing the onus of proof onto the State that it has 
taken reasonable measures and any limitations are justifiable.139 
Thus once it is established that the minimum core is not being fulfilled, it falls on the 
State and the government to prove it has legitimate resource constraints. This 
presumption of unreasonableness then becomes part of a test of reasonableness as 
it can be argued whether the government’s failure to provide the minimum core is 
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reasonable because of scarcity of resources, but the onus of proof and requirement 
of strong justification shifts onto the government and not the litigants. So we have a 
minimum core as the first requirement of reasonableness and a presumption of 
unreasonableness when this is not being fulfilled. As has also been seen, part of 
this is proving that the State has tried to attain any needed international assistance 
in order to fulfil the minimum core. If it can be shown that it is the developed 
countries that are failing their obligations, clearly the governments in the poorer 
nations will not be violating the right. There are some reservations about a court 
requiring governments to seek international assistance because often loans come 
with conditions attached and can actually be detrimental to the development of a 
nation.140 In such a situation it would be inappropriate for the courts to be making 
such calls. However, these reservations are because of the conditions placed on 
such international aid. If these were removed or replaced with a much better and 
fairer system of global economic distribution, then these reservations would surely 
cease. This is an issue to which I shall return in chapter six when discussing the 
global economic order. 
 
  5.2.5 Reasonableness and Minimum Core: Separate Entities or 
Irreverisbly Intertwined?  
 
Despite his arguments of a basic minimum as a first obligation of the right to health, 
Bilchitz contends that the minimum core and test of reasonableness are separate 
entities that cannot be used within the same test. He argues the: 
The minimum core does not gloss the notion of 
reasonableness; rather, reasonableness is assessed in 
terms of whether a government has complied with its 
minimum core obligations in terms of the right. The idea of a 
minimum core comes from an analysis of the obligations 
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imposed by the right and a consideration of the notion of 
progressive realisation. This is a separate enquiry to that 
involved in determining the reasonableness of the measures 
adopted by the government.141 
The argument here could be that minimum core adds specific content, and its 
purpose is a debate on what that content should be. Reasonableness however is a 
discussion where actual content of healthcare and what is being provided is not 
assessed. However it seems unconvincing to suggest they are separate enquiries 
given the admission that reasonableness is assessed in terms of the minimum core. 
If they are assessed in terms of each other, it remains unclear how they can be 
separate. Without the fulfilment of the minimum core, there should at least be a 
‘presumption of unreasonableness’. The two enquiries occur simultaneously. It is 
true that assessing the fulfilment of the minimum core is an enquiry that helps 
establish reasonableness, whereas reasonableness is not an enquiry that changes 
the outcome of whether the minimum core is being fulfilled. However, this does not 
mean they are entirely separate enquiries as they are part of a larger test of 
reasonableness, for which assessing fulfilment of the minimum core is the first stage. 
Failure to fulfil the minimum core can still be reasonable, and fulfilling the minimum 
core can still lead to a conclusion that the government’s policies beyond this 
fulfilment are unreasonable. The enquiries of minimum core fulfilment and 
reasonableness cannot be separate, as the minimum core should be part of the 
reasonableness assessment. Indeed they are irreversibly intertwined as they are 
both assessed within the scope of each other; assessing reasonableness begins 
with fulfilment of the minimum core; whereas any lack of fulfilment of the minimum 
core establishes a presumption of unreasonableness and thus a strong justification 
required from the government.  
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Bilchitz argues that the courts should use the minimum core approach and that the 
basic ‘minimum’ minimum core will be beyond resource constraints and must occur 
without delay.142 He argues it is “unclear why the Court is so set on distancing itself 
from the minimum core approach [which] . . . suggests that there are degrees of 
fulfilment of a right and that a certain minimum level of fulfilment takes priority over a 
more extensive realisation of the right.”143Establishing this ‘minimum’ minimum core 
can be a good first step for each country. The amount of money needed to ensure 
this ‘minimum’ minimum core can then be estimated and can help inform whether a 
State is being reasonable if it is not realising this right. It can also better inform 
where international cooperation is needed; direct government finances and 
infrastructure, which leads to more sustainable healthcare solutions; and can also 
lead to a required minimum spending by all States on healthcare, which can be 
calculated with reference to a minimum percentage GDP incorporated into 
international obligations. Such ideas will be looked at further in chapter six.  
The establishment of this framework leads to the idea that this test of 
reasonableness which incorporates a minimum core should be used in all courts 
when adjudicating ESC rights; national, regional and international. While courts are 
not a panacea., “[t]his does not mean . . . that the courts cannot make a significant 
contribution to the enforcement of the child’s right to health.”144 The courts can be a 
powerful tool in enforcing the right to healthcare but even if there were many courts 
across the world willing to adjudicate ESC rights responsibly in the way proposed, 
there is no guarantee of implementation. Avoiding this possibility is part of why it is 
important to follow a respected jurisprudence as well as apply that similar 
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adjudication internationally, but lawsuits may also not be the best means of 
asserting children’s rights.145  
 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
The Law of Peoples was presented as an extension of Rawls’ domestic theory of 
justice, but crucially Rawls saw the need for a different exercise because for him, 
justice between societies is different from justice within societies. Here, Rawls’ 
global theory was briefly presented and critiqued in order to justify not using the 
authors own extension of his domestic theory. It has been shown how the domestic 
theory of justice is to be applied globally, especially the difference principle, which 
for the purposes of this thesis is important for realising a child’s right to healthcare in 
practice with the necessary redistribution of resources as a matter of global justice.  
Equally important to realising global justice is the enforcement and implementation 
of rights, otherwise the philosophical arguments serve to convince, but are 
meaningless in practice. This is why the role of the courts was discussed in chapter 
three and then again above. If rights, such as a child’s right to healthcare, are to be 
enforced and meaningful, then their forceful implementation through the courts 
should be seen as perhaps the best guarantor. This jurisprudence and adjudication 
must, however, be done appropriately and in the correct way so as to avoid judicial 
over-stepping, and equally must be thought of as global, especially if the 
consideration is the judicial enforcement of international human rights. Thus, the 
framework above draws on comparative lessons around the world as the best 
examples for judicial decisions about codified economic, social and cultural rights. It 
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has been argued that from these lessons, any court, domestic or international, 
should use a test of reasonableness when deciding on a government’s policy 
without losing sight of a basic minimum standard. There should be a presumption of 
unreasonableness when it can be shown that the minimum core of a right is not 
being realised, which therefore shifts the onus of proof onto the government to 
prove its resource constraints.  If this framework was applied globally it would 
ensure a substantial change in the way such rights are viewed and enforced. The 
more precise changes that are required to enhance a child’s right to healthcare are 
now discussed in the concluding chapter, including changes to the global economy 
and redistribution of money, and the possibility of a World Court of Human Rights, 
which would, of course, be expected to follow the recommended jurisprudence and 
framework above.  
 





Time to Change 
 
In this penultimate chapter, the thesis pulls together the conclusions made from the 
variety of disciplines discussed so far and take them further, adding greater detail to 
the ideas proposed. It has been shown that there is an inequity in children’s access 
to healthcare services and that provision of such services are indeed a matter of 
justice. Any State that can be considered just, therefore must provide a basic 
minimum of healthcare services to children. It has also been shown that this is a 
global problem, not one that can be restricted within the confines of random, post 
original position, borders. Therefore, the problems encountered require global 
solutions and application of a global difference principle. Equally important, as 
demonstrated in the last chapter, is a global legal response. These multiple 
conclusions will be taken further in this chapter; combined, and enlarged to 
demonstrate the pragmatic possibilities, and better illustrate the overall conclusion 
to this thesis.  
Firstly this chapter will address the issues raised around minimal healthcare 
provision being a global problem that requires a global response, with a 
redistribution of global resources. It will establish the philosophical foundations for 
this argument before demonstrating that such a bold suggestion does not have to 
be empty, impractical words. After showing the economic possibilities to achieve 
global healthcare provision with a minimal redistribution of resources, it will also be 
argued that there is a legal responsibility on the world’s financial institutions. Section 
6.1 therefore answers the philosophical, economic, and legal questions around 
redistributing global resources to ensure a child’s access to a minimum core of 
healthcare. The legal position is taken further in the next section where the young 




area of global constitutionalism is considered. Here, international law’s comparison 
to a superior world constitution as codified law is discussed, which is why the 
framework of the previous chapter used examples for the way a written right to 
healthcare had been enforced and adjudicated through the courts. If international 
law is akin to a written constitution, it should be enforced in a similar way to that 
suggested so as to avoid the pitfalls of the less successful implementers of rights. 
This then takes discussion into proposals for more active enforcement and the 
flagship recommendation of a World Court of Human Rights. This is recommended 
among many other changes that would help make the United Nations a powerful 
human rights implementer; a change long overdue to avoid its demise into 
insignificance akin to a second League of Nations.  
 
6.1 Can We Afford Global Health Justice? 
 
 
The bleak picture of healthcare around the world was highlighted in chapter one as 
well as the stark contrast between per capita spending on healthcare in some of the 
wealthiest countries in the world and some of the poorest. The effect this has on 
health is shown by reminding ourselves that the infant mortality rates of South Africa 
and India were 41 and 48 (per 1,000 live births) respectively in 2010, compared to 
just 7 and 3 for the USA and Germany. As was also discussed in chapter one, this 
is hardly surprising given that India spends just US$141 (PPP) per capita on total 
health expenditure compared to Germanys US$4,495. 1  Yet it should also be 
reiterated that the USA spends US$8,508 per capita for slightly worse health 
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outcomes than other similar countries such as the UK and Germany, showing that 
money needs to be better directed at creating a fundamental and universal 
healthcare system.2  
In the first section of this chapter, ways to change this will be explored, and more 
specifically, ways to ensure that the poorest nations have the means to ensure the 
minimum core content of the right to health. As is seen with the United States 
however, merely spending more money does not automatically lead to better 
healthcare,3 yet ensuring the minimum core seems an appropriate place to start if 
funds can be directed for such a purpose. Thus in this section the focus is on using 
the idea of globalising Rawls discussed in the last chapter and ensuring a global 
difference principle as a moral foundation and justification for change. Discussion 
will then focus on the more practical problems of redistributing global resources to 
counter suggestions that it may not be possible or anywhere near enough for 
ensuring a minimum of children’s healthcare.   
 
6.1.1 Philosophical Foundations for Change in the Global 
Economic Order 
 
Whilst Pogge’s work was used to globalise Rawls theory of justice, he has also 
taken this further to suggest how this might actually be achieved by making 
arguments to implement a global difference principle. His particular idea of a Global 
Resources Dividend (GRD) is designed to help with the broader area of poverty in 
general.4 The GRD is based on the natural resources found within the territory of a 
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State and Pogge suggests that governments should make payments for use of the 
planet’s resources into this dividend.5 This GRD fund is then to be used to ensure all 
human beings have a basic minimum standard of living. Repeating his arguments 
that the affluent countries of the world impose the current global order that, at the 
very least, contributes to severe poverty, Pogge argues that those who “make more 
extensive use of our planet’s resources should compensate those who, involuntarily, 
use very little.” 6  This is the basis of his argument for redistribution of global 
resources. Stewart and Daws similarly argue that as the distribution of capital flows 
among countries is so uneven, it demands action at the global level in order to 
correct this.7  
The changes proposed by Pogge do not impact upon eminent domain as the 
decision to use the resources is still that of governments, but those that do choose 
to, by buying or selling, contribute to the GRD which can be targeted towards 
reducing poverty. Pogge acknowledges that practical problems will emerge, 
especially if either the US or EU cannot be persuaded to participate and help ensure 
payments,8 but believes that once this barrier is overcome, sanctions such as import 
and export taxes,9 will ensure compliance from all States to create a GRD with vast 
resources that can be appropriately spent. The underlying moral idea why Pogge 
favours the creation of such a fund or dividend is because it avoids the usual 
notions of charity and dependence and instead “incorporates into our global 
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institutional order the moral claim of the poor to partake in the benefits from the use 
of planetary resources.”10 
This is Pogge’s basic idea to improve global economic justice and the GRD is 
designed to show that there are alternatives to the way the economic order is 
structured. 11  Pogge finds it inconceivable to think that with such global 
interdependence the rich countries are not involved in, influence, or contribute to, 
the abject poverty across the world. He also finds it equally incredulous that the 
current global economic order may be the best one possible to conceive, rendering 
the position of the worst off as best off as possible, as demanded by a just world 
applying a global difference principle.12 Pogge is not the only person who has taken 
up such a challenge or highlighted the connection that globalisation establishes. 
Stewart and Daws also suggest that “[g]lobal institutions are essential to ensure that 
the international implications of national action are taken into account.”13 
They propose the establishment of a Social and Economic Security Council.14 They 
put forward many reasons for this idea, the most convincing of which is because the 
current UN Economic and Social Council is widely accepted to be weak and largely 
ineffective.15 Thus when it comes to implementing economic and social rights, such 
as the right to healthcare, the need for change is at least relatively unanimous. 
Stewart and Daws regret the lack of world governance of agreed social and 
economic rights and point out that the enforcement mechanisms that are effective 
are dominated by powerful Western economies. Stewart and Daws argue that one 
of the reasons the economic and social council is so ineffective, is because of the 
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voting majority of developing countries and so developed countries, those with the 
resources to implement decisions, refuse to give the council any power. Certainly 
the most economically influential institutions are the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). In theory, these ‘Bretton Woods’16 institutions 
are under the purview of the United Nations, however, in practice, these authors 
suggest that this has not occurred at any point.17 With the method of weighted 
voting in both the IMF and the World Bank, it is the US and Western Europe that in 
essence decides the policies of these institutions, a dominance which was 
controversial at the outset,18 and a state of affairs which further supports Pogge’s 
argument that the global economic order is decided by a few rich countries.19 The 
World Bank and the IMF have become separate entities from the UN despite the 
theory that they are part of the same system. Indeed, the IMF website actually 
states that it is a specialised agency of the United Nations, but it has its own, 
separate charter, governing structure, and finances.20 The Western-centric power of 
the World Bank and the IMF has made them powerful in economic terms however, 
so arguments in defence of where their power comes from focuses on the 
effectiveness of these institutions.21 In their argument for an Economic and Social 
Security Council, Stewart and Daws propose accepting the voting majority of the 
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world’s most powerful countries, yet unlike the current UN Security Council, refusing 
to allow them a veto. A special majority of two-thirds should however be required to 
reach decisions.22 This Economic and Social Security Council would, as part of its 
establishment, be given authority over the World Bank and the IMF to enable it to 
meet with and direct those institutions so as to better redistribute finances to 
securing socioeconomic rights.  
These ideas of an Economic and Social Security Council and especially the GRD, 
have been termed a ‘philanthrotax’ by Brassington in his moral discussion of such 
forced philanthropy. 23  Using Harry Frankfurt’s earlier arguments, 24  Brassington 
argues the moral acceptability of such a ‘philanthrotax’ arises because as decent 
people we would not want to violate the demands of morality.25 The ‘philanthrotax’ 
may go against the notion that people and States should be able to choose how to 
spend their money, but if the ethics and moral thought establish that the 
redistribution is necessary, and if we assume that decent people and States will 
want to act in an appropriate way and not violate the demands of morality, then 
creating a ‘philanthrotax’ changes nothing and does not add controversy.26 It is not, 
therefore, morally problematic to be told you must do something you were going to 
do anyway, and if States acted in a decent way as set out, they would redistribute 
such wealth anyway. According to this view, a GRD or ‘philanthrotax’ adds nothing, 
except potentially greater efficiency. Whilst this is an interesting idea, it fails to 
provide the detail of where the necessary resources would come from, what is 
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needed, and how to attain them if State consent is withheld. This is one of the 
fundamental problems of idealism, the lack of a practical solution which is the very 
challenge Norman Daniels left to others. 
It will be recalled from chapter four that after accepting Norman Daniels’ extension 
of Rawls’ theory to include a right to minimal healthcare provision by the State as a 
matter of justice, linked to the obligation to ensure fair equality of opportunity, 
Daniels’ challenge to others was to find an appropriate, practical solution between 
cosmopolitanism and statism not leaning too heavily on one extreme or the other. 
“This intermediary ground consists of relatively recently formed and evolving 
international agencies, institutions, and rule-making bodies.” 27  Both suggestions 
above would fit within this middle ground and whilst Pogge does make some 
suggestions where the funds for the proposed GRD would come from, it still lacks 
the specificity to be considered a serious economic proposal. However, there are 
others who have made suggestions that are very similar to Pogge’s GRD, with 
much greater economic specificity.   
 
  6.1.2 Practical Ideas for Change in the Global Economic Order 
 
Such a specific response has come from Ooms and Hammonds when they call for a 
Global Health Fund.28 In actual fact, the ideas of Pogge and Ooms and Hammonds 
fit together exceptionally well, and they are not alone in suggesting that in order to 
realise a minimum core of the right to healthcare, the resource limitations of many 
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countries requires a change in the global distribution of resources. 29  Using an 
economic measurement known as the Gini coefficient, Ooms and Hammonds firstly 
show that wealth inequalities across the world have become much worse in the last 
twenty years. 30  This is predicted by an economic principle called the Matthew 
effect,31 which Ooms and Hammonds use to highlight the injustice such increasing 
inequalities represent, thus agreeing with Pogge about the violation of a negative 
duty not to harm and the “critical importance of correcting the obvious harm that is 
being done by rich countries”.32 Ooms and Hammonds proceed to propose ways to 
assuage this harm, deciding on a similar solution to the Pogge’s GRD in responding 
to the idea of a global difference principle. If we accept the free market and a global 
difference principle, increasing inequalities are not by themselves unjust. However, 
the difference principle requires such inequalities ensure the minimum standard is 
better than it otherwise would be, and it seems safe to argue that this is not the case. 
Ooms and Hammonds argue for a secondary redistribution of wealth at the global 
level as a way of adjusting the free market to address this problem33 and then 
proceed to explain exactly how this could be done.  
Their idea begins with securing the minimum core of the right health to all people in 
every country, which, even as a basic package of health services, is not being 
achieved. This concept was further discussed in chapter one and will not be 
repeated here, but a WHO bulletin has estimated that securing the essential 
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services envisaged by the minimum core should cost approximately US$40 per 
person per year.34 The kind of international assistance Ooms and Hammonds then 
recommend is following in the footsteps of the relatively successful Global Fund to 
fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, but instead proposes a Global Fund for Health 
with a broader mandate for all health related issues. The Global Fund has been an 
enabler despite no formal burden sharing among donor countries, however it can be 
submitted that any form of global institution to ensure funds to those countries that 
need them, must be formal and universal, in this way similar to Pogge’s GRD. Such 
a fund should be subordinate to the United Nations, with the power of sanctions, 
and can direct money specifically with a view to assisting health interventions.  
It is pointed out by Ooms and Hammonds that many of the poorest countries in the 
world cannot afford even this basic minimum on their own, even if past pledges by 
the African States are fulfilled. 35  Estimating, although admittedly being very 
optimistic, Ooms and Hammonds believe that it is possible for low-income countries 
to achieve 20% of its GDP as government revenue,36 and they therefore proceed 
with an estimate that, to the maximum possible, some of the poorest countries in the 
world could spend 3% of their GDP on healthcare.37 With this estimate they proceed 
with an analysis of 59 of the poorest countries in the world where 3% of GDP would 
not equate to US$40 per person per year. For example, if 3% of GDP per capita for 
a country equated to US$30 per person per year then the total deficit for the country 
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to be able to afford a minimum core of the right to health is US$10 multiplied by the 
population.38 Proceeding along these lines, and multiplying the deficit in each of the 
59 countries by the population, Ooms and Hammonds estimated that the total global 
deficit is approximately US$50 billion in 2012.39 This is based on the minimum to 
ensure the most basic essential health interventions, US$40, however more in 
depth coverage for all children in the 75 countries with the worst infant mortality 
rates also creates a similar figure.40 
The 2005 World Health Report by the WHO estimated that scaling up child health 
interventions to ensure full coverage in those 75 countries would require additional 
spending of US$52.4 billion over 10 years. 41  This additional funding is what is 
required to ensure full coverage to all children for some of the world’s most vital 
vaccines, as well as treatment for many preventable diseases that cause so many 
child deaths including diarrhoea, malaria, pneumonia and HIV.42 It is the scaling up 
of coverage of these treatments that the US$52.4 billion could be used for. Statistics 
differ slightly but cost estimations tend to be quite similar. The US$52.4 billion is to 
be accumulated over ten years, as proposed by the report, which would mean 
requiring approximately an additional US$5.24 billion to current funds each year.43  
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Another article in The Lancet focusing on 23 specific health interventions, mostly 
preventive care, in 42 countries in the world which were accountable for 90% of 
child deaths in 2000, returned a similar cost estimation of requiring an additional 
US$5.1 billion each year.44 The focus was on achieving the millennium development 
goals for child mortality in these countries and ensuring universality in preventive 
care such as vaccinations. One of the largest increases in funds required was an 
extra US$1 billion to ensure full coverage of the Hib vaccine. In total all the 23 
interventions were expected to save 6 million lives per year for the additional 
running cost of just US$5.1 billion. The 75 countries considered in the WHO report 
account for 95% of child deaths, covering a population of 4.6 billion in 2005, and 
496 million children.45 The differences between The Lancet article and the WHO 
report may be due to the fact that some of the countries beyond the 42 used in the 
article will require very limited scaling up or additional funds in order to achieve 
universal coverage of necessary interventions. Also, the WHO report does not 
consider the reduction of treatment costs that will occur if such preventive measures 
are universally applied, which The Lancet article tries to do, estimating a reduction 
in curative costs of at least 60%.46 This also shows the advantage of universal 
application of healthcare services which in the long run will render healthcare 
cheaper, a lesson that should be learnt in Brazil. Regardless of these discrepancies, 
there can be no certainty in accuracy, as the “estimates are only as good as the 
assumptions and projections underlying them.”47 The fact that such estimates create 
similar numbers, however, increases their chance of being accurate and on that 
basis we can move on to consider whether funding such scaling up of the 
healthcare system is even possible.  
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The Lancet requiring US$5 billion is 10% of what Ooms and Hammonds calculated 
is needed to provide US$40 per person per year in 59 low to low-middle income 
countries, covering 2.5 billion people, to ensure a minimum core content of the right 
to health. Using the approximation of US$50 billion, Ooms and Hammonds put this 
into perspective by highlighting the high income countries in the world as defined by 
the World Bank. At present, the number of high income countries is 75, and the total 
GDP amongst them is US$50.45 trillion, covering a population of just 1.306 billion.48 
Thus with the approximation of US$50 billion being needed to make such drastic 
changes to healthcare in the poorest countries in the world, whether very basic 
health interventions in 59 countries or universal child health coverage in 75 
countries, only 0.1% of GDP from the most developed countries is needed, or 0.2% 
if we consider both of these estimates, or 0.01% GDP if we consider universally 
ensuring the necessary child health interventions. No matter which estimate is used, 
it is clear that a comparatively miniscule amount of money is required from the 
richest countries in the world to make exceptional changes to children’s healthcare 
in the very poorest.  
 
  6.1.3 Requirement Under International Law 
 
It is often argued that this form of international assistance is actually required under 
international human rights law,49 and the CESCR has insisted that extra-territorial 
obligations arise from the ICESCR, although this is contentious, especially with non-
compliant responses by the US.50 The International Court of Justice did discuss 
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extra-territorial obligations in the Legal Consequences51 case, however it refrained 
from discussing the obligations as imagined by Ooms and Hammonds. It merely 
stated obligations under ICESCR would extend to occupied territory even if not 
under a States’ sovereignty. 52  It is also argued that by opining that various 
provisions protected under ICESCR had been violated by Israel’s construction of the 
wall, the International Court of Justice in fact confirmed the justiciability of ESC 
rights.53 As will be recalled from chapter two, the obligation to progressively realise 
the right to health should be sought individually and through international assistance 
and cooperation wherever it is available and to the maximum possible.54 With the 
accepted principle that ‘ought implies can’ which was highlighted in chapter three, 
and expresses the legal concept ultra posse nemo obligator,55 no-one, or no country, 
can be obligated to do something that it is not possible for them to achieve.56 It 
follows therefore, countries that fail to achieve the US$40 per person per year 
spending of health (assuming that US$40 is less than 3% of their GDP), are not 
violating international law by failing to achieve, at the very least, the minimum core 
of the right to health. However, the obligation to seek international assistance also 
falls under the ultra posse nemo obligator principle, in that the money must be 
available. If not, then countries cannot seek such assistance, which also means 
they cannot be violating international law as it is impossible to attain non-existent 
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assistance. Therefore, if the right to health is to exist in practice, then there must be 
a corollary international obligation to provide such assistance, otherwise the right 
cannot be achieved, and is reserved solely for the privileged, and is purely formal.57  
International assistance was also sought in the Abuja Declaration when the African 
Union countries pledged to allocate at least 15% of their government spending to 
the health sector, yet in paragraph 28 the Declaration specifically states: “Africa 
cannot, from its weak resource base, provide the huge financial resources needed. 
In this regard, we urge those [donor] countries to, among others, fulfil the yet to be 
met target of 0.7% of their GNP as official Development Assistance (ODA) to 
developing countries.”58 The problems with ODA are vast and far reaching. Pogge 
highlights that in 2005 only $7.63 billion of the total $106.78 billion ODA went to 
basic services such as education or health, and suggests therefore that only 0.02% 
of the combined GNP of high-income countries goes towards poverty eradication.59 
Similarly, the WHO has pointed out that only 5 of the 22 donor countries to the ODA 
have reached the 0.7% GNI target, 60  and these targets were formalised and 
accepted by most countries at the G8 in 2004. In 2009, the average donation to 
ODA was just 0.36% of GNI, clearly showing a failure to achieve targets and an 
actual decrease in overall ODA over the previous 10 years.61 However it must be 
accepted that the donor countries are not alone in the failure to meet the targets to 
improve the health sector in some of the world’s poorest countries. The declaration 
pledge of 15% of government spending on improving the health sector has only 
been achieved by one country, Tanzania, while 11 have actually reduced their 
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percentage spending on health since 2001. 62  In 2011, the median level of 
government spending on health from domestic resources was US$13.4 per capita in 
the countries involved in the Abuja Declaration, highlighting the problem of reaching 
the necessary funds and targets. 63  The report by the WHO highlights another 
funding issue by the IMF which suggests for every dollar transferred to sub-Saharan 
Africa for poverty reduction, only US$0.27 was spent on this purpose while the rest 
was spent on debt reduction and foreign reserves.64 Clearly, ways to ensure that the 
money goes towards its intended purpose, and also that the governments have no 
need or pressure to spend the money elsewhere, are greatly required. “Funding 
targets are being missed, both domestically and in terms of international 
assistance,” 65  so new ways to ensure the funds are available and used 
appropriately need to be considered. 
Hammonds and Ooms have considered this issue and suggested that World Bank 
policies are too centred towards macroeconomics and development rather than 
looking at the impact and immediate effect their grants, loans and policies have and 
can have.66 Wolff has also criticised some policies that have actually recommended 
restrictions on State spending on health which have proved a disaster in the poorest 
countries.67 Hammonds and Ooms focus specifically on the World Bank institution of 
the International Development Association (IDA)68 because of the regular funds the 
IDA receives from donor countries, thus making it the appropriate place to call for 
the changes they see as necessary and to assess the responsibilities of the donor 
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countries. 69  Also in many countries that rely on World Bank funding, the IDA 
remains one of the most influential actors and so change could have a large 
impact.70 In their earlier 2004 paper, Hammonds and Ooms highlight the minimum 
core obligation for the right to health and the necessary US$40 per person per year 
(per capita) the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health suggest.71 However, 
their objective is not just to highlight that despite spending 15% of government 
revenue on health many countries will still fall short of this required amount for a 
minimum core. In this paper Hammonds and Ooms seek to show that the policies of 
the World Bank actively prevent this achievement from being possible.  
The World Bank use Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), replacing 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), as their mechanism to decide on 
development aid as they provide national planning for the recipient countries.72 
Alongside these, and regularly as part of the PRSPs, the World Bank will use 
Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) that impose budget ceilings and it 
is here the argument of actively preventing the fulfilment of a minimum core carries 
weight because these ceilings are substantially less than US$40 per capita. These 
ceilings apply to both domestic and donor funds used in a country and are imposed 
to ensure the macroeconomic policies of the World Bank are adhered to. This 
exercise has been appropriately labelled ‘grow now and realise human rights 
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later.’73 The World Bank does not consider human rights fulfilment as a first priority 
and is more concerned that specific economic objectives are being achieved.74 The 
World Bank has consistently stated that human rights are beyond its mandate as it 
should not be involved in politics, and in the past, has refused UN resolutions calling 
for removal of assistance to countries on human rights grounds. It is argued that this 
historical, non-political justification is no longer relevant.75  
The approach of the Bank means that in order to receive donor funds, a country 
must impose domestic ceilings on its budget in certain areas to accommodate the 
macroeconomic policies of the World Bank, with its budget being analysed line-by-
line in some cases.76 The donor funds the countries receive also have a ceiling on 
them that is so low there cannot be enough money to surpass the required amount 
for a minimum core. The only way a country could surpass this amount is by finding 
separate outside funds, which a report by the WHO and World Bank has suggested 
creates certain tensions between macroeconomic policies and expanding resources 
of the health sector.77 
In the fiscal year 2014, the World Bank had lending commitments of US$40.84 
billion for a range of projects, not just on health; down from an overall high of 
US$58.75 billion in 2010.78 As discussed above, the World Bank receives most of its 
finances from donor countries and members in exchange for votes and does not 
collect all the funds its members promise. This remaining money is known as 
‘callable capital’. This fund, which according to the World Bank website in 2015 
stood at US$178 billion, is money that the World Bank can call on should it need to 
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(which it never has to date).79 It is argued that international law requires such funds 
to be made available to those countries that cannot afford the minimum core 
requirements, and also that SAPs from the 1980s and now PRSPs, along with other 
examples such as the release of political opponents in Chad after pressure from the 
World Bank President, show that the Bank is not afraid to use its influence and 
leverage to have an impact.80 The legal obligations of the World Bank are often 
scrutinised because many of its members have ratified the ICESCR and the CRC. 
Indeed most scholars have argued that the World Bank and IMF have a basic 
obligation to respect human rights,81 but for Hammonds and Ooms the obligations 
go further.82 It has been suggested that the obligation stems from the UN Charter 
and customary international law, but a stronger conclusion can be reached by 
considering all binding international treaties and conventions, including the CRC, as 
comparable to an international constitution.83 It is argued that as shareholders in the 
Bank, the member States can, and have a responsibility to change Bank policy and 
funding to ensure a minimum core. The particular language used by the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General Comment 14 reiterates and 
highlights this point: 
States parties which are members of international financial 
institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and regional development banks, should pay 
greater attention to the protection of the right to health in 
influencing the lending policies, credit agreements and 
international measures of these institutions.84 
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Here, these ideas are taken further by calculating that members of the World Bank, 
more particularly the IDA, that have ratified the CRC control 89.26%85 of the voting 
shares and thus the prospect of changing the Bank is not impossible for fear of a 
veto by the United States. The obligation to influence the policies of the World Bank 
can be clearly seen as its members have ratified conventions to impose those 
obligations upon themselves. The retrogression of funds from the Bank in the last 4 
years, along with the arguments made above that US$50 billion per person per year 
extra spending on healthcare would achieve a minimum core which is affordable as 
0.1% GDP of the richest countries in the world, supports the obligation to change 
the World Bank and provide these funds. The current policies by the World Bank 
impose a ceiling on the amount of funds countries can receive and spend on 
healthcare and it can be convincingly seen that the Bank’s policies actually render it 
impossible for some countries to achieve a minimum core standard of healthcare.86 
This surely amounts to a violation of international obligations by the World Bank. 
The theoretical foundations to support this are established by Pogge’s thesis of 
global injustice and a violation of the negative duty not to unduly harm, as well as 
the idea of a global difference principle requiring the position of the worst off to be 
better off if any inequalities are to be fair and just. The legal foundations are found in 
international law and the requirement that international assistance be sought, and 
must therefore be available. With such a small burden on the richest countries in the 
world, 0.1% of GDP leading to an increase in funds of US$50 billion which could 
drastically change the lives of every child in the 75 countries with the highest infant 
mortality rate, a Global Health Fund, a Global Resources Dividend, or drastic 
change to the World Bank policies by member States stepping up, needs to be 
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established sooner rather than later. It would however be naive to think that this 
alone will solve the problem. If the United States serves as an example of anything 
when it comes to healthcare, it is that merely throwing money at the problem is not a 
panacea.87 Therefore, ways to enforce international law and ensure governments 
make progressive steps to ensure every child has access to quality healthcare 
services need to be considered.  
 
6.2 Enforcing a Child’s Right to Healthcare 
 
 
The thesis began with an overview of healthcare systems to show the need for this 
obligation to be taken up seriously, even in the richest country in the world where 
the minimum core is not being fulfilled. The moral underpinnings of a child’s right to 
healthcare have been established using Rawls’ theory of justice in chapter four and 
extending the principle of equality of opportunity before it was globalised as a 
necessary part of Rawls’ theory to ensure a global difference principle. This means 
the obligation of securing a minimum standard of a child’s healthcare lies with the 
international community as well as with the State within which the child happens to 
be born. In this chapter, it has been demonstrated that this international obligation 
would not impose too much of a financial constraint on the world and that this 
distribution of funds is part of international law. It is clear however, that despite the 
ease with which a considerable difference could be made to so many children’s 
lives by providing the international assistance required to ensure socio-economic 
rights, this is not occurring. It is also clear that in some countries the right to health 
is being ignored for reasons other than resource constraints. So discussion must 
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now move to what can be done to ensure that this right is realised and enforced in 
all countries in the world, and how international law and a child’s right to healthcare 
can be transformed into a tangible right as opposed to an idealistic goal on a piece 
of paper. The first step of achieving this will be discussion of international law as 
possible superior constitutional law in order to allow greater enforcement. If this 
area of academic discourse can unite behind one single definition which imposes 
supremacy of international law enforced by a World Court, then international human 
rights law could become tangible guarantees. 
 
6.2.1 The Status of International Law 
 
Perhaps one of the most convincing methods of accepting international human 
rights law as a way of ensuring tangible, enforceable rights is to think of human 
rights and the international instruments much like an international constitution. It is 
argued that the international community definitely has a constitution88 and so it must 
be asked which parts, if any or all, of international law forms this. The advantage of 
conceiving international law as constitutional, and the use of constitutional 
vocabulary, is that failures and violations then become objective wrongs89 and the 
rights included therefore must have a remedy. 90  Indeed, on such a viewpoint 
treaties ‘trump’ any inconsistent national laws, and if this is accepted by the courts, 
those treaties take on the status of a constitution.91 However, the legal status of 
international law can be contentious as some argue that the absence of hard 
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enforcement and democratic deficit render it not real law.92  HLA Hart famously 
questioned whether international law was really law in his concept of laws. The 
criticism is that international law lacks the characteristics to be law by lacking effect. 
Not everyone shares Hart’s view. Peters for example, points out that a State’s 
Constitutional law may not be directly enforceable and lack hard enforcement 
through the courts, yet is undeniably seen as law, as an analogy to giving 
international law its legal status.93  Drake also argues that a lack of effectiveness is 
no objection to legal character but merely international laws development, and the 
suggested changes made later using the example of European law and its 
constitutional supremacy, show this impotence can also change.94 There is also the 
criticism of a lack of legitimacy in international human rights which needs to be 
countered to allow for effective enforcement methods to be proposed.95  This is 
addressed at the same time as the arguments that establish the constitutional status 
of international law, to also support its legal legitimacy.  
Fassbender highlights one of the main difficulties engaging with such discussion 
being that ‘Constitution’ is well-defined as regards the States, but in terms of 
international law and the international community it has yet to become a clearly 
defined category.96 Yet it is counter-argued that a ‘constitution’ is not solely defined 
as regards the State. 97  Fassbender suggests that international constitutionalism 
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may be a paradigm shift from the old view of international law based on State 
sovereignty where law is only binding because of consent, to a view where consent 
of the State is not required as the legal order must be respected by every member 
of the community, as seen in Europe.98 Peters makes a similar point arguing that a 
gradual shift is occurring rendering sovereignty less important as its basis is 
understood to arise from humanity and human rights. 99  This will be further 
discussed below when establishing the content of a global constitution and the 
inquiry into the standing of human rights. 
Another concern for the idea of a global constitutionalism or an international 
constitution is that it raises objections about creating a false legitimacy as well as 
the unrealistic and impractical expectations of what it may achieve. 100  The 
legitimacy concerns can be addressed fairly simply by constitutional moments 
suggested by many authors, as they clearly show the intention of the drafters to 
create a new legal order in a constitution-like manner.101 It cannot be denied that 
there has been a constitutional moment for every UN treaty and convention in a 
similar way to the constitutional moment which established the US constitution. Not 
every American was present. Not every American had a say. Not every American 
will have agreed to every element of the constitution. But it was a clear moment of 
constitutional agreement and the legitimacy of its law is not in doubt.  Equally such 
fears can be assuaged because the aim of global constitutionalism is not to over 
reach on its legitimacy. “The idea is not to create a global, centralized government, 
but to constitutionalize global, polyarchic, and multilevel governance.”102  
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An additional criticism connected to this, is that current constitutional thought is very 
much a Western ideology and therefore it would be inappropriate to apply this 
globally. However, Fassbender argues, in much the same way as was done in the 
previous chapter in connection to globalising Rawls, that there is an overlapping 
consensus of minimal values which would create a common constitutional stock that 
can be used.103 It is also argued that this stock is much more substantial than we 
are normally led to believe. If this common crossover is accepted, especially at a 
minimal level then Fassbender contends that an international constitution has a 
good chance of succeeding, as there is no attempt to form a world government, but 
merely realise basic rights in a framework we universally label as constitutional.104 
The contention here is to find a way to directly enforce international law by 
comparing it to a constitution, drawing on the examples discussed in chapter three 
and the right to healthcare in written Constitutions. Whilst the international human 
rights instruments were not specifically designed to be a Constitution, the UDHR, 
the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, are collectively known as the International Bill of 
Rights. 105  The constitutionalisation of international law is an emerging area of 
academic discussion and it will be shown to have teething problems, nevertheless 
the aim remains to view the basic international human rights instruments as 
constitutional, with a doctrine of supremacy allowing them to be enforced by an 
overarching world court.    
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6.2.2 Global Constitutionalism 
   6.2.2.1 Definition 
 
The first main point to consider about global constitutionalism is that there is no one 
definition; no one is certain exactly what it is and debate is rarely coherent and is full 
of contradictions, 106  with even the purpose of global constitutionalism being 
questioned and far from straightforward.107 Indeed to begin with there is no precise 
definition and agreement on constitutionalism. 108  It is suggested that 
constitutionalism is the unwritten, flexible principles underlying a constitution, which 
is a living document, with some arguments that this has already happened on the 
international level with human rights.109 Whilst it is argued that precise agreement 
on a definition is highly desirable, it remains clear this has not yet happened.110 In 
this search for a clear definition it is argued that global constitutionalism needs to be 
recognised more in academic circles.111 
Fassbender has highlighted three main schools of thought on different approaches 
to the idea of constitutional law of the international community; firstly, a monism 
assuming a unity of law based on Kelson’s basic norm and the constitution of a 
universal community of States based largely on customary law with some formal 
constitutional instruments; secondly, one that differs between constitutional and 
constitutive processes and finds international treaties and charters as part of an 
ongoing constitutive process, but not a normative international constitution; thirdly, 
that of the international community which consists of States and organisations as a 
community governed by law which can become a formal constitution of the 
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community, which differs from the first school through a focus on community law as 
opposed to monism.112 Fassbender argues that discussion in this area suffers from 
terminological confusion where, in the international sphere, constitution is not yet a 
defined category. 
Peters suggests global constitutionalism is a continuing gradual emergence of 
constitutional elements in the international order supported and encouraged by 
academics.113 She discusses the connection between sovereignty and international 
law mentioned above and the gradual shift towards global constitutionalism.114  She 
argues this shift is progressively and slowly happening as international law gains 
more constitutional acceptance and in turn reduces the importance of sovereignty 
once held. Sovereignty, as the first and most important principle of international law, 
is being ousted as the focus shifts from State’s rights to their human rights 
obligations. This is happening because increasingly sovereignty is seen to come 
from humanity and the legal principle of respecting human rights. 
Peters argues that the justification of State sovereignty comes from the fulfilment of 
basic human needs. State’s respect for each other’s sovereignty is horizontal as 
opposed to a humanised sovereignty which exists in an ontological sense: 
When human needs are taken as the starting point, the 
focus shifts from states’ rights to states’ obligations vis-à-vis 
natural persons, and a state that does not discharge these 
duties has its sovereignty suspended. The possibility of a 
suspension of state sovereignty leads, in a system of 
multilevel governance under the principle of solidarity, to a 
fallback responsibility of the international community, acting 
through the U.N. Security Council.115 
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Humanising sovereignty, according to Peters, is an ongoing process that is vital to 
an international legal system centred on individuals. The international legal order is 
not exclusively based on State sovereignty anymore, with the introduction of 
‘responsibility to protect’116 a major step in ousting its importance.117 Fassbender 
has also argued for this paradigm shift where consent of the State is not seen as 
required anymore.118 Whilst the shift may be occurring gradually, it is argued that 
the first school is much more the intention of the formal international instruments; a 
constitution of a universal community of States. Equally important is the need for 
those instruments to be included in global constitutionalism so as to include human 
rights. Scholars differ on whether human rights can and should be included in any 
thoughts surrounding global constitutionalism, and through discussing possible 
content, more clarity on the definition may arise.  
 
   6.2.2.2 Content 
 
Those elements of international law which are argued to have constitutional rank 
can be determined by looking at literature on global constitutionalism. For some it is 
argued that the broadly defined idea of ‘global constitutionalism’ will reject the UN 
Charter or human rights treaties as a written constitution because this would be 
seen as an attempt to revive antiquated notions of formalism and normativism. 
Global constitutionalism, as Fassbender understands it, comprises of various values, 
norms, practices and institutions for example, as opposed to a visible written 
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document. Fassbender argues that such a written constitution offers an authoritative 
statement of rights and responsibilities of members.  
An alternative view is provided by Gardbaum who contends it is undeniable that 
there is “something inherently constitutional about human rights law”.119 Despite this 
quote, he is less convinced that International Human Rights Law, as opposed to EU 
law, has constitutional quality. He contends that there are three fundamental 
characteristics which render something constitutional law. It must be: made by a 
special constituent power; considered higher law; and only able to be amended or 
repealed by the authority that created it.120  Below (6.2.2.3) it will be seen how 
Gardbaum argues at length that EU law definitely has these qualities, whereas for 
global human rights he suggests that the UN Charter and the International Bill of 
Rights have the strongest claims to being “products of constitutional moments”.121  
    6.2.2.2.1 The UN Charter 
 
Peters warns against including all international law as constitutional law because 
then nothing becomes constitutional, and it is detrimental to inflate the current 
international system to such an extent.122 The explicit claim of constitutionalisation 
of international law tends to focus more on customary international law and the UN 
Charter,123 neither of which have human rights as a central element. Indeed it is 
argued by many that the UN Charter and the EU’s treaty framework have 
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constitutional quality holding a position that enhances Kantian regulative ideas of 
international conventions as constitutions.124  
Whilst the content of any international constitution is argued, especially as regards 
human rights, it is largely accepted that if there is one, the UN Charter is 
undoubtably part of it.125 Some would argue it is the international constitution,126 as 
opposed to others who suggest it is part of several documents that make up the 
constitution of the international community. 127  Fassbender contends it is the 
supporting frame of all international law and the highest level in the aforementioned 
hierarchy.128 The notion of comparing the UN Charter to a constitution started as 
early as the final session of its adoption when US President Harry Truman stated 
that it is a constitution that grows, develops and expands over time.129 Indeed the 
Charter has the features that have been suggested as necessary for a constitution, 
such as being established by a special body and that it cannot be amended 
ordinarily but only by special means.130 This itself is a distinction between a normal 
treaty and one with constitutional status, as a treaty may be changed via customary 
law without editing the text as opposed to a constitution that can only be amended 
through special procedures.131 Fassbender has discussed the differing views on the 
position of the Charter in international law and its binding nature. Some authors 
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uphold the principle that a treaty cannot bind a non-member State against its will,132 
whereas others suggest States live with basic rules from their creation which 
determines their rights and obligations with or without their will.133 Tomuschat is 
firmly of the opinion that the UN Charter is part of the international constitution, but 
one of several world order treaties, which has constitutional rank because it relates 
to the basic functions of governance. Fassbender suggests that the two Human 
Rights Covenants can be attributed constitutional rank if they characterise in detail 
and further develop the constitutional law of the Charter.134 This becomes difficult as 
the Covenants develop the declaration adding greater detail and develop its 
constitutional character. It is contended here that the universal acceptance of the 
declaration gives it constitutional status and therefore rather than argue that the 
Covenants are developing the constitutional character of the charter, it is contended 
here the same argument can apply to the declaration. This therefore allows for more 
State obligations, including the provision of medical care. However, such a human 
right being part of the international constitution is not free of critics. 
    6.2.2.2.2 Human Rights 
 
Gardbaum suggests some weaknesses in claiming humans rights as part of an 
international law constitution: firstly, they make individuals objects and not subjects; 
they do not bind countries against their will; and they do not bind international 
organisations.135 Indeed the changing status of individuals under international law is 
a direct response to the atrocities of World War II and the formation of human 
rights. 136  These ideas also echo the second characteristic of Gardbaum’s  
characteristics of constitutional law; that to be constitutional it should be considered 
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‘higher law’, which has its roots in the work of Hans Kelson and his ‘basic norm’. As 
is well known, for Kelson a Constitution’s validity comes from its basis in a basic 
norm that has been constructed by logical inference.137 This Grundnorm is at the top 
of the hierarchy of laws but is not the Constitution itself. In essence it informs the 
Constitution which then becomes the formal top of the hierarchy. This was the 
beginning for formal Constitutional hierarchy,138 which is where a world constitution 
should aim to be. 
However, the failure of the US to ratify several treaties illustrates part of the problem 
with human rights as part of international constitutional law, because they clearly do 
not bind a country against its will. Included in this argument against human rights 
being part of a global constitution is the weak enforcement even when a treaty is 
ratified. 139  Yet none of these reasons defeats the possibility of human rights 
becoming part of an international constitution that all countries and international 
institutions, such as the World Bank, would legally have to abide by. For the 
purpose of effectiveness and the desire to make human rights tangible guarantees 
not words on paper, it is therefore important to question whether further 
constitutionalisation of international organisations would help,140 and if so, how we 
might go about achieving this.  
Möller uses the above arguments on the basis of sovereignty to point to a State’s 
obligation to join an international system that protects human rights, because each 
State has obligations to people in other States. This obligation arises by virtue of 
their humanity.141 This status of humanity, or human dignity, is a moral concern, 
violation of which cannot be defended merely by a claim to sovereignty. Thus, every 
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State is under an obligation to ensure human dignity and human rights are upheld in 
all States which requires involvement in international systems of rights protection.142  
The argument is made that sovereignty is now a second-order norm, which is 
derived from and at the same time geared towards the protection of basic human 
rights.143 The possible power to rescind authority from those States that fail their 
obligations towards their citizens is an important element of human rights possibly 
being part of a global constitution. States have responsibilities, duties and powers 
granted to them by the international community, which at least in theory, can also be 
curtailed and rescinded by a more supreme international law. This may be wishful 
academic thinking as it appears to lack political support, a fact which Peters accepts 
as a problem with global constitutionalism and its challenge to navigate the gap 
between dignifying the status quo and academic pipe dreams.144  
To counter arguments that a constitution with a strong place for human rights 
cannot apply internationally, the example of Europe has been referred to many 
times and serves as the appropriate way to defeat the idea that international law 
cannot have a constitutional nature and even if it could be argued that it did, it would 
be impractical and give false hopes of the end of political debate.145 This argument 
is combined with concerns that global constitutionalism will give rise to a rigid 
system that does not accept differences between societies and that any global 
constitution must be anti-pluralist.146 This can be countered by arguing that the aim 
of global constitutionalism is not to create a world government but to be minimal, 
giving effect to only those principles on which there is over lapping consensus. In 
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Europe, EU law has clearly established itself as a supreme constitution, which acts 
as a minimum a State cannot fall below. States themselves can go beyond this 
minimum and the exact method of fulfilment of a right is left to the governments of 
Europe. This gives rise to political debate on how best to achieve the rights laid 
down in a supreme European constitution. First it will be discussed how the EU 
established a supreme constitutional law, which is similar to the way Fassbender 
understands global constitutionalism as mentioned in 6.2.2.1. 
 
6.2.2.3 The Example of Europe 
 
EU law and the human rights contained within being universally acknowledged as 
constitutional law demonstrate that constitutionalism is not exclusively limited to the 
national, sovereign State setting anymore. 147  Peters also argues that EU and 
European Court of Human Rights treaty regimes are among the top of all 
constitutional regimes, 148  and serve as the most successful example of 
constitutionalisation.149 EU law, Gardbaum suggests, also contains the three of the 
fundamental characteristics of constitutional law mentioned above. 150   It is the 
supremacy of EU law that is the most important reason for attributing constitutional 
status, a status that was established by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
in Costa v ENEL.151 In accordance with Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome,152 the 
Court of the Justice of the Peace of Milan referred the case to the European Court 
of Justice because of uncertainty about treaty interpretation. The case concerned 
the nationalisation of a former private electricity company and whether this 
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breached EU law established by the Treaty. The Italian Government however, 
argued that the request was inadmissible as this was an issue of national law and 
should be decided in a national court which cannot avail itself of Article 177.153 
Mangold argues that in response to this position, the CJEU more or less invented 
the doctrine of supremacy, declaring the EEC Treaty to have its own legal system 
integral to the systems of Member States.154 
The Court went on to make the point that by establishing the European Community 
with its institutions, the member States have accepted to give up some of their 
sovereignty and created a law which binds themselves as well as their citizens, 
making it more than a technical question, but rather a presupposition of the legal 
order. 155  With these ideas, the Court then firmly established supremacy over 
domestic law affirming that “law stemming from the Treaty . . . could not, because of 
its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however 
framed”.156 Thus the Court also ensured that the community law established by the 
Treaty did not differ from one State to another after ratification.  
It is from this decision that the principle of the supremacy of EU law has been 
established as one of the EU’s central doctrines,157 and which Gardbaum argues is 
the most important of the three criteria to EU law having a constitutional nature.158 It 
is obvious from Costa that the Treaty of Rome was not created or established in a 
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‘constitutional moment’ with the view of being a constitution for Europe,159 which it 
has been suggested would be necessary for constitutional status. Despite this, it is 
clear that over the next few decades the Treaty of Rome has become a 
constitutional document for Europe, achieved through development of the doctrines 
of supremacy and direct effect in the Court of Justice.160 The European Court of 
Human Rights has exercised similar jurisprudence in determining that the document 
they base their jurisdiction upon has a constitutional character in Europe.161 This 
was argued in Ireland v UK (1978)162 where the European Convention was given 
constitutional status. 
It is clear that the Courts have stated the superiority of European laws and 
independence from the law of member States, but Eleftheriadis argues it is unclear 
what, if any, doctrinal basis this has.163 The European court has skilfully avoided 
these questions and as such its constitutional nature is more practical than 
philosophical. The European Court argues for a single European legal order where 
the Treaties are the highest source of law with superiority in all conflicts. This is a 
monist approach, however, the German Constitutional Court argues for a dualist 
approach in Europe where the Treaty law is not superior but becomes valid only 
because the national Constitution allows it. Both approaches are found in respect to 
international law but if there is to be a single legal order with a clear hierarchy, then 
they cannot both be right at the same time. Both occur in the context of European 
                                                          
159
 Ackerman B (n 91) 34. 
160
 Eleftheriadis P, 'Aspects of European constitutionalism' (138); see also Ackerman B (n 91) 
793. 
161
 Klabbers J (n 81) . 
162
 2 EHRR 25, 239 “unlike international Treaties of the classical kind, the Convention 
comprises more than reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, over 
and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the 
words of the Preamble, benefit from a “collective enforcement.””; see also Loizidou v Turkey 
(1998) 20 EHRR 99, 75; see also; Pollicino O, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and 
the Italian Constitutional Court: No ‘Groovy Kind of Love’ in Ziegler KS, Wicks E, and 
Hodson L, (ed), The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Hart 
Publishing 2015) 377 
163
 Eleftheriadis P, 'Aspects of European constitutionalism' (n 138) 37. 




law, so there is in fact no single coherent legal order within the European 
Community which is, theoretically a problem still unresolved.164  
In spite of this, the enforcement and implementation problems experienced in 
international law are not experienced in EU law which undoubtedly has become a 
regional constitution. 165  Therefore, the success of Europe can still provide a 
valuable lesson to international human rights law and finding ways to make that 
more constitutional in nature to provide enforceable law through the courts. The 
hierarchy of law in Europe still has questions that need answering, yet it remains a 
step in the right direction for international law to take. If the theoretical questions of 
European law were the only questions international law needed to answer, there 
would be much greater implementation of human rights. 
One of the main reasons behind the success of the EU is the transition of 
international treaty law from the normal horizontal elements 166  to a vertical, 
supranational entity, establishing supremacy of its law. 167  It is the paradigm of 
constitutional international law, with supranational status and a court with 
compulsory jurisdiction.168 The creation of a direct effect of hard EU law,169 along 
with the establishment of supremacy, has led to a supranational system of 
international law with limited sovereignty for the member States to depart from this 
body of law. The key to this change was the recognition of the Treaty of Rome as 
the highest source of law, which Eleftheriados argues created the hierarchy of 
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European legal norms, with the central European Grundnorm at the top.170 It has 
been suggested that the Court specifically moved to create this system; “the Court 
as early as 1963 had a concept for the legal arrangement of Community law’s 
consequences: Only direct effect and supremacy of Community law together could 
establish its “supranationality””.171 This transformation from a traditional private law 
concept of horizontal relations between sovereign equals has been replaced by the 
public law model of vertical supranational relationships between States and 
individuals, showing the constitutional nature of EU law.172 Gardbaum argues that 
part of this shift is the compulsory jurisdiction of an international court and that: 
“consent to compulsion is also typified by the EU.” 173  Applying this idea more 
specifically to human rights, it is argued that the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) has reached the same levels of constitutionality as EU law despite 
not requiring incorporation into domestic law. This is because certain compulsory 
factors have led to de facto incorporation and acceptance because: “Compulsory 
jurisdiction of human rights courts, in the strong sense as a condition of membership, 
remains limited to the ECtHR”174. The CJEU also has compulsory jurisdiction over 
member States as a condition of EU membership, yet the ECtHR is the best 
example for human rights specifically. As part of the ratification of treaties and 
conventions, which is necessary as a condition of membership, States accept the 
jurisdiction of the courts. There is no opt-out. This is unlike any other regional 
human rights instrument or any part of international law, but it is put forward in this 
thesis as the main reason why Europe has been the most successful implementer 
of human rights. Thus it seems appropriate to suggest that the supranationality of 
European law, the compulsory ratification of instruments and the jurisdiction of the 
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courts, serves as an example to international human rights law and law-making 
global institutions, which would be much more successful implementers of human 
rights by recognising the constitutionalism of their law. If the constitutionalism of 
certain international treaties is recognised then the role of organisations and 
systems that must be in place is equally important and a role for judicial review will 
be reserved as guardians of the rule of law and above politics.175 
Viewing international human rights law as supranational constitutional law 
establishes a human right to healthcare which has to be appropriately implemented. 
Ways to achieve this were discussed at the beginning of the chapter, but where 
there is no remedy, there is no right, and therefore such constitutional rights also 
have to be enforceable. This requires something different, which is why the effective 
nature of recourse to a court in countries with a constitutional right to healthcare 
was discussed in 3.2. International Courts have been widely suggested, and this 
thesis now turns to discussing the prospect of enforcing human rights through such 
a court. 
 
  6.2.3 A World Court of Human Rights 
 
The idea of a World Court of Human Rights (WCtHR) is not new and is perhaps 
most associated with the work of Manfred Nowak.176 However, as early as 1947 the 
Australian government, leaning on the well-established proposition that where there 
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is no remedy there is no right,177 supported the creation of an International Court of 
Human Rights.178 It is seen as uncontroversial that international law will be relatively 
ineffective without specific provisions for enforcement, with even critics of universal 
human rights suggesting a need to better utilise the International Court of Justice.179 
As mentioned in the conclusion of chapter two, Buergenthal also suggests a United 
Nation Court for Human Rights, but proposes much more constrained ideas, and in 
less detail, than Nowak’s World Court. Buergenthal suggests that the court should 
begin by only having the jurisdiction to offer advisory opinions and not have 
individual standing.180 His suggestion is that this court would be more likely to gain 
State support for its establishment and it would then be easier to widen its 
jurisdiction later. This may be true, but is very much more a political, Machiavellian 
discussion of how best to realise what is established to be the best system for 
implementing human rights. Such international diplomacy does not find a large 
space in this thesis. Eventually a 2008 report by the Panel of Eminent Persons, of 
which Nowak was a member, strongly recommended the creation of a fully 
independent, permanent World Court of Human Rights, which would make final and 
binding decisions on human rights violations of all duty-bearers.181 This idea was 
solidified and expanded when, a year later, a draft statute for the World Court was 
published.182  
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   6.2.3.1 Structure 
 
In many ways, and this is admitted by Nowak himself, the proposed structure and 
organisation of the Court follows that of the European Court of Human Rights. It 
should consist of six committees of three judges to decide whether complaints 
before it are admissible; individual cases should be decided by three chambers with 
seven judges; and inter-State cases should be decided by a plenary court of twenty-
one judges. This plenary court can also act as an appeals chamber for individual 
cases in exceptional circumstances. 183   There is some concern around global 
juristocracy in that unrepresentative international judges will be called upon to 
adjudicate disputes and should not rely on their conception of constitutional 
legitimacy from their home country, but will be required to interpret the conception 
from the original society, which may be impossible.184 For Raz, and Rawls as seen 
in chapter five, because the principles governing international relations should be 
different from those governing an individual society as the content of the principles 
will differ, this cautions against external interference and scrutiny.185 Once again the 
example of Europe can be used as this dilemma is dealt with daily. Nowak also 
discusses the Inter-American Court and the African Court of Human Rights but 
argues the model of Europe is stronger and contends that the existence of these 
other Courts shows that the idea of an international court is not limited to Western 
Europe. The only region without a regional court and also without a full regional 
organisation is Asia and the Pacific. Rather than see this as a disincentive to the 
universal nature of a human rights court, Nowak suggests this is an incentive for the 
WCtHR which should be inspired by the experiences of the three existing regional 
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human rights courts.186 If the difficulty and difference in conception of law in these 
Courts, especially in Europe, is so extreme then the simple strategy and important 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation can be used. Given the notion that a World 
Court would only be used after domestic remedies are exhausted, this simply 
requires allowing the final decision of the highest national court. 187  Such large 
differences are however, unlikely when adjudicating the minimalist universal human 
rights.188 
 
   6.2.3.2 Establishment 
 
One argument put forward for the need for a WCtHR has already been seen in what 
Nowak has called the “very essence of the rule of law”;189 the idea that where there 
is a right, a remedy must also exist. If we are serious about rights and making them 
tangible guarantees as opposed to idealistic goals, then rights-holders naturally 
endow duties on someone or something else; in the case of international human 
rights, the State. If the duty-bearer does not fulfil their duty, then a remedy must be 
available before an independent neutral body, usually a court, which decides in a 
final and binding decision what reparation to provide. This reparation must also be 
adequate. It is not merely enough to find a violation of the right and then leave it to 
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the State to decide what measures should be taken. Thus the mandate of the court 
is broad in the sense that it will be able to order enforceable reparation to ensure 
enjoyment of the violated right in future as well as appropriate compensation for the 
past.190 The need for a new court can be seen because the current international 
legal structures have not been able to adjudicate on health, despite the International 
Court of Justice being asked for an Advisory Opinion by the WHO in 1993. 191 
Resolution 46/40 requested an Advisory Opinion of the Court on the legality of the 
use of nuclear weapons because of their effect on health. The Court’s opinion came 
in 1996 and generally avoided the health question, stating that it did not have the 
jurisdiction to give such an opinion. 192  Ignoring the health questions, the Court 
focused on self-defence and concluded by stating that they could not say whether 
the use of nuclear weapons would be legal or not in extreme cases and made no 
reference to health. 193  This disappointing opinion of the court, that they lacked 
jurisdiction, is further evidence that the current legal system does not offer 
reparation for a violation of the right to health.  
Another argument put forward in favour of establishing a WCtHR is that it would not 
require a cumbersome and difficult amendment to the UN Charter because it has 
been written as a new treaty. An amendment to the Charter would require a two-
thirds majority of the General Assembly as well as ratification of all the permanent 
members of the Security Council.194 To avoid this, Nowak has written a draft statute 
so establishment of a World Court would not be as difficult as may be initially 
thought. The World Court, like the International Criminal Court, would be based on a 
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new treaty, hence the draft statute, which would be adopted by the UN General 
Assembly after a sufficient number of States have ratified it. The Court would then 
take over the individual and State complaints procedure from the treaty monitoring 
bodies, so the Committees can focus on analysing State reports. This would help 
reduce the backlog of reports, allow the experts on the Committees to focus on the 
areas they specialise in, and allow the legal challenges to be dealt with by the 
judges in the Court who have the necessary specific legal expertise.195  
 
   6.2.3.3 Recourse to the Court 
 
Much like the ECtHR, individual complaints can be heard, which is important as 
without this there is limited justification for creating such a court.196 This idea can be 
contentious on a global level with questions as to whether the State or individual 
people are the subjects of international law. Tesón argues that traditionally, 
international law focuses on the rights and duties of States and does not recognise 
the important status of the individual.197 However I do not believe the two have to be 
mutually exclusive, and I agree with Brown that individuals possess the right to bring 
a claim against their State, which in turn is also a subject to international law which 
establishes the State obligation.198 However, modern cosmopolitanism, based on 
the work of Kant, led to the emergence of human rights as the basis of international 
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law and rights to which all individuals can claim.199 Human rights led to changes in 
the subjects of international law, with human rights being viewed distinctly as 
individual rights and not, as was exclusively the case for international law, as rights 
for the State. 200  Daniele Archibugi argues that this modern cosmopolitanism 
acknowledges universal human rights that must be protected by States, as well as 
the “creation of a mandatory core of rights which individuals may claim, as well as 
duties vis-à-vis global institutions.”201 Rights in the first instance ought to relate to 
issues that go beyond national borders, and in turn these create duties on world 
citizens to allow global institutions to replace national institutions temporarily where 
needed.202 This is similar to Brown suggesting that the State and individuals are not 
mutually exclusive in being subjects of international law.203 The relationship between 
the State and the individual is one of the principal characteristics of modern human 
rights.204 The position of children within this system is argued by George Kent, who 
articulates MacCormick’s philosophical ideas discussed in chapter two; the 
progressive change from dependency and need of protection to autonomy and 
capacity.205 Kent considers the priority is to help a child become responsible for 
themselves, allowing them to mature, which is the responsibility of society. If this is 
not possible then it becomes the responsibility of the local community, then local 
government, national government, and finally the international community as seen 
in chapters four and five where children are bestowed the principles and should be 
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given equal opportunities in life, and this is not limited to a small society but instead 
applied globally.206 
To the idea of exhausting national remedies, before recourse to the World Court of 
Human Rights, it is argued in this thesis, should ideally be added an expectation 
that all regional remedies would be exhausted as well,207 so recourse to the World 
Court of Human Rights would not come immediately after failure in the national 
Supreme Court. This is the first of three recommend changes to Nowak’s work in 
this thesis, to add in what Trechsel calls the ‘Pyramid Model’, to ensure uniform 
interpretation of human rights using the codification of international covenants 
creating a World Court that would act as an ultimate court of appeals.208 However, 
for Treschel this would only apply to those rights that are in the European 
Convention, thus if the complaint is of a right not guaranteed by the ECHR then 
direct recourse to the World Court may not be admissible. This would be the case 
for the right to health for example. Yet the international law that is given 
constitutional law status should be seen as the minimum, so therefore no region or 
State may fall below, so it should be expected that either Europe creates a new 
Convention including the ESC rights not currently protected, or that the ECtHR is 
granted the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon international human rights law for its 
member States. This pyramid model helps to show the expanding nature of the 
rights as they filter down the systems from global, to regional, and then to national. 
Any regional system of human rights protection, and any regional court, must abide 
by the more minimal rights and jurisprudence established at the global level. 209 
Whether to take this further and add detail is left at regional discretion. The same 
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applies nationally after regional interpretation. In a similar way to Europe, discretion 
is often left to national authorities and courts to decide precisely how to balance and 
implement the rights that must be protected.210 Some form of national discretion will 
always be expected. In addition to all of this, Nowak and Kozma propose that the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights supervise the execution of the judgments 
and that requests to the Human Rights or the Security Council can be made to take 
the necessary measures and ensure compliance of court decisions.211 One final 
main point to highlight about the idea of a WCtHR is that an opt-in was suggested 
originally, or an alternative that all treaties are subject to the jurisdiction of the court 
upon ratification but States can enter reservations to opt-out of its jurisdiction. These 
ideas have some major flaws in repeating problems already seen in international 
law and ignore the positive lesson of compulsory jurisdiction. 
 
   6.2.3.4 Jurisdiction and Adjudication: Differences from 
Europe 
 
One key difference between the European Court of Human Rights and the proposed 
World Court of Human Rights is that the World Court will be expected to adjudicate 
on all UN treaties and conventions, or at least those ratified by the countries party to 
the case in Nowak’s proposal, as opposed to just the one convention as in the 
European Court of Human Rights. This difference to Europe creates two further 
distinctions for the World Court: the lack of compulsory ratification, and the 
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proposed adjudication of economic, social, and cultural rights such as a child’s right 
to healthcare. In Europe, part of the requirement of becoming a member of the 
Council of Europe is the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
within which the recognition of jurisdiction of the ECtHR is also a requirement.212 
Thus every individual within a country in Europe has possible recourse to the 
ECtHR. The example of the United States removing itself from the jurisdiction and 
participation of the International Criminal Court and not being party to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, serves to show the difficulties in allowing a 
country to choose to accept jurisdiction or not. It is argued that Nuremberg offered 
brief hope of a minimum binding international law that could be adjudicated beyond 
sovereignty but was never realised.213 Compulsory jurisdiction should be sought 
given the aim of better enforcement and implementation of human rights. This is a 
second change to Nowak’s work recommended here, as a free opt-in seen across 
the rest of the international law treaties, would be likely to render the court 
powerless with a very small number of State’s ratifying the treaty. Yet, it is 
acknowledged that compulsory ratification as part of UN membership in a similar 
way to that seen in Europe, whilst ideal and strongly recommended, could lead to 
extreme difficulties in establishing the World Court in the first place.  
The final, and third difference to Nowak’s work and between the ECtHR and the 
WCtHR is the question of adjudicating ESC rights. Nowak suggests that having a 
WCtHR that fulfils this function will show sceptics that such rights can be justiciable 
and adjudicated in an appropriate way,214 yet this has been taken further in this 
thesis by actually establishing the appropriate jurisprudence for such a court. As 
shown in chapter three, it is possible to adjudicate ESC rights but there is danger in 
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doing so and it is suggested here that the proposed framework for adjudication must 
be followed by the World Court. Extensions of rights to extreme levels as seen in 
India will lead to countries not respecting the jurisprudence of the court and 
probably removing themselves from its jurisdiction. Blanket calls for increased 
spending to secure rights will lead to a poor judicial system where those with the 
funds to access courts gain protection of the rights and countries are forced to 
spend money they might not have, as seen in Brazil in section 3.1.2. An appropriate 
reasonableness test should be carried out, considering the resource constraints of 
the government and the reasonableness of any policies connected to the right in 
question, regardless of political slants. However, differing from South Africa slightly, 
it seems that part of this reasonableness test, indeed the first step of 
reasonableness, is the proposed minimum core of the right. Thus, if, for example, as 
argued earlier in this chapter, the minimum core for the right to health costs US$40 
per person per year, then availability of such funds can be analysed by a World 
Court. If a Global Health Fund, or GRD, is set up to provide the money that can 
ensure a minimum core, then failure to achieve this may well be considered 
unreasonable by the World Court and orders to the State could be made for change. 
The onus of proof would shift onto the government of a State against which a 
complaint is brought to prove its resource constraints, and if the international 
assistance is available then a World Court and the Human Rights Council can force 
governments to access these funds and use them for their intended purpose.  
Interpreting a constitution however requires careful management, as seen in 
chapter three, especially with ESC rights and the right to healthcare. Thus the 
framework proposed in the last chapter should be followed by the World Court of 
Human Rights which should be established and structured in a similar way to the 
European Court of Human Rights. As Möller has argued, following the same 




standards of review is not contentious and indeed is part of the point of international 
human rights law: 
There is . . . nothing suspicious about the fact that . . . 
national constitutional courts and international human rights 
courts apply the same standards of review. The international 
mechanisms for the protection of human rights will only kick 
in when something has gone wrong at the national level. . . . 
Thus, there is no deep problem here. The point of 
international human rights law is to police the boundaries of 
a state’s sovereignty.215 
So it is argued that a World Court should follow the same standards as national and 
regional courts, such as the presumption of unreasonableness and applying the 
minimum core, and when it is found that these are violated and the State can offer 
no legitimate defence based on resource constraints for example, then the 
argument of State sovereignty is removed and international actors have authority to 
intervene. Compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court to all members of the UN, in a 
similar way to that seen in Europe, has not been proposed in the draft statute, but it 
is contended here (along with the pyramid model and the use of the proposed 
framework) that this would be an effective way of enforcement and learning from the 
mistakes of the ICJ which does not have compulsory jurisdiction. 216  This idea 
corresponds and aligns with further changes, discussed below, especially to the 
structure of the UN and the treaty instruments, again often using Europe as an 
example.  
 
  6.2.4 Further Changes to the United Nations 
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Peter Singer has suggested some extensive changes to the United Nations in his 
focus to prevent crimes against humanity and such atrocities as genocide.217 His 
two main proposals are: to provide the UN with greater military force so as to 
exercise a duty to intervene, and to move the structure of the UN to a more 
democratic idea of sovereignty to justify such interventions. Others have 
alternatively suggested that whilst there should be a move towards a more 
democratic world parliament, it would not require military force as it would have in 
the past, because of the move towards world constitutionalism and the aid of 
modern technologies to support this movement.218 Within such suggestions more 
would need to be done to encompass ESC rights such as the right to healthcare; 
searching for ways to better ensure this right and enforce human rights law does not 
require a strong global military. Singer’s suggestions on reforming the UN Security 
Council do highlight the focus of power in the UN and the inability to put pressure on 
the P5219 countries to realise human rights. It might be expected that this would not 
be needed as the members of the Security Council would not violate human rights 
as wealthy and powerful countries that can easily afford to protect the human rights 
they have a large say in drafting. However, we know this is not the case, at least 
with respect to the United States and the right to healthcare, as well as other rights 
such as not to be tortured.220 Thus, the members of the Security Council cannot be 
perceived as model adherents to all international human rights law, so such a focus 
of power and inability to pressure them to observe the rights seems unwarranted. 
The Security Council consists of 15 members, with 5 permanent members which 
are: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China. The other 
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10 members are elected by the General Assembly for two year terms. If any of the 5 
permanent members disagree with proposals by the Council, then nothing will go 
ahead because each of those members have a veto, and there is no option of a 
veto override. Singer finds major flaws with this system.221 Initially it was intended 
that the veto would be a very exceptional device, however it is clear that this is no 
longer the case.222 The permanent members are based on the powers that emerged 
post Second World War and today it seems irrational to have no permanent 
members from the Southern Hemisphere. At the very least the addition of Brazil and 
India has been argued for,223 as well as perhaps some countries from the world’s 
largest continent, Africa. This change however, may face legal difficulties if certain 
elements, especially the UN Charter, are to be considered constitutional law, as this 
means it is difficult to amend and any changes must not impede with the purpose of 
the Charter. Therefore any changes or additions that may impede the Security 
Council’s ability to secure peace will not be allowed.224  
Singer also proposes removing the veto with the requirement for a special majority 
such as two-thirds or three-quarters.225 This reconstituted Security Council reduces 
the power of the select few slightly, and increases the chances of intervention when 
it is necessary, whilst maintaining a powerful Security Council that can act and 
enforce international law. One problem with recourse to the Security Council was 
considered in the 1997 General Comment by the CESCR in which the impact of 
economic sanctions on ESC rights was addressed.226 The Committee encouraged 
the Security Council to strongly consider the impact of sanctions if they are not 
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carefully targeted, and highlights that oftentimes it is the people that suffer because 
leaders will pass on any economic loss. 227  Thus the unintended outcome 228  of 
strong sanctions on States that deny human rights can be further deprivation of 
those rights, hence General Comment 8 and the call for the Security Council to be 
careful and consider the impact of its decisions.229 Political realism may mean that 
such changes as proposed above could never happen, especially as it is difficult to 
see how action could be taken if some of the world’s superpowers are in opposition, 
thus they practically have a veto regardless. It should still be seen as a non-ideal 
situation and an exercise of might if this occurs.230 Reisman argues that the current 
situation does meet the reality principle in a number of key ways.231 Firstly, the 
permanent members do roughly represent the distribution of power globally and so 
any agreement means action can be undertaken and thus making it more than a 
verbal exercise. Secondly, the veto stops the UN being a casualty in a confrontation. 
This stops the organisation confronting one of the major powers which prevents it 
being damaged. Thirdly, Reisman highlights that there is a possibility of a ‘functional 
veto’ by the other members of the council to ensure that the P5 do not act solely in 
their own interests. This itself all seems a romanticised version of a Security Council 
which does not unanimously agree and where action is only achieved when the P3 
agree and Russia and China abstain.232 
The second proposal by Singer is to move the UN to a more democratic structure so 
as to better justify potential interventions. Here, once again the example of the 
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European Union is used.233 Singer proposes a directly elected assembly, much like 
the European Parliament, which he argues comes with other benefits such as 
minimum standards for admission. 234 Singer suggests a halfway mechanism 
because it is important to have inclusiveness with the United Nations, which is one 
of its strongest assets. Equally it may not be legally possible to bring in any actions 
of expulsion because of the principles of universality and sovereign equality which 
entitle every peaceful State to membership of the UN.235 Additionally there is a 
potential problem of withdrawal or expulsion from the UN by the power of the purse 
of the State. If the State in question is a major contributor, the US for example, then 
withholding its contribution will cause more harm than good and persuade others 
against such a course of action.236 This is a major dilemma facing international 
organisations and human rights enforcement as they must attempt to act 
independently of member States and impose human rights, yet at the same time 
they need State consent in order to do so. Singer proposes the current system of 
one State, one member is disproportional considering such differences in population 
and so recommends elected delegates proportionate to population in democratic 
countries, and one member to the assembly in undemocratic countries.237 This has 
the importance of retaining inclusiveness and changing the General Assembly to be 
more democratic and thus justify greater action and intervention. However, I do not 
believe this goes far enough to ensure ESC rights and abidance of international 
human rights law. Singer mentions the minimum standards for admission to the 
European Union and ensuring the basic minimum of human rights. Gardbaum 
above mentions that compulsory jurisdiction of a Court as a condition of 
membership remains limited to the European Court of Human Rights. And Nowak 
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has proposed at length, and drafted a statute for, a World Court of Human Rights. 
Thus, it seems possible and logical to demand more from members of the United 
Nations, at least those who will have more than one delegate in the General 
Assembly and thus more influence. As a minimum condition it should be expected 
that all UN treaties and conventions are ratified by UN member States, and this 
includes a new UN Convention, Treaty or Statute for the establishment of a World 
Court of Human Rights. This compulsory ratification is again using the model of 
Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus it becomes a 
requirement for States to ratify the CRC and recognise a child’s right to healthcare. 
This will have the largest effect on the United States as one of the few countries in 
the world yet to ratify the CRC, and if refusal is continued, various penalties and 
sanctions could be established. The new model of the Security Council would mean 
that economic sanctions for failure to realise such basic human rights in a country 
where resources are not a concern are possible. Such sanctions or fines or 
directives, could also be ordered by the World Court if a case is brought before 
them regarding the number of children in the US without health insurance.  
One common objection to these ideas which needs to be refuted is the idea of 
Western Hegemony. Most of the proposals use the EU as a model of its success in 
enforcing human rights, however there is surely a difference between the EU and 
the UN, and the European community and the global community from which we 
cannot easily escape.238 The Chairman of the UN Working Group drafting the CRC 
stated that we should not try to escape from traditions and diversity of values but 
that the rights must be established within their context. 239  The greater cultural 
diversity across the globe as opposed to within Europe has led to claims that, for 
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example, different values, such as ‘Asian values’ mean that universality and the 
consequent denial of diversity is harmful and unsatisfactory.240 However Amartya 
Sen refutes this idea stating that “Asian values that are invoked to justify 
authoritarianism are not especially Asian in any significant sense.”241 The traditions 
of countries such as India and China have been said not to differ much from 
Western countries anyway, and it has been argued that such criticism is not against 
the international human rights instruments themselves, but against any idea of 
outside influence.242 However, as rightly pointed out, the U.S. also fears such impact 
which is one of the reasons for its poor ratification record of the human rights 
instruments.243 Widdows also purports a fundamental humanity arguing that such 
distinctions misrepresent the traditions of ethics, divides the world inappropriately 
and forgets we are all human.244 
It must also be considered that international human rights law is established from 
the Universal Declaration which was drafted with the representation of China, India, 
Iran, Lebanon and the Philippines.245 Van Bueren also makes this point highlighting 
the contributions made by many developing and Eastern States, especially in the 
international law on children’s rights.246 The drafters were drawn from all over the 
world representing many different regions, religions, cultures and legal practices 
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and interpretations, yet a consensus was still reached.247 Thus, Asian values and a 
lack of universality in human rights would seem to be undermined, but concern over 
using a European model may still arise. However, it should be noted that this is 
merely a model of implementation and not of the rights in question. The rights 
enforced by a new global model will still be those established via global 
mechanisms, and it has also been suggested that the right to health, with its 
physical nature, goes beyond such diversity and is seen as identical everywhere.248 
In terms of suggestions that universal human rights are problematic because of 
cultural diversity and because of their principles being Western; it is the fundamental, 
underlying, yet overlapping consensus that these human rights have tried to reach 
to take them beyond problems of cultural diversity, much like Rawls’ theory of 
justice.249 It could be argued that in order to find this lowest common denominator, 
the content would be so minimal and lacking in any specificity, as to be meaningless 
and too thin for the issues international human rights law seeks to resolve.250 I 
contend however that the principles of justice are “devoid of real content”,251 yet an 
obligation and right to healthcare has been found within them. Green agrees with 
such value and cultural holism, arguing that differences cannot possibly conflict and 
are interconnected and mutually supporting. Despite differing cultural values there 
will be some holism where there is no conflict and it is through this scope that we 
should evaluate rights and Convention jurisprudence. 252  This commonality and 
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 Green A, 'A philosophical taxonomy of European human rights law' (2012) 1 European 
Human Rights Law Review 71; Green also argues that establishing rights must focus on the 
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overlapping consensus within the international texts has been highlighted previously 
by Tomuschat who argues that such texts define the realm of common 
agreement.253 
Additionally, given the international treaties that have been agreed upon, especially 
the near 100% ratification of the CRC, it seems that cultural differences have not 
been a barrier to achieving an underlying consensus.254 This idea and my opinion 
on enforcing human rights has been perfectly expressed by Kent and the argument 
is worth quoting in full: 
One way to deal with the problem of cultural relativism is to 
say that the international law of human rights is about 
universal minimum human rights. International conventions 
on human rights should be based on universally recognized 
rights. Of course this means that international law can codify 
only the ‘lowest common denominator’ of rights that are 
widely accepted. Individual countries should be free to make 
more stringent specifications of human rights, and to vary 
among themselves, provided that they recognize and work 
within that baseline universal minimum. This understanding 
implies that international human rights law would cover only 
a narrow base of issues. But the fact that the law focuses on 
only a few major issues, and is codified without exceptions, 
could make it much more powerful.255 
Enforcing universal human rights cannot be seen as cultural imperialism that will 
suppress societies and their way of life. Rather ensuring these human rights is more 
likely to secure fundamental opportunities for all people. Intervention by the UN 
might be seen as a step too far, but in certain circumstances, intervention will help 
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prevent a way of life that is not an element of a distinctive culture worth protecting, 
such as female genital mutilation,256 or a culture of privatisation, smaller government 
and negative rights, such as that in the United States, that allowed 6.6 million 
children to live without any health insurance in 2012.257 
 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to extend previous ideas of a global theory, 
bringing a global difference principle and framework of adjudication of ESC rights 
into practice. Therefore, the ideas and practical changes were proposed based on 
this and began by exploring ideas of a global difference and what this could look like 
in practice. Philosophical ideas about the need for economic redistribution were 
further explored, in order to establish a firm ground of justification, based on the 
concept that the current economic order does not practice anything representing a 
global difference principle and in fact, actively causes harm to the poorer nations in 
the world, as the current order originates from the world’s most powerful countries 
that subsequently benefit the most, After this considering the arguments for  
economic redistribution, practical ways of how this might be done were explored. 
Here, two findings were of central importance; the world could quite easily afford the 
extra money required to realise a minimum core of a child’s right to healthcare; and 
the global financial institutions are failing to adhere to their international legal 
obligations to help protect and ensure a child’s right to healthcare. 
After this, the idea of enforcing the right was undertaken, bringing in the concept of 
international human rights law as part of the international constitution, and 
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discussing the emerging area of global constitutionalism. Comparing human rights 
treaties and the international conventions to constitutional law, justifies the use of 
the judicial framework based on jurisprudence from courts that have adjudicated a 
codified right to healthcare. This brought discussion to the possibility of a World 
Court of Human Rights, to ensure that such judicial enforcement could occur on a 
global scale. Here, the work of Manfred Nowak was largely followed, modified by 
three amendments and recommendations, notably that: the international law opt-in 
may not work as this is one of the current reasons there is weak enforcement; there 
should be a push for a full pyramid model, exhausting regional remedies before 
reaching the World Court; and that the framework argued for in the previous chapter  
of this thesis should be followed in order to avoid problematic jurisprudence that 
governments will not accept. This final chapter has brought together themes 
developed throughout the thesis to make lots of ideas and proposals for change that 
may help address the problem of children’s lack of access to even basic levels of 
medical care.   






A child is born a blank slate. Their future is unknown. We cannot be certain what 
their hopes and dreams will be. What is certain however is that the opportunities 
whereby they may fulfil those hopes and dreams, rests in the hands of others. Are 
they born in a society that allows them to strive for whatever it is they want to be? 
Are they born in a country that gives every child the same chance? Are they born in 
a world with healthcare, so that genetic predisposition and misfortune do not decide 
what a child can aspire to become?  
The spark that spawned this thesis was the question ‘why does America not seem 
to be such a society that allowed children those chances because it was a society 
without universal healthcare?’ Unfortunately, it still is. That initial question also had a 
second part: what could be done on a global level to enforce the provision of 
healthcare services? Once again the unfortunate answer is nothing; at least not 
right now. The connection between the importance of healthcare to children and 
their opportunities required a philosophical foundation; something that was also 
thought coud support the cogent arguments justifying a child’s right to healthcare. 
Equally, as it was seen how anaemic and insipid international law can be, research 
had to consider the issue of enforcement and implementation. It was hoped in this 
way that persuasion and enforcement of the law could be achieved.  What was 
sacrificed by heading in these different directions was a singular focus on any one 
particular topic. It is argued that what focus there is, is sufficient, but it cannot be 
claimed that this thesis has the depth in any one area that an entire thesis on that 
topic would have. All of the areas discussed in this work could easily be a full thesis 
on their own. This is perhaps the greatest strength, and also weakness of this work. 
It was never intended to be so interdisciplinary, but in pursuing the search to the 
foundation and justification of this right, the work quickly turned from a purely legal 




analysis of a child’s right to healthcare in international law, towards a search for a 
just world, in which access to healthcare services is one important part. 
Healthcare is considered a basic human right, appearing in many national 
constitutions as well as universally agreed upon documents. If these words were put 
into practice then we would have a just world where every child had access to good 
quality, basic healthcare. In order to explore if this is the case, this thesis was split 
into two parts; firstly, to explore the problem by analysing healthcare systems, 
international law and the adjudication of the rights; and secondly, to address the 
problems established in the first part, by searching for convincing moral arguments 
for a State and global obligation to provide the right, and then recommending 
specific changes to practical enforce it. Thus Part A began by analysing the current 
situation around a child’s right to healthcare and unfortunately showed that the ideal 
is not being realised. 
Chapter one highlighted the problem. Using health indicators to support a brief 
overview of the state of children’s healthcare in certain countries, clear problems 
emerged. Three developing countries were chosen as examples where the right to 
healthcare exists within their written constitutions, yet without the political will to 
push for drastic change, such a codified right remains words on paper, just like the 
international human right to health. The three developed countries that were 
considered, show that different healthcare systems can achieve appropriate levels 
of children’s health protection, and thus we can accept a margin of appreciation in 
the delivery of this right. However, it is also shown that the frequent omission of 
wealthy countries from healthcare analysis is unwarranted when we consider the 
poor state of healthcare in the richest country in the world, the United States. Here 
the healthcare policies of the past cannot be excused by reference to any margin of 
appreciation or claims to independent sovereignty, as without resource constraints 
these policies have left 6.6 million children without health insurance. There is 




however a glimmer of hope in the Affordable Care Act which could ensure coverage 
to a further 26 million Americans by 2017. Even this does not go far enough. Thus, 
healthcare is far from a perfect institution with many countries failing through 
resource constraints or lack of political will. Therefore chapter one very clearly set 
out the need for discussion on a child’s right to healthcare, the obligations of the 
State, and the enforcement strategies required to realise it this right.  
In chapter two the thesis began to look at the current legal position of a child’s right 
to healthcare in international law in an attempt to explore real, practical problems 
and set later discussion of ways to realise and enforce the obligations in context. It 
was seen in chapter two how weak the current international legal structure is, with a 
self-reporting system and an opt-in to human rights conventions. The notable 
exception is Europe which has compulsory ratification of the European Convention 
on Human Rights as a condition of membership of the Council, and strong 
implementation of rights due to the courts. It is widely acknowledged that Europe is 
the most successful implementor of human rights in the world, and as such it is 
often used as a template from which lessons can be learnt as to how to better 
implement human rights globally.  
Because of the impact of the courts in Europe, consideration of adjudicating the 
right to healthcare was undertaken in chapter three. The justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights generally has been a heavily debated topic, and the 
argument of this thesis is that the courts have an important role in implementing 
such rights. Drawing on examples of the developing countries from chapter one that 
have the right to healthcare within their written constitutions as a model, because 
this is similar to the codification of the right in international law, it was shown how 
lessons can be learnt from each jurisdiction; even if it is what not to do. 




The thesis then moved on to Part B to address the problems seen in Part A, and 
began trying to answer the question of the moral underpinnings of such a right and 
whether the State is required to ensure it in the hope of providing the most 
convincing arguments for those individuals who are so ardently against the right and 
State obligation. Why should we care about the ill-health of strangers? Why should 
the State be obligated to provide basic healthcare to each child? There are many 
ways to answer such questions and in chapter four, one possible answer was 
proposed drawing on a minimal theory of justice by John Rawls. Chapter four 
explained the theory, which simply argues that we can only assess whether our 
world is just if we can remove all prejudices and knowledge of ourselves that are 
morally arbitrary, such as intelligence, gender, religion and so on. This hypothetical 
exercise is designed to place individuals behind the veil of ignorance. This thick veil, 
or original position, denies all morally arbitrary knowledge in a paragon of what 
Rawls calls ‘pure procedural justice’, the outcome will be fair and just no matter 
what it is. If we challenge individuals to place themselves behind the veil of 
ignorance, and then decide on principles to govern society once the veil is lifted, 
those principles will be the basis of a just society.  
The three most important outcomes of the theory for this thesis are: the clear 
application of the principles to children; the equality of opportunity principle; and the 
difference principle. Very little has been written about Rawls’ theory and children 
and what little literature there is, is often mistaken. Although in Rawls’ theory 
children cannot be in the original position themselves, children are included 
because they will be considered as subsequent generations despite Rawls’ 
apparent omission. It seems fair to say that the contractors will agree to bestow the 
principles upon children to protect them and allow them to become rational adults. 
The contractors will be unsure what their society will be like once the veil is lifted, 
they will be naturally conservative and minimalist in the principles they set down. 




Therefore those they do set down are very basic and will arise from an overlapping 
consensus of all contractors; as such they will be universal as well. They will be 
principles which it is logical to want more of than less, and one of these is 
opportunity. Thus the principle of fair equality of opportunity will be established. 
Finally wealth, which is on the same list of things it is always logical to want more of 
than less, informs the difference principle. This is because the contractors will be 
naturally risk averse as they could find themselves in the position of the worst off 
when the veil is lifted. Therefore they will set down that inequalities in wealth are 
only acceptable as long as the worst off are better off than they otherwise would 
have been; the difference principle. The logical extension of Rawls’ theory to include 
healthcare is provided by Daniels who argues the fair equality of opportunity 
necessitates healthcare. Ill-health clearly impedes ones opportunities in life. 
Therefore health and healthcare are a matter of justice. It follows therefore, that any 
society that can be considered just must ensure basic healthcare services.  
Having considered Rawls’ theory, the thesis then explored how this can be 
extended in order to show how it applies globally, so it can inform the international 
legal obligation to ensure children have basic healthcare and its enforcement. This 
was done in chapter five, mostly through the work of Thomas Pogge. Pogge 
extends Rawls’ theory by arguing for a global difference principle and highlighting 
the current injustice in the global economic order. By its very nature A Theory of 
Justice can apply globally because there is no restriction on the size of the society 
Rawls places in the original position. For Pogge, the focus is on a global difference 
principle and the unjust economic order which leaves many countries with the 
inability to realise a child’s right to healthcare. To this globalised idea, possible 
judicial enforcement is added, and it is seen from the lessons learned earlier in 
chapter three, that courts must be careful not to overstep in to budgetary decisions 
and policy making in areas that are considered the prerogative of a democratic 




government. Instead the main role of the courts is oversight and ensuring 
reasonableness of the governements policy which, it is argued, includes use of a 
minimum core as a presumption of unreasonableness. This framework is important 
if there is to be any universal oversight and adjudication of the right to healthcare, 
which as seen in chapter two may be an important tool in enforcing human rights, 
but needs to be managed appropriately by using the above framework so that 
judicial decisions are respected and implemented. 
Finally, in chapter six the various conclusions drawn in the preceding chapters were 
brought together and carried forward in proposing more specific changes that need 
to be made to the international legal order. There is undeniably a child’s right to 
healthcare in any just world through the extension of Rawls’ opportunity principle. 
Extending the theory globally demands a global difference principle, which also 
serves to help those countries that cannot afford even a minimum core to healthcare. 
It is also shown that the world can afford to provide the funds required if the global 
economic order was adjusted as necessary. The proposals for change of the 
enforcement strategies for human rights focus on viewing the core human rights 
treaties as an international constitution and subsequently their adjudication by the 
courts. This culminated in one of the main concluding proposals of this thesis; to 
establish a World Court of Human Rights. As long as there is appropriate 
adjudication and a presumption of unreasonableness if a basic minimum is not 
being achieved, such a court with universal oversight could become a valuable part 
of the human rights enforcement strategy and limit the ability of States to simply 
ignore their human rights obligations. Various other possible changes are discussed 
at the end of chapter six as further ways to implement the necessary change in the 
United Nations and the international legal community. These include a more 
democratic General Assembly with greater powers and more permanent members 
of the Security Council with the removal of the veto. Such changes have been 




suggested many times because international law is at a pivotal point. If it continues 
to be inept and meaningless and if the superpowers simply ignore their basic 
obligations, then the UN may dwindle into obscurity and ineffectiveness and be a 
repeat of the League of Nations. However, increased awareness and globalisation 
shows promise that international law is being taken more seriously and the world 
can head towards a monist hierarchy. The recent failure of the Millennium 
Development Goals has focused the attention of the world on how much is still 
needed to be done. This focus may be the push for change that has been needed 
and if the world can respond to this challenge and recent failure, something may be 
salvaged from the disappointment of the MDGs. Important changes are needed to 
realise this and the promise of human rights. It is equally important that the world 
does not wait and miss this vital opportunity.  
Change will not come if we wait for some other person, or if 
we wait for some other time. We are the ones we've been 
waiting for. We are the change that we seek. 
- President Barack Obama 
We have the ideas. We have the capacity. We must now change to avoid 
international legal obscurity. Martin Luther King once said that “a right delayed is a 
right denied.” We cannot pretend there is a right to healthcare in international law if 
we are not willing to change now. Change in the face of American obstinacy. 
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Abstract: New beginnings offer new opportunities but also present new 
challenges. The restoration of democracy in Fiji in 2014 was accompanied by 
a new and far reaching Constitution, which, among other things, promises 
much in the context of social, economic and cultural rights. These rights, 
which have sometimes been described as soft or ‘third generation’ rights, 
give rise to resource demands, and in developing and least developed 
countries, governments may struggle to deliver on promises, or if they seek 
to do so may encounter certain difficulties. In this article we look across the 
globe at comparative examples of how different countries have met their 
international and national obligations to give effect to the right to health and 
healthcare, especially for children, and use this comparative exercise to 
consider the options open to Fiji in considering how to fulfil the expectations 
raised by an ambitious new Constitution.  
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Following what appears to have been a peaceful election in September 2014  
Fiji is back on the road to democracy after several years of government by 
decree following a military coup in 2006. Part of this process includes a new 
constitution. This promises to be far reaching and in particular includes 
extensive human rights provisions in Chapter Two. The rights with which this 
paper is concerned are those which broadly fall under economic, social and 
cultural rights – which go far beyond Fiji’s current international obligations,1 
notably the right to health, especially the rights of children to health care. 
This paper locates those rights within the international rights context and 
within the comparative perspective of a child's right to health and healthcare 
elsewhere, drawing on the examples of India, South Africa, Brazil and 
Columbia.  This comparison is made in order to examine the challenges that 
may confront Fiji in delivering on this right and to identify the approaches 
which have succeeded and those which have created as many problems as 
they have solved. While it is recognised that in many respects the situation in 
this Pacific island state is unique, nevertheless it is hoped that with virtually 
nothing in the way of local or regional precedent to guide it, experiences from 
elsewhere may serve as useful lessons for the newly elected government to 
consider. 
This article first briefly introduces the reader to those aspects of Fiji 
which are significant for the focus of the paper. It then examines the new 
rights provisions in the Constitution, locating these against the broader 
international background of human rights and in particular the right to health 
care. Express provision for the right to health care is relatively rare in 
national bills of rights, nevertheless there are comparators elsewhere, and it 
is to these that attention is turned in order to explore how the right has been 
given effect and what consequences this has had. The article concludes by 
considering what can be learnt from these comparative experiences and 
whether these lessons might be useful to Fiji in meeting the expectations 
raised by its new constitution. 
                                                          
*Dominic O’Brien is a PhD student at Northumbria University, Newcastle, England. Sue 
Farran is a Professor of Laws at Northumbria University and an Adjunct Professor at the 
University of the South Pacific. 
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 Fiji has not ratified the ICESRC. 








Young people are a significant factor when considering health provision in 
Fiji.  A mid 2013 estimate suggested that those aged 0-14 accounted for 
28.2% of the total population of 859,200,2 with an average population growth 
rate estimated at 0.8%, and a crude birth rate of 19.1 per 1,000. Infant 
mortality is 13.1 per 1,000 (based on 2010 data).  In 2008 it was reported 
that Fiji had made good progress towards MDGs and in terms of human 
development, but it was also noted that less than half the population had 
access to basic health infra-structure such as clean water and sanitation.3 
Poverty and hardship in rural and urban squatter areas was particularly 
noted, with estimates of over 25% of the country’s population living below the 
basic needs poverty threshold. 4 
Although the 2008 report referred to above was reasonably positive, 
Fiji’s own Ministry of Health has pointed out in its Strategic Plan 2011-2015,5 
that targets in MDGs 4, 5 and 6 will not be met by 2015,6 and that among the 
contributory reasons for this are the ‘cost of health services to allow (the) 
poor to take advantage of available health facilities‘.7  Similarly, while infant 
mortality has declined, MDG 4 will not be met unless it declines by a further 
57% over five years (a tall order when it has already taken twenty years to 
decline by 23%).8 
                                                          
2
 The SPC Pacific Island Populations – Estimates and projections of demographic indicators 
< http://www.spc.int/sdd/> accessed 6 March 2015. 
3
 SPC Fiji Islands Country Profile 2008 
<http://www.spc.int/sppu/images/COUNTRYPROFILES/fiji%20country%20profile%20final.pd
f > accessed 9 November 2014. 
4
 SPC Fiji Islands Country Profile 2008 (n 3) 2. 
5
 Ministry of Health,  ‘Shaping Fiji’s Health: Strategic Plan 2011-1015” 
<http://www.wpro.who.int/health_services/fiji_nationalhealthplan.pdf> accessed 9 November 
2014. 
6
 MDG 4: reduce child mortality; MDG 5: improve maternal health; MDG 6: combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases. United Nations ‘Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 
2015’  <un.org> 
7
 Ministry of Health (Fiji) Shaping Fiji’s Health (n 5)  8. 
8
 The Australian Government Report on Health in Fiji suggest that while Fiji is on-track to 
achieve the reduction of child mortality it is not on track as regards infant mortality, under-
five mortality or maternal mortality and states that ‘a more concerted effort is necessary to 
 




Of particular relevance to this article are the Fiji Ministry of Health’s 
own stated aims which are to:  ‘Improved child health and reduced child 
morbidity and mortality’.  There are eight objectives under this aim: 
 
1. Develop and disseminate a child health policy and strategy 
2.  Strengthen emergency neonatal care at all paediatric units 
3. Improve child health assessment and strengthen child health support 
services in antenatal, perinatal and postnatal period 
4. To ensure over 95% for birth dose for hepatitis B to be given within first 24 
hours and introduce the rotavirus and pneumococcal vaccine into the child 
health immunisation schedule. 
5. Maintain all hospitals as baby friendly 
6. Reduce the incidence rates of Low Birth Weight babies by 5%. 
7. Ensure 95% of 5-15 year olds are screened for Rheumatic Heart Disease 
and that 80% of those positive for RHD managed via public health and 
clinical services 
8.  Strengthen Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) and Paediatric Intensive 
Care Unit.9 
 
Although children are not the only focus of this Strategic Plan, the 
significance of the plan is that this is clear evidence of Fiji’s commitment to 
child health care and that these objectives establish priorities which will 
inform, as will be seen below, the incremental achievement of certain rights 
for children. This is, moreover not only the wishful thinking of policy makers 
but ties in directly with  new constitutional provisions in Fiji regarding the right 
to healthcare, which in turn can be located against a much broader 
international rights context. 
 
III. The legal framework 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ensure better health outcomes for the whole population’.  Australian Aid proposes to focus 
its efforts on strengthening primary health care to reduce mortality and illness among 
mothers, babies and young children. <aid.dfat.gov.au> accessed 8 November 2014.   
9
 SPC Fiji Country Profile (n 3) 21-22. 




The international context 
The international legal framework for the right to health especially for children 
can be found inclusively in the Constitution of the World Health Organization, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and specifically in the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). 10   The 
UNCRC also has an optional protocol, its third, which will allow children to 
make direct complaints to the Committee. This opened for signature in 
February 2012, and entered into force on 14th April 2014, three months after 
Costa Rica became the 10th country to ratify it. 11 As of November 2014 only 
14 countries have ratified this optional protocol, and Fiji is not one of these. 
However, the main advantage and difference of the CRC over the ICESCR 
and other Committees, is that the UNCRC itself has been ratified by 193 out 
of a possible 196 countries, including Fiji.12  
The UNCRC is overseen by the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CCRC) which is a non-judicial body with clear limits to its jurisdiction. It 
works with other bodies of the UN, particularly the Economic and Social 
Council and the General Assembly, which may result in technical assistance 
being provided to certain countries based on their reports. 13   There are 
differing views about the efficacy of the UNCRC. It has been suggested, for 
                                                          
10
 Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946) preamble; this is after defining health 
as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity’, for in depth discussion as to why this very broad definition may not be 
appropriate see; D Callahan, ‘The WHO Definition of “Health”’ (1973) 1 The Hastings Center 
Studies 77; See also, N. Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly   (Cambridge 
University Press 2008)  37; D. Da Costa Leite Borges, ‘Making Sense Of Human Rights In 
The Context of European Union Health-Care Policy: Individualist and communitarian views’ 
(2011) 7 International Journal of Law in Context 335, 337; The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights  (1948), Article 25; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966), Article 12; Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) Article 24; see also 
art.5(e)(iv) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD); arts 11.1(f) and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
11




 UN Treaty Collection 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 19 November 2014. 
13
 R.K.M. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights   (6th edn, Oxford University Press 
2014) 47. 




example, that the reporting system lacks teeth, 14  as there is little that can be 
done in the way of legal sanctions should a state choose to ignore the 
concluding observations of the Committee,15 and it can be argued that this 
has led to the lackadaisical attitude of many countries towards the reporting 
process.16 Claims of ‘soft’ enforcement are supported by the fact that the 
Convention does not state any consequences for failure to report or non-
compliance with the Convention, and as such it has been suggested that the 
rights are more idealistic goals and aspirations than tangible guarantees with 
legal effect.17  Additionally, because of a lack of an institutional set-up to 
claim the rights on behalf of a particular child, there is little scope to make 
demands on the state to meet its rights’ obligations.18 Contrastingly, it has 
equally been suggested that the reporting procedure is a positive exercise 
that leads to open dialogue and inclusiveness that can be an honest 
appraisal and assist by highlighting areas where help is needed. 
The formal, international acknowledgement of a child’s right to 
healthcare is promising but is far from a guarantee of promotion and 
implementation. The near universal ratification of the CRC may be 
meaningless, if, as Tomás highlights: 
 
there is no effective supervision over and enforcement 
of the way in which each country promotes and 
guarantees the CRC, besides the periodical writing of 
reports for the International Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, it is foreseeable that in a decade’s time, we 
                                                          
14
 M. Freeman, ‘The Future of Children's Rights’ (2000) 14 Children and Society 277, 290. 
15
 M. Freeman, ‘The Limits of Children’s Rights’  in M. Freeman and  P. Veerman  (eds),  
The Ideologies of Children’s Rights,  (Martinus Nijhoff  1997) 71-80; see also E. Burman,  
‘Local, Global or Globalized? Child development and international child rights legislation’ 
(1996) 3 Childhood 45, 50;  J. Mann, L. Gostin,  S. Gruskin, T. Brennan, Z. Lazzarini  and 
H.V. Fineberg,  ‘Health and Human Rights’ (1994) 1 Health and Human Rights 7, 10. 
16
 E. Bates, ‘The United Kingdom and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ in M. Baderin, and R. McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights in Action (Oxford University Press 2007) 267-268. 
17
 Burman (n 15) 50; see also Freeman (n 15) 71-80; M. Freeman, ‘Laws, Conventions and 
Rights’ in M. Freeman (ed), The Moral Status of Children: Essays on the Rights of the Child 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1997) 47-62; Bates (n 16).  
18
 O. O’Neill, ‘Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives’ (1988) 98 (3) Ethics 460; see also C. 
Brown, ‘Universal Human Rights: A critique’ (1997) 1 The International Journal of Human 
Rights 41, 53. 




will still be able to say only that it is the most ratified 
international document; the rights to protection, to 
provision and to participation are universally recognised 
for children but the problem resides in the way they are, 
or are not, put into practice.19 
 
Freeman has suggested that if the Committee is to remain the fulcrum of 
enforcement, it should be permanent and given more powers,20 and Navi 
Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008-2014, admitted 
that  economic, social and cultural rights lack ‘appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms at the international level’.21 It is very much the case therefore, 
that responsibility for giving effect to children’s rights and in particular the 




The domestic legal framework of Fiji has at its apex, in principle at least 
although this has not been the case in recent years owing to its abrogation, 
the written constitution. The Constitution which is considered here, and which 
was signed into law in 2013, is Fiji’s fourth constitution since its first in 1970 
when it became independent.  Subsequent constitutions followed in 1990 
and 1997. The new constitution is not the first to include a bill of rights but 
goes considerably further than previous constitutions in its provisions for 
social and economic rights, at the cost, some might say, of cultural rights.23 
The Constitution opens with a statement of values (s1) the fourth of 
which is ‘equality for all and care for the less fortunate based on the values 
                                                          
19
 C. Tomás, ‘Childhood and Rights: Reflections on the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child’(2008) 2(2)  Childhoods Today: an online journal for childhood studies available at 
<http://www.childhoodstoday.org/article.php?id=19> accessed 19 November 2014. 
20
 Freeman (n 14) 290. 
21
 N. Pillay, ‘Human Rights in United Nations Action: norms, institutions and leadership’ 
(2009) 9 European Human Rights Law Review 1, 2. 
22
  C.E. Easley, S.P. Marks and R.E. Morgan Jr, ‘The Challenge and Place of International 
Human Rights in Public Health’ (2001) 91 American Journal of Public Health 1922. 
23
 This is because there is virtually no reference to indigenous rights for native Fijians and 
indeed there is emphasis in the Constitution that the people of Fiji are inclusive and holistic 
and not distinguishable on ethnic grounds.  




inherent in this section and in the Bill of Rights contained in Chapter 2’. In 
setting out the supremacy of the Constitution the next section (s2(3)) states 
that: ‘The obligations imposed by this Constitution must be fulfilled …’ 
(emphasis added). At the outset therefore we are looking at mandatory 
obligations imposed on the state and a strong emphasis on the Bill of Rights. 
This is found in Chapter Two and s6(1) stipulates that ‘This Chapter binds 
Parliament, the judiciary, the executive branch of government at all levels, 
and every person performing the functions of any public office’. It is therefore 
implied that private individuals are not bound by the obligations of the Bill of 
Rights although there is the possibility that this may be modified through the 
process of interpretation and application. The scope of these rights 
obligations are influenced by a number of considerations. Firstly s6(6) states 
that they are not absolute but may be ‘ limited by limitations expressly set out 
or authorised in relation to a particular right or freedom in this Chapter, or as 
limited by provisions set out elsewhere in this Constitution’.  
Secondly, in providing for the interpretation of this Chapter on the Bill 
of Rights, s7(1)(b) states that a court or tribunal or ‘other authority’ ‘may, if 
relevant, consider international and foreign law, applicable to the protection 
of the rights and freedoms in this Chapter’.  This point is important for our 
purposes as it makes it possible to bring into the interpretation equation the 
international statements of rights referred to above, including of course the 
UNCRC. Thirdly, the interpretation section goes on to provide in s7(5) that in 
giving effect to the rights enumerated a court has to consider not only the 
‘context and consequences of the law’ but also the ‘impact upon individuals 
or groups of individuals’. As will be seen in some of the comparative 
examples, this consideration in the context of healthcare can be significant 
as decisions regarding the allocation of resources, especially for health care 
or access to health services, can have a number of consequences for 
individuals or groups of individuals. 
The Chapter then details an extensive list of rights. The ones we are 
most interested in here are found in s35, the right to health, and s38 rights of 
children, but these also have to be read with s26 which provides for the right 
to equality and freedom from discrimination. 




Turning first to the right to health, there are three main provisions: 
firstly, that the obligation of the state to provide health care and secure to 
each individual the right to health is subject to progressive realization subject 
to available resources;  secondly, a person cannot be denied emergency 
medical treatment; and thirdly, that if the State claims it lacks resources for 
giving effect to the right to health and healthcare the state must demonstrate 
that it lacks the necessary resources. 
There appears at first sight therefore to be a minimum core obligation 
imposed on the state to provide health care,24 although  the possibility of 
modifying this absolute compliance has already been flagged up above, 
under s6(6). At the same time however, if a strict or even literal interpretation 
is adopted, the state may need to be very clear as to why it is or is not 
putting resources into particular forms of health care. As comparative case 
law demonstrates, a court is not bound to accept the justifications of the 
state. Moreover when it comes to the health care of children, not only might 
international rights considerations come into play but also the rights of 
children are strengthened through the dedication of s38 to the rights of 
children, particularly  s38(1)(b) which states that every child has the right ‘to 
basic nutrition, clothing, shelter, sanitation and health care’, and the section 
concludes ‘The best interests of a child are the primary consideration in 
every matter concerning the child’ (s38(2)). 
The scope of the state to justify not resourcing or under-resourcing 
certain health care may be further limited by the s26 provisions against 
discrimination. Direct or indirect discrimination is prohibited on an extensive 
range of grounds under s26(3)(a)  including ‘economic or social or health 
status, disability, age, … or pregnancy’, and s26(4) states that ‘Accordingly, 
neither a law nor an administrative action taken under a law may directly or 
indirectly impose a disability or restriction on any person on  a prohibited 
ground’. This clearly limits prohibited discrimination to actions based on 
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written laws and would, for example, exclude policy guidelines, internal 
memorandums of practice and so on, all of which are more likely to be 
informing resource distribution across health care services than laws. 
However, s26(7) is not so limited and states ‘A person shall not discriminate 
directly or indirectly against any other person on any of the prohibited 
grounds’. Notionally therefore a hospital administrator or health board which 
makes the decision not to finance the treatment of drug addicts, for example, 
could be guilty of discrimination on the grounds of health status. They may, 
however escape liability under the next section which provides a ‘wriggle out’ 
route as it states ‘Treating one person differently from another on any of the 
grounds prescribed under subsection (3) is discrimination, unless it can be 
established that the difference in treatment is reasonable in the 
circumstances’ (emphasis added). The allocation of resources might be seen 
as reasonable in the circumstances, but as will be seen from the comparative 
analysis, this threshold of reasonableness is not without problems. 
The new Constitution is therefore a brave attempt to ensure that Fiji 
complies with its international obligations, strives to meet MDGs and meets 
its own development goals and objectives including those relating to health. 
At the same time it is recognised that there are limited resources to achieve 
these aims and that progress may have to be incremental.    
Choices will have to be made.  But how easy is this?  The same rights 
have been recognised in other parts of the developing world, in different 
ways and approached via different strategies.  It is to these experiences that 
we now turn in order to consider if lessons can be learned from these 
comparative examples. 
 




India is one of the best known examples of a country that has established a 
justiciable right to health and, unlike the situation now possible in Fiji, has 
done so without the right being within the enforceable sections of the 
Constitution. The right to health is in Part IV of the Indian Constitution, known 




as the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) – somewhat comparable to 
the ‘values’ statement in the Fiji Constitution. Article 37 states this Part ‘shall 
not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are 
nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the 
duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws.’25 Despite this clear 
limitation it is the case of Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerala26 that is 
considered to have opened the floodgates for the Indian judiciary to establish 
an enforceable right to health.27 Here the Indian Supreme Court restricted 
the right of the government to amend the Constitution, ruling that the 
government could not amend the ‘basic structure or essential features of the 
constitution.’ 28  The court also discussed within this context the DPSP, 
recognising their importance to the enforceable fundamental rights and their 
complementary nature.29 In this case one Judge said: ‘In building up a just 
social order it is sometimes imperative that the fundamental rights should be 
subordinated to the directive principles’,30 which led to the belief that they 
were complementary with ‘neither part being superior to the other.’31 It is 
suggested that after this case in 1973 and following the state of emergency 
declared between 1975 and 1977, the perception of the judiciary in India 
changed concerning ‘its role in the working of the Constitution.’32 Between 
1975 and 1977, large scale rights violations occurred across India and the 
post-emergency period led to political realignment and a weak government 
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that did not last long.33 The judiciary stepped in and promoted the public–
interest litigation (PIL) movement which, acknowledging that the majority of 
the population could not access the justice system, and relaxed procedural 
rules to the extent that it was claimed that even ‘writ petitions could be 
submitted on a postcard.’34  The post emergency period allowed the judiciary 
to redeem itself by becoming actively involved in the protection of those who 
were deprived of their most basic constitutional rights. PIL was the tool the 
Court used to disregard the traditional requirements of locus standi.35 This 
was clearly seen in Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration36 where a prisoner who 
was being tortured wrote a letter to the Supreme Court, which was taken up 
as a petition and the court made orders for humane treatment. Progressively 
the court began to expand its protection and interpretation beyond the basic 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution. As more destitute individuals were able 
to come before the courts, it was inevitable that the courts would have to 
decide if they were going to protect them or not.  
PIL has been critical in bringing ESC rights within the scope of the 
judiciary,37 despite the apparent non-justiciability of ESC rights in the Indian 
Constitution, largely because the Supreme Court took it upon itself to make 
some of the principles in the DPSP equivalent to the protected civil and 
political rights. It has done this mainly ‘through the application of an 
expansive definition of the right to life.’38  
One palpable example of this expansion was seen in 1992 in Mohini 
Jain v State of Karnataka,39 in which the court, in discussing the right to 
education, clearly accepted and established the interdependence of the 
fundamental rights of Part III of the Constitution, and the DPSP of Part IV. 
This case was concerned with the charging of capitation fees for private 
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colleges and so centred on the expense of higher education.40 In finding the 
fees illegal, the Supreme Court held that ‘[t]he right to education flows 
directly from the right to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity 
of an individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to 
education.’41 The extension of the right to life was one argument used, but 
the court also determined the interdependence of the DPSP and 
fundamental rights, stating: ‘The directive principles which are fundamental in 
the governance of the country cannot be isolated from the fundamental rights 
guaranteed under Part III. These principles have to be read into the 
fundamental rights. Both are supplementary to each other.’42 This argument 
was reiterated just a year later in a case that was brought by private colleges 
challenging state legislation regulating the capitation fees. In Unni Krishnan, 
J. P. v State of Andhra Pradesh,43 the court went a little further in clarifying 
the argument that the two parts of the Constitution were interdependent. 
Again extending the right to life by arguing for the interdependence of rights 
and more particularly the importance of the right to education to the right to 
life, the court held that Article 41 in the DPSP informed the content of the 
right to life, but they were quick to assert that not every DPSP would inform 
what the right meant. The court decided that in this instance only Articles 41, 
45 and 46 would determine the parameters of the right.44 
So the court established that the DPSP can inform the content of a 
right that has been found via extension of fundamental, enforceable rights in 
Part III of the Constitution. With this in mind the court ruled that children have 
a fundamental right to free education up to the age of 14, and beyond that 
the enjoyment of the right is subject to economic capacity. The court did 
briefly mention the progressive realisation of the ICESCR as an indication 
that this objective should be followed for children over 14, but it gave no 
more information as to whether a challenge by a 16 year old that their 
ICESCR rights were not being progressively realised would be successful or 
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justiciable.45 The extension of the right to life to the right to education is 
significant because the right to health has also been included through this 
form of expansion.  
The key case to do this is Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity and 
Ors v. State of West Bengal46 (Samity). In this case a labourer by the name 
of Hakim Seikh fell out of a train in West Bengal suffering serious head 
injuries and a brain haemorrhage. He was taken to eight state medical 
institutions over the next 14 hours and refused access to all of them either 
because of a lack of beds or lack of necessary facilities for his treatment. He 
was eventually admitted to a private hospital which cost Rs.17,000.47 The 
court was very quick to establish that the one important question it would use 
to decide the case was: is the non-availability of treatment a denial of a 
fundamental right under Article 21?48 
Paragraph 9 of the decision leaves no room for doubt that the court 
believed the right to health is an integral part of the right to life, and that this 
right had clearly been violated in these circumstances. The argument was 
based on reading the Constitution as envisaging a welfare state, which in 
turn establishes a government obligation to provide adequate medical 
facilities. The court held that failing the obligations envisaged by a welfare 
state would violate the right to life guaranteed under Article 21.49 
The court then, crucially, went beyond merely finding a violation to the 
right to health via the right to life and ordering redress, by proceeding to 
issue directions to the government on the exact facilities that should be 
provided. The court did this by taking into account the opinions of an Enquiry 
Committee appointed by the state government and listening to other experts 
and ‘learned Counsel’ 50  to make further specific orders to the state 
government before ruling that these orders should apply to all other states 
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within India as well as the national government.51 The facilities which the 
court ordered were extensive, including a better communication set up, 
better ambulance services, and the upgrading of hospitals at district and sub-
division level. 52  The court admitted that such expansive direction would 
require financial resources but merely commented in response that 
constitutional obligations cannot be ignored. There was no discussion or 
consideration of the financial implications or a possible resource allocation 
prerogative of the government and it would appear that the obligation stands 
irrespective of any financial constraints.53 All that was said was ‘[w]hatever is 
necessary for this purpose has to be done.’54 This expansive direction is 
where many criticisms of the Indian Supreme Court lie. Samity is one 
example, however the court also started to get involved in ordering petrol 
pump sites, rules of conduct for public authorities, control of automobile 
emissions, parking charges and many more trifling matters that should not 
considered by any court, least of all a country’s Supreme Court.55  
The Indian Supreme Court has faced many criticisms of illegitimately 
extending its jurisdiction into areas regarded as the prerogative of a 
democratic government through ‘overt judicial activism’. 56  Tobin has 
commented:  
 
The work of the Indian Supreme Court with respect to 
the scope of the right to life provides a precedent for 
such a strong and expansive interpretative approach. In 
several cases the Court has pushed the boundaries of 
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the right to life beyond what would be considered 
reasonable in many jurisdictions.57 
 
The court however, has remained stoic, arguing that it is filling the void 
created by inadequate branches of government and that the importance of 
the policy decisions outweighs a strict adherence to separation of powers.58 
One of the problems with this judicial activism has been ‘continued non-
implementation … undermining the court’s authority.’59 This raises questions 
about the legitimacy of the court and demonstrates a lack of respect for the 
decisions of the court. One of the main problems causing this is the structure 
of the court, which has multiple benches of often just two judges and hears 
thousands of cases, meaning it is impossible to keep track of all matters, 
leading to inconsistent decisions from different benches and a breakdown of 
the system of precedent.60 However elsewhere it is suggested that there has 
been a general acquiescence by the government to such judicial activism.61 
There have doubtless been some cases where the government has 
disagreed with the court to such an extent as to pass legislation, or the 
cabinet has had to assert an ordinance, so that the order of the court is 
rendered void.62 
A reaction to judicial activism in India is evident in the Judicial 
Appointments Commission Act (No.40 of 2014). This is in response to the 
judiciary seizing power from the executive to appoint judges and further 
illustrates the tension between the two branches in India. This dates back to 
1993 when the courts reversed the position set out in the Constitution that 
the president, after consultation with the Chief Justice, would appoint judges 
to the superior courts.63 This consultation was interpreted as concurrence, 
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and the Chief Justice would make their recommendations to the President, 
who would have limited scope to disagree. Further influence was grasped by 
the judiciary when the requirement of consultation was changed to requiring 
an ‘advisory opinion’ whereby the Chief Justice, together with some senior 
colleagues, known as a ‘collegium’, would recommend names to the 
President, who would then be bound by the decision. 64  The government 
reaction has been this legislation. The next step is the establishment of a 
national judicial commission to appoint senior judges which will remove the 
power solely from the courts. 
Despite this constitutional tension, it is clear that India now has a 
justiciable right to healthcare and has made moves to enforce ESC rights 
through the courts using an imaginative interpretation of the right to life. The 
former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health has used the Samity 
case to argue ‘that there are health related rights that give rise to some 
immediate obligations that are not subject to resource availability.’ 65 This 
refers to the ‘essential minimum’ the court ordered which is similar to the 
minimum core content envisioned by the Committee on ESC rights and 
which is immediately enforceable and beyond resources constraints. Hunt, 
rather more pragmatically, argues that ‘if a Government of a low-income 
country has insufficient resources to meet its immediate health-related 
obligations, it is incumbent upon those in a position to assist to provide 
international assistance and cooperation that will enable the Government to 
meet its immediate obligations.’ 66  This is an argument for the legal 
obligations of the world’s most developed countries to provide more 
international aid and assistance and change the global economic order.67 
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India it seems provides some very mixed results. On the one hand, 
judicial activism may lead to unrealisable expectations and jeopardises the 
separation of powers which underpin democratic government. On the other 
hand, PIL has made the courts more accessible to those who would 
otherwise have been ignored and prompted widespread discussion on the 
fulfilment of their fundamental rights. Kirby, in defending PIL, has argued that 
protection is needed from ‘decision-making that is wholly political’.68 This is 
why we look at comparative examples of adjudication; to see what lessons 
Fiji needs to learn. While the right to health in Fiji is clearly distinguishable 
from that in India, because in the former it is an express right, the duty 
imposed on the judiciary (and other agents) to meet the obligations of state 
are not dissimilar and raise the question of how pro-active the courts are 
expected to be in this regard and whether the boundaries between the 
different branches of state may be crossed in seeking to give effect to the 
rights of children in particular, to health care. Similarly, it might be asked 
what weight might be given to the values stated in s1 of the Fiji Constitution 
referred to above, particularly if the intention is that these are read with the 
Bill of Rights, as has been argued in India. 
 
Brazil 
The example of Brazil initially appears to be more similar to the provisions of 
the Fiji Constitution.  Brazil has an express right to health in Article 6 and 
more specifically Article 196 of its Constitution.69  This subsequently led to 
the introduction of the Sistema Único de Saúde (Unified Health System), 
known as the SUS in 1990 as a ‘universal, publicly-funded, rights-based 
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system’.70  There can be little doubt that this has had a considerable impact 
on the health indicators of Brazil and has been considered an outstanding 
success. 71  There has also been successful litigation on the right to 
healthcare in Brazil so it may be thought to be an excellent example for other 
countries as well as demonstrating how obligations incurred under 
international law can be given domestic effect. Moreover, and particularly 
relevant to Fiji, Brazil has also established a priority for a child’s right to 
healthcare, accepting the increased vulnerability of children and the need to 
ensure that their rights are not subordinated. Indeed the Superior Court of 
Justice has stated that it is a constitutional norm that children’s rights have 
absolute priority most especially with a right to healthcare.72 
This shows promise for the prioritisation of healthcare for children and 
the positive attitude of the court in achieving this. Brazil however, is not 
without some major problems. One of the problems of the SUS is the 
inequities in access to health care services. The poor have much less access 
to the care they need than those who are more wealthy, and this problem, far 
from being rectified by the courts, is exemplified and exacerbated by the 
nature of Brazil’s healthcare litigation.73 Ferraz explains: 
 
[T]here is instead a high concentration of right-to-health 
litigation in the richest states, cities, and districts of 
Brazil. … The explanation for this high concentration of 
litigation in developed states, cities, and districts is 
hardly surprising: access to courts and lawyers is 
beyond the means and reach of most poor Brazilians.74 
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This exacerbation is partly because there is no public-interest litigation 
(PIL) system in Brazil compared to that found in India, meaning access to 
courts is more difficult and writ petitions cannot ‘be submitted on a 
postcard’.75 Also, because Brazil is a civil law country it does not adhere to 
the rule of stare decisis found in common law systems - and also incidentally 
in Fiji, meaning one court decision does not affect all subsequent cases with 
similar facts. Consequently many similar if not identical cases have been 
decided.76 Further exacerbation is due to the jurisprudence of the courts and 
the specific way the courts have interpreted the right to health. The Brazilian 
courts have interpreted the right to health in the Constitution as a right of all 
individuals to have all of their health needs satisfied with the very best 
treatment, irrespective of cost.77 This failure to consider the limited resources 
of the country is only one problematic conseuence of the litigation in Brazil; 
another is that collective complaints are almost never heard, and so the vast 
majority of cases are individual and concern the provision of curative 
medicines to be enjoyed individually.78 Ferraz points out that in Brazil ‘the 
right to health is an individual entitlement to the satisfaction of one’s health 
needs with the most advanced treatment available, irrespective of costs.’79 
Tobin agrees and adds that ‘[s]uch an approach is not only unsustainable 
because of its drain on Brazil’s limited resources, but it also skews the 
benefits of the right to health to those who have access to the courts.’80 The 
reasoning of the courts in accepting such arguments has been called 
‘syllogistic reasoning’81 because they follow the clear pattern needed for a 
syllogism. The argument is in essence: the Constitution guarantees a right to 
health for everyone; this individual has a medical need requiring certain 
treatment; therefore he/she is entitled to that treatment. It is a very simplistic 
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argument and it is said that ‘all that a claimant must do to win his or her case 
under this interpretation is to prove that he or she has an unsatisfied health 
need as documented by a doctor’s prescription.’ 82  Thus somewhat 
unsurprisingly, the number of successful litigations is high, estimated at 90% 
in lower courts and 100% in the Supreme Court, when an individual asserts 
the need for a particular health service.83 
While the approach to the right to healthcare in Brazil is positive in so 
far as the right to health is guaranteed by the Constitution and is being 
enforced by the courts in a clear, consistent and strong way, the cost of such 
litigation must be considered as ‘[j]udges by and large do not engage in any 
form of substantive cost or economic impact analysis of their decisions’.84 
This litigation, in which the resource implications of the decision are not 
considered, is made even more problematic by a large increase in the 
number of cases. For example, Rio de Janeiro went from just one claim in 
such a case in 1991, to 2,245 in 2005, with federal courts also seeing large 
increases: the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ), the second highest court 
in the country, went from 2 to 672 cases between 2001 and 2004. 85 
Consequently, rather than enhancing the right to healthcare the combination 
of these factors has a negative impact because high success rates and 
increased litigation ‘means that a significant volume of resources allocated to 
the health care system are used to pay for judicially mandated medication 
and treatment … litigation allocates resources originally intended to treat a 
large number of people to an expensive (and sometimes experimental) 
treatment that may benefit just a small group, regardless of the relative 
wealth of the plaintiffs’.86 
This last point emphasises that plaintiffs are often relatively wealthy 
people, rarely the poorest in society despite the fact that it is the latter who 
may need state funded medicines the most. The outcome of all of this has 
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been a sharp increase in federal spending on judicially granted medicines. 
Ferraz highlights that in 2008 São Paulo was ordered to spend 
approximately R$400 million to purchase expensive drugs for 35,000 
claimants.87 He then goes on highlight the extent of the problem: ‘This is 
roughly the same level of resources that the federal Ministry of Health has 
recently announced will be invested in a program of vaccination against 
pneumococcal bacteria to cover all 3.2 million children born every year in 
Brazil.’88 The overall federal spending on medicines ordered by the courts 
increased from R$188,000 in 2003, to R$26 million in just the first half of 
2007.89 With this large increase in spending being ordered as a result of 
most courts ruling in favour of any litigant with a prescription, it seems Ferraz 
is right to point out that ‘It is likely that the increasing amount of resources 
spent to fund the health benefits granted to successful claimants … is 
diverted at least in part from current or future health programs that would 
benefit larger and more disadvantaged groups who cannot easily access the 
courts to protect their interests.90 
Thus it seems Brazil’s courts are indirectly make resource allocation 
decisions which are more usually considered to be the prerogative of 
government. One way of justifying such direction and decision making by a 
court is that the courts interpret the constitutional provisions as providing a 
ring-fenced core element of undeniable healthcare rights, however, even if 
this was the initial thinking behind the courts’ jurisprudence, persistence 
along this route without reflection on its impact has resulted in the 
government having less and less money to spend on basic health 
programmes. There is also the problem of how to get out of this vicious 
circle. Ferraz argues that the cumulative effect is likely to be retrogressive 
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and that it will be very hard for Brazil to change now it has started down this 
jurisprudential path.91 Thus Brazil’s health jurisprudence exacerbates health 
inequities and trespasses into the role of a democratic government. 
Both India and Brazil have a justiciable right to healthcare, but what 
has been seen so far is that finding support for the justiciability of the right to 
health is not the same as showing the appropriate way in which a court can 
adjudicate such a right. India has established this justiciable right via an 
expansion of the right to life, but has also done so for many other rights, 
using the argument that the DPSP in the Constitution should be justiciable. 
While this may well be a pragmatic response to inadequate and inert 
government, it is clearly not an ideal model to follow. In Brazil, by contrast 
and as in Fiji, the Constitution establishes a justiciable right to healthcare, but 
in Brazil it is the simplistic syllogistic reasoning of this right that leads to 
problems. A right in the Constitution, and then an individual having a medical 
need, should not necessarily require the state to provide for that need 
regardless of cost or broader priorities. The fact that the courts think it does, 
combined with individual litigation and the absence of collective complaints 
or class actions, lead the courts to make decisions which have considerable 
resource implications which not only deviate money from other programmes 
but also only benefit those who can afford access to court. So there is a 
difference between having a justiciable right to healthcare, and an 
appropriate way to adjudicate this right. Although Fiji does not have 
anywhere near the population of Brazil, development has given rise to an 
merging middle class elite, and access to justice is not equal, not just 
because of wealth but because of education, geographical location, and a 
reluctance to engage in formal litigation more generally, preferring more 
customary means of dispute settlement.  
 
South Africa 
A more appropriate model for giving effect to the right to health can be found 
by looking at South Africa. The South African 1996 Constitution incorporates 
many ESC rights and, unlike the situation in Brazil, there have been very few 
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significant cases decided by the South African courts. 92  From the very 
beginning of post-apartheid South Africa there were challenges to the 
constitutional court’s ability to adjudicate on ESC rights culminating in ‘the 
First Certification case’.93 Here the very inclusion of ESC rights within the 
Constitution was challenged before the Constitutional Court on the grounds 
that such inclusion was against the separation of powers doctrine because it 
would lead the court to make decisions, especially budgetary, that are the 
prerogative of the other branches of government. The court based its 
response on a well established argument: that adjudicating ESC rights is no 
different from adjudicating civil and political rights, in that both sets of rights 
can have a significant budgetary impact, and that as the justiciability of civil 
and political rights is not contested on this ground, neither can the 
justiciability of ESC rights be contested.94 The court ruled that this did not 
result in a breach of the separation of powers.95 
In response to another more general argument that ESC rights are not 
justiciable, the court held that at the very least ESC rights can have negative 
protection so that they are not improperly impeded.96 The court therefore 
made it very clear that ESC rights were justiciable and expressly 
acknowledged its own jurisdiction over such matters.97 Berger points out that 
these short arguments put an end to the debate about the justiciability of ESC 
rights in South Africa, but the true meaning of winning this argument can only 
be seen in the context of considering the cases that came after such 
peremptory conclusions.98  
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One case that applies specifically to the right to healthcare and 
access to medical treatment is that of Soobramoney99 which came before the 
Constitutional Court in 1998. This was the first time the court ‘was asked to 
interpret the enforcement of a quintessentially socioeconomic right against 
the state’.100 Soobramoney was a 41 year old man suffering from chronic 
renal failure who needed kidney dialysis to survive.  He had been paying for 
and receiving this privately but now had exhausted his funds. Therefore he 
petitioned the state to provide him with the necessary medical care arguing 
his rights under Section 27(3) of the Constitution,101 the right to emergency 
medical treatment, and the right to life in Section 11. The state had denied 
Soobramoney care because it had in place a policy that only patients 
suffering from acute renal failure would automatically be provided with 
dialysis and priority after this would be given to those patients who would 
benefit from and were good prospects for a kidney transplant. Soobramoney 
was in the final stages of chronic renal failure, his condition was irreversible, 
and he also suffered from diabetes, heart and vascular disease, meaning he 
was not a candidate for a transplant and therefore did not fall within the 
guidelines. Only 30% of patients with chronic renal failure met the guidelines 
for dialysis102 and the state in its defence argued that the policy was in place 
because of a lack of resources.  
The court ruled in favour of the state. It did not accept that chronic 
renal failure required emergency medical treatment saying section 27(3) 
envisaged sudden trauma not ongoing conditions and treatment. The court 
also dismissed the right to life argument stating that as there is a separate 
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provision for the right to healthcare within the Constitution, the argument was 
unnecessary. In doing this, the court specifically referred to the Samity case 
of India and stated the differences in jurisprudence because of the specific 
provision in the South African Constitution, and highlighting that Samity not 
Soobramoney is precisely the type of case that would fall within the scope of 
Section 27(3).103 The court stated that the arguments that should have been 
made by the appellant were based on sections 27(1), the right to access 
healthcare services and (2), the state must take action to progressively 
realise the right, but then went on to rule that even on these arguments the 
claim would not have succeeded because the healthcare guaranteed must 
be within the state’s available resources. The court accepted the resource 
limits of the state, noting that it had actually over-spent on its budget,104 and 
appreciated the ‘difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing 
the health budget’, 105  stating the court would be slow to interfere when 
rational decisions were taken in good faith. Critically the court did not look at 
the case in the way a Brazilian court might have done; individually and 
regardless of cost. The case was decided more generally and it was 
accepted that the decision would have an impact on all patients in 
Soobramoney’s position and therefore the wider state health sector. Sachs J, 
a judge in the Soobramoney case, later argued that if all chronic illnesses 
and their treatments were to be emergency situations, the impact on the 
health system would be enormous with no funds left for many other important 
areas of health care.106 
  Rather than adopt an individual needs-based right, as might be done 
in Brazil, the court in essence was asking itself, not whether the state could 
afford just one more kidney dialysis patient, but probably many more, and 
thus the court assessed the appropriateness of the guidelines that restricted 
dialysis to those with acute renal failure. The court noted how stretched the 
services were, before stating: 
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It has not been suggested that these guidelines are 
unreasonable or that they were not applied fairly and 
rationally when the decision was taken by the 
Addington Hospital that the appellant did not qualify for 
dialysis.107 … If everyone in the same condition as the 
appellant were to be admitted the carefully tailored 
programme would collapse and no one would benefit 
from that.108 
 
Thus, whilst regrettable, there were legitimate resource constraints on the 
state, and the guidelines they had therefore applied because of this were 
found to be reasonable. The deference to the state to decide what was best 
given these constraints was the beginning of an important test of 
reasonableness which can be found throughout the South African 
jurisprudence on ESC rights. Berger suggests that Soobramoney shows that 
a right to healthcare ‘does not impose an obligation on the state to provide 
everything to everyone’.109 The court made this point itself acknowledging 
that many South Africans did not have housing, food, water or many other 
necessities, but the state had to manage its limited resources to do what it 
could.110 
Soobramoney died two days after this ruling 111  demonstrating the 
difficulty associated with adjudicating ESC rights and the hardship 
associated with the search for appropriate jurisprudence. The court had to 
make this legal decision faced with the knowledge that, in many ways, a 
man’s life was in their hands. Albie Sachs has written of the emotional nature 
of some of the Constitutional Courts cases, particularly describing 
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Soobramoney as a ‘most painful case. The Court’s decision could help 
prolong his life or else conduce to his early death.’112  
This rather more reticent approach by the South African courts 
respecting the separation of powers in the context of the right to healthcare, 
and appreciating the wider repercussions of individual decisions has 
received some criticism. Forman has argued that the South African ‘limited 
approach certainly misses opportunities for advancing the realization of the 
right, [but] it nonetheless has had a positive influence on national health 
policy,’113  and it does not appear that the jurisprudence of the courts in 
South Africa has been seized on as a positive model of how to give effect to 
such rights while being mindful of resource constraints. Nor does the South 
African decision inspire great hope in advancing the right to healthcare for 
those most in need.  More significant however, has been the case of Minister 
of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 114  which in particular 
challenged this concept of ‘reasonableness’ in limiting or extending access to 
healthcare.  
TAC is a powerful NGO that brought this case against the government 
of South Africa because of the government’s policy on the ARV drug 
nevirapine which would prevent mother to child transmission of HIV. The 
drug was only available at a limited number of centres which focused on 
research because the government questioned its safety and effectiveness as 
well as questioning the connection between HIV and AIDS.115 TAC argued 
that this policy was in breach of Section 27(1), the right to access health care 
services. The government’s defence was based on the need for continued 
research and a lack of resources to roll out the programme and provide the 
drug nationally. The government argued that at the sites where nevirapine 
was available, a full comprehensive programme was used including 
counselling and breast-milk substitution which was why the drug was so 
effective. It argued that it did not have the resources to roll this programme 
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out to other hospitals. Key to defeating this argument, however, was that 
nevirapine had been provided free of charge to South Africa for five years by 
the German manufacturers Boehringer Ingelheim and that even without the 
full supporting programme the drug would still save many lives.116 Thus it 
was found unreasonable for the government not to provide the drug at state 
hospitals and the court therefore required government ‘to devise and 
implement within its available resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated 
programme to realise progressively the rights of pregnant women and their 
newborn children to have access to health services to combat mother-to-
child transmission of HIV.’117 The court went further by ordering nevirapine to 
be made available at other state hospitals that were not research sites and 
allowing its use to prevent mother to child transmission of HIV. 
This is perhaps as specific as the South African Court has been with 
regards to directing government actions in this context. Whilst the deference 
to government may be consistent with the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, Byrne argues the limited approach and lack of detail leads to 
problems with implementation of the courts orders.118   
Nolan also points out the problems of the court’s jurisprudence in not 
accepting direct and immediate obligations to ensure a child’s right to 
healthcare: 
 
The TAC decision is an example of a court displaying 
reluctance to require the State to do more than to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the child’s right to 
health within that State’s maximum resources. Indeed, 
in doing so, the Court arguably ignored the text and 
purpose underlying the particular constitutional 
provision setting out the child’s right to health at issue 
in the case.119 
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Nevertheless the fact is that as a result of the ruling South Africa has made 
huge steps in the availability of ARV drugs and treatment. It should be 
pointed out however, that in the case the court focused its argument on the 
more general right to health protected in Section 27 and denied any direct or 
immediate entitlements to health care services for children under Section 28. 
Despite the appropriateness of the reasonableness test used by the South 
African Constitutional Court, a failure to ensure a basic minimum, especially 
for children, under the right to health and as part of the test for 
reasonableness, requires rather more assertive measures to be taken.   
Nolan argues that failure to make the right a direct claim for children risks it 
being meaningless but at the same time acknowledges the possibility that a 
direct claim might lead a flood of litigation such as that seen in Brazil.120 
The South African example suggests that a certain combination of 
elements may provide the right model for giving effect to ESC rights such as 
the right to healthcare: the codification of ESC rights in a constitution; an 
appropriate court judgment which considers cases with regards to collective 
– rather than individual, rights; and deference to government making difficult 
resource allocation decisions.  
In these cases, and others,121 the court declined the use of a minimum 
core but left the possibility of using it later open. One of the main reasons for 
not using such a measure was the lack of institutional capacity of the court to 
decide on an appropriate minimum for the content of the rights in question. 
The ideal opportunity to add such content and demand a basic minimum 
arose when the court considered the case of Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg.122 In this case, dealing with the right of access to sufficient 
water, residents of the Phiri township, Soweto, Johannesburg argued, among 
other things, that the city’s monthly allocation of 6 kilolitres of water per 
household per month was unreasonable. For the purposes of this article, this 
is the argument we will focus on, but there were many others in this complex 
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case. The plan that was in place by Johannesburg Water was based on a 
consumption rate of 20 kilolitres per household, with a monthly flat rate of 
R68. The actual consumption rate was a lot higher 123  and the revenue 
generated from Soweto because of a culture of non-payment was 
substantially out of proportion to the amount of water being supplied to the 
area. Therefore Johannesburg Water decided to overhaul the system to 
‘reduce unaccounted for water, to rehabilitate the water network, to reduce 
water demand and to improve the rate of payment.’ 124  One of the most 
contentious parts of the complex plan was that only 6 kilolitres per household 
per month, or 25 litres per person per day, of water would be allocated for 
free and this allocation was seen as the sufficient amount required under 
section 27 (1) (b) of the Constitution.125 Water in excess of this allowance 
would need to be paid for. The applicants argued that the allowance of free 
water was too low and should be 50 litres per person per day, on the 
grounds that this was the amount needed for a dignified life.126 The court 
held that this argument must fail for the same reasons as the minimum core 
failed in Grootboom and TAC. The court did not have the capacity or 
authority to set a minimum core, and only a reasonableness test should be 
used in establishing whether the government has carried out its duty to 
progressively realise the basic necessaries of life.127 Key to the decision is 
the argument focusing on the basic necessaries for a dignified life, not that 
this amount of water is the minimum needed for survival and therefore the 
clear minimum core content of the right. Expert evidence put forward and 
considered in the Supreme Court of Appeal decision used General Comment 
15 on the ICESCR, evidence from an affidavit from I. H. Palmer and an 
article by P.H. Gleick, and focused on two possible minimums; one of which 
was 50 litres per person per day; the other was 42 litres per person per 
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day.128 So in contrast to the previous cases, the applicants were able to 
produce specific international expert evidence on the minimum core content 
of the right to water.  Unfortunately these arguments were not engaged with 
at all by the Constitutional Court, partly because the applicants accepted that 
the government provided the minimum necessary. Also the opportunity to 
engage more broadly with minimum core content was undermined by the 
applicants asking the court to define the right to water in its entirety, a 
demand which the court rejected completely.129 A challenge to the minimum 
of 25 litres per person per day would perhaps have forced the court to 
engage with the studies and expert evidence and consider defining a 
minimum core of the right. Instead, the court maintained that it is ordinarily 
inappropriate for it, as an institution, to determine what steps should be taken 
to realise a right and precisely what that right entails.130 Whilst it can be 
argued that not determining the full content of the right was correct,131 the 
court missed a chance to seriously debate the minimum content of the right 
and then challenge the government on the basis of a presumption of 
unreasonableness132 if this is not being fulfilled. Thus it is argued here that 
while South Africa has done well establishing the reasonableness test and 
adhering to the principles of the separation of powers, it has miss an 
opportunity to add minimum core content of constitutional rights to the 
doctrine of reasonableness. 
Not everyone agrees of course. Humby and Grandbois argue that 
Mazibuko was the correct decision because of South Africa’s limited 
resources to provide the amount of water needed. 133  In fact resources 
constraints can be included in consideration of a minimum core. What is 
required is that if a minimum core is identified and found not to be fulfilled, 
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serious questions have to be asked of government. If non-fulfilment can be 
justified by a lack of resources then there is no breach of the right. Byrne 
does not see South Africa as a perfect model to follow and whilst accepting 
the fine line courts must walk, argues that South Africa and India are on 
opposite sides of that line, with neither being successful: 
 
The cautious approach of the South African courts in 
relation to esrs [ESC rights] contrasts with the more 
assertive stance of their Indian brethren who over a 
much longer period have frequently been willing to 
actively intervene in policy and administrative areas 
usually viewed as the preserve of the executive, 
handing down detailed orders often with significant 
resource implications … Critics of the Indian approach 
have pointed to the lack of cooperation it has 
apparently engendered in state officials requiring, on 
occasion, contempt of court proceedings to be initiated. 
However, the TAC case illustrates that the South 
African Constitutional Court cannot rely on the goodwill 
of officials to implement its decisions and may also 
have to be more proactive in monitoring and 
enforcement whilst continuing to walk a fine line in 
preserving the separation of powers.134 
 
Courts have a role in protecting the rights encoded in a Constitution 
and ensuring that these rights become tangible guarantees,135 yet this must 
be done with deference and constant mindfulness that they are not the 
elected branch of government. The South African Constitutional Court has 
defended its approach in the TAC case arguing the jurisprudence of the court 
achieves an appropriate constitutional balance between the judicial, 
legislative and executive functions and this requires the courts to adopt ‘a 
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restrained and focused role … to require the state to take measures to meet 
its constitutional obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these 
measures to evaluation.’ 136  From the Fiji perspective South Africa may 
provide a useful example. Not only is there a focus on collective rather than 
individual rights, which finds some resonance in Fijian society and in the 
balance approach of the Fiji Constitution, but the South African court has 
shown itself to be mindful not only of its place in the balance of power, but 
also the impact decisions may have on resources. The progressive 
realisation of rights has been acknowledged as important in principle and in 
practice in both South Africa and Fiji. 
 
Columbia 
The South African failure to directly address the question of the minimum 
core of healthcare and direct entitlements for children can be contrasted with 
the example of the Columbian Constitutional Court. 137  The first of two 
important cases in Columbia was in 1998 and focused on children’s access 
to vaccines.138 Indeed the example of Columbia is promising for children’s 
rights because the Columbian Constitution explicitly states in Article 44 that 
‘[t]he rights of children have priority over the rights of others.’139 Litigation on 
a child’s right to healthcare services was brought by the parents of 418 
children who lived in impoverished areas of Bogotá. It was argued that these 
children were particularly vulnerable and at high risk because of their living 
conditions and because the parents could not afford to meet the costs of 
necessary vaccines. It was especially argued that failure to provide a 
vaccination to prevent meningitis for these children violated their 
constitutional rights. The Constitutional Court agreed accepting such basic 
care as part of the minimum content of the right to health which must be 
applied by the Court. As Nolan points out with reference to the case: 
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In SU-225/98, the Court made it clear that the rights in 
Art 44 (including the right to health) have an essential 
content of immediate application that limits the 
discretion of the political organs and that rely on a 
reinforced judicial mechanism for their protection … 
The Court concluded, however, that only the essential 
content of the right can be directly applied by the judge, 
while it is legislature which must define the full scope of 
the right.140 
 
In 2008 the Columbian Constitutional Court went further with a 
landmark decision that completely changed the country’s health policy.141 
Since the Constitution of 1991, Columbia has accepted individual claims for 
rights, much like Brazil, via tutelas (protection writs) which, similarly to the 
Public Interest Litigation of India, has enhanced access to courts by ensuring 
limited procedural requirements. As in Brazil, this lead to high levels of 
litigation with a similar success rate of approximately 80% of tutelas being 
granted in order to resolve the individual case before the court.142 In the 2008 
case of T-760, the Constitutional Court brought together 22 tutelas to 
illustrate the structural and systemic problems in the health system that had 
led to the overuse of tutelas. Whilst also resolving these 22 cases the court 
called for a complete systemic transformation because government had not 
established a way of guaranteeing the right to health without recourse to the 
tutela. 143  In directing this transformation the court reiterated its own 
previously established jurisdiction on the enforcement of the right to health 
and importantly reiterated its jurisprudence on the minimum core obligations 
of the state. In Columbia there was a two-tier system of health benefits: the 
contributory regime (Plan Obligatorio de Salud or POS) for those earning 
twice the minimum wage, and the subsidised regime (Plan Obligatorio de 
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Salud Subsidiado or POSS) for those earning less. POSS provides 
approximately half of the benefits available under POS. The benefits 
provided in these systems have been interpreted by the court as a minimum 
core. As Yamin and Parra-Vera explain: 
 
According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court, which reviews tutela judgments from courts 
throughout the country, the right to health is 
enforceable for plaintiffs unable to afford care … when 
the health good or service at issue is included in the 
POS/POSS, which the Court has taken to define a 
minimum core content of the right to health.144 
 
In the 2008 case the court reiterated this jurisprudence but went further in 
calling for specific changes to the plans themselves. ‘The judgment calls 
upon government to adopt deliberate measures to progressively realize 
universal coverage by 2010, and sets various compliance deadlines in 2008 
and 2009.’145 As part of this universal coverage, unification of the POS and 
POSS systems was ordered in order to remove discrepancies. It was also 
reaffirmed that these systems constitute the minimum core content of the 
right to health which is immediately enforceable. The aim behind increasing 
the funding and decreasing the waiting time for these minimum core services 
was to reduce unnecessary litigation via the tutela.146 Significantly the court 
did not defer entirely to the government on the content of the right once 
these orders had been made. The court explicitly adopted the CESCR’s 
minimum core and the definition of the right to health given by General 
Comment 14. This may be because Columbia is a state party to the 
Covenant, although this does not require the domestic courts of state parties 
to adopt the minimum core approach, even though this is encouraged. The 
Columbian court reiterated in its ruling the immediately enforceable nature of 






 M.A. Olaya, ‘The right to health as a fundamental and judicially enforceable right in 
Colombia’ (2009) 10 ESR Review 16.  




the minimum core in line with the VEDCR’s interpretation of the right to 
health, whilst accepting the progressive realisation of other elements of the 
right to health subject to resource constraints. As Olaya has stated, ‘The 
Court understood progressive realisation to mean “that States parties have a 
specific and continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible towards the full realization”’.147 
Such specific orders for restructuring and the immediate 
implementation of a minimum core may be thought to overstep the division of 
powers in a democratic state and lead to the pitfalls experienced in India or 
most notably Brazil, but Yamin and Parra-Vera suggest the structural 
approach taken in Columbia might avoid these problems. They point out that 
‘the Court does not assume it knows best what benefits should be included 
under the POS/POSS, nor the precise ethical grounds for making these 
determinations.’ 148  Thus while appearing to order government to make 
decisions in line with its international obligations under General Comment 14 
the court avoids the specifics, deferring to government to decide on the 
detail. In doing so the Columbian example shows, in contrast to South Africa, 
how a minimum core content of the right to health established in international 
law can be called on in constitutional courts. In South Africa the court 
focused on a test of reasonableness: whether the policies of government 
were understandable given the circumstances; whereas the court in 
Columbia focused on ensuring that the government protected the basic 
minimum of the right to health, but deferred to government to decide the 





In many respects Fiji appears to be going in the right direction for giving 
effect to a child’s right to health and health care.  Certainly from a 
comparative analysis it would seem that in order for economic, social and 
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cultural rights to be justiciable – particularly the right to healthcare for 
children, constitutional recognition is required as a first and fundamental 
step. Without this there may still be provision for the right to healthcare but 
this may open the door to the possibility of the type of imaginative 
interpretation used by the Indian Supreme Court with resulting adverse 
consequences such as lack of respect for the court and contempt of court 
proceedings. Constitutional recognition or ‘codification’149 should prevent or 
at least restrain courts from imaginative interpretation.  This form of 
integration into the legal system is also similar to the right to health 
established in international treaties and conventions. Attention needs to be 
paid to the structure, form and content of this codification however. In India 
statements of general values have been elevated to modify the substantive 
provisions of the Constitution, while in Columbia the fact that children’s rights 
take priority has been usefully employed to ensure a minimum core, but may 
also trump other rights claims. The current provisions in the Fiji Constitution 
lie somewhere between these: there is a statement of underlying values, and 
there are specific provisions for children, as well as the right to healthcare, 
but there is no express order of priority. It might therefore be open to a court 
to establish its own order of priorities, either to give effect to particular 
policies or in line with international commentary – for example through the 
international treaty reporting process. Alternatively the government, through 
its control of budgets might dictate priorities. This might however mean that 
effectively the government (not necessarily by legislation) encroaches on the 
powers of the court to interpret legislation, thereby putting at risk the doctrine 
of the separation of powers, which, while it may be more difficult to achieve 
in small island developing states, is nevertheless a principle which underpins 
democratic governance. Consideration of the Columbia experience might 
suggest a compromise between respect for the distinct branches of 
government and the duty of the court to hold the government to account 
through ruling on a minimum core but leaving it to government to work out 
the details. 
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The comparative analysis also suggests that an established 
jurisprudence which shows some deference to the principle that the power to 
allocate resources is usually the preserve of government is required, so as to 
avoid the problems seen in Brazil. Consideration regarding the relationship 
between resource allocation and rights is evidenced in the Fiji Constitution. 
What is absent is a national or even regional body of jurisprudence for courts 
to draw on in respect to the determination of ESC rights. As seen from the 
case-law considered above, these constitutional cases are complex and 
demand astute legal minds and well-versed human rights and constitutional 
lawyers. While these are not absent in the Pacific region they are not prolific 
and, without access to legal aid funds, are likely to be expensive. In looking 
to relevant common law precedents there is always the danger that 
reference is made to jurisprudence drawn from countries with vastly different 
resources for and demands on, their healthcare systems – such as Australia 
and New Zealand, not only because these are closest to hand and share a 
common law heritage, but also because of the influence of judges from these 
countries in the Courts of Appeal of the region. Ideally any overseas judges 
ruling on such questions would familiarise themselves with the health needs, 
priorities and the economic realities of the country.  
 Linked to this question of interpretation of the rights of children to 
healthcare, is the question of what challenges to ‘reasonableness’ or 
‘progressive achievement’ might be raised? Given that Fiji is only just 
emerging from nearly a decade of non-democratic government – during 
which most of the existing judiciary were either dismissed or replaced, it may 
be unlikely that the exercise of the power of the government to decide on 
what is or is not reasonable or what steps should be taken for progressive 
achievement, will be challenged by a pro-active court. Similarly, although 
there are examples of group action in Fiji, notably in the case of land, public 
interest litigation is not a feature of the legal system. Theoretically of course, 
decisions of government on the allocation of resources for healthcare could 
be challenged by way of judicial review, or, in the Pacific context, by 
destabilising the government. Judicial review in the context of health 
provision may not, however, be straightforward. Even in countries which 
have a limited land mass, such as Fiji, the geographical spread of people 




and poor infrastructure can mean that the allocation of health care and other 
resources is devolved more remotely, for example to provincial government, 
to hospitals and to rural healthcare centres. In developing countries donor 
aid programmes, agendas or agencies may also have an influence or 
priorities for ‘progressive achievement’. In other words the politics of others 
are involved.  Nevertheless if there is too much deference to the separation 
of powers and the prerogative of the executive to determine what resources 
are allocated to healthcare for children then there is a danger that a minimum 
core of rights will not be met.  What needs to be achieved therefore for an 
optimum outcome is a compromise between positive action by the court on 
the one hand, and consideration of consequences of judicial intervention on 
the other hand. 
While Fiji does not have a separate constitutional court and is not a 
state party to the CESCR, if comparative jurisprudence is finding (as in 
Columbia) that there is a minimum core of fundamental health care rights for 
children, or that reasonableness may be a key measure of progressive 
realisation (as in South Africa) and if, as is explicit in the Fiji Constitution, 
international law may be called into play, then the highest courts in Fiji may 
find themselves confronted by the types of dilemmas considered above and 
have to rule accordingly. At the same time, if, as a comparative analysis 
might suggest, countries are moving towards recognising a minimum core 
right to health then, as indicated in discussion of the Samity case above, it 
may be incumbent on wealthier nations to assist Fiji in delivering on the 
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ABSTRACT The right to health is enshrined in the South African Constitution as well as a 
range of international and regional human rights treaties which South Africa accepts. Yet 
empirical data reveals some of the challenges faced by South African youth—childhood 
diseases, HIV/AIDS and such like. There are evidently challenges realising the right to 
health in practice. Nevertheless, South African courts have led the international field in 
recognising the justiciability of economic and social rights such as the right to health. Having 
reviewed the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the paper will conclude that a more holistic 
human rights-based approach offers perhaps the best way forward. 
 




This paper will reflect on the right to health of young people in South Africa.  The 
right to health is enshrined in the South African constitution as well as a range of 
international and regional human rights treaties which South Africa accepts.  
Moreover, South African courts have led the international field in recognising the 
justiciability of economic and social rights such as the right to health. As recent 




reports indicate, however, there are many health-related challenges facing the 
country’s youth. This paper thus adopts a human rights based approach to the 
question how can the right to health of young people in South Africa be better 
guaranteed? 
 
A brief overview of data on the health of young people in South Africa 
For many young people, the right to health is almost taken for granted, having 
survived infancy. After all many countries still have high infant mortality rates and a 
relatively low life expectancy. For this overview of the position in South Africa, data 
is taken from the annual data published by UNICEF in its State of the World’s 
Children Report (UNICEF, 2014) and the UN Development Programme’s Human 
Development Report 2014 (UNDP, 2014). The 2015 versions of each report will not 
be published until the end of 2015 but both reports provide data on all UN member 
states. According to the UN Development Programme, South Africa ranks 118th on 
its 2014 Human Development Index, placing it in squarely in the medium 
development state category (UNDP, 2014). This index is ‘a summary measure of 
average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy 
life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the 
geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.’ i South 
Africa has risen upwards to a higher level of development achievement. However, 
drilling into the figures, the issue of health looms large. South Africa ranked fifty-
eighth in the world, out of 194 states, in terms of under five mortality rates (first 
being the worst as the ranking is in descending order) although the statistics 
indicate a decline from 61 to 44 deaths per 1,000 live births (UNICEF, 2014: 30, 39).  
Life expectancy at birth is barely fifty-seven years (UNICEF, 2014: 39; UNDP, 
2014). Many African states, including Commonwealth states rank above South 
Africa and thus have even higher levels of under-five mortality rates.   
 




Looking at health indicators quoted in the annual State of the World’s Children 
report issued in December each year by UNICEF, a total of 95% of households 
have improved drinking water (99% in urban areas) and an average of 74% have 
improved sanitation in households (UNICEF, 2014: 52). This is obviously a positive 
indicator of developmental progress, not least towards the UN millennium 
development goals. Over sixty percent of children receive core immunisation, with 
84% receiving BCG immunisations (UNICEF, 2014: 52).  However, according to the 
data presented, some forty percent of children had had diarrhoea immediately prior 
to the survey and had treatment with oral rehydration salts. Diarrhoea remains a 
threat to the health and life of many children and younger people around the world, 
not least in Africa. Looking more specifically at issues affecting youth, UNDP notes 
that there are 50.9 births per 1,000 girls aged fifteen to nineteen (UNDP, 2014). This 
figure should be viewed in light of the maternal death rates and the HIB/AIDS data. 
Three hundred women die per one hundred thousand live births (UNDP, 2014) and 
the statistics for HIV/AIDS indicate the continuing scale of the problem in the 
country (and indeed region). For the 2013 statistics quoted, 19.1% of those aged 
15-49 are living with HIV, over six thousand people in total;  8.6 percent of young 
people aged 15-24 are recorded as living with HIV and barely a quarter of young 
people: (1) could correctly identify the main ways of preventing the sexual 
transmission of HIV; (2) rejected the local misconceptions about transmission; and 
(3) knew that a healthy looking person can be HIV-positive (UNICEF, 2014: 58). For 
eastern and southern Africa as a region, the young person prevalence rate is 2.7%, 
still the highest region in the survey, but considerably lower a statistic than that of 
South Africa alone (UNICEF, 2014: 59), indeed, South Africa is recorded as having 
by far the highest prevalence rate for young people of any country. 
 
It is clear from this brief overview, and other data sources reveal similar statistics, 
that the youth of South Africa are some way distant from experiencing the full 




realisation of their right to health. What expectation should people have of their right 
to health? 
 
The right to health in South African and international laws 
Section 27 of the Bill of Rights enshrined in Chapter 2 of the South African 
Constitution of 1996 proclaims that everyone has the right to access healthcare 
services and no one can be refused urgent medical treatment. According to section 
28 of the same, specific provision for basic health care services extends to all those 
under the age of eighteen. The highlighting of children’s rights, with the age of 
eighteen, reflects the terms of Article 1 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
one of several treaties South Africa has ratified. 
 
South Africa has ratified seven of the nine designated core UN human rights treaties 
including (of particular relevance to the right to health),  the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women and, in January 2015, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. ii South Africa thus accepts many international treaty 
obligations on the rights to health, including Article 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.   
 
The right to health is discussed in a range of literature but for the working definition 
and application of the UN treaty right, it is necessary to consider the work of the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the principal entity reviewing children’s rights 
within the UN treaty framework, which focussed on the children’s right to health in a 
2013 General Comment (UN CRC 2013). General comments indicate the view of 
the committee on, in this instance, a particular right in the treaty. 
 




Article 24 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of 
illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that 
no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services. 
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in 
particular, shall take appropriate measures: 
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality; 
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care 
to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health care; 
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of 
primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available 
technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean 
drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of 
environmental pollution; 
(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers; 
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children, 
are informed, have access to education and are supported in the use of 
basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of 
breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of 
accidents; 
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family 
planning education and services. 
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a 
view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children. 
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-
operation with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 




right recognized in the present article. In this regard, particular account shall 
be taken of the needs of developing countries. 
The vagueness of the standards in some articles of the convention have led 
commentators to suggest that the rights are more idealistic goals and aspirations 
than tangible guarantees with legal effect (Burman, 1993: 50; Freeman, 1997).  The 
UN guidance in its general comment is thus particularly valuable. 
 
Young women are additionally protected against discrimination in access to health 
services in terms of Articles 11(1)(f) and 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women with general discrimination on grounds 
of race in relation to health proscribed by Article 5(e)(iv) of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. Of these four key treaties, the 
jurisdiction of the UN monitoring committee of experts iii  to consider individual 
complaints (a quasi judicial procedure) is recognised by South Africa only in respect 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
However, South Africa does submit its reports on performance to the relevant UN 
committees, albeit not always on time - (there are no real penalties for late or non-
submission). Its second report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child was due 
July 2002, yet only submitted November 2014.iv It has not yet been considered.  Its 
first report to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights is not yet due.  
The formal, international acknowledgement of a child’s right to healthcare is 
promising but is far from a guarantee of promotion and implementation. Youth are 
mentioned but in passing. Moreover, international treaties may be meaningless, if 
as Tomás (2008: 6) writing on the Convention on the Rights of the Child highlights: 
 
if there is no effective supervision over and enforcement of the way in which 
each country promotes and guarantees the CRC, besides the periodical 
writing of reports fo [sic] the International Committee on the Rights of the 




Child, it is foreseeable that in a decade’s time, we will still be able to say only 
that it is the most ratified international document; the rights to protection, to 
provision and to participation are universally recognised for children but the 
problem resides in the way they are, or are not, put into practice. 
Freeman has suggested that if the Committee is to remain the fulcrum of 
enforcement, it should be permanent and given more powers, (2000: 290) and Navi 
Pillay, the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has herself admitted 
that economic, social and cultural rights lack ‘appropriate enforcement mechanisms 
at the international level’ (2009: 2). It has been suggested, for example, that the 
reporting system lacks teeth (Freeman, 2000: 290), as there is little that can be 
done in the way of legal sanctions should a state choose to ignore the concluding 
observations and it can be argued that this has led to the lackadaisical attitude of 
many countries towards the reporting process (Bates, 2007). On the other hand, the 
reporting procedure can be viewed as a positive exercise that leads to open 
dialogue and inclusiveness, involving an honest appraisal and assisting states by 
highlighting areas where help (eg technical assistance) is needed.  
 
At the regional level, monitoring and enforcement does not fare much better. 
However, within the African Union, South Africa is party to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa and, of particular relevance, the African Youth Charter.  
This instrument applies to every person between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five 
years.  Article 16 makes provision for the right to health and states: 
1. Every young person shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state 
of physical, mental and spiritual health.  
2. States Parties shall undertake to pursue the full implementation of this 
right and in particular shall take measures to:  




a) Make available equitable and ready access to medical assistance and 
health care especially in rural and poor urban areas with an emphasis on the 
development of primary health care;  
b) Secure the full involvement of youth in identifying their reproductive and 
health needs and designing programmes that respond to these needs with 
special attention to vulnerable and disadvantaged youth;  
c) Provide access to youth friendly reproductive health services including 
contraceptives, antenatal and post natal services;  
d) Institute programmes to address health pandemics in Africa such as 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria;  
e) Institute comprehensive programmes to prevent the transmission of 
sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS by providing education, 
information, communication and awareness creation as well as making 
protective measures and reproductive health services available;  
f) Expand the availability and encourage the uptake of voluntary counselling 
and confidential testing for HIV/AIDS;  
g) Provide timely access to treatment for young people infected with 
HIV/AIDS including prevention of mother to child transmission, post rape 
prophylaxis, and anti-retroviral therapy and creation of health services 
specific for young people;  
h) Provide food security for people living with HIV/AIDS;  
i) Institute comprehensive programmes including legislative steps to prevent 
unsafe abortions;  
j) Take legislative steps such as banning advertising and increasing price in 
addition to instituting comprehensive preventative and 
g) Institute incentive schemes for employers to invest in the skills 
development of employed and unemployed youth;  




h) Institute national youth service programmes to engender community 
participation and skills development  for entry into the labour market.  
j) Take legislative steps such as banning advertising and increasing price in 
addition to instituting comprehensive preventative and curative programmes 
to control the consumption of tobacco, exposure to environmental tobacco 
smoke and alcohol abuse;  
k) Raise awareness amongst youth on the dangers of drug abuse through 
partnerships with youth, youth organisations and the community; 
l) Strengthen local, national, regional and international partnerships to 
eradicate the demand, supply and trafficking of drugs including using youth 
to traffic drugs;  
m) Provide rehabilitation for young people abusing drugs such that they can 
be re-integrated into social and economic life;  
n) Provide technical and financial support to build the institutional capacity of 
youth organisations to address public health concerns including issues 
concerning youth with disabilities and young people married at an early age.  
 
This provision is considerably more detailed than the core provisions in international 
human rights law. Raising awareness is a common theme and lends support to 
national strategies on promotion of health and healthy choices. This links to the 
empowering/education element of a human rights based approach, as will be 
discussed below. As with so many treaties, the provisions are binding only on the 
parties thereto – that is to say, the states. 
 
If responsibility rests with national governments (Easley et al, 2001), then it is 
necessary to first identify the scope of the right and then examine the opportunities 
for enforcing the right in terms of national law. As noted above, South Africa has 




one of the most comprehensive rights-orientated written constitutions, with 
extensive provisions guaranteeing human rights, including the right to health.  
All states are required to protect, promote and respect accepted human rights.  
Respecting human rights can be achieved through omission – not acting directly to 
violate the right, but more often protecting human requires positive legislative and 
policy measures, as well as the dedication of resources. Enshrining rights in the 
constitution is an important public indication of commitment towards protecting 
human rights. However, it is not necessarily enough for states to tabulate human 
rights in a constitution, it is important that such rights are meaningful and can be 
enforced, as a first step the promotion of human rights is important. Promoting 
human rights requires generating awareness of the right and the remedies available 
for any infringement. Article 16 of the African Youth Charter gives strong guidance 
on the former. 
Healthcare and health services must be available, accessible, acceptable, and 
scientifically and medically of good quality for all recipients. Paul Hunt, the first UN 
Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health used this framework for assessing 
the realising of the right to health around the world.v General comment 14 of the UN 
Committee and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains it in more detail (UN 
CESCR, 2000). 
 
What then happens if someone is refused access to healthcare, or if the healthcare 
available is too expensive? It appears from the foregoing that the onus is on states 
to provide the level of care commensurate with the treaty obligations they have 
accepted. If states fail in this endeavour, then recourse to the international and 
regional mechanisms is a distant possibility and relatively weak. Individuals must 
first consider national law and national remedies. Central to the full realisation of the 




right to health is thus the capacity of a victim of an alleged infringement to hold the 
state authorities to account.  
 
Litigating the right to health 
Rights in the South African Constitution can be considered by the constitutional 
court. From the very beginning of post-apartheid South Africa there were challenges 
to the constitutional court’s ability to adjudicate on economic, social and cultural 
rights culminating in “the First Certification case” (Ex parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC)). Here the very inclusion of economic, social and 
cultural rights within the Constitution was challenged on the grounds that it was 
against the separation of powers doctrine because it would lead the court to make 
decisions, especially budgetary, that are the prerogative of the other branches of 
government. The court based its response on a well established argument: that 
adjudicating economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights) is no different from 
adjudicating civil and political rights, in that both sets of rights can have a significant 
budgetary impact, and that as the justiciability of civil and political rights is not 
contested on this ground, neither can the justiciability of economic social and 
cultural rights be contested (Yamin, 2008: 52).  The court ruled there was no breach 
of separation of powers (para 77). In response to another more general argument 
that such rights are not justiciable, the court held that ‘[W]e are of the view that 
these rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable’ (para 78). The court therefore 
made it very clear that ESC rights were justiciable and expressly acknowledged its 
own jurisdiction over such matters (see also Ngwena, undated). Berger (2010) 
points out that these short arguments put an end to the debate about the 
justiciability of such rights in South Africa though further litigation suggests the issue 
was not so clear.  
 




Part of the claimed problem lies in the perceived vagueness of the precise 
conditions necessary to fulfil (in this case) the right to adequate healthcare. What is 
adequate? How much budget should a state spend on healthcare? In answer to 
that, the African Union countries pledged in the 2001 Abuja Declaration to spend 
fifteen percent of their budget on health. Mauritius and the Seychelles were first on 
track to meet this figure. Not all regions have the same approach. The lack of 
perceived specificity, however, cannot be a barrier to litigating rights such as to 
health. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child are clear on this. Both these committees can 
accept and consider complaints on, inter alia, the right to health. The Limburg 
Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/17, annex) whilst noting that rights in the 
Covenant are to be achieved progressively (Article 2), states that some rights can 
be made immediately justiciable (para 8). Paragraph 72 elaborates on the criteria 
for proving a violation of a right – these include deliberately failing to meet a 
standard of achievement which is within the powers of a government to meet or 
retarding/ halting progress towards a right for reasons other than a lack of available 
resources or force majeur. 
 
In South Africa, the right to healthcare and access to medical treatment was initially 
litigated in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu - Natal) (1) SA 765 (CC) 
which came before the Constitutional Court in 1998. Soobramoney was a 41 year 
old man who needed kidney dialysis to survive and was claiming this from the state, 
having exhausted funds to pay for it privately.  Soobramoney was in the final stages 
of chronic renal failure, his condition was irreversible, and he also suffered from 
diabetes, heart and vascular disease, meaning he was not a candidate for a 
transplant and therefore did not fall within the guidelines for state support - 
guidelines which were in place because of a claimed lack of resources. The court 




ruled in favour of the state. The court accepted the resource limits of the state, 
noting that it had actually over-spent on its budget (para 24), and appreciated the 
‘difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health budget’ (at 
para 29). The deference to the state to decide what was best given these budgetary 
constraints was the beginning of an important test of reasonableness which can be 
found throughout the South African jurisprudence on economic, social and cultural 
rights. Berger suggests that Soobramoney shows that a right to healthcare ‘does not 
impose an obligation on the state to provide everything to everyone’ (at 54).  The 
case of Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2002) 5 SA 721 
(CC) challenged this concept of ‘reasonableness’ in limiting or extending access to 
healthcare.  TAC was challenging the government’s policy on the ARV drug 
nevirapine which would prevent mother to child transmission of HIV. The drug was 
only available at a limited number of centres which focused on research because 
the government questioned its safety and effectiveness as well as questioning the 
connection between HIV and AIDS. The government’s defence was based on the 
need for continued research and a lack of resources to roll out the programme and 
provide the drug nationally. Key to defeating this argument, however, was that 
nevirapine had been provided free of charge to South Africa for five years by the 
German manufacturers Boehringer Ingelheim and that even without the full 
supporting programme the drug would still save many lives (para 57). Thus it was 
found unreasonable for the government not to provide the drug at state hospitals 
and the court therefore required the South African government ‘to devise and 
implement within its available resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated 
programme to realise progressively the rights of pregnant women and their newborn 
children to have access to health services to combat mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV’ (para 135). The court went further by ordering nevirapine to be made available 
at other state hospitals that were not research sites and allowing its use to prevent 
mother to child transmission of HIV. 





This is perhaps as specific as the South African Court has been with regards to 
directing government actions in this context. Nolan, however, points out the 
problems of the court’s jurisprudence in not accepting direct and immediate 
obligations to ensure a child’s right to healthcare stating that: 
The TAC decision is an example of a court displaying reluctance to require 
the State to do more than to achieve the progressive realisation of the child’s 
right to health within that State’s maximum resources. Indeed, in doing so, 
the Court arguably ignored the text and purpose underlying the particular 
constitutional provision setting out the child’s right to health at issue in the 
case (Nolan, 2010: 151). 
 
These South African cases suggest that a certain combination of elements may 
provide the right model for giving effect to the right to healthcare: the codification of 
economic, social and cultural rights in a constitution; an appropriate court judgment 
which considers cases with regards to collective – rather than individual, rights; and 
deference to government making difficult resource allocation decisions. Tobin 
support this, noting: 
[T]here is a need for caution when assessing the justiciability of the right to 
health in international law by reference to its treatment in regional and 
domestic forums . . . At the same time, the comparative exercise can be 
used to demonstrate the justiciability of the right to health in international law 
and in this respect two cases arising under the South African Constitution 
are particularly revealing . . . [The Constitutions] formulation of the right to 
health, with its focus on access to health care services, is narrower than the 
formulation adopted in international law. But accessibility is still a core 
element of the right to health in international law and the progressive nature 




of the obligation under the South African Constitution is consistent with the 
obligation in international law (Tobin, 2011: 205).vi 
 
The constitutional court itself, in the TAC case noted that: 
The Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the 
courts, namely, to require the state to take measures to meet its 
constitutional obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these 
measures to evaluation. Such determinations of reasonableness may in fact 
have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves directed at 
rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial, legislative and executive 
functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance ( para 38, emphasis 
added). 
 
Setting aside the complex arguments on budgetary implications of court decision, 
what is promising is the willingness of the South African court to consider claims of 
violations of the right to health. It is clear that, unlike many countries, it can therefore 
be litigated. 
 
A human rights based approach to realising the right to health 
Litigation should, of course, be a last resort, and in any event is not a remedy 
particularly accessible to many youth – accessibility is a major factor, although 
many non-governmental organisations are active in the region and have locus 
standi to bring complaints as the TAC case demonstrates. This brings us to the last 
section of the paper advocating a human rights based approach to realising the right 
to health. The explicit formulation of a human rights based approach dates to the 
2003 UN Common Understanding on Human Rights Based Approaches to 
Development Cooperation and Programming. This conceptual framework sought to 




ensure more consistency between UN agencies and programmes. The three key 
elements of the common understanding translate well to realising the right to health: 
 
1) The state should ensure all its laws and policies respect and promote human 
rights 
2) Human rights standards should guide and develop all laws and policies 
3) The state should support duty bearers in discharging their obligations and 
rights holders in claiming their rights.vii 
 
In South Africa’s case, as was discussed above, the framework of laws is already in 
place to respect youth health rights. Whether human rights standards do guide laws 
and policies is beyond the scope of this paper. Clearly they do to an extent as the 
constitution imposes obligations on the government, as do the various regional and 
international human rights treaties. Where great progress could be made, however, 
is the third element. This can be read as requiring the state to ensure that all state 
health professionals are aware of their obligations to protect the right to health of 
those they treat (or who can expect to be treated). A human rights perspective 
should thus govern their work. Ford (2006: 188-189) writing on female genital 
cutting in southern Africa thus argues for shifting the focus from its traditional 
negative perspective (what is being done wrong; characterising cultural practices as 
harmful or a problem; aiming at individual change; and [imposing] prescribing 
expert-driven solutions) to a more inclusive participatory approach developing 
dialogues with the people concerned and working more holistically. Such an 
approach clearly has relevance for many health issues, including HIV. Given the low 
statistical information on success of communication on HIV in South Africa, for 
example as outlined above, it is clear that current approaches are either not working 
or are working too slowly. Health demands more than just laws and policies, a 
holistic strategy is necessary to achieve increases in the enjoyment of health, not 




least against the indicators discussed at the start of this paper. Laws alone cannot 
reduce HIV/AIDS transmission or increase youth awareness of the virus. Similarly, 
laws alone cannot reduce teenage pregnancy or maternal deaths. The issues and 
challenges are complex and interrelated. 
 
The desirability of a holistic approach is clearly evident in the literature on human 
rights education and the second part of the third element: awareness of rights 
holders. If young people do not know of their right to health in terms of the 
constitution, laws, policies and treaties, they are unlikely to be able to take action to 
enforce those rights. Moreover, the reality is that their right to health will be better 
realised by ensuring they know how to be healthy and have access to healthcare 
when required and access to information otherwise. For example the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains that the right to health in the 
Covenant includes provision of a safe environment for adolescents, enabling them 
‘to participate in decisions affecting their health, to build life skills, to acquire 
appropriate information, to receive counselling and to negotiate the health-
behaviour choices they make.’(UN CESCR, 2000: 7). This explicitly includes ‘youth 
friendly health care’ respecting confidentiality and privacy of the individual. A 
multitude of non-governmental organisations, civil society entities, grass roots 
activists, foreign technical assistance and development aid and, of course, state 
projects, aim at ensuring young people are aware of threats to their health, how to 
protect their own health and how to engage with health professionals and state 
healthcare provision. Yet still the data indicate failings in realising the right to health 
of young people in South Africa. 
 
Conclusion 
South Africa and its regional and international partners have the potential to direct 
resources more effectively towards securing the right of health of young people in 




the country. Key areas have been targeted, including HIV/AIDS though obviously 
more has to be done. A more holistic approach and better education, broadly 
construed, is posited as the way forward.  
                                                          
i Taken from the UNDP explanation at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi> accessed 8/09/2015.  
ii It has not yet signed or ratified the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All  
Migrant Workers and their Families or the Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. 
iii These are appointed under each individual treaty – a committee of experts 
receives and considers reports on each state’s performance and engages in a 
constructive dialogue with the state. 
iv At the time of writing this was not yet published. 
v Note that none of the Special Rapporteurs on Health have undertaken a country 
visit to South Africa although South Africa has issued a standing invitation to all 
special procedures. 
vi The cases Tobin refers to are Soobramoney and TAC.  
vii For information on the human rights based approach to development, see 
http://hrbaportal.org/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-cooperation-
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